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What's in a name? Ð 
There's lots in my name: 
Three African syllables tossed in my name: 
Many refugees fleeing gunshots in my name - 
One father, to us long lost, in my name... 
Some people frown when they jot down my name: 
And often the spelling is botched of my name - 
I forgive them. Its rhythm was born not on this plain 
But one where the sun soothes the crops with its rays. 
We have achieved lots with my name: 
There are poets, musicians, doctors with my name: 
A name some find odd, but I bear not with shame 
But as proudly as some wear a cross on a chain. 
 
(Musa Okwonga) 
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ABSTRACT  
This thesis argues that despite claims that the UK is a post-racial society, (sur)names 
are understood in a racialised way. 31 semi-structured interviews and one survey-
based interview were conducted. 29 of the 32 participants had changed their surname 
from one they perceived to be symbolically representative of their own embodied 
racial identity to one that they felt was not, or vice versa. This thesis claims that some 
(sur)names are socially constructed as invisible and normal, i.e. white British, whilst 
ÔOtherÕ names are deemed foreign and highly conspicuous. It is asserted that 
(sur)names inform stereotypes of a personÕs embodied racial appearance. The 
confusion and intense interest encountered by the name-changers in relation to a 
perceived disjuncture between their embodied racial identity and the racialised 
categorisation of their name, exposes processes of racialisation. Name, embodied 
racial appearance and accent interact in different ways and contexts in deciding how a 
person is racialised and what their access is to the privilege associated with the 
majority identity of white Britishness. It is suggested that names are racially 
hierarchized according to the racial and/or national identity that the name is seen to 
represent. The thesis uses literature on race, racism, whiteness, racial passing, 
inbetween people and nationalism, in order to explore the racist and nationalist 
undertones of many participantsÕ encounters in regard to a racial disjuncture between 
name and body. Whilst supporting the point that race is a social construction rather 
than biological fact, the thesis nonetheless asserts that difference is conceived not just 
in terms of culture but in relation to embodied notions of race. Names should be 
acknowledged as being an important marker of biological conceptions of race. Race is 
still common currency in the UK, and this matters because power is differentially 
attributed within racialisation processes. Racism is not over.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCING THE RESEARCH 
Introduction 
The core, empirical, aim of this project is to gain an insight into the everyday 
experiences of people who have borne what they perceive to be two racially
1
 different 
surnames. The project is interview-based, and aspires to investigate the experiences 
of 32 people who have borne two different surnames they understand to be 
traditionally symbolic of different racial groupings.  Alternatively, they have been 
married to someone with a surname they deem to differ in racial categorisation to their 
own. Specifically, one of these surnames is considered by the participants to be 
symbolically and commonly understood within the UK as white British or white 
English, whilst the other surname is understood not to be so. 
The theoretical inspiration for this research idea came in two parts. Firstly, the 
project is a response and a challenge to a consistent and underlying rhetoric in the UK 
that race, and thereby racism, are no longer prevalent (Lentin, 2011b, 2012). The 
second stimulus for my research was a curiosity with past research (e.g. Wood et al., 
2009), which has indicated that names Ð as markers of race - are crucial in 
determining an individualÕs employment chances within the UK. It is important to firstly 
situate my discussion of the notion that racism has ended within the context of the 
UKÕs move away from multiculturalism and towards a more neo-assimilationist 
approach to dealing with perceived negative issues of diversity. This overview 
provides the context to the notion that race is no longer important and that racism in 
the UK is subsequently over. I then indicate that names are potentially used as 
metaphors of race and therefore that the concept of racism can be explored via the 
avenue of names. This discussion includes a brief outline of existing research into 
names and discrimination in the employment sector, and a subsequent discussion of 
the history of name-changing and attitudes towards names portrayed by the UK 
                                                       
 
 
 
 
1
 Many social scholars put race in quotation marks (Lewis and Pheonix, 2004). For 
aesthetic reasons I have chosen against this option. This is no way detracts from my 
belief in the socially constructed nature of race, as I assert at length in Chapter Two. 
7 
 
media. This is so as to provide an introduction to why names in relation to the 
concepts of race and racism are an important topic of study. I then present my 
research questions, followed by a note on my use of terminology in regard to the 
racialised essentialisation of names. Finally, I describe the thesisÕ structure. 
 
The End of Multiculturalism, the Introduction of Neo-Assimilationism and 
Refutations of Racism 
Arguably, globalization along with its powerful twin sibling, capitalism, has 
consistently stirred the debates around racism (Macedo and Gounari, 2006). It has, in 
recent times, been a key driver of the global movement and interaction of peoples and 
cultures across the world (ibid.). Globalization consequently informs, shapes and 
changes the perception, construction and the understanding of racism in the 
immediate and most likely in the future. Moreover, McGhee (2005) suggests that 
globalization has led to a backlash of anti-migrant feeling in places such as the UK. 
Gilroy (2004, 2005) warns that race is often incorrectly considered to be a positive 
supplier of certainty, saving one from the negative postmodern attacks on the 
completeness and concreteness of oneÕs identity. GlobalizationÕs perceived threats to 
the nation state has allowed racism to be more obviously connected to notions of 
sovereignty and nationhood. Those construed as being Other (Said, 2003) Ð for 
example, new migrants - are viewed as being external to the believed Òhomogenous 
national cultureÓÕ (Bhavani, Mirza and Meetoo, 2005:12; also Stolcke, 1995). This 
state of affairs provides the context for GilroyÕs (2004) argument that post-September 
11
th
, 2001, the presence of racism and the history of colonialism have been dismissed 
angrily as being unimportant in the UK even by liberals (also see Lentin, 2008).  
Indeed, Gilroy (2004) asserts that in response to the homogenizing affects of 
globalization, governments have intervened in issues of national identity and 
consciousness in an extensive manner. Britain has in recent years turned its back on 
its commitment to the multicultural policies (McGhee, 2008), which had been 
advocated by British governments between the approximate years of 1960 and 2000. 
Explanations for this change in policy have been embedded in discourse of the 
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continually Ôgrowing immigration flows and ethnic diversityÕ, as well as Ôthe Òwar on 
terrorÓÕ since September 11th 2001 (Cheong et al., 2007:25-6; also Burnett and 
Whyte, 2004; Lentin, 2005). The concept of multiculturalism has been heavily 
criticized by the media and by politicians for supposedly leading to a growth of 
diversity (one can label this as Ôsuper-diversityÕ; Vertovec, 2006) and separatism 
(Per, Tenegra and Zontini, 2008b). For example, in relation to disturbances in 
Bradford, Burnley and Oldham of 2001 (Alexander, Edwards and Temple, 2007), the 
7th July 2005 bombings in London, and the riots in several UK cities in August 2011. 
Lentin and Titley (2011a:3) convincingly argue that attacks on the concept of 
multiculturalism have provided a Ôdiscursive space for debating questions of race, 
culture, legitimacy and belongingÕ, since race in itself is a topic considered 
conversationally out of bounds. By asserting that multiculturalism has failed, this 
allows room to discuss more than ever, concerns around migration (ibid.). 
A greater emphasis has subsequently been placed, in popular and political 
discourses, on notions of ÔcohesionÕ and ÔsolidarityÕ, and consequently upon Ôneo-
assimilationismÕ, which can be defined as a backlash against diversity and a stronger 
identification with ÔBritish national valuesÕ (Per, 2008a:5; also Grillo, 2005; Vasta, 
2007; Alexander, Edwards and Temple, 2007). It is however, unclear what such 
values are (Johnson, 2002; Gamble and Wright, 2009). Illusions to an idea of 
ÔBritishnessÕ/Õa mythical cohesive pastÕ (Per, 2008a:7) have nonetheless become 
commonplace, and are promoted in opposition to the super-diversity of modern day 
Britain. This neo-assimilationist turn has coincided with a severe and sustained 
mainstream attack on minorities and immigrants (Per and Solomos, 2010). For 
example, the tabloid press frequently portrays migrants and refugees Ôas social and 
economic parasites unwilling to integrate, and whose values are incompatible with 
British valuesÕ (Sveinsson, 2010:9). 
The context of British super-diversity being in friction with the increasingly 
neo-assimilationist tones (that is, the emphasis on Britishness) in public and political 
discourses, has also led to government policies which are increasingly ever more 
unfavourable and ÔhostileÕ towards migrants (Sveinsson, 2010:8, also Per, 2013). For 
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example, the recently introduced family reunification policy stipulates that a person 
who wishes to bring their foreign partner to reside with them in the UK has to have an 
income of at least £18,600 per year. This means that close to 50% of the UK working 
population would not be able to bring a partner from overseas to live in the UK (Grove-
White, 2012), and equates to about 18,500 people who will now not be able to join 
their families in the UK. Grove-White asserts that this policy may aid the government 
in moving towards its target of lower net migration, but will be traumatic for those 
families who will be unable to live together (ibid.). Anti-immigration policies inevitably 
produce an ideological conflict between the immigration policy Ôas a form of differential 
exclusion from the territory and hence society, and citizenship as a way of including 
people in civil society and the nation stateÕ (Castles, 2000: 90). 
In 2005 new naturalization rules were introduced in the UK. Consequently, 
migrants meeting BritainÕs residency (and other relevant) criteria are required to pass 
either an ESOL with British Citizenship Course, or a Life in the UK Test (Life in the UK 
Test website, 2012). These are Ôtests of knowledge about life in the United KingdomÕ 
(ibid.), which the previous, Labour, government stated were designed to encourage 
people Ôwho have decided to make their lives in Britain to learn more about our culture 
and institutions, and in many cases to improve their knowledge of our languageÕ (Reid, 
2007: Foreword; see Alexander, Edwards and Temple, 2007, for a discussion of 
language requirements in relation to national exclusion).  
Once a person has passed either of the tests, they then have to attend a 
Ôcitizenship ceremonyÕ, which was created in order to Ôcelebrate the achievement of 
new Britons in becoming citizensÕ (Reid, 2007: Foreword). The language contained 
within the above extracts is particularly informative about the way the previous 
government viewed the distinction between immigration status and citizenship status: 
the new citizens are constantly Othered in the use of the word ÔtheirÕ. This contrasts 
with those who already properly belong, and constitute the ÔourÕ. Moreover, the pledge 
of allegiance to Britain, which new British citizens must make at the citizenship 
ceremonies, is a requirement that British-born citizens do not have to adhere to. 
Consequently, migrants have to Ôprovide evidence for their own worth above and 
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beyond what is required of British [-born] citizensÕ (Sveinsson, 2010:8). The 
responsibility for achieving an integrated society has been placed solely upon Ôits 
outsidersÕ (Lentin, 2008:499). 
In addition, the current government has revised the Life in the UK test. The 
migration minister, Mark Harper, stated that: Ô"The new book rightly focuses on values 
and principles at the heart of being BritishÓ..."Instead of telling people how to claim 
benefits it encourages participation in British life"Õ (quoted in Booth, 2013). Critics have 
likened the test to a public school entrance exam and have highlighted the way some 
more unsavoury episodes of British history go unmentioned in the syllabus (ibid.). 
Moreover, see Sales (2008) and Yuval-Davis, Anthias and Kofman (2005) for critiques 
of the Life in the UK Test as a means of making migrants fit in with a mythical way of 
living as a British person.  
As Billig (2004) so rightly expresses, identities do not exist within a neutral 
vacuum, but are embedded within national/social structures of power - and 
accordingly within classification (Balibar, 2002) and hierarchies of inequality (Billig, 
2004). As Van Dijk (1993:10) argues, it is elite members of society such as politicians 
who ÔprepareÕ much of the prejudice that invokes popular racist views (also Per, 
2013). Elite views arguably impact upon the life chances of racial minorities more than 
popular racist views (Van Dijk, 1993). Therefore, the kind of government ÔusÕ and 
ÔthemÕ discourse echoed within such policies as the UK Citizenship Test arguably 
ÔflagsÕ (Billig, 2004) perceived justification of why Others are less worthy in terms of 
intelligence, ability and so on. Consequently it emphasises why the Other deserves 
less from the system with regards to housing, jobs, rights etcetera (Bhavani, Mirza 
and Meetoo, 2005; Alexander, Edwards and Temple, 2007; Darder and Torres, 2004; 
Solomos, 2001). Furthermore, migrants have tended to be objectified by political 
elites, who have concentrated on how to Ômanage, use, control and discipline 
migrantsÕ in the best interests of the nation (Per and Solomos, 2010:7). Little 
attention has been given to the subjective personhood of migrants (ibid.). This 
managerialist style of governance (Enteman, 1993) suggests that as migrantsÕ views 
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are not deemed important within UK society, they will therefore be ignored and buried 
under the governmentÕs neo-assimilationist rhetoric.  
As Per (2013) asserts, there is little difference, and are many overlaps 
between racial minorities and migrants in terms of their vulnerability to being blamed 
by politicians for the nationÕs problems. Related to the backlash against 
multiculturalism, David Cameron (2011) announced an end to a tolerance, which he 
asserted has been taken advantage of by minorities (especially Muslim terrorists) in 
the UK. He heralded the dawn of a more assimilationist approach by the government, 
whereby ÔÒcertain valuesÓÕ will be promoted by a ÔÒmore active, muscular liberalismÓÕ 
rather than allowing citizens to live separate lives (ibid.). Cameron (2011) stated that 
there would be an end to state multiculturalism and to ÔÒpassive toleranceÓ, with a 
message that what is Òat stake is not just lives, itÕs our way of lifeÓÕ. Just who ÔourÕ is, or 
what Ôour way of lifeÕ refers to is left unexplained. Lentin (2012) rightly argues that the 
anti-multiculturalism shift is in actuality an assertion that there is too much of Other 
cultures and not enough of ÔourÕ culture. Alexander et al.  (2007:787-8) eloquently 
encapsulate this point: 
 
…groups which are seen as placed beyond the pale of national inclusion Ð 
particularly ÒMuslimÓ groups, which have increasingly come to symbolise the 
limits of national belonging…Despite the nod to pluralistic versions of 
Britishness, the strong implication is that it is only through the dissolution of 
difference that ethnic minorities can become part of the nation Ð by becoming 
Òpeople who think and behave like usÓÕ. 
 
Therefore I would argue that to call the tolerance practised by the UK ÔpassiveÕ 
is inaccurate. As Holmes (1991:110) argues, BritainÕs proud history of tolerance is 
Ôamong the most distorting celebratory myths in recent British historyÕ (also Clarke and 
Garner, 2009; Putnam, 2009; McKinnon, 2006; Wemyss, 2006). Furthermore, 
CameronÕs implied scapegoating of Muslims fits with the current increase in the 
essentialisation of, and discrimination against, Muslims in the UK (Alexander, 2004, 
Alexander, Edwards and Temple, 2007; Chryssochoou, 2004; Clarke and Garner, 
2009; Yuval-Davis, 2006). Indeed, as Younge (2011) points out, terrorism perpetrated 
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by British-born Muslims has been framed as a new phenomenon, despite the fact that 
the UK has been involved for the past 40 years in the terrorist conflict of Northern 
Ireland. The murders committed by white Norwegian, Anders Breivik on the 22
nd
 July 
2011, which have been praised by far right English groups because of BreivikÕs anti-
multiculturalist stance (Townsend, 2012), underline the fact that terrorism is not a 
Muslim-specific problem. 
The above discussion indicates that racial minorities and migrants currently 
tend to be framed in the UK as a problem, and even a threat, for society. As Per 
(2013) argues, it seems that migrants and minorities are used by the British 
government as a means of encouraging cohesion amongst the white majority 
population, through the scapegoating of what are actually vulnerable groups. The neo-
assimilationist turn, with its vagueness and lack of definition with regards to just what 
values and culture those conceived as Other or different are supposed to assimilate 
into, also serves to hide, and even deny, the existence of racism. Indeed, as implied 
earlier, the construction of difference in terms of essentialised notions of culture 
means culture is used as a mask for race (Lentin, 2005; Lentin and Titley, 2011a). 
Looking back to the 1990s, anti-racism was critiqued severely by the political 
Right, one of whose arguments was that racism was all in the imagination of the Left 
and of the Ôrace relations industryÕ (Solomos, 2003:187). In doing so, public attention 
was distracted from racism and instead directed towards black people and anti-racist 
campaigners who were perceived as somehow profiting from the idea that Britain is 
racist (ibid.). As Gilroy (1987) asserts, prejudice was held up as being historically 
cultural, and as an aspect of freedom of speech. Accusations of racism have often 
been described as a curbing of the white British majorityÕs freedom of speech (ibid.). 
There are arguably echoes of such rhetoric in present-day attitudes towards notions of 
cultural difference, and therefore of race/racism.  
As racial minorities and migrants are blamed (Bauman, 2006) for the 
problems within British society, they thereby have no right to complain about being 
victims of racism. The rhetoric suggests that any lack of their success within the UK is 
because of their unwillingness to integrate culturally into white British ways. Therefore, 
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the blame is laid at the feet of the cultural difference or Otherness of minorities and 
migrants, which in itself denies the possibility of white majority racism against 
minorities and migrants (I will discuss the Ônew racismÕ that is based on notions of 
culture in Chapter Two). The prevalent discourse effectively implies that the white 
majority has been too passive and compassionate in allowing a multiculturalist 
approach, which is felt to have led to a lack of cohesiveness and even to terrorist acts, 
as described above. Consequently, whereas multiculturalism arguably recognised 
difference and tried to make a diverse society work, neo-assimilationism appears to 
demonise difference, drown out the voices/preferences of minorities and migrants in a 
sea of imposed rules and blame Ð thereby oppressing them within an already racially 
inequitable society (I highlight this racial unjustness in the following section). It is 
therefore not surprising that Lentin (2011b, 2012) goes so far as to assert that the UK 
is often portrayed as being post-racial. Race and racism are ignored due to the 
dominant preoccupation with culture, and specifically because of the prevailing notion 
that multiculturalism has failed, as discussed above. That is, there is a conceived 
understanding that migrant and minority cultures have failed to cohesively interact with 
the majority white British culture (whatever these cultures may be). This ignores the 
ways in which culture is itself arguably racialised (Lentin, 2012), as I will explore in 
Chapter Two.   
An example of this outward emphasis on (an essentialised notion of) culture, 
rather than race, can be seen in The Spectator article written by Samir Shah, who was 
chair of the Runnymede Trust for ten years. The piece is entitled ÔRace Is Not An 
Issue In The UK AnymoreÕ (2009). He stated in this article that culture, rather than 
race, is to blame for differential levels of success between ÔcommunitiesÕ in Britain 
(ibid.): ÔThe first impediment to progress is a communityÕs determination to cling on to 
elements of their own cultural traditions and ways of lifeÕ (ibid.). Furthermore, he writes 
that ÔCultural cloning is…the main source of discrimination in Britain todayÕ Ð that is, in 
the employment sector, there is a Ôhuman tendency to recruit in oneÕs own imageÕ 
(ibid.) and that this consequently leads to white males being selected ahead of racial 
minorities. He also states that: ÔStyle, background, accent, dress sense, and cultural 
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(as opposed to ethnic) background and Ð most of all Ð your manner count just as 
much as your ethnicity in trying to land that jobÕ (ibid.). He does not seem to consider 
that judging someone on such criteria as accent, dress and culture Ð which he 
appears throughout the article to use in an essentialised, rather than individualised, 
sense Ð could be said to be very racialising indeed.  
I use the term racialisation in this thesis to refer to ways in which racial 
meanings are psychologically and socially attributed to specific individuals and/or 
issues, in the sense that race would seem to be integral to the manner in which those 
individuals/issues are understood (Murji and Solomos, 2004; Lewis and Phoenix, 
2004). Shah also seems to ignore in his article how research (such as Wood et al., 
2009) has indicated that employer decisions regarding job applications tend to be 
heavily influenced by the racialised category accorded to someoneÕs name, without 
that personÕs dress sense, accent, manner and culture (etcetera) being known. I will 
touch upon this research in the following section. 
In a similar vein, the comments made by the Conservative MP, David Davies, 
who spoke in 2010 about the case of 14 year old Balan Khan, who raped and robbed 
a woman, are relevant. He said that: ÔÒThere do seem to be some people in some 
communities who donÕt respect womenÕs rights at all, and who…without necessarily 
saying that this is the case on this occasion, who have imported into this country 
barbaric and medieval views about womenÕÓ (quoted in BBC News, 2010). He then 
said that he wished to say that his point was not relating to ÔÒan Islamic issue…let me 
be quite clear, and itÕs not a racial issueÓÕ (ibid.). As Saleem Kidwai of the All Wales 
Ethnic Minority Association responded at the time, Davies appears to be ÔÒcovering 
himself…by saying that….heÕs not referring to any ethnic community…itÕs obvious! 
Who is ÔimportedÕ?ÓÕ (ibid.). As Per (2013) argues, the views of politicians are 
important in the context of influencing the wider populace on attitudes towards 
minorities and migrants. 
Furthermore, Michael Gove, the Secretary of State for Education, has recently 
introduced the Children and Families Bill, which has been heavily criticised in some 
quarters for denying the importance of race in determining who should be allowed to 
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adopt a child (Townsend, 2013). Barn (2013) asserts that it is important to consider 
whether or not potential adoptive parents have an understanding of racial 
discrimination and how this may impact on a child conceived as not being white. 
Furthermore, Muir (2012) writes that GoveÕs given reason for removing race as a 
criterion for adoption decisions is misguided. He quotes Ofsted as saying that there is 
ÔÒlittle evidenceÓÕ that adoptions are delayed because social workers are looking for a 
perfect racial match between the child and adoptive parents (ibid.). Barn (2013) further 
argues that the Bill is a ÔcrusadeÕ on the part of Gove, which is Ôso perversely 
obsessed with the elimination of ethnicity that it cannot stomach any reference to the 
importance of this in an adopted childÕs lifeÕ. Townsend  (2013) quotes John 
Simmonds of the British Association for Adoption and Fostering as saying he is 
concerned that GoveÕs motivations for removing race from the agenda are grounded 
in David CameronÕs announcement that multiculturalism is finished and his 
ÔÒemphasis…on being BritishÓÕ. This implies that no credence should be given to race, 
that there is no such thing as racism. That there is only the lack of cultural adaptation 
on the part of racial minorities, which does not apply to adopted non-white children, 
who can be socialised into white Britishness by white parents. The implication is that 
biological notions of race as based in the body are no longer important, it is all about 
culture. 
I feel myself, from my own experiences of being in a Ômixed-raceÕ relationship, 
that biological notions of race (that is, racialised categorisations on the basis of 
assumed biological differences between human beings, which can be seen in 
embodied skin colour etcetera) are still used as a powerful basis of categorisation 
within the UK. I also sense that notions of cultural difference are, underneath the 
rhetoric, racialised (Lentin, 2012) and that racism is still therefore persistent. I desire 
to explore this issue from a sociological perspective: to understand whether or not 
individuals are still commonly racialised in the UK, and whether or not racism is still 
prevalent. I will be discussing the history, and the socially constructed nature, of the 
concepts of race and racism (Alexander, 2006; Nayak, 2006) at length in Chapter 
Two.   
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Names and Racialisation 
As mentioned above, I will explore, via the tool of names, if race and racism 
are still dominant in the UK. I will explain more extensively in Chapter Two how Wood 
et al.Õs (2009) research indirectly asserted that names are used by employers as a 
device to distinguish between people in a racialised manner. Wood et al. assert that 
this racialisation led to higher chances of employment for those people conceived as 
white British, and lower chances for those regarded as Asian or African (ibid.). In this 
study, names were invented as quantitative proxies for different racial groupings. In 
contrast, I seek to understand actual peopleÕs lived experiences of living with a name, 
which may be racialised and/or conceived as foreign within the British context. I aim to 
look at whether or not the UK is a post-racial society from the angle of names: do 
racialisation processes exist, and if so, what part(s) do names play within them?  
A further recent report by the Runnymede Trust (2012) is also of interest in 
this regard. It qualitatively investigated the reasons behind the low unemployment rate 
for black, Pakistani and Bangladeshi women in the UK. It estimated that 25% of the 
ethnic minority unemployment figure in the UK could be explained by the 
discrimination faced by ethnic minorities (ibid.). One facet of discrimination that the 
report highlighted was in relation to names (ibid.). Many of the projectÕs participants 
identified with the findings of Wood et al.Õs (2009) report (The Runnymede Trust, 
2012). Some of the participants indicated that they had altered their names in order to 
make them appear Ômore traditionally BritishÕ (The Runnymede Trust, 2012:12). 
Indeed, one publication aimed at Human Resource professionals related the reportÕs 
findings under the heading of: ÔWant a job? Get a ÒwhitenedÓ nameÕ (People 
Management, January 2013). The report goes on to urge that the government should 
promote the use of blank name application forms in the employment sector (The 
Runnymede Trust, 2012). Such a strategy was seen as a possible means of 
decreasing discrimination in the process of shortlisting applicants for jobs (ibid.). 
Nonetheless, such research does not focus on names predominantly, nor upon names 
outside of the area of unemployment. This thesis aims to fill this gap in existing 
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research by providing data about the social interactional Ð as well as the socio-
economic - experiences of my participants in relation to their names.  
Furthermore, I aim to complicate the study of names and racialisation, in that 
most of my participants have experienced bearing one surname that they understood 
to reflect their embodied racial identity and one which did not. Thus these participants 
have been able to compare their experiences of bearing the two different surnames 
and the ways in which they interact with embodied features of their perceived racial 
identity, such as accent and skin colour. Consequently, I will explore in this thesis 
whether/how the participantsÕ surnames have served as a racially categorising device. 
Moreover, I will aim to establish if their (sur)name is used alongside seemingly 
accepted nationalising and/or racialising typifiers. These markers can be said to 
include phenotypical features, skin colour, accent, and other information such as 
parentage and place of birth (Bond, 2006). Such indicators of race and/or nationhood 
are seemingly used in the act of making racialised and nationalised judgements about 
people, over which they may have little, or no, control. Such judgements can lead to 
feelings of inclusion or exclusion within a particular nation state, and of access to, or 
denial of, the privileges
2
 accorded to the majority racial group within a nation 
(McCrone and Bechhofer, 2008). I will discuss these issues in the following chapter. 
Lipski (1976) argues that names are representative of the individual to which 
they belong. For example, names tend to symbolise the main language of the 
geographical place from which they derive (ibid.). Consequently, they can often be 
said to also represent oneÕs Ôethnic originsÕ (ibid.; also Kang, 1971; Lieberson, 1992). 
It is with this thought in mind that I will now discuss the quite extensive history of 
name-changing in the UK and the US. This history will have direct contextual 
relevance to my later explorations of my participantsÕ decisions to change, or not to 
                                                       
 
 
 
 
2
 I have used the term ÔprivilegeÕ, rather than ÔentitlementsÕ, throughout my thesis. This 
is because I feel that the inequitable nature of the entitlements seemingly accorded to 
white people on the basis of their allocated race should be revealed and 
acknowledged, and the term ÔprivilegeÕ implies this. Whiteness literature tends to have 
also used the term ÔprivilegeÕ (e.g. Dyer, 1999).  
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change, their (sur)names (mainly prompted by the event of marriage). Furthermore, it 
speaks strongly of a history of racialising names and of discrimination linked to this 
practice. This invokes racism and national inclusion/exclusion theories, which will be 
discussed in the following chapter.  
 
A History of Name-Changing 
Surnames carry more meaning and value than a person usually admits 
(Titford, 2009). Their age typically means they are the oldest possession one has 
(ibid.), and they therefore reflect backwards towards oneÕs ancestral roots (ibid.). 
There is, however, an extensive history of name-changing in the UK (and beyond). 
This is evidenced, for example, in the fact that despite the historically substantial 
amount of migration to the United Kingdom, the number of names that originate with 
these migrants are not found in current names in the UK today (Weekley, 1928). 
Indeed, during the Middle Ages, immigration only had a small impact upon the 
collection of surnames being used in Britain, as many immigrantsÕ names were 
completely Anglicised. This was either because they did not have surnames at all 
upon arrival and were thus given new names, or because their names were literally 
translated into English upon arrival (McKinley, 1990).  
This pattern of Anglicising immigrantsÕ names changed somewhat after about 
1500 (ibid.), which can be explained by the fact that some immigrants were more 
educated and kept their names, or modified them only slightly (ibid.). Nevertheless, 
the majority of immigrants were still largely unskilled and illiterate, which as Weekley 
(1928) argues, explains the astonishing disappearance between 1500 and 1700 of the 
names of thousands of French migrants to the UK. Moreover, whilst some of these 
immigrantsÕ names were literally translated into English, such as ÔPoissonÕ to ÔFishÕ 
(ibid.), in most instances the names were randomly replaced by officials.  
In reference to a list of migrants created in 1618 in London, Weekley (1928) 
describes how migrantsÕ name-alteration depended upon the specific officialÕs 
preference. The first name was transposed into an English one, whereas the surname 
was either altered into a presumably English-sounding arrangement, or warped 
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entirely (ibid.). For example, one constable chose to create a surname out of the 
personÕs country of origin, thus referencing one man as:  ÔCristofer Switcher, born at 
Swerick (Zurich) in SwitcherlandÕ (ibid.:52). Alternatively, other officials appeared to 
have little creativeness or patience and subsequently swapped foreign names with 
Ôplain EnglishÕ ones (ibid.). Such attitudes towards names deemed foreign indicate 
both a certain lack of respect for those migrantsÕ original names, and the ease with 
which a name could be Anglicised for them, apparently without their consent.  
In addition, in the American context, some African slaves were forced to adopt 
Anglicised names by their white American slave masters in the seventeenth and 
nineteenth centuries (Kohli and Solrzano, 2012). Having their name Anglicised was a 
sign of ownership (ibid.). Moreover, indigenous American peopleÕs names were also 
often forcibly Anglicised/Christianised until the 1920s (ibid.). Kohli and Solrzano 
(2012) argue that such practices have meant that names deemed not white are to this 
day felt to be an undesirable problem or nuisance in American society. Furthermore, 
names, as I described at the beginning of this section, tend to be viewed as personal 
possessions and individual identity markers. This described history of name-changing, 
however, suggests that names can also be viewed as a collective identity marker. 
Names can be viewed as foreign or as acceptably English/British (in the UK setting). 
Foreignness has seemingly been viewed as inferior in the UK context and 
consequently as something to be neutralized Ð for example by the enforced 
Anglicisation of names.  
Nonetheless, name-changing has also been something many individuals, in 
more recent times, have chosen to do. There are those who alter/change their names 
so as to avoid embarrassment. A 2008 study found that ÔSurnames with rude or 
unfortunate connotations including 'Shufflebottom' and 'Daft' have fallen by as much 
as 75 per centÕ in terms of usage in the UK since 1881 (Jamieson, 2009). Others have 
changed their names in an attempt to psychologically distance themselves from 
painful events or relationships, or because they especially dislike their name  (ibid.). 
For example, a recent television programme explored the immense emotional 
difficulties for the descendants of high-ranking Nazi officials (Cronin, 2012). Bearing 
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their ancestorsÕ surname was deemed to be a major part of the trauma felt by these 
descendants (ibid). Some chose to alter their surnames and/or be sterilised so that the 
name and/or genes belonging to their ancestors would die out (ibid.). Either way, for 
name-changers their name is regarded as being so important as to be worthy of going 
through the administrative hassle and often emotional consequences of changing it 
(Pearce, 1990).  
The Anglicisation of names has notably occurred in relation to Jewish names 
of German extraction (ibid.). For instance, ÔMeyer is transformed into Myers, 
Goldschmid into Goldsmith, Kohn into Cowan…and so onÕ (ibid.:54; also BBC News 
Magazine, 2007). Furthermore, this has also been the case outside of Britain. Wilson 
(1998) asserts that unusually, rather than name-changing because of divorce, Jewish 
people have tended to do so because of a desire to improve their social status. This 
meant they felt the need to disassociate themselves from names, which were felt to 
hold negative associations in the eyes of wider society (ibid.). Indeed, Wilson (1998) 
argues that it is now difficult to identify Jewish people by their names in the USA. This 
suggests that such individuals reacted to perceived discrimination/racism by trying to 
mask their foreignness through changing their names. Consequently, although one 
can say that the people made the decision to change their names, the sheer scale of 
the name-changing suggests that perhaps they felt somewhat compelled to do so.  
Thus we can perceive that throughout history particular names have been 
regarded as negatively symbolic of certain racialised identities Ð such as the anti-
semitism associated with Jewish names. It can be argued that such names have been 
conceived as stigmatic, which has led the bearers to significantly alter, or to change, 
their names (Schettler, 1942). It is not that the names themselves were necessarily 
viewed by their bearers as being somehow grotesque, but rather it is that these 
names told others around them something about themselves that was not to be 
viewed positively: in this case their Jewishness, their foreignness to majority tastes 
within the USA. Furthermore, Wilson (1998) notes that numerous prosperous Jewish 
Britons had Anglicised their names, which then led to those new names being 
subjected to the same anti-Semitic discrimination as their former names. 
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Consequently, we can observe that it was not the new names adopted by these 
Jewish Britons which were stigmatic. Rather the Jewish people were themselves 
viewed as bringing something negative to these names in adopting them. What is 
more, their name-change did not sufficiently neutralise their foreignness. There were 
seemingly other perceived racial markers that prevented their total assimilation into 
the respective nation-state. 
A further example of a desire to bear a name that would blend in with the 
majority, can be seen in the British royal familyÕs decision to change its name 
overnight in 1917 (Rohrer, 2007). This choice was made upon a wave of public anti-
German sentiment in Britain during the First World War (ibid.). Consequently, the 
familyÕs surname was changed from Saxe-Coburg-Gotha - deemed to be overly-
German-sounding - to Windsor - conceived as stereotypically English-sounding (ibid.). 
It appears that the Royal FamilyÕs other racial markers and/or its position of social 
power within the UK meant that the name-change neutralised its foreignness. This 
contrasts with the Jewish name-changersÕ afore-mentioned imperfect removal of their 
foreignness.  
A related example to that of Jewish name-changing, is that of those African 
slaves in North America who had not had their names forcibly Anglicised. Upon 
gaining freedom many tended to abandon their African names, as they viewed them 
as Ôethnic epithets of a pejorative kindÕ (Wilson, 1998:310). Thus for such ex-slaves, 
taking a new name was emblematic of freedom (ibid.). Consequently they tended to 
alter their first name and choose a surname that would fit in with where they lived, 
thereby disassociating their name from their former life as a slave (ibid.). Such actions 
imply the desire to assimilate, and to move away from names perceived to be 
stigmatic. This is, though, perhaps surprising in light of the practice mentioned above 
of many slaves having their names forcibly Anglicised as a sign of ownership. Thus 
history indicates views towards the connotations of particular names do change 
according to context and over time.  
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Indeed, Malcolm X
3
 (1963) argued that, in contrast to those African slaves in 
North America who abandoned their African names because of their negative 
connotations, in his own lifetime African names gained more respect from white 
Americans than did a black AmericanÕs Anglicised name. Malcolm X (1963) contrasted 
his negative experiences of being treated as a black American with the positive 
attitudes he perceived upon giving out his Islamic name, Malik Shabazz. Thus, 
Malcolm X (1963) asserted that African-Americans were at this time still associated 
with something negative (seemingly slavery), even though they often bore Anglicised 
names. In contrast, Africans (distinguishable by their African names) were the free-
born, the landowners, to be respected more than African-Americans (ibid.).  
In bearing Anglicised names, ex-slaves Ð similarly to the afore-mentioned 
Jewish Britons - had seemingly brought a stigma to them. Or, alternatively, perhaps 
the historic practice of slavesÕ names being forcibly Anglicised had led to notions that 
to be African American (seemingly categorised via skin colour etcetera) with an 
Anglicised name meant that person (or personÕs ancestor was) a slave. This may 
have then carried particular negative connotations for them. Again, as I mentioned 
earlier, it seems that racial markers (other than name) are used in order to decide if a 
person belongs or does not belong to the in-group within a nation-state. Indeed, those 
who feel that their name is the ÔcontaminatedÕ part of their social identity (Goffman, 
1990:19-20) may consequently react with an attempt to amend this ÔfailingÕ (ibid.), by 
changing their name (Bursell, 2012). Yet this does not necessarily help them to 
achieve Ônormal statusÕ (Goffman, 1990:20), but rather changes them into someone 
who obviously carried a specific stigma into someone who has a history of having 
Ôcorrected a particular blemishÕ (ibid.). A personÕs name is only one aspect of their 
identity, and it can seemingly interact with the other indicators of their social standing 
such as skin colour, accent and place of birth. Anglicising a personÕs name apparently 
                                                       
 
 
 
 
3
 The X symbolised Malcolm XÕs African ancestral surname, which had been 
Anglicised during times of slavery. 
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removes one social barrier towards acceptance within the nationÕs in-group, but there 
may be others that remain.  
Moreover, perhaps a person still carries the emotional weight of that history of 
name-changing and the foreignness or Otherness that the name-change may have 
hidden. As I will consider in Chapter Two, the UNESCO statements were written in the 
aftermath of shock at how the race idea had led to the murders of so many innocent 
people during World War Two, purely on the basis of their supposed race (Bhavani, 
Mirza and Meetoo, 2005). France reacted to its guilt at having deported 76,000 Jewish 
people during the Second World War to concentration camps by vehemently 
encouraging French Jews to make their names sound more French (Samuel, 2010). 
Nonetheless, the descendants of many of those people who did change their surname 
have found that they are legally unable to revert back to their ancestorsÕ name and 
have mounted a legal challenge to the French civil code in this regard (ibid.; La Force 
du Nom website, 2012). This code allows surnames conceived as foreign to be made 
more French-sounding, but surnames deemed French cannot be changed to foreign 
ones (Samuel, 2010). This example also implies a resistance towards an increase in 
foreign names within a particular nation-state by those in power. The acknowledged 
and legal preference within France and some other European nations (as I will explore 
in Chapter Two) is for their citizens to bear names deemed to be representative of the 
respective majority national/racial identities. 
In the UK context, UK Deed Poll, a company specialising in helping people to 
change or alter their names in the UK, suggests that many migrants to the UK who 
bear names considered foreign or difficult in the UK setting, decide to change their 
names Ôto something that is more common and easier for British people to useÕ (UK 
Deed Poll, 2010). As I will discuss further in Chapter Six, the insinuation from the 
companyÕs website is that the person with a name considered difficult for ÔBritish 
people to useÕ is somehow at fault and should alter their name. This harks back to the 
afore-mentioned attitude of officials in the Middle Ages, who apparently felt that 
names conceived as foreign should just be replaced by good, solid ÔEnglish/BritishÕ 
names. 
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Attitudes Towards Names as Expressed in the UK Media 
One can perceive from the history of name-changing I presented above that 
names have long been viewed as particularly meaningful. Not only to the bearer, but 
also to others with whom the individual comes into contact, and even to those in 
power within particular nation-states. Especially when a person moves to, or lives 
within, a society where their name is not seen to originate, they seemingly can 
become increasingly aware of the connotations that name has, both to themselves 
and to others. Names appear to reflect geographical locations, religions, even an 
individualÕs supposed race. Yet is this not a misleading signifier of a personÕs 
identity/identities?  
Although Singh appears to have originated in India (British Surnames website, 
2012), there were 17 people with the name Singh listed in the UK census of 1881 
(ibid.; also The Telegraph, 2009). Singh and Patel now rank alongside traditionally 
common surnames in the UK such as Smith and Jones, in terms of the number of 
people who bear the names in the UK (The Telegraph, 2009). However, are these two 
surnames considered British? The TelegraphÕs (2009) write up would suggest not: ÔA 
century of immigration has seen the nation's dictionary of names drastically altered to 
include a host of foreign onesÕ (my emphasis). A name that has existed in the UK 
since at least 1881 is apparently foreign. The name-changing history I discussed 
above suggests that this may be because the surnames are stigmatized in some way. 
If one accepts the personal/individualised aspect to names Ð that a personÕs name 
somehow represents their identities Ð then the above description of Singh as being a 
foreign name implies that the bearers of that name are not conceived as truly British. 
This thereby alludes to their embodied racial and cultural heritage. It would seem, on 
the basis of SinghÕs lengthy history in the UK, that many bearers of the surname were 
born and raised in the UK and therefore it is their skin colour (amongst other things) 
that prompts their racialisation. Consequently their surnames are also seemingly 
racialised and understood as not being British but foreign. The name and other racial 
and national identity markers appear to be understood and/or assessed in relation to 
each other.  
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A recent Radio Four programme was entitled, ÔThe consequences of having a 
ÒforeignÓ nameÕ (BBC News Magazine, 2012). It gave a brief insight into everyday 
difficulties of mispronunciation/misspelling that the presenter and her contributors had 
experienced in relation to bearing Ôforeign namesÕ in the UK (ibid.), both in social and 
work contexts. The programmeÕs title vividly illustrates that bearing names not 
generally conceived as belonging to the in-group within particular nation-states is not 
insignificant, and therefore worthy of research. I will now briefly discuss some 
examples of how names deemed to be foreign are represented and viewed by the 
British media. 
Gillingham TownÕs football manager, Martin Allen, reacted to the recent 
appointment of a new manager at Southampton Football Club with the following 
statement in his Mail Online column: 
 
Then look at Southampton, who sack the most successful manager in the 
history of the club and bring in a foreign manager. What the hell is all that 
about? I find it incredible. When I was told it was Mauricio Pochettino I said 
ÒI'm not looking for something off the takeaway menu, who's the new 
manager?Ó What's that about? I could not believe it. 
(Allen, 2013).  
 
To Allen, it was acceptable not only to think the above statement but to publish it on a 
national website. For him a fellow managerÕs name can be mocked because to his 
ears it is laughably foreign. It is interesting to reflect on the world of sport when 
considering UK attitudes towards names. Arguably, unlike other employment sectors 
in the UK, it is regarded as a positive endorsement of the English Premier LeagueÕs 
status that it can attract workers deemed foreign (the worldÕs best football players). 
Consequently, football fans buy replica shirts with these playersÕ names on. A recent 
survey showed that many Premier League clubsÕ top shirt sales bear the names of 
players originally from places/areas outside the UK, such as Nigeria, Japan, Holland, 
Benin, Italy and Eastern Europe (Cunningham, 2012).  
Nonetheless, one can observe everyday incidents of mispronunciations or 
misreadings of names in the sports media, which I have perceived to be indicative of 
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disrespect towards names. As Deluzain (1996) asserts, people tend to dislike their 
name being mispronounced, perceiving such as a misrepresentation of their identity. If 
the mispronunciation is on purpose, the slight is much worse (ibid.). Although it is 
difficult to ascertain the intentionality of mispronunciation, one can infer at best a 
certain disregard for the importance of pronouncing names correctly in the incidents 
about to be described. For example, Joe Kinnear, the Director of Football for 
Newcastle FC, recently gave a radio interview during which he mispronounced many 
of the clubÕs playersÕ names: ÔShola Ameobi became ÒAmamobiÓ…Hatem Ben Arfa 
became both ÒAfraÓ and ÒAfriÓ…Yohan Cabaye…was referred to as ÒYohan KebabsÓÕ 
(BBC News Magazine Monitor, 2013). Kinnear had previously, in 2009, called 
Newcastle player Charles NÕZogbia, ÔÒinsomniaÓÕ repeatedly in an interview (ibid.). 
Gordon Taylor, the football playersÕ union boss, referred to this latter mispronunciation 
as ÔÒat best disrespectful and at worst deeply offensive, especially as insomnia is as 
difficult to pronounce as NÕZogbiaÓÕ (ibid.).  
There are also several internet blogs that draw attention to sportsÕ 
commentators lack of effort in terms of pronouncing names. Glenny (2013), for 
example, cites the mispronunciations by commentators of even champion tennis 
playersÕ names. Other internet forums/articles discuss the unease with which many 
British newscasters attempt to say the names of both individuals and countries 
perceived as foreign (for example, Digital Spy, 2012; NewsWatch, 2005). It can be 
argued that it is the duty of newscasters and media figures to learn how to say names 
and place names in a manner that shows respect towards the person or country, 
respectively (Pronounce It Right website, 2013). This in turn encourages better 
pronunciation of names amongst the populace who listen to such commentaries 
(ibid.).  
I conceive that there is little excuse for completely misreading a personÕs 
name if all of the syllables within the name are present in oneÕs own mother tongue. 
Nonetheless, such internet articles and forums that I have just mentioned appear to 
have grown out of a frustration with the widespread mispronunciation of names, an 
acknowledgment that the correct pronunciation of names is important within social 
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interaction (Hear Names website, 2013), and that there needs to be more effort made 
to pronounce names correctly (Pronounce It Right website, 2013).  
As enunciated earlier, this thesis is concerned with more than just the 
potential mispronunciation of my participantsÕ names. It aims to explore whether or not 
names function as part of potential racialising processes in the UK. I have included 
these examples of media-based attitudes as an acknowledgment that the national 
media plays a powerful role in shaping the general populaceÕs attitudes towards in-
group, out-group conceptions (Van Dijk, 1993; Per, 2013), as I will consider in 
Chapter Two. My above discussion has suggested that the British media tends to 
conceive names to be either foreign or normal (that is, white British). Moreover, the 
lack of effort made by many sports commentators (and arguably newscasters) to 
pronounce names/places they view as foreign suggests that such attitudes may be 
propagated to, and accepted amongst, the wider British populace (Van Dijk, 1993). I 
will now turn to an overview of the research questions upon which my thesis is 
founded.  
 
Research Questions 
The main research questions that I want to explore through my case study are the 
following. 
 
Are (sur)names racialised? If so, are some (sur)names consequently normalised in 
the UK context (for example, considered white British), and accorded more status than 
(sur)names deemed Other? 
This is my main, overarching research question. It indicates my desire to 
explore how names are viewed within the UK context (according to my participantsÕ 
everyday experiences). In accordance with my above discussion about how common 
discourse in the UK suggests that notions of biologically-based race and racism are 
defunct, I aim to understand if this is indeed the case, by using (sur)names. I wish to 
consider if (sur)names are understood to be holistically symbolic or representative of 
racial identities. By focusing on the experiences of those who bear a (sur)name that 
they understand to not be stereotypically related to their own embodied racial identity, 
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I conceive that I can explore if (sur)names are understood in racial terms. For 
example, does bearing a (sur)name potentially considered to be white British lead to 
general assumptions that the name bearer is white British in an embodied sense?  
Furthermore, I will discuss whiteness literature in Chapter Two, which 
indicates that whiteness (at least to white people) has an unnoticed, unraced, invisible 
quality in an embodied sense (Dyer, 1999; Garner, 2007). White people are 
apparently seen as individuals, not representative of a particular race, whereas Others 
are always representatives of their race, are always visible, all of their deeds are 
referred back to this race, and are seen (by white people) to be typical of, or 
originating from, that race (Dyer, 1999). Thus I am interested to explore if such 
concepts also apply to (sur)names. Specifically, if (sur)names potentially deemed 
white British, are conceived as invisible. Conversely, are (sur)names potentially 
conceived as non-white/non-British all too visible, and indicative of a personÕs race 
rather than their individuality?  
In addition, in Chapter Two I will discuss the concept of a racial hierarchy 
(Dyer, 1999; Ratcliffe, 2004). I seek to understand if the same notion applies to 
(sur)names. That is, do different (sur)names appear to elicit different responses and/or 
access to privileges in accordance to the racial identity they are deemed to represent? 
For example, are some (sur)names considered closer to the seeming privileges of 
white Britishness than others? 
 
Should a personÕs (sur)name be considered alongside well-known indicators of racial 
classification such as skin colour and accent?  
The questions I have raised in the previous section also tie in with a desire to 
explore the relationships (if any) between (sur)names and more established tools of 
racial categorisation in skin colour and accent (Herring, Keith and Horton, 2004; 
Klonoff and Landrine, 2000; Fernando, 1984; Hing, 2002; Singh and Dooley, 2006). I 
therefore want to understand if a personÕs (sur)name evokes differing responses when 
they are visually and/or audibly present: both when their name is, and is not, known.  
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Does bearing a (sur)name, which is stereotypically taken to be from a different 
racial/national origin to a person's former (sur)name have an impact on their everyday 
experiences/quality of life: for example, in the social and employment contexts?  
Unlike the existing research on names and employment discrimination (which 
I will discuss further in Chapter Two), my interest is explicitly related to the impact of 
(sur)names, in themselves, upon peopleÕs everyday lives. This is in terms of 
experiences with names in respect of employment and work environments, 
professional relationships, and social relationships (such as familial relationships and 
friendships). I am keen to qualitatively understand the potential impacts of (sur)names 
in their fullness and complexity. 
 
What experiences are related to bearing a (sur)name that is not (potentially) 
considered to represent a personÕs embodied racial identity? And what impact do such 
experiences have upon those peopleÕs personal and/or outward identities? 
I will assess in Chapter Two how racism in relation to skin colour has been 
said to ÔterroriseÕ those considered not to be white (hooks, 1997:171). I aim to 
understand if those who bear (sur)names that potentially are not commonly 
understood to symbolise their embodied racial identity, experience such racism and 
personal trauma. If so, do such experiences impact upon these peopleÕs feelings 
around their personal and/or social identities? (I will discuss some existing theory on 
identity and race in Chapter Two). 
 
If people who bear (sur)names considered foreign encounter negative experiences in 
this regard, do they develop coping strategies?  
I am interested in discovering if those who bear (sur)names that are 
potentially considered different to their embodied racial identity develop any coping 
strategies in order to counter any negative experiences they may have had in relation 
to their (sur)names/name-changes. For example, strategies aimed at avoiding such 
experiences, or challenging such discourse (Wemyss, 2009). Indeed, my earlier 
discussion suggests that name-changing has throughout history been used as a 
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strategy in order to avoid discrimination. I desire to understand if this approach is still 
used: if racism remains prevalent in the UK and if this is reflected in attitudes towards 
(sur)names, what do those people who bear (sur)names deemed foreign/Other/non-
white British do to resist and/or avoid such discrimination?  
 
My Terminology of Names  
It is important to note that I do not believe there are, in actuality, such things 
as British/English/white/foreign/non-British names (etcetera). They are social 
constructions. Indeed, as I mentioned earlier in relation to Singh and Patel, there are 
many British citizens who bear names originating from all geographical regions of the 
world. Moreover, colonisation saw to it that people living in all areas of the globe 
similarly bear names originating from Britain, and names that are common in the UK in 
themselves have been constructed from what can be conceived as French, Latin, 
Scandinavian words/names and more over time. I am concerned in this thesis with 
whether or not (according to my interview data) there is a pervasive notion within the 
UK that names are racially coded/understood as being foreign/Other (visible), and 
British/English/white (invisible). This invokes similar difficulties with regards to defining 
what an ethnic or racial group is. They are social constructions, but as they are 
concepts that are in use and treated as though they are ways of grouping people, one 
can say that a person is a member of an ethnic/racial group because they believe 
(and others accept) that they are so (Eriksen, 2002), or because others believe a 
person to be so regardless of whether or not they accept it.  
In addition, as I mentioned in the previous section, I am interested in whether 
or not there are social constructions of what (sur)names represent beyond them just 
being a referent to a particular individual. That is, whether or not (sur)names are seen 
to represent a personÕs understood embodied racial identity. I am consequently not 
interested in essentialising particular names as being racial or national, but rather in 
trying to explore the potential forces of whiteness and racism behind attitudes towards 
names Ð to reveal the possible processes of name racialisation. Moreover, the 
experiences of my interviewees will be presented in this thesis so as to complicate the 
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notion of racial categorisation and to challenge the immortality of whiteness (that is, its 
all-pervasive, everlasting nature) as a construction. I therefore in no way intend for my 
thesis to add credence to the notion of there actually being Ôwhite BritishÕ or ÔforeignÕ 
names. Indeed, I will assert that race and other nationalised notions of difference are 
social, rather than biological inventions. Rather, I aim to explore the ways in which Ð 
according to my participantsÕ experiences Ð names may be commonly understood in 
racialised, and perhaps nationalised ways, just as bodies and accents may be 
commonly perceived in racialised, and nationalised, ways. 
 
The ThesisÕ Structure  
In Chapter Two I introduce the key literature and theory in which this thesis is 
situated and through which lenses my subsequent data analyses will be viewed. 
Throughout the chapter, I locate my projectÕs interests within the theoretical 
discussions. Firstly, I provide an overview of the socially constructed nature of race 
and the concept of racial hierarchies. Secondly, I discuss national perpetrations of the 
race concept, and of racism. Thirdly, I consider cultural racism and some ways in 
which race is often reconceptualised and disguised in terms of culture (among other 
things). This leads on to an outline of the notion that race and racism have ended. In 
the subsequent section I look at why it can be argued that the concept of race still 
matters, which encapsulates a discussion of power and whiteness literature. I then 
outline the inbetween people thesis and how this concept indicates the fuzzy nature of 
racial categorisation and of the attainment of racial privilege Ð in spite of their inflexible 
appearances. I then consider racialisation processes and embodied understandings of 
race. I consequently move onto an overview of identity in relation to race and 
particularly of racial passing. Finally, I link the above discussions of theory more 
explicitly to names, with an overview of Correspondence Test research (Wood et al., 
2009) and other research pertaining to name discrimination. 
In Chapter Three I detail the specificities of my research approach and 
methodology. I explain how I deemed qualitative research to be most appropriate in 
respect of my research questions. I subsequently depict my own research standpoint. 
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I also describe my data collection, participant sample, ethical factors and data 
analysis, including some of the complexities and obstacles encountered during the 
project. I also reflexively consider my own motivations for conducting, and my impact 
upon, the research. 
Chapter Four is the first of three data analysis chapters, based upon the data 
collected from 32 participants. In Chapter Four I explore whether there is a racialised 
disparity between my participantsÕ surnames and their self-defined embodied racial 
identities. I achieve this by presenting and analysing the participantsÕ reported 
experiences of the everyday interactions of their surnames with their embodied 
appearances. I also consider the ways in which the participants asserted that their 
surnames interacted with their accents.  
In Chapter Five I address my participantsÕ experiences in relation to the 
concept of racism. I particularly analyse some of my name-changersÕ familial, social, 
educational and employment experiences in this vein. I discuss how my participantsÕ 
experiences may have affected their personal sense of identity. I also consider how 
they have responded to any negative responses to their surnames, in terms of 
potential strategies for avoiding, or fighting it. Finally, I discuss how some participantsÕ 
own attitudes towards the ways in which their surnames and their own embodied 
racial identities interact, may be problematic.  
Chapter Six is the final data chapter and in it I explore the topic of naming 
children in relation to race and racism. This was not a topic I had extensively 
considered prior to starting my research, although I did have a question about it in my 
research schedule. It is, though, an example of the ways in which themes can emerge 
that differ from a researcherÕs initial focus, particularly when an inductive approach to 
research is taken (Braun and Clarke, 2006). It was clear at the interview stage that it 
was a matter of key importance to many of the participants. I consequently analyse in 
this chapter the notion of racial passing in relation to parental choice of name, in terms 
of gaining access to white British privilege versus attempts to fight racism. I also 
consider whether or not it can be argued that there is a racial hierarchy of name. 
33 
 
Chapter Seven is the concluding chapter. In it I draw together my findings and 
analyses from the three data chapters in relation to my initial consideration of whether 
or not the UK can be viewed as a post-racial society. I therefore present the more 
theoretical and abstract contributions of the thesis, whilst also considering the 
shortcomings of my research and how the research can be extended in the future. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I provide an overview of the theoretical concepts upon which 
my study is grounded, as well as indicating the ways in which my research fits within 
existing literature. My project is located predominantly within the theoretical 
frameworks of race, racism and whiteness. I firstly discuss the socially constructed 
nature of race. This is a key concept in relation to my desire to explore the notion of 
names as a potential factor in those racialisation processes that I have suggested in 
Chapter One may still be prevalent in the UK. It has long been acknowledged that 
race is a social, rather than a biological/scientific, means of categorising humans 
(Nayak, 2006). I consider how it originated, was developed and gained such societal 
importance. I consequently discuss the concept of racial hierarchies, because if I find 
that names are racialised it may then follow that they are hierarchised. Historically, 
individuals have been hierarchically categorised in terms of embodied indicators of 
race.  
I then follow this discussion with an exploration of the interrelated concept of 
racism. In Chapter One I introduced the notion that dominant discourses in the UK 
suggest that racism is no longer a problem. I questioned if this is the case and 
explained that my thesis looks at the potential racialisation of name in order to 
understand how important (or not) race is within the UK context. Racism is an integral 
concept in considering the consequences of any racialisation of names my 
participants may report. In this vein, I then discuss national manifestations of the race 
concept, and of racism. This is in order to understand the ways in which such 
concepts are developed and understood within a national context. I then discuss 
cultural racism and how the UK societyÕs reliance on race is seemingly disguised in 
terms of culture.  
Subsequently, I consider, in more detail than in Chapter One, the notion that 
race and racism have ended. In the next section I address why I perceive that race 
continues to matter, and this includes a discussion of power and whiteness literature. 
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This explains why my research may be important, as existing literature indicates that 
race and therefore racism have significant impacts upon individualsÕ life chances. 
Following this, I provide an overview of the inbetween people thesis and how this 
concept reveals the hazy, rather than clear-cut natures of racial categorisation and the 
attainment of racial privilege. I include this discussion, as I feel that my participants 
may be constructed as being in such an inbetween racial position because of their 
name-change. I then look at existing theory regarding racialisation processes and 
embodied understandings of race, in order to understand how this may extend to a 
potentially disembodied racial indicator in name. I follow this by outlining the notion of 
identity in relation to race and of racial passing. It may be that the name-change has 
impacted upon my participantsÕ own feelings of identity, especially if they have been 
positioned as racially passing because of their name-change. Finally, I link the above 
discussions of theory even more explicitly to names, with an overview of 
Correspondence Test research and other research pertaining to name discrimination. 
I indicate how my research may build upon existing studies in relation to the 
racialisation of names. 
  
The Socially Constructed Nature of Race and the Notion of Racial Hierarchies 
 
ÒRaceÓ is a fiction that we turn into a social reality every day of our lives. It lies 
at the heart of the complex, historical and multifaceted  sets of social 
relationships to which we attach the label ÒracismÓ. This is a historical process, 
a set of ideas and a set of outcomes (benefits for some, disadvantages for 
others). 
(Garner, 2010:ix). 
 
Race is a socially constructed concept, a discredited and inaccurate notion 
(Alexander, 2006; Nayak, 2006). Indeed, Ôthe division of mankind into races is an 
invention not of Nature but of ManÕ (Watson, 1970:xiii). The history of race is complex 
and has become deeply embedded in social and political discourse. Moreover, race is 
seemingly the only major concept of the social arena that remains so important in 
general thought processes in spite of it having no scientific validity (Ratcliffe, 2004). 
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Consequently, one must ask what race is, how it originated and came into popular 
usage and consciousness (ibid.). Furthermore, one should consider why there is the 
need for such a concept in describing the social importance attached to difference 
(ibid.; Gilroy, 1993). 
In the Western context, the original meaning of the word race was Ôfamilial 
lineageÕ (Ratcliffe, 2004:16) or Ôa line of descentÕ (Bhavani, Mirza and Meetoo, 
2005:8). Race was not originally comprehended as having a scientific basis  (ibid.). 
Differences in colour were apparently understood in the 15th and 16th centuries either 
in respect of the impact of the sun, or in religious terms (blackness as Ôa curse of 
GodÕ; Bonnett, 2008:1038; Bhavani, Mirza and Meetoo, 2005:8). With the expansion 
of the transatlantic slave trade in the 17th and 18th centuries, notions of supremacy 
and subservience emerged in regards to the domination of white Europeans over 
black Africans (Bhavani, Mirza and Meetoo, 2005). However, it was not until the mid-
eighteenth century (the Enlightenment) that race came into common parlance (Bulmer 
and Solomos, 1999), when it took a scientific meaning, indicating biologically 
differentiated groups (Bhavani, Mirza and Meetoo, 2005). During the Enlightenment, 
many philosophers began to consider that the social world could be studied using 
scientific/rationalist methods (Ratcliffe, 2004).  
Indeed, it became pertinent to some Western thinkers of the time to try to 
scientifically compare human beings from different geographical parts of the world, in 
an attempt to justify the transatlantic slave trade. For example, the ÔGreat Chain of 
BeingÕ concept argued that all of the earthÕs creatures were linked together in a 
hierarchy (Dyer, 1999:22). Black people were conceived to be valued as only just 
above the apes, and white people were considered as the pinnacle of all beings, 
closest to the angels and thereby to God. White people were genealogically 
understood to be the best and purest of all humans (ibid.; Lentin, 2008). Furthermore, 
Cuvier argued in 1805 that humans were divided into three racial divisions, namely 
white, yellow and black (Ratcliffe, 2004). He also ranked the categories, with white the 
highest, and black the lowest (ibid.). Race was thereby conceptualised as being the 
only way of understanding the world and the way that it was organised (ibid.). 
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In the nineteenth century, the Social Darwinists interpreted Charles DarwinÕs 
ÔThe Origin of SpeciesÕ in terms of the idea of human race, by arguing that Ôinclusive 
fitnessÕ and Ôsurvival of the fittestÕ provided an explanation or even a justification for 
the dominance of one race of humans over another (ibid.). They omitted an important 
tenet of DarwinÕs book: that all humans have the same genetic origin (ibid). 
Furthermore, Darwin (1901; quoted in St Louis, 2005) asserted that because there is 
such variation between the external appearance of different humans/races, these 
variations cannot be overly integral, otherwise certain features would have been either 
retained and cemented, or discarded.  
Nonetheless, the Social Darwinists used DarwinÕs work in order to promote 
the notion of a racialised gap between cognitive and physical ability (St Louis, 2005). 
Furthermore, their argument included a hierarchy of races concept, which drew upon 
assertions that groups of people had different origins and that such distinguishing 
features of races were culturally and socially significant (Bulmer and Solomos, 1999). 
Thus, the notion of race had evolved beyond the idea of different groupings of people 
in terms of biological origins into one where groups of people had different cultural and 
intellectual standards/abilities. Moreover, Social Darwinism promoted a belief that 
races should be kept apart, unmixed/unpolluted, especially the European white race 
(Bhavani, Mirza and Meetoo, 2005). 
Ideas of the hierarchy of race were also reflected in the field of Eugenics 
(Ratcliffe, 2004), of which the holocaust was a chilling example. Extreme conceptions 
of race resulted in Jewish and Gypsy peoples being labelled as threats to the German 
nation: thereby legitimizing the attempted extinction of them (Darder and Torres, 
2004). A compelling need therefore arose for academics, scientists and social activists 
to devise a convincing rebuttal of the manner in which race had been used in Nazi 
Germany (Lentin, 2011b; Miles, 1999). Concurrently there was also an increase in 
scientific research that denied the naturalised and concrete notion of race as a means 
of categorising people (Miles, 1999). 
UNESCOÕs statements in the 1950s and 1960s further underlined the lack of 
biological legitimacy to the concept of race and its socially constructed nature 
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(Bhavani, Mirza and Meetoo, 2005). Gilroy (2005) asserts that such statements made 
the fight against race real and present, and indeed he harkens back to such ideals. 
Unfortunately, the established understanding of race as having biological meaning still 
has influence to this day, largely because of its initial scientific label and due to the 
lasting heritage of slavery/colonialism (Bhavani, Mirza and Meetoo, 2005). The 
continuing significance of biological race can be seen in relatively recent Ôracist 
pseudoscienceÕ literature (ibid.:9), which argues that IQ scores are racially 
differentiated: that African-Americans have lower IQ scores than people of other races 
(e.g. Herrnstein and Murray, 1996). 
When one considers the afore-mentioned history of the concept of race, it is 
striking how a scientifically inaccurate notion could have become such a vivid part of 
everyday thought and language. Physical features cannot be measured or understood 
in a racialised sense (Salkeld, 2011), despite attempts made in Nazi Germany and 
during South African Apartheid. Race should perhaps therefore only be a marginal 
concept (Washburn, 1970). Yet in race being a social invention, rather than a natural 
finding (Garner, 2010), definitions or understandings of it are consequently very much 
context and time specific. There is no one meaning of race, no permanency of its 
conception. In the past couple of centuries, understandings of race have varied 
according to national context (Bulmer and Solomos, 1999). For instance, historically, 
being perceived to have one drop of black blood has been enough to define an 
American as black (Chryssochoou, 2004).  
I note the socially constructed nature of race, whilst also recognising its deep 
historical roots and suspecting its sustained and current importance in common 
societal understanding in the West (Lentin, 2008; Ratcliffe, 2004). As I discussed in 
Chapter One, one of my main research questions is to understand if names are 
understood in a racialised way: e.g. as Asian, African, or European. Should this be the 
case, in light of the literature above, which indicates that there are hierarchized 
understandings of race, I aim to explore whether or not the same concept applies to 
names. For instance, regarding names constructed as European, would Eastern 
European names be understood as being lower down the British hierarchy of 
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belongingness than French or Scandinavian names at this current moment in time? I 
will explore these issues in Chapter Six. 
 
National Perpetrations of Race, Racism and Nationalism 
Race is a commonly used term in the UK and is essentialised in, and given 
authority by, formal discourse such as the Race Relations Act (Ratcliffe, 2004). UK 
Census forms also make official such categories as ÔÒPakistanisÓ, ÒIndiansÓ, ÒBlack 
AfricansÓÕ, giving them an aura of naturalness and universality (Ahmad and Sheldon, 
1994:129). Such official usage can result in sustaining racialised notions of the 
requirements, actions and demands of people so categorized, as if they were 
homogenous entities (ibid.). Indeed, race appears permanent and unchangeable, 
despite its lack of definition Ð barring some alleged characteristics of the body 
(Ratcliffe, 2004). It is important to continually analyse and critique the concept of race, 
because of its role within society of dividing, omitting and marginalising people 
(Alexander and Knowles, 2005). In this vein, I will now reflect upon the related term of 
racism.  
Despite its wide usage in everyday, social, and academic dialogue, racism is 
a relatively new term (Miles, 1999; Bulmer and Solomos, 1999). Its creation in the 
1930s was a consequence of the paradigmatic shift in academic discourse against 
biological/scientific notions of race, particularly in response to the horrors of the Nazi 
Germany Ôrace ideaÕ. It was the scientific/biological notion of race that became known 
as racism (Miles, 1999). As Chryssochoou (2004) outlines, racism is a form of 
discrimination that relies on the imagined concreteness, and consequently the justified 
nature, of racial variation. Thus race itself is considered a self-apparent tool of 
categorisation, found in the act of discriminating, which is itself subject to the specific 
context in which it is perpetrated (ibid.). In the British context, the UKÕs current Deputy 
Prime Minister Nick Clegg asserted that the Ô"war on inequality" has "barely even 
begun" on the front of "economic opportunity"Õ (Stevenson, 2011). (Also see The 
Runnymede Trust Report, 2012; EHRC, 2010; Ramesh, 2010; Macedo and Gounari, 
2006; Chryssochoou, 2004, for further discussions of racial inequality within the UK). 
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Notwithstanding the influential notion that globalisation would see the end of 
nationhood, this prospect is not at all likely (Anderson, 2003). Indeed, Birch (1989:3) 
calls nationalism Ôthe most successful political ideology in human historyÕ. Anderson 
(2003) describes how the nation is a modern concept, yet it holds a strong essence of 
antiquity. The British nation state only came into existence in the modern era, after the 
Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707, and so whilst ÔBritishnessÕ as an identity may seem 
Ôauthentic and oldÕ it can be asserted that it is Ôfabricated and newÕ, that such notions 
as the eternal history of ÔBritish nationhoodÕ are really a Ôself-deceptionÕ (Uberoi and 
McLean, 2009:43; also Anderson, 2003). Wallerstein (2002:78) writes of this notion of 
ÔpastnessÕ that members are socialised into and which is crucial to the continuation of 
national cohesion.  
Indeed, Winder (2004:1) describes this idea of the ease with which people can 
believe in a non-evidenced history: 
 
We do not always think of Britain as a country settled at a deep level by 
immigrants. We prefer to construct mythologies of the national character as 
something stable, as a still and virtuous point in an often unruly world. Even 
the most authoritative histories see it as a durable set of genes, ideas and 
habits, a white page to which, in the last few decades, a few multicoloured 
flourishes have been added…The arrival of migrants from our former empire 
is categorized as one of the ÒproblemsÓ or ÒchallengesÓ faced by postwar 
society. But the long and steady movement of people to these shores before 
the modern era is forgotten altogether. 
 
This quotation makes the point that it is easy to believe that it is only in modern times 
that the solidity of life has been ÔliquidizedÕ, made much less certain (Bauman, 2005), 
but there has always been migration, and there have been Britons considered not 
white for hundreds of years. Histories tend to be remembered in a fragmented and 
inaccurate fashion. Subsequently, in an interlinked way, a national identity can be 
constructed in opposition to notions of difference and foreignness, which may in 
actuality have been in existence within that nation for ages past. As Patterson 
(1982:19) expresses: ÔIn all societies of course, there is a distinction between what is 
actually going on and the mental structures that attempt to define and explain the 
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realityÕ. Nationalism has little theoretical/philosophical coherence (Anderson, 2003), it 
is imagined (ibid.; Balibar, 2002), yet one cannot doubt its political power (Anderson, 
2003). 
Balibar (2002) notes that conceptions of race and nation are closely related. 
Modern ideas of racism Ôattempt to fix human social groups in terms of natural 
properties of belonging within particular political and geographical contextsÕ (Solomos 
and Back, 2000:23; original emphasis). For something to be conceived as natural is 
for it to be something beyond oneÕs control (Anderson, 2003). Similarly, Ônation-ness is 
assimilated to skin-colour, gender, parentage and birth-era Ð all those things one can 
not helpÕ (ibid.:143). As Birch (1989) writes, most nations have ethnic minorities who 
are not completely integrated within them. Indeed Eriksen (2002:123) argues that it is 
not the choice of an ethnic minority to assimilate into a nation: in Ôminority-majority 
relationsÕ the ethnic minority is accorded an ethnic/racial classification even if they do 
not support it (also Lentin, 2005, 2008). 
In addition, BondÕs (2006) analysis of national belonging using data from the 
2003 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, looked at potential markers of Scottishness 
such as ancestry, birthplace, parentÕs birthplace and ethnicity. Although Bond 
(2006:623) asserted that identities are likely to be the result of ÔinteractionsÕ between 
majority and minority views, he nonetheless stressed that minority identities can be 
destabilized by majority views. For example, in relation to his research findings Bond 
(2006:623) announced himself to be concerned about Ôthe relative reluctance [of the 
white Scottish majority] to whole-heartedly accept the Scottishness of those from 
ÒvisibleÓ minority ethnic groups, even when they have other identity markers (such as 
residence and accent) important to being ScottishÕ. The data Bond examined 
apparently did not include name as a potential marker of Scottishness. However it 
does provide an intriguing insight into the role that others play in a personÕs own 
classification of their Scottishness and the potential for an internal limiter in terms of 
national identity.  
As McCrone and Bechhofer (2008:1262) state, ÔWho we think ÒweÓ are, and 
who ÒweÓ are not, may matter, or may come to matter, not in terms of causal and often 
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unthinking prejudice, but in terms of social and political actionÕ. Markers of what or 
who we think we and/or others are, seemingly feed into and are fed by the 
gatekeepers, such as the state, Ôwho decide who is or is not a ÒnationalÓ, whether they 
are entitled to benefits and opportunities as befits Òone of usÓÕ (ibid.). My project 
desires to understand if having a (sur)name potentially seen as not British means that 
a person is Othered, that they cannot be part of the in group. 
The concept of citizenship is extremely important for politicians, as, according 
to Smith (1998:xii) they are: Ô…persons who hope to govern certain populations. 
Hence they very much want those populations to believe that they constitute a political 
community, a ÒpeopleÓ, and a people who are governed properly by those self-same 
politiciansÕ. However, citizenship is by its nature exclusionary, as for some to belong to 
a particular nation state, necessarily others are excluded (Castles, 2000; Goldberg, 
2002). As Anderson (2003) explains, no nation claims to be infinite in its population: 
exclusion is what makes it a nation. 
Anti-migrant rhetoric is founded upon notions of exclusion: that there are 
those who belong to the ÔusÕ group(s) and those who belong to the ÔthemÕ group(s), 
whereby ÔthemÕ is universally seen in a negative light (Macedo and Gounari, 2006; 
Stolcke, 1995; Van Dijk, 1993). Wemyss (2006:223) frames this in terms of a 
Ôhierarchy of belongingÕ within Britain. As Bauman (2006) states, blaming immigrants 
for all social problems and especially for feelings of uncertainty heralded by 
globalization, has become a worldwide custom. Yuval-Davis (2006:204) explains that 
the Ôpolitics of belongingÕ  is altogether concerned with an imagined  Ôboundary line of 
the nationÕ and the decisions made by the majority group of who belongs to the in-
group and who does not (also Goldberg, 2002). Yuval-Davis (2006:204) calls this a 
ÔÒdirty businessÓÕ, and so it is. 
 
…the Germans blame the Poles, the Poles blame the Ukrainians, the 
Ukrainians blame the Kirghiz and Uzbeks Ð while countries too poor to attract 
any neighbors desperately seeking a livelihood, like Romania, Bulgaria, 
Hungary or Slovakia, turn their wrath against the usual suspects and standby 
culprits: the local but drifting, fixed-address shunning, and therefore 
ÒnewcomersÓ and outsiders, always and everywhere Ð the Gypsies. 
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(Grabbe, quoted in Bauman, 2006:38). 
 
This quotation highlights the perceived hierarchies of power within nations: there is 
always a race or nationality of people to exclude or discriminate against.  
Calhoun (2007:53) argues that ÔNationalism is anything but a thing of the past, 
and even the newest claims to nationalism are often rooted in a rhetoric of pre-existing 
ethnicityÕ. This point also suggests why there may be negative attitudes towards 
names perceived as foreign. I mentioned above how the literature suggests that races 
have long been considered as fixed: that certain people have particular physical 
characteristics, which correlate to their social characteristics and/or intelligence and/or 
culture. Goldberg (2000) asserts that the underlying power of this reification rests in 
the silencing of those who are perceived as Other, in terms of denying them 
individuality, social benefits and representation in the political arena. Order, once 
defined, has to be looked after and strengthened, consequently the Other is created 
and labelled, thereby increasing dominion over them (ibid.).  
Furthermore, for racism to be significant within a particular nation, there must 
be a substantial number of people who perpetrate it and/or believe in it (Van Dijk, 
1993). Ferber (1999) asserts that there could be no extreme right without racism being 
prevalent within the mainstream: extremists are not detached from society but are 
created by the system(s) in which they grow up. Indeed Ferber (ibid.) argues that 
there tends to be an emphasis placed on the leaders of a particular extremist (racist) 
group, and an interest in the specific characteristics of a person who joins such an 
organisation. However, according to Ferber (ibid.), racism is inherent within white 
societies and cultures in their entireties, and every member is shaped by it. To 
consider white supremacy as being unusually vociferous in its racism can have the 
effect of excusing wider society of its own racism, whereby racist supremacists are 
considered to be outside of the allegedly normal, egalitarian society (ibid.; Ware and 
Back, 2002). Indeed, Ferber (1999) writes that supremacist groups regenerate and 
redistribute discourses once from the mainstream: these discourses appear to be 
common-sense knowledge because they have historically been a major part of wider 
white societal beliefs. It is during times when such discourse is critiqued/threatened, 
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that some people will seek solidity and comfort in holding onto these Ôonce taken for 
granted TruthsÕ (ibid.:150). These ÔtruthsÕ can be said to be an old Ôregime of truthÕ, if 
one uses FoucaultÕs (1972; as quoted in Reed, 2005:80-1) notion of certain 
knowledge being perpetuated as ÔtruthÕ by outlets such as the media. Lentin (2005), 
meanwhile, argues that race and racism are a modernist creation of European nation-
states, that they are bound up in this development, rather than being only temporary 
peculiarities in the forms of slavery, colonialism and the Holocaust (also Goldberg, 
2002). Moreover, that they are not just attributable to the Ôpathological or ignorant 
individualsÕ but that they are institutionalised and politically founded (Lentin, 
2005:381). 
Indeed, I am interested in exploring if names are used as a way of 
establishing the Otherness of an individual. Furthermore, I aim to investigate whether 
or not those with names perhaps associated with immigration flows to the UK - such 
as the recent migration from Eastern Europe, and the more established migration from 
India, Pakistan, and African countries - are perceived in a particularly negative light. 
Additionally, I desire to understand if (sur)names are considered in racial and 
nationalistic terms: for instance with labels such as white, black, African or Asian. I will 
discuss these issues throughout the three data chapters. Also, in alluding to the afore-
mentioned idea of racial hierarchies, is there also a hierarchy of names? If this were 
the case, then within such a construct, is there a notion of white British names (the 
ingroup) and Other names (the outgroup(s))? I will particularly explore this concept in 
Chapter Six.  
 
Cultural Racism 
Ratcliffe (2004:22) asserts that race is entrenched in everyday discourse, as it 
means many things to many people, in many contexts, invoking aspects of colour, 
Ôbiology, culture, religion and nationÕ. The complex and interwoven history of race has 
led to its seemingly irreplaceable, yet utterly problematic, position in discourse. It has 
aided the obsession of locating differences between human beings, both in individual 
and social relationships, and at the Ôinterface between people and structuresÕ 
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(Alexander and Knowles, 2005:2). As Gilroy (2004) argues, racism does not originate 
specifically from a notion called race, but rather is the outcome of the desire to 
discriminate. Despite this flexibility of the concept of race, it is seemingly often used 
unconsciously and unthinkingly, as though its meaning is fixed. I desire to explore if 
this is also the case with names. Not only do I aim to know if my participants consider 
names in terms of race (as mentioned above) but also if they will raise the constructed 
nature of such concepts or if they accept such notions uncritically. I will discuss this in 
Chapter Five. 
Furthermore, Lentin (2008) notes that the word race itself is not vital and could 
be replaced by another. Ratcliffe (2004) asserts that race is often used 
interchangeably with the term ethnicity, which just like race is used very freely to 
indicate similarities between people of language, religion, nationality and identity. 
Indeed, Solomos and Back (2000) write that racism is often not framed using the term 
race: difference and culture are frequently used instead so as to avoid accusations of 
racism (also Brah, 1999) - arguably ethnicity is also used in a similar vein. The 
UNESCO statement of 1967 widened the concept of racism to be an ideology not just 
necessarily based upon biological assumptions of race, but also (or instead) to be 
reliant on cultural differences (Lentin, 2005), or differences in terms of education, or 
some other dogma which would continue to perpetuate hidden racist notions (Miles, 
1999). 
Ideas of race and racism have therefore become ever more complex in the 
sense that, to some extent, they have moved away from overtly enunciating bias in 
terms of skin colour (or other physical features), biological inferiority or the notion of a 
racial hierarchy (Miles, 1999). Thus Chryssochoou (2004:52) asserts that Ôa discourse 
of the OtherÕ (that is, someone considered by those in power to be omitted from an 
exclusive social group, a foreigner (Said, 2003) continually perpetuates with new 
Ôideological contentsÕ (Miles, 1999:354). The meanings of race vary and are socially 
constructed throughout the making/course of Ôhistory, culture and social relationshipsÕ 
(Alexander and Knowles, 2005:1; also Gilroy, 1993). 
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In the same vein, this cultural racism, which emerged in the late 1970s 
(Stolcke, 1995; Lentin and Titley, 2011a:), became known as a new racism (Solomos 
and Back, 2000). Its focus is as a defence of the imaginary ÒBritish/English way of lifeÓ 
in the face of challenges posed by the incursion of Òforeign influencesÓÕ (ibid.:20; also 
Stolcke, 1995). Lentin and Titley (2011a) assert that the central idea of cultural racism 
is that race is unchangeable whereas culture can be altered. Consequently to say that 
the OtherÕs culture is not compatible with ÔourÕ own, has been seen to be acceptable, 
non-racist discourse. However, cultural characteristics can come to be essentialised 
just as much as embodied ones, and are consequently as racialising (Lentin and 
Titley, 2011a; Lentin, 2005) and exclusionary (Stevenson, 2001) as ever. Indeed, 
Gilroy (1993:57) asserts that as culture has become more important in UK debates 
about race, it has consequently become more reductive, almost equating to a 
Ôbiological termÕ because of its closeness to the notion of race. One could argue there 
is little ÔnewÕ about this racism (Brah, Hickman and Mac an Ghaill, 1999).  
Moreover, Stolcke (1995) argues that despite using cultural, instead of racial 
referents, the motivation behind the discourse still remains as racist as it ever was 
(also Alexander and Alleyne, 2002a). This latter point is why I refer throughout this 
thesis to race rather than to ethnicity or to culture, as I understand such labels to be 
an attempt to mask the issues of race and racism that are hidden beneath (Lentin, 
2008). As Lentin and Titley (2011a) write, cultural notions of difference may appear to 
be common-sense, but they essentially refer to the same, age-old notion of there 
being immutable differences between human beings (also Lentin, 2012). These must 
therefore be based on the entirely unsubstantiated, but nonetheless firmly rooted, 
belief that there is an essence to different groups of human beings which cannot be 
changed: that of biological race. Thus the fact that race is now almost entirely 
understood, both on the left and right wings of politics, through the concepts of culture 
and identity Ð so much so, that it is seen as Ôcommon-senseÕ knowledge (Lentin, and 
Titley 2011a:57) - is a worrying development. It appears to hide the constructed or 
political nature of race (ibid.): we should Ônot see culture [as] flowing into neat ethnic 
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parcels but as radically unfinished social processes of self-definition and 
transformationÕ (ibid.:61). 
Solomos (2003) argues that there is an oppositional organisation of 
representation, which identifies and tries to secure the gap between those who belong 
and those who do not. This system is primarily achieved by thinking of oneself as 
being biologically, rather than culturally, produced (ibid.). Two interconnected points 
one can take from SolomosÕ argument are that racism is not always consciously 
framed in terms of culture, and that the importance of physical appearance and/or skin 
colour should not be forgotten when considering racism. This perhaps highlights the 
conception of the interrelated nature of the mind and the body, the belief in culture 
(and of the hierarchies of cultures; Lentin, 2012) and its relation to an acceptance of 
the concrete nature of appearance, of bodies. As Ahmed and Stacey (2001) note, a 
concept that does not allow an emphasis of cognitive function over bodily appearance, 
is also one that is rooted in the naturalness and fixed notion of difference. Their 
assertion touches upon the notion that bodies are in themselves viewed in a 
constructed way, they are produced in a particular time and place in relation to Other 
bodies: both those bodies that are perceived to be familiar and those considered 
foreign (ibid.).  
Consequently, this notion of an essentialising association of culture with race, 
means that culture is still linked to physical appearance. The idea is that someone is 
identified as being part of a particular group by the way they look (Garner, 2010). 
Membership of that group implies specific expected behaviours (ibid.) and thus 
allocates worth (or not) to them (Dyer, 1999). Clarke (2012) writes that although race 
does not have biological or scientific validity, nonetheless it is still essentially based 
within the body (also Solomos, 2001). Alexander and Knowles (2005) note that in 
current discourse and in the past, bodily difference is/has been equated to particular 
internal features such as abilities and beliefs, which are themselves perceived to be 
forever secured within notions of white supremacy and black inadequacy. I will explore 
in Chapter Five this rooted biological notion of race, particularly in regard to if names 
and bodily appearance are related. I aim to understand whether or not people 
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read/hear a name, understand it in a racial way and consequently expect someone to 
look and/or sound a particular way, and vice versa. In addition, I approach racism from 
the perspective that it does apply to more than just biological notions of race, and that 
it encapsulates exclusionary/discriminatory attitudes regarding culture, religion (for 
instance Islamophobia) and even nationality (for example in regard to anti-Eastern 
European rhetoric in the UK in recent times). As I discussed above, seemingly racism 
is subject to time and context in the sense that the object(s) of exclusion vary, but the 
desire to discriminate always remains present. 
 
The Notion that Racism has Ended 
Arguably part of the power play of racism is the oft-heard claim that racism 
has ended. As I mentioned in Chapter One, in the 1990s anti-racism was criticised 
rigorously by Right-wing politicians, who argued that racism was an invention of the 
Left (Solomos, 2003). This critique implied that racial minorities somehow benefitted 
from promoting the idea that Britain is racist (ibid.). Furthermore, anti-racism was 
alleged to curb the free-speech of the white British majority, and of therefore being 
tyrannical (Gilroy, 1987). This is not, though, as Lentin (2012) points out, a coherent 
argument as UK ethnic minorities do not have the societal influence needed to dictate 
in such a manner. Berger (1999:35) asserts that such attitudes also serve to 
encourage the ÔdangerousÕ and bogus notion that racism is not as bad as it used to 
be.  
Moreover, Ratcliffe (2004:24) writes that the tendency by those on the Right to 
equate racism to political correctness has had the further impact of limiting the 
candour with which ÒÔweÓÕ discuss ÒÔthemÓÕ. Ratcliffe (ibid.) asserts that this has 
resulted in the conception that the Other cannot become part of the ÔweÕ group. Lentin 
(2008) notes that this indicates the seeming hypocrisy of the argument: how can 
racism/discrimination be mere political correctness if there is such a distinction being 
made at the same moment between an ÔusÕ and a ÔthemÕ?. Furthermore, Bhavani, 
Mirza and Meetoo (2005) assert that this denunciation, and denial, of racism can 
further ingrain it within societal psyches. This can also make it difficult for someone to 
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complain about discrimination they have suffered (Lentin and Titley, 2011a). Indeed, 
such a backlash against racism ignores its historical longevity, the actual reality of 
racism. It thereby is Ôideological manipulationÕ (Macedo and Gounari, 2006) and racist 
behaviour in itself (ibid.; Lentin and Titley, 2011a; Lentin, 2012). 
In addition, Said (2003) argues that the West has created dominant depictions 
of the Orient (the Other) that have consequently been adopted by ÔOrientalsÕ 
themselves. He asserted that no dialogue of exchange exists, that there is merely a 
Western monologue (ibid.). SaidÕs argument perhaps underestimates the ability of the 
Other to resist such discourse/representation. Once the power-balances within racism 
are visible or exposed to those who are being discriminated against, this does not 
mean that those considered Other cannot attempt to resist, re-appropriate or subvert 
racist ideas and actions (Alexander and Knowles, 2005). Nonetheless, SaidÕs (2003) 
argument is valuable: as Macedo and Gounari (2006) urge, there is a need to avoid 
moving into a position where even some racial minorities claim that racism is not so 
terrible as it was. Similarly, assertions that the USA is post-race because of ObamaÕs 
election miss the point that if the country was over race, then race would not be the 
term used for discussing his election in the first place (Lentin and Titley, 2011a). Also, 
attempts to frame Obama as a Muslim, or as a foreigner who was not born in the USA 
merely serve to mask racial-thinking/accusations of Otherness (ibid.; also Hughey, 
2012).  
Furthermore, Delaney (1970:4) asserts that Ôthe psychodynamics of white 
racismÕ are quite obscure, which adds to the falsehood that white people are not 
complicit with racism Ð that it is the problem solely of black people - despite the fact 
that they invented it. Additionally, Bhavani, Mirza and Meetoo (2005) write that there is 
a trend amongst British liberals for racism to be viewed as behaviour outside of 
societal norms, committed by individual deviants (also Lentin, 2005). Thus, racism is 
not viewed for what it is: something collective and institutionalised within British 
systems and cultures (Bhavani, Mirza and Meetoo, 2005). According to Van Dijk 
(1993:6): 
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Many of both the subtly and the blatantly racist events that define the system 
of everyday racism are enacted, controlled, or condoned by white elites, that 
is, by leading politicians, professors, editors, judges, officials, bureaucrats, 
and managers. If whites are not themselves actively involved in these modern 
forms of segregation, exclusion, aggression, inferiorization, or marginalization, 
then their involvement in the problem of racism consists in their passivity, their 
acquiescence, their ignorance, and their indifference regarding ethnic or racial 
inequality. 
 
Indeed, Van Dijk (ibid.) argues that there is often a deep subtlety to the racism 
entrenched in societal structures. Lentin (2011b) maintains that the relativist alignment 
of racism with other forms of ÔdifferenceÕ, such as religion and sexuality, has further 
obscured and belittled racist structures and episodes. Furthermore, Beeman (2007) 
states that the increasing subtlety of racism is what allows people to assert that racism 
does not exist. It was with such a thought in mind that I decided to choose people who 
have changed their name as my sample group for this project. I felt that any 
experiences of discrimination/being Othered may be more obvious for those who have 
experienced life with both what are potentially understood to be a foreign surname 
and a white British surname, than for someone who had only ever experienced 
bearing one kind of (potentially) racialised name.  
An example of what Beeman (2007) asserts is the problematic relationship 
between race and popular culture can be seen in the recent outcry about a British 
television programme called ÔMidsomer MurdersÕ. The director of the show stated:  
 
We don't have ethnic minorities involved. Because it wouldn't be the English 
village with them. It just wouldn't work. Suddenly we might be in Slough… And 
if you went in to Slough you wouldn't see a white face there. We're the last 
bastion of Englishness and I want to keep it that way…I'm trying to make 
something that appeals to a certain audience, which seems to succeed…And 
I don't want to change it. 
(True-May, quoted in Jones, 2011). 
  
In the aftermath of these comments, ITV (the television company that airs the 
programme) stated that: ÔWe are shocked and appalled at these personal comments 
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by Brian True-May, which are absolutely not shared by anyone at ITVÕ (Jones, 2011). 
True-May was subsequently suspended from his job. Why, though, during the 14 
years or so that the programme was shown, did no one from ITV or from its viewers 
seemingly demand to know why there were no characters conceived as not white on 
the show? Was it so difficult to perceive? Or was it just that nobody was bothered or 
offended? If the latter is the case, then why is there such a public outcry once the 
director has admitted that it is a deliberate policy not to cast characters deemed 
black? This example indicates the hypocrisy and subtlety of racism in action. It should 
not be surprising then that True-May argued that he had been ÔvictimisedÕ and that the 
reaction to his comments had been ÔhystericalÕ (Revoir and Fernandez, 2011). 
GoldbergÕs (2005:218) words seem especially relevant here: ÔRace matters…even as 
its matter and reach are ignored, denied, repressed, erasedÕ.  
Relatedly, the Runnymede TrustÕs Report (2012:9) has called for an end to 
the UK governmentÕs ÔÒcolour-blindÓ approach to race equality. The authors assert that 
it is a matter of concern that this was the first ever parliamentary report about the 
unemployment of British black, Pakistani and Bangladeshi women and that this is the 
result of the governmentÕs desire not to assess employment in terms of race/ethnicity, 
but rather in terms of individuality (ibid.). The report states that the government 
consequently has not even been prepared to look at the large over-representation of 
ethnic minorities in unemployment figures (ibid.) in terms of ethnicity/race. This would 
suggest that the government thereby is denying that racism in the UK employment 
sector exists, or, alternatively, it is aware of it and chooses not to act.   
In Chapter Five I will explore race and racism in relation to names. Specifically 
if (and how) names are related to these concepts and will discuss the notion that 
race/racism is over in relation to my participantsÕ experiences of their name-change. 
 
Power: Why Race Matters, and Whiteness  
Garner (2010) asserts that because racism is a social construction, it must 
always be lived/known in unequal situations of power: for instance, that some people 
have easier access to resources than others (also Goldberg, 2005). Chryssochoou 
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(2004) notes that it is power, which determined race should become the dominant way 
of socially dividing humankind, and that thereby created racism (also Darder and 
Torres, 2004). Chryssochoou (2004:50) states that: Ôracism equals power plus 
prejudice…Reification, essentialization, and discrimination work together to maintain a 
particular vision of the world, a world characterized by racial differenceÕ. Moreover, 
Garner (2010) argues that the discourse of racism is about more than unequal 
relationships between individuals Ð the social inheritances of slavery cannot be 
changed by an individual. To belong, or to be allocated, to a particular race is 
seemingly about more than just oneÕs individual opinion: all the perceived meanings of 
that race are allocated to one, whether one desires this or not (Eriksen, 2002). It 
appears then that racism has developed via a mixture of Ôsocial and psychological 
powerÕ (Bhavani, Mirza and Meetoo, 2005:150). 
Indeed, I wonder if in modern times racism, rather than merely being a 
justification of slavery (as suggested earlier), is now conceived as a derivative or a 
legacy of the transatlantic slave trade. Although the physical aspect of this slavery 
was abolished on paper, in principle the substance (and psychological essence) of 
slavery has perhaps lived on in the system and become (re-)institutionalised as 
racism. Indeed, Gilroy (1987) writes that because the UK does not truly acknowledge 
the history of slavery, and hides its impact, its psychological repercussions live on in 
current-day racism (also Casciani, 2007; Roediger, 2003).  
Garner (2010) notes that within the construct of race, no two races can ever 
be seen as equal. Races have always historically been viewed in hierarchies, which 
change according to time and context (ibid.). As I mentioned above, I will explore in 
Chapter Six if there are also racialised hierarchies of names. In the UK, a white 
majority nation, it would appear integral when considering the meanings and power of 
race and racism to consider the power of the notion of whiteness. As Garner (2007) 
states, one cannot discuss whiteness without acknowledging the power behind it, for 
then its entire history of subordinating the Other is forgotten.  
It is only since the mid-1990s that academics in the UK and particularly in the 
USA (Ware and Back, 2002) have moved anti-racist work away from ethnic minority 
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behaviours and towards white racism: the core concern of the racial past and present 
(Bonnet, 2000). Moreover, it has been common for the term race to be understood as 
indicating anyone except white people. Aanerud (1997) suggests that Western white 
people often point out the raced blackness of their associates, but do not indicate the 
race of their white acquaintances (also Babb, 1998; Dyer, 1999). I desire to uncover 
whether or not the same also applies to names. I purpose to explore if some names 
are unmarked (potentially Ôwhite BritishÕ) from a white personÕs perspective, and if 
some are perceived as foreign/Other and raced. I will discuss this concept extensively 
throughout the thesis, and particularly in Chapter Four.  
 European-origin versions of the whiteness concept (Bonnet, 2008) have 
always situated white people on the Ôpositive side of all the binaries used to attach 
value and meaning to groups of peopleÕ (Garner, 2007:175), such as: Ôcleanliness/dirt; 
purity/impurity; restraint/excess; backwardness/modernityÕ (ibid.). Seemingly the 
essential symbolism of whiteness is that whiteness is good and blackness/the Other is 
bad (Dyer, 1999; Neal, 1999). Apparently such opposing constructs are needed, for 
what is Ôcivilisation without barbarityÕ, Ôfreedom without slaveryÕ, or indeed, Ôwhiteness 
without blacknessÕ? (Garner, 2007:51). Thus it seems whiteness is created by 
constantly adapting itself to be the exact opposite of what it considers blackness to be 
(ibid.; Babb, 1998; Neal, 1999). Garner (2007:43) argues that whiteness is about what 
it is not, rather than what it is, and that it therefore has an impression of ÔinvisibilityÕ: 
despite appearing not to exist, it has presence Ð and power (Neal, 1999). Ô[T]he 
unmarked natureÕ of whiteness originates from its centrality, its power to judge the 
Other by placing itself in binary opposition to it (Garner, 2007:43.; also Babb, 1998).  
Consequently, whiteness appears to symbolise Ônormality, dominance and 
controlÕ (Garner, 2007:9; also Ware and Back, 2002), and therefore to hold dominion 
over blackness - so much so that whiteness seems natural and merely human 
(Garner, 2007). This demonstrates how power has the ability to seem invisible and 
unchallengeable (ibid.). To be understood as simply human is a status of utmost 
power and normativity (Dyer, 1999). Indeed, Bonnet (2000) asserts that the desirable 
standing of whiteness is seemingly indisputable, never considered, never mind 
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challenged: its origins and history are actively hidden. I am interested in exploring if 
this notion also applies to names. If my participants report that some names are 
generally viewed as white British, are those names therefore conceived as being 
normal, accepted, familiar and unnoticed? It is impossible to unproblematically 
determine what a white British name is, just as it is to define someoneÕs race. 
Nonetheless it appears that to be categorised as racially white is a position of power, 
because of the trust, and consequently advantage, that it garners. Bush (2011) 
indicates that whiteness universally dominates and simultaneously denies it has 
structured the world in its own vision: that white people have designed their own 
progress at the expense of the OtherÕs demise (also Dyer, 1999; Lipsitz, 2006).  
One of the apparent purposes of whiteness is to promote a covert sense of 
unity amongst white people that causes them to temporarily forget about differences in 
class, gender and personal beliefs and to feel as one, separate from the Other, 
perceived according to racial, embodied ideas hidden within cultural rhetoric (Garner, 
2007). I would add that this is perhaps especially the case within a nation. As I 
mentioned earlier, the nation is designed to make the majority of its population feel a 
kinship even though they will never meet (Anderson, 2003). Accordingly, whiteness is 
seemingly used as a social identity that coerces the majority of white people Ð within a 
nation - into thinking they are particularly alike, in perfect opposition to the Other, 
purely because they are not black or migrants (ibid.). Indeed, Dyer (1999:19) argues 
that: ÔWhiteness has been extensively and frighteningly successful in uniting white 
people across lines of differenceÕ. Goldberg (2002) asserts that whiteness is not just a 
racial identity, but it is the national one. Similarly to my earlier discussion of how 
nationalism is an exclusionary device, Dyer (1999) writes that white people 
(regardless of their internal differences e.g. gender, social class) believe they should 
be favoured by their particular nation state over racially minority groups.  
Moreover, since the 1980s in the UK and USA there has been a popular 
discourse about how privilege has moved away from white people towards racial 
minorities. For example, in the USA the advent of affirmative action has been framed 
as (unjustly) damaging white peopleÕs chances (Hannah-Jones, 2013). Although 
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affirmative action may not be a European phenomenon, there is an increasingly 
widespread notion of white Europeans as a neglected and undefended group that is 
being unjustly marginalised in a social hierarchy switch, whereby working and lower 
middle class white Europeans are allegedly being replaced by non-white Others 
(Garner, 2007; Clarke and Garner, 2009).  
The support of such ideas could be seen in the commissioning of a ÔWhite 
SeasonÕ series by the BBC (2008). Unfortunately, such programmes appear to give 
voice to this notion of discrimination against white people. This concept can also 
seemingly be seen in the current spate of racially abusive public rants by several 
white British women (see Nelson, 2012; The Voice, 2013). They have argued that they 
and their families have paid taxes and that black/Asian Britons and/or migrants have 
not and instead claim benefits (Nelson, 2012). As the women have approached 
people randomly on the basis of their skin colour without knowing their individual 
circumstances, this implies that their abuse connects to the white backlash concept.  
Garner (2007) asserts that it is important to investigate why white people are 
feeling they have been dispossessed of privilege and that this notion indicates a 
combination of egotism and anxiety. Bonnet (2000) claims that the privileges of the 
British welfare and social system have long been framed as belonging to the white 
majority, and that this has become an important part of their identity. The assertion is 
that people not classified as white do not deserve these benefits and are taking too 
much from white people, or white people have given too much away (ibid.).  
Yet such rhetoric risks drawing too much attention away from racism towards 
the intricacies of white identities (Garner, 2007). Indeed, Dyer (1999) writes that it is 
integral not to consider white people as victims: the motivation for critiquing whiteness 
has been to knock its power, not to reaffirm and celebrate it (also Ferber, 1999). 
Bonnet (2000) writes that male power did not need re-promoting due to the challenge 
of feminism, and nor does the power of white people, who are not in a socially or 
economically inferior position to the Other.  
Dyer (1999:1-2) argues that the power and privilege of whiteness is reborn 
continually and in its wake it spreads Ôinequalities, oppression, privileges and 
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sufferingsÕ, all the while reducing the platform from which those who are not perceived 
as white can speak against it. Indeed, despite all of the UKÕs equality laws, racism 
apparently remains difficult to prove. For instance, John Terry, a prominent Chelsea 
footballer and former England captain, was recently filmed by television cameras 
shouting a racial slur at an opposition footballer, Anton Ferdinand, during a football 
match (Davies, 2012). He was nonetheless found not guilty of racial abuse in a court 
of law (ibid.). Berger (1999) writes that it is testament to the hold of racism upon the 
thoughts of the West that whiteness had been largely ignored, or unseen, for so long 
(and still is). Consequently, Berger (ibid.) states that racism is often perceived by 
white people as being a problem overcome, as now existing only in black peopleÕs 
imaginations. However, Dyer (1999) notes that this attitude is only possible because 
white people do not tend to acknowledge that their high societal position is because of 
their whiteness rather than just their own merit. Garner (2007) asserts that, in contrast, 
black people cannot but consider their colour due to their daily encounters with 
racism.  
Ferber (1999) writes that white privilege is only possible because of the 
subjugation of the Other (Ferber, 1999). As Macedo and Gounari (2006) describe, in 
the West there has been a limited but highly publicised liberal drive against explicit 
racism and discrimination, but this can distract away from how common white, 
Western, supremacy is, and this structural whiteness still remains largely 
unchallenged. Bonnet (2000) highlights the paradox of, on the one hand, the need for 
the immense structural and societal power of whiteness to be seen and critiqued, yet 
Ð on the other hand Ð for whiteness to be simultaneously revealed as the racist 
production that it is. It is important that whiteness should not be reified as truthful 
(ibid.), nor as an identity to be claimed and re-asserted. Dyer (1999) argues that this 
white power is not necessarily pursued with mal-intent by all white people - because, 
as touched upon previously, white people are not homogenous (Lam and Smith, 
2009) and are subject to power differences, such as those structured around social 
class and gender. Nevertheless, Garner (2007) asserts that all white people are 
complicit within the system of whiteness, because it is social, therefore no one can be 
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immune to it, no white individual can entirely remove their privilege. Garner (2007) and 
Goldberg (2002) consequently state that despite differences in class and gender, 
Ôbeing white per se is a relatively free rideÕ.  
Subsequently, it appears that whiteness does terrorise (hooks, 1997) those 
constructed as non-white, as it rules the world according to its own benefit. This can 
be seen in the fact that black people have lower life expectancies, and live in societies 
where they are still held back by their skin colour and so are less likely to achieve 
according to their ability, which is essentially racialised (Garner, 2007). Moreover, the 
apparently ingrained notion in white cultures of the invisibility of whiteness, this idea 
that Ôwhite people are just peopleÕ (Dyer, 1999:2; also Aanerud, 1997), is not far 
removed from questioning the humanness of non-whites (Dyer, 1999). Indeed, 
Solomos and Back (2000:21) assert that whiteness ÔcolonisesÕ the idea of being 
ÔnormalÕ. They also criticise the tendency for sociology to ignore those who commit 
racism, instead focusing only on the victims of it (ibid.). Frankenberg (2000) outlines 
that it is important to acknowledge the raced status of white people, alongside that of 
black people in our societal imaginations (also Dyer, 1999). Whiteness provides those 
considered white with a privileged position within societal structures, which is also the 
place from where Others are judged (Frankenberg, 2000). 
  Consequently, it seems that those not considered white generally live 
beneath Ôthe shadow of social deathÕ (ibid.:447). The idea is that those constructed as 
not white should strive/desire to be so, but at the same time, the structures of 
inequality will inform them that this will never come to pass: they can never be part of 
the in-group (idea adapted from Treacher Kabesh, 2009). Berger (1999) notes that 
whiteness exists by denying that the Other can have talents or positive attributes and 
instead only acknowledges the strengths of white people (ibid.). In addition, Clarke 
and Garner (2009) write that within the structure of whiteness, white people are 
perceived as non-racialised individuals, in contrast to those not considered white (also 
Morrison, 1992). McIntosh (1988:5, quoted in Dyer, 1999:8), a writer who perceived 
herself to be white, states: ÔÒI can swear, or dress in second-hand clothes, or not 
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answer letters, without having people attribute these choices to the bad morals, the 
poverty or the illiteracy of my raceÓÕ (also see Garner, 2007).  
I aim to explore if names are involved within this homogenising or 
individualising process: if names are racialised, have my participants noted any 
changes in the ways in which they themselves are perceived racially? Have those 
white participants who have taken a name, which may be viewed as Other (and vice 
versa) noticed any differences in their everyday access to privileges? As I discussed 
in Chapter One, those Jewish migrants and ex-slaves in the US who historically 
Anglicised their surnames, seemingly brought a stigma to these surnames. This can 
be likened to the changeable hierarchy of whiteness I discussed earlier, whereby 
whiteness presents itself as desirable and seemingly achievable, but in reality it may 
not be so, and some people remain whiter than others. This may also be the case with 
names, in that some are also whiter than others, and some people who try to whiten 
their names perhaps merely transfer their Otherness to different names. Whereas 
other participants may be successful in being assimilated into the in-group, thereby 
attaining the privileges of white Britishness. 
 
Inbetween People  
As I considered earlier, the socially constructed nature of racial identities 
means they cannot be unproblematically defined. Likewise, Dyer (1999) writes that 
whiteness is a liquid concept, whose inner hierarchies are not clear-cut. Dyer (ibid.) 
argues that this flexibility helps make whiteness a desirable identity, because the 
fuzziness of its boundaries makes the privileges it promises enticing to those who 
have any opportunity to achieve it. Although whiteness may seem quite solid in its 
invisible (for white people), powerful nature Ð as I have outlined in the previous section 
- nevertheless it is a construction that is not altogether secure, and which, to a point, is 
a label of ÔascriptionÕ (ibid.:48). Dyer (1999) asserts that people are white only if they 
are deemed to be so by white people and that this puts white people within an 
incredibly dominating position.  
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Whiteness is therefore a hierarchy of those deemed white and those on the 
fringes who may be and/or could be white: all of which is ever subject, throughout 
history, to dispute and change. Seemingly racismÕs function is to create difference, 
which explains why it is that those who would usually fit into certain racial categories 
can be omitted from them: for example, Gypsies, Irish Travellers (Reed, 2005) and 
Jewish people who have been labelled white at times and not at others (Belluscio, 
2006; Babb, 1998). Thus some people are seen as whiter than others even within the 
category of those considered physically white (Clarke and Garner, 2009; Dyer, 1999). 
Following such a (parallel) pattern, attitudes towards names seemingly also change 
according to time and context, as I described in Chapter One. Dyer (1999) writes that 
whiteness appears achievable, adding to its desirability, but not leading to any loss of 
power, as the ascription of whiteness remains at the whim of those at the top of the 
white hierarchy (Dyer, 1999; Clarke and Garner, 2009).  
In relation to the seemingly ascribed nature of whiteness, it is important to 
consider the concept of the inbetween people. Roediger (2005:12) explains that 
Southern and Eastern immigrants to the USA in the nineteenth century were racialised 
as being not quite white, not quite black, but inbetween Ôhard racism and full inclusionÕ. 
Roediger (2005) asserts that the experience of these migrants cannot be compared to 
the racism experienced by black people, but nevertheless they were racialised as non-
white, in spite of their physical appearance. They were inbetween in the sense that 
they held an indistinct and indefinite status that was continually assessed (ibid.). 
Indeed, Roediger (ibid.) writes that by the late nineteenth century, Roosevelt did not 
dispute the new immigrantsÕ legal standing as white people, but he did have to 
consider if they were worthy of taking citizenship and entering the American race. 
Thus, Ôsouthern and eastern Europeans [were viewed] as objects of debate, their 
racial status on trial as they lived, poised between nonwhiteness and a white 
Americanism that was seen as a racial as well as a national categoryÕ (ibid.:64). 
Garner (2007) asserts that the inbetween people were at times associated 
with black Americans, and consequently they held for some time the lower jobs and 
social positions (also Barrett and Roediger, 1997). Subsequently, they appeared white 
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but they were nonetheless Ôideologically and culturally…considered different and 
lesser Òwhite racesÓÕ (Garner, 2007:66). However, Garner (2007) writes that the 
inbetween people were always closer to achieving whiteness than black Americans, 
South Americans, Asians and Native, Americans could ever be. Thus, these 
immigrants appeared to complicate notions of whiteness: their experience showed 
that phenotypically appearing white is not always enough to grant someone white 
status and privileges. In addition, they highlighted the capacity for racialisation to 
change, and this will be something I consider in the subsequent data chapters. In 
Chapter Four I will address the concept of an inbetween racial status in order to 
explore if the participants consider their name-change has impacted upon perceptions 
of their racial status(es). 
 
Racialisation Processes and Embodied Understandings of Race 
To understand race and racism it is vital to consider the importance of 
physical difference in the process of racial categorization/construction (Alexander and 
Knowles, 2005). Many academics have noted the deep links between racism and 
embodied indicators of race such as skin colour (for example, Herring, Keith and 
Horton, 2004; Klonoff and Landrine, 2000; Fernando, 1984) and, to a lesser extent 
perhaps, accent (Hing, 2002; Singh and Dooley, 2006). Indeed, the UKÕs Race 
Relations Act (1976) cites skin colour as a racial marker that is potentially used to 
perpetuate racial discrimination. Dyer (1999) asserts that notions of race all originated 
in the body, yet whilst black people have always tended to be equated only to their 
bodies (by white people), white people have always been professed (again, by white 
people) to be more than just their bodies. Dyer (ibid.) also notes that part of the 
desirability of whiteness rests in its beautiful and virtuous associations, in its 
positioning at the pinnacle of what it is to be human (also Babb, 1998). Perhaps this is 
also one of the reasons for historical (and current) disdain for miscegenation, in that it 
threatens the ÔpurityÕ of whiteness (Kennedy, 2004:18-9; Dyer, 1999). It seems then 
that blackness is used as the dual opposite of whiteness, in order to define what 
whiteness is not. Moreover, the lack of white racialisation (i.e. the tendency not to 
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consider white people as consciously and biologically racialised) seemingly contrasts 
with the notion that black peopleÕs identity is embodied (Dyer, 1999). 
Dyer (ibid.) argues that since the twentieth century, tanning has often been 
prized by white people, as symbolising wealth (i.e. travel), healthiness, and as 
perhaps reflecting a secret desire to ingest the naturalness of the Other, who have 
traditionally tilled the land. Yet Ahmed (1998) argues that white people are using 
blackness as an accessory when tanning, and do not risk being contaminated by it or 
actually turning black. Dyer (1999) therefore asserts that tanning does not result in 
any loss of privilege, and even illustrates the white personÕs privilege of being flexible 
and individual. This supports the afore-mentioned notion that white people are more 
than just their skin colour, whereas black people are equated to the truth of their 
blackness, which remains a stigma that cannot be removed (ibid.). Ahmed (1998) 
writes that a black person cannot be conceived as disembodied: their bodies reflect 
who they really are, and so black skin symbolises their being Ð inside and out. 
Consequently, the idea is that black skin is permanently coloured, which symbolises 
colour as the indicator of racial difference (ibid.). However, Ahmed (1998), through her 
own personal experiences, questions the straightforwardness of such concepts by 
arguing that colour from tanning and racial colour can crossover/be mistaken for each 
other. Moreover, the notion that whiteness dwells in hidden, disembodied 
characteristics struggles with the idea that a white personÕs whiteness must be 
recognisable in order to attract the privilege associated with it (ibid.). Indeed, the 
colour white Ôis both a colour and, at once, not a colourÕ (ibid.:44). This again 
underlines the socially constructed nature of racial identities and of the resulting 
accordance of privilege. 
I will explore this ascribed notion of whiteness in Chapter Four, as - if my 
participants suggest that some names are racialised as white or white British - how is 
this racialisation process challenged or supported by the participantsÕ own embodied 
racial identities? Again, if names are found to be racialised, I intend to address if the 
act of taking a name characterised as oppositional to a personÕs own perceived 
embodied race impacts upon their access to white privilege. As mentioned above, 
62 
 
theory suggests that white people can take on blackness through tanning as an 
adornment, which can be removed and which does not change their embodied racial 
identity. Moreover, that for black people lightening the skin arguably does not give 
them any access to white privilege. Can the same said be said for names? If a white 
person takes a name deemed Other, is this merely a playful exercise that does not 
affect their access to white privilege, and likewise, if a black person takes a name 
deemed white (British), does this make any difference in terms of their racial identity 
and/or access to white privilege? I will discuss this in Chapter Four. 
 
Identity and Racial Passing 
Alexander and Knowles (2005:13) assert that Ôthe ability of the individual to 
create even a semi-autonomous sense of self varies according to the relations of 
power, whether around gender, race, class, body, age and so onÕ. Ratcliffe (2004) 
further argues that a personÕs identity is created by their heritage, own sense of self 
and how they are viewed by others. It is the battle between these constructions, which 
creates what one is and is not (ibid.). Indeed, one can perceive this struggle for 
individual identity in relation to the forces of racism, in many writersÕ work. For 
example, Stuart (2005:172) writes: 
 
…by the age of four I had already learnt what Fanon had discovered decades 
earlier, that it was only through the gaze of others that I existed. The ÒothersÓ 
are white men (Fanon 1967/1968). What they chose to see Ð a nigger Ð I 
hated. 
 
Many writers put forward the idea of the duality of identity: that which a person 
is and that which they are not; what they are and what the Other is (Hall, 2000). 
Barrett (1999) wrote of how blackness is coupled with, in the sense that it is opposite 
to, value in the American cultural psyche. In addition, Du Bois (1999) wrote eloquently 
of doubleness, of a world where there was no real understanding of oneself except 
through an understanding of the Other. He termed this: Ôdouble-consciousness, this 
sense of always looking at oneÕs self through the eyes of others…One ever feels his 
63 
 
twoness…two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in 
one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunderÕ 
(ibid.:126). 
Furthermore, identity is a fluid concept in itself, and is important to how we 
think of ourselves. Hall (2000) asserts that oneÕs identity relies on the idea of there 
being an essential, genuine ÔselfÕ inside of one, which is living amongst the Other, 
fictitious selves that one shows to the outside world. Hall (1996:v) writes that our 
cultural identities are the product of telling ourselves our own story, producing the 
Ôcultural selfÕ, and thereby a sense of belonging. Hall (1996) notes that oneÕs story is 
often created as an afterthought, so as to produce a convincing identity and history for 
oneself. As Hall (2000) writes of his own history of being raised in the Caribbean 
where there was no black but only brown, and where no one considered themselves 
as being foreign to the United Kingdom, but as citizens, one can see the painfulness 
of his learning what became his ÔtrueÕ identification in Britain as a migrant. 
Alexander and Knowles (2005) assert that the creation of identities is so 
multifaceted that they serve to challenge the notion of a black/white 
opposition/dualism and instead reveal the mixed nature of such categories. As I have 
discussed earlier, what does it mean to be black or white? What is race anyway? Yet 
despite this recognition that racial identities are constructed, a personÕs physical 
features, the colour of their skin still seem to matter. In Chapter Five I will analyse if 
changing their name appeared to impact upon my participantsÕ self-attributed (racial) 
identities and/or the way in which they felt others had ascribed their (racial) identities. I 
will also explore in Chapter Four if the participantsÕ lived, everyday, experiences 
challenge neat binaries of racial categorisation/identity.  
In this vein, it is also important to consider the implications of identity in 
relation to race passing. 
 
…passing is about identities: their creation or imposition, their adoption or 
rejection, their accompanying rewards or penalties. Passing is also about 
boundaries established between identity categories and about the individual 
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and cultural anxieties induced by boundary crossing. Finally, passing is about 
specularity: the visible and the invisible, the seen and the unseen. 
(Ginsberg, 1996:2). 
 
Sollos (1997) asserts that passing in American discourse has been associated with 
the notion that there are integral differences between racial groups. Belluscio (2006) 
notes that passing from a white perspective has tended to indicate black people trying 
to take a false white identity (also Kennedy, 2004; Sollos, 1997). The notion is that 
such a person illegally passed over a racial boundary in order to avoid discrimination 
associated with blackness, and to claim the benefits associated with whiteness 
(Ginsberg, 1996; Belluscio, 2006). 
Consequently, the idea of passing challenges the truthfulness/reality of 
categories of identity and how they are created, in that it questions the essentialism of 
racial categories as rooted in the body (Ginsberg, 1996). If blackness is founded in the 
body, then how can a black person pass as white via their physical appearance? 
Ginsberg (1996) outlines that the desperate desire by white powers to cling to the idea 
of pure races can be perceived in their reaction to the long history of miscegenation 
that made some people appear physically white who nonetheless had some black 
African heritage. The powers that be argued this made them actually black (ibid.; 
Kennedy, 2004), actually slaves (Ginsberg, 1996; Clarke and Garner, 2009; Sollos, 
1997). This created a problem in that those who were legally black could pass as 
white, free-born people. This led to the situation whereby well into the middle of the 
20th century, some US states categorised a black person as someone who had just 
one black great-grandparent Ð in some states, one great-great-grandparent (Ginsberg, 
1996). 
There is little evidence about how much racial passing by people deemed 
legally black has actually occurred in the USA (ibid.). It is not really about the 
numbers, though, but more about the way in which racial passing has been an 
incarnation of the fears and irrationalities of a society that placed so much importance 
on race. Passing challenged the fixity of whiteness, both within society generally, and 
for the individual (ibid.). I will discuss this notion particularly in Chapter Four, in 
65 
 
relation to whether or not my participantsÕ experiences also pose questions regarding 
the presumed fixity of racial categories.  
Kennedy (2004) asserts that a black person who is racially passing would 
probably conceive this as a way of trying to rise up the racial hierarchy. Whereas from 
a white perspective, passing can be conceived as fraudulent (ibid.; Sollors, 1997) and 
a deceitful way of trying to gain rights to which one is not eligible (Ginsberg, 1996). 
Garner (2007) elucidates that Jewish and Traveller people, for example, could take 
certain steps in order to pass as white, such as stopping religious practices and 
changing names that identify them as Other. Garner (2007) asserts that this ability to 
pass, and thereby to disobey the laws of whiteness that stipulate a personÕs 
racial/cultural stigma should be made clear, renders such people transformative: how 
can whiteness function properly when a personÕs Otherness is so falsely hidden? 
In addition, Piper (1996) movingly tells of her own struggle as someone with 
black heritage but with a phenotypically white appearance. Piper (ibid.) writes that she 
has often been charged with deceitfully white passing, and that her white accusers are 
actually upset because they have engaged in interactions with her that they would not 
consider if they knew her to be black (ibid.). PiperÕs testimony surely makes a mockery 
of racialisation: as Ginsberg (1996) argues, racial passing causes a crisis of 
categorisation that challenges the roots of white privilege.   
Moreover, ironically in light of the dominant discourse of black people as being 
homogenous rather than individual, Pfeiffer (2003) writes that passing makes it 
possible to find room to be quite independent in oneÕs identity choice. Passing enables 
someone to try out different (racial) identities, and attempt to move into more 
advantageous social and economic positions (Ginsberg, 1996; Belluscio, 2006). This 
seems an important point to consider in relation to the experiences of my participants. 
If names are racialised, if a black participant with a name deemed foreign changed it, 
would this help them to racially pass and perhaps gain white privileges (and vice versa 
for my white participants)? I will discuss this in Chapter Four. Moreover, in Chapter Six 
I will discuss the relevance of the racial passing concept in terms of how my 
participants chose to name their children. 
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Dreisinger (2008) writes about the reverse scenario to the common perception 
of racial passing: that of people deemed white passing as black. Dreisinger (2008) 
asserts that there are several avenues for passing: passing based on appreciation for, 
and identification with, black cultures, and accidental passing, such as by slaves who 
appeared white, but were nonetheless in the subjugated position of a black slave. 
Furthermore, arguably some passing is now of a more performative, than biological, 
nature. Dreisinger (2008) explores how white rappers such as Eminem outwardly 
identify with black cultures, but also avow their white privilege. They know that they 
cannot be phenotypically black, but believe they can be performatively (Belluscio, 
2006). I am interested in the possibility that, should my white British participants 
suggest names are racialised, they may have found it difficult to decide whether to 
take their partnerÕs foreign surname upon marriage - in the sense that they may have 
expected to encounter prejudice in relation to bearing a name considered Other. I will 
discuss this issue in Chapter Five.  
In addition, Bonnet (2000) asserts that white identification with blackness, as 
seen in passing as black, can be perceived as a form of social anarchy, and that such 
disorderly and deviant forms of identity-crossing have a substantial history. Indeed, 
Dreisinger (2008) suggests that passing as black can be viewed as a challenging and 
positive act, and one that attacks whiteness. But it seemingly can only be so if one is 
continually Ôself-reflexiveÕ, with a double-consciousness of how one perceives the 
world to be, and how one is perceived in the world (ibid.:149). Such reflexivity results 
in an investigation of race and the hierarchy of power within racial structures (ibid.). 
However, passing is not necessarily always a non-racist act (Bonnet, 2000): for 
instance, minstrelsy Ð white Americans blackening their faces for entertainment 
purposes (Pfeiffer, 2003) Ð has a problematic history. However, passing does have 
the potential to challenge the presumed concreteness and finality of whiteness (ibid.). 
For example, John Howard Griffin (2011), a white American, who decided to have 
treatment to darken his skin successfully managed to pass as a black American in 
order to understand what it is to be on the receiving end of racism. His reported 
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experiences raised many questions about the dominant notion of fixed racial 
categories.  
Passing can also apparently have deep emotional consequences, not only for 
the one passing but also for their relatives, friends and community. Piper (1996) writes 
about finding it hard to accept that some of her relatives have made the decision to 
pass as white and thereby sever ties with their black roots and family. In addition, 
passing for white has most often been perceived as a denunciation of oneÕs 
blackness, of Ôself-hatred or disloyaltyÕ (Pfeiffer, 2003:2). However, Piper (1996) is 
able to rationalize her family membersÕ decision to pass in another way. Her rather 
unique position of being inbetween Ð that is appearing white but understanding herself 
to be black - has seemingly allowed Piper to ascertain at first hand the privileges 
gained by being white and what is taken away once one is known to be black (ibid.).  
Piper (1996) subsequently seems to understand how a black personÕs feelings 
of injustice regarding discrimination could be so strong that they could not bear it. As 
she argued, if one is not politically gifted, passing may be perceived as the sole way of 
flouting the system of white privilege (ibid.). Passing can perhaps originate from a 
desire to be in charge of oneÕs own destiny and identity, rather than have oneÕs life 
decided by the whims of racialised categorization (Wald, 2000). In Chapter Six I will 
consider such issues in relation to the emotional aspects of the participantsÕ decision-
making in regard to choosing their childrenÕs names.  
With such thoughts of passing in mind, I will now turn towards an overview of 
existing research, which suggests names are racialised. I will also explore research 
that claims those who bear names considered white may have better employment 
chances than those with names deemed Other. This is especially interesting in the 
light of my desire to understand the potential usage of names in a racialised sense. It 
also implies there are known strategies via name, on paper, for avoiding being 
classified as Other, and consequently for being accepted in the in-group. 
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Linking the Above Existing Theories to Names: Correspondence Test Research 
and Other Research on Name Discrimination 
My discussion about the history of name-changing in Chapter One underlined 
the importance of names and of the associations that those names bear. It also 
suggested the notion that names are representative of more than just the individuals 
who use them: that perhaps names are raced (whether that be in terms of skin colour, 
religion and/or nationality). In this vein, it is important to examine the Correspondence 
Testing based research, which indicates that there is racial discrimination on the basis 
of name in the UK context. 
The ÔCV testing approachÕ, or Correspondence Testing method, was 
developed by Jowell and Prescott-Clarke (1970). This approach is based on the 
principle of selecting names that are stereotypically linked to specific racial 
backgrounds and, using them to create fictional CVs. The created CVs are intended to 
be identical in terms of the personÕs qualifications and experiences, and only vary by 
the name presented and what this represents (the implied race of the candidate). The 
CVs are then used to apply to jobs, for each of which a CV with a name deemed 
white, and ones with names felt to represent other racial minorities (e.g. Black-African, 
Chinese and so on) are sent (Wood et al., 2009).  
Wood et al.Õs (2009:32) research, which is UK-based, indicated that their 
Ôwhite CVsÕ had a 68% success rate (in terms of the candidate being called for 
interview), whereas those CVs with Ônon-whiteÕ names had a 39% success rate. This 
study was conducted within six major UK cities, including London, Birmingham and 
Liverpool, and there was found to be no statistical difference between the levels of 
discrimination between them (ibid.). The researchers assert that they could find no 
other reason to explain the differing experiences of their two groups of names other 
than racism, and they argue that the existence of an ethnic hierarchy within the British 
job market is Ôa well-established factÕ (ibid.:1). Moreover, they write that other research 
(for example, Heath and Cheung, 2006) has consistently found that second 
generation ethnic minorities encounter a similar level of discrimination in the job 
market to their parents (Wood et al., 2009). 
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Wood et al.Õs (2009) study concludes that name is a significant factor in oneÕs 
employment chances (at the application stage) in Britain, as this is apparently the 
basis upon which race can be detected. That second generation ÔmigrantsÕ are 
seemingly discriminated against to the same extent as those persons not born in the 
UK also highlights the key role that name appears to play in discrimination (ibid.). The 
Runnymede Trust Report (2012) also backed up the prior Wood et al. (2009) findings 
and called for the use of blank name application forms in order to mitigate against this 
stage of employment discrimination. There has also been Correspondence Test 
based research conducted in other countries, such as that by Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2004) in the USA, Booth, Leigh and Varganova (2009) in Australia, 
Carlsson and Rooth (2007) in Sweden Ð all of which indicated preferences in the job 
market for Ôwhite namesÕ, ÔAnglo-Saxon sounding namesÕ, and Swedish names, 
respectively. Arai and ThoursieÕs (2009) report asserted that those individuals who 
had changed their names from Asian, African or Slavic sounding names to Swedish 
names had noticed a significant increase in their annual earnings after doing so. Other 
research (which is not based on the Correspondence Test method) has also found 
discrimination in the UK employment field against ethnic minorities (for example, 
Berthoud, 2000; Heath and Cheung, 2006). 
Nevertheless, it is clear that in the Correspondence Tests, name is used only 
as a proxy for race, and not out of a desire to understand the impact of name in itself. 
As Levitt and Dubner (2007:170-1) assert, such research is interesting but at the 
same time restricted, as it does not answer why Ôblack-sounding names carry an 
economic penaltyÕ. Moreover, it does not assess the actual experiences of real people 
(ibid.). My project thereby builds upon this previous research by trying to qualitatively 
understand my participantsÕ everyday experiences in relation to bearing a name that is 
perhaps regarded as racially Other in comparison to their own embodied racial 
identity.  
There have been a few more academic-based articles written on the topic of 
names and discrimination. Although these are centred outside of the UK, they are 
nevertheless informative to my project. According to Lipski (1976), names are 
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hierarchized within different geographical areas. This argument relates to the theory of 
hierarchized race that I mentioned earlier. Lipski (1976) also asserts that names 
deemed to be of a lower social standing are often changed by their bearers in order to 
try to gain an advantage. This concept has been suggested by the afore-mentioned 
literature on embodied racial passing, and by the history of name changing I 
presented in Chapter One. As Schettler (1942:176) writes:  
 
…name changes establish without question the fact that there is such a thing 
as name status; a social distance, a discrimination based upon name 
introductions. Some members of minority groups perceive that only a name 
stands between them and acceptance in the dominant group. Telling names 
of nationality and ancestry are displaced by names that have merit and 
prestige in the judgements of members of the majority group. It is almost 
literally true that the individual who changed his name, changes his character. 
 
This may appear quite an extraordinary statement that a name change alters a 
personÕs ÔcharacterÕ. However, as I conveyed earlier, a personÕs designated race is 
seemingly often deemed to be representative of their inner abilities and 
characteristics. If names are symbolic of race, then they may also inform stereotypical 
assumptions of a personÕs abilities according to their racial designation. As Kim 
(2007:117) notes, ÔOneÕs given name is always socialÕ (also Kang, 1971). 
Indeed, Khosravi (2012:66) (writing in a Swedish context) argues that names 
are tied up with issues of inheritance and rights: they are signifiers of privilege and 
therefore have a Ôcommodity-like valueÕ. This argument can be likened to Wood et al.Õs 
(2009) research described above: that to have a name considered white British 
increases oneÕs employment chances. Furthermore, it also reflects the earlier-
mentioned notion that the closer a person is to whiteness, the more privilege they 
accordingly have access to. It is interesting to consider KhosraviÕs (2012) assertion 
that in Sweden an individual cannot adopt a Swedish surname unless they can prove 
blood ties with two generations of a family that has borne that name in the last century 
(also Bursell, 2012). Consequently, someone with a non-Swedish name in Sweden 
often must invent a new surname if they wish to alter theirs, but this surname must be 
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Swedish-sounding Ð or Ônear whiteÕ (Khosravi, 2012:78). Thus that person can never 
take a traditionally white Swedish surname, can arguably never truly become part of 
the in-group where names are concerned (Bursell, 2012). Nevertheless Khosravi 
(2012) points out that this ÔneutralisationÕ of their name (via a name-change) is still an 
attempt on the part of the name bearer to racially pass as white, or to Ôperform 
whitenessÕ (ibid.:75), Ôto cope with and manage stigmatisation and discriminationÕ 
(ibid.:66) - at least on paper (Bursell, 2012). 
As the name-changing history I presented in Chapter One suggests, name 
changes are often not introduced by the name bearer themselves but by others 
(Lipski, 1976). Drury and McCarthy (1980) provide an interesting example of 
pressured name changing in Denmark. They note that it is not a customary social 
practice for one to be pressured into changing or altering oneÕs name. They add that 
an exception to this concerns living in a culture where a language different to oneÕs 
own dominates: Ôa person may experience pressure to alter his or her mode of self-
referralÕ (ibid.:311). The motivations for such name alterations on the part of others are 
difficult to determine. Lipski (1976:113) suggests that most Ôethnically stigmatized 
namesÕ are unintentionally mispronounced. For example, he asserts that many 
Americans consider all Polish names to be unpronounceable and that they 
accordingly mispronounce them even if they are not difficult to pronounce (ibid.). 
Indeed, Lipski (ibid.) suggests that names, which are unusual in a particular area may 
be pronounced according to the phonetic structure of the areaÕs dominant language.  
Nonetheless, Lipski (1976:117) does consider that ÔThere appears to be an 
unconscious, or at least semiconscious, ethnolinguistic mechanism that automatically 
regulates pronunciation according to feelingsÕ. This point implies that there are cases 
where names are deliberately mispronounced, with the motivations perhaps being to 
Ôdegrade, belittle, or ridicule members of minority ethnic groupsÕ (ibid.:113). Such 
cases are perhaps more obvious when a particular name is misread, even though the 
name should be easy for the person to say correctly (ibid.). This ties in with the 
example I gave in Chapter One of Kinnear, Newcastle FCÕs Director of Football, who 
has repeatedly misread footballersÕ names in quite an extreme fashion. Kohli and 
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Solrzano (2012:443) suggest that such misreadings or mispronunciations of names 
are Ôracial microagressionsÕ. That is, they are understated everyday slurs that uphold a 
Ôracial and cultural hierarchy of minority inferiorityÕ (ibid.). They may not be overtly 
racist, but they cumulatively cause a similar effect upon those who suffer them (ibid.). 
In Chapter Five I will look at my participantsÕ everyday experiences of names in 
relation to potential racism/discrimination.  
Kohli and SolrzanoÕs (2012) point also backs up a UK-based study by 
Edwards and Caballero (2008). Their qualitative research looked at parental name 
choices of couples with differing racial, ethnic and/or faith backgrounds. They claim 
that parents of mixed-race children often choose their childrenÕs names in a quite 
straightforward way. They assert that it is only over time that the parents sometimes 
regret or ponder their name choice in terms of whether or not it has left their child 
vulnerable to racism (ibid.). This is a valuable study in that there is very little research 
on the topic of how parents choose their childrenÕs names Ð especially with regards to 
considering racial/ethnic and/or religious aspects to decision making (ibid.). However, 
it does not focus on the topic of racism in relation to names, which I intend to explore. 
Therefore my study builds upon Edwards and CaballeroÕs (2008) findings, and also 
takes into account some of the parentsÕ own experiences of bearing a name deemed 
opposite to their own embodied racial and/or religious identity. I will explore this topic 
in Chapter Six.  
In Chapter Three I will outline the methodological approach of this study, and 
subsequently provide a discussion of my research findings in relation to the literature 
and theory contained within this chapter, in the subsequent chapters.  
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN 
!
Introduction 
I begin this chapter by providing an explanation of the methodological 
standpoint I have taken for this study and of why I felt the chosen method is the best 
fit for the project. In addition, I will consider my participant sample, data collection and 
analysis, and provide a reflexive account of my own role within this research process. 
I will also discuss my projectÕs ethical considerations. Finally I contemplate the ethical 
implications of changing my participantsÕ names, which is an important contribution to 
methodological literature. 
 
Study Design 
Qualitative research attempts to analyse social acts, relationships and 
structures in terms of the meanings given to them by individuals (Greenhalgh, 2006; 
Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). As my research topic has been under-explored outside of 
the employment sector (e.g. Wood et al., 2009; The Runnymede Trust, 2012), I felt 
that my research approach needed to be exploratory (Dickson-Swift et al., 2007). 
Consequently, I decided that a qualitative approach would be the best fit for exploring 
my participantsÕ everyday experiences in relation to their names, in terms of the 
research questions I laid out in Chapter One. My qualitative approach is in contrast to 
the quantitative study on racial discrimination by Wood et al. (2009) I referred to in 
Chapter Two. Wood et al.Õs study explored racial discrimination via name, rather than 
names in their own right. It also did not investigate the life experiences of real people 
in relation to name. My research is more in line with the qualitative approach taken by 
The Runnymede Trust (2012) project, which Ð as I also discussed in Chapter Two - 
touched in part upon name discrimination, although names were not the focus of 
study. Edwards and CaballeroÕs (2008) project on mixed-race couples and their 
naming decisions for their children, which also briefly discussed name discrimination, 
also took a qualitative approach.  
In addition, I have used a predominantly inductive approach to research. As 
Hammersley (1992:168) points out, no project can be entirely deductive or inductive, 
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because one is always moving between ÔideasÕ and ÔdataÕ. Nonetheless my project 
has been conducted with the desire to create theory rather than to test hypotheses, to 
discover rather than to verify (Ambert et al., 1995; Esterberg, 2002). Thus, whilst I 
began with the starting point of an interest in whether or not (sur)names were thought 
of in racialised terms, my findings go, and my analyses will go, far deeper than merely 
answering this question.  
Ontologically, my research has taken a constructionist standpoint, which is 
often taken to be the antithesis of objectivism (Crotty, 2003; Bryman, 2004). 
Constructionism argues that social occurrences and the ways in which these are 
interpreted are constantly being undertaken by individuals within the social sphere 
(Silverman, 1993; Bryman, 2004). It also asserts that the meanings that individuals 
attach to social relationships between individuals, and between individuals and 
objects, should be at the centre of social research (Esterberg, 2002). All social 
meaning is perceived to be constructed by these individuals (ibid.; Crotty, 2003) 
through their experiences (Flick, 2004). These experiences are then evaluated 
according to the individualsÕ constructed concepts and frameworks of understanding 
(ibid.).  
According to Crotty (2003), constructionism can be said to be ontologically 
positioned between objectivity and subjectivity. Constructionism, in contrast to a 
subjective position holds that there are objects within the world within which to find 
meaning: that individuals do not have a blank sheet of paper (ibid.). Meanwhile, in 
contrast to objectivity, constructionism does not hold that there are essential truths to 
be found within the world and its contents: constructionism considers that there is no 
universal truth (ibid.). Nonetheless, as Flick (2004:90) argues, individuals can evaluate 
the quality of their constructed understanding, in whether or not it enables them to 
adequately locate themselves and Ôact in the worldÕ. This evaluation is often aided 
through social interaction with others (ibid.).  
This ontological position is arguably most visible in my thesis in relation to the 
ways in which I treat the terminology of my research area. For example, throughout 
my thesis I use terms such as race, whiteness, British and foreign, with an overt 
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awareness of their socially constructed nature, whilst also acknowledging that their 
existence means they have social meaning. Nayak (2006) has criticised social 
constructionist approaches for stating that race is a social construction but then 
continuing to use, and research into, the term. However, I feel that if race is not 
acknowledged as existing in the social world through the social study of its effects, 
then it will be even harder to critique, and move beyond, it. Alexander and Alleyne 
(2002a:548) assert that there is currently an inadequate amount of academic research 
conducted about racism, because  the academy Ôno longer believes in ÒraceÓÕ, and that 
this has Ôrendered racism invisibleÕ.  I aim to critically explore the constructed nature of 
race by highlighting any perceived lack of coherence I observe within my participantsÕ 
experiences regarding the concept. Also, I do not treat my participantsÕ descriptions of 
their experiences as a Ôtransparent window on their worldÕ (Braun and Clarke, 
2006:95). Rather, I seek to analyse them in relation to one another and theorise them 
in relation to my own understanding of Ôsociocultural contexts and structural 
conditionsÕ (ibid.:85).  My epistemological approach has been interpretivist, with some 
feminist influences, as I will describe in the following two, respective, sections.  
 
Interpretivist Epistemology 
My project has taken an interpretivist epistemological approach, as I wanted 
to gain a deep understanding of whether or not, (and, if relevant, how) surnames are 
racialised. Interpretivism is based upon the idea that people cannot be considered the 
same as the objects researched in the field of natural sciences (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2005; Bryman, 2004). Consequently, an interpretivist approach means that social 
scientists must embrace the subjectivity of social exploits (Williams, 2000). Thus an 
interpretivist approach aims to subjectively investigate Ôthe meanings and actions of 
actors according to their own subjective frame of referenceÕ (ibid.:210). Also, it accepts 
that a researcher has their own values and subjective interpretations, which in 
themselves influence their research project in its entirety (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).  
Furthermore, sociologists working with an interpretivist outlook tend to assert 
that all meaning, and consequently research too, is the product of social interaction, 
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and must be understood as such (Gunaratnam, 2003; Esterberg, 2002). Indeed, the 
researcher is part of the production of research data/knowledge (Bowling, 1999). The 
intellectual origins of interpretivism are found in WeberÕs conception of Verstehen, in 
the history of hermeneutic-phenomenology and of symbolic interactionism (Bryman, 
2004). Verstehen can be equated to ÔunderstandingÕ (Benton and Craib, 2001:186), 
particularly in relation to the notion of an Ôempathic understanding of human action 
rather than with the forces deemed to act on itÕ (Bryman, 2004:13). Symbolic 
interactionism, on the other hand, is understood to proffer the idea that individuals, 
when interacting with others, ever assess and interpret their surrounding environment 
in terms of symbolic meaning (Blumer, 1986; Bryman, 2004). 
The phenomenological approach, meanwhile, advocates the use of a 
ÔreductionÕ technique, whereby the researcher attempts to bracket out their own 
preconceived understanding of the participantsÕ social environments, and 
consequently tries to discover and follow the practices through which the world is 
comprehended (Heap and Roth, 1973; Benton and Craib, 2001). Phenomenologists 
assert that the social world is made up of multifarious ÔtypificationsÕ, which are 
structured into a store of information/wisdom that is assumed to be self-evident and 
subsequently is to be imparted to others (Benton and Craib, 2001). This notion 
therefore avows that humans have a particular consciousness (Hughes and Sharrock, 
2007), that our social environments are not existent/real aside from relations between 
people (Bowling, 1999). In other words, the interest is with the ways in which people 
find meaning within their social world (Ambert et al., 1995), rather than in the social 
world itself (May, 2001). Consequently, phenomenology is concerned with analysing 
Ôconscious human experience in everyday lifeÕ (Bowling, 1999: 112). 
Meanwhile, hermeneutics began as an approach to investigating and 
interpreting the divine veracity of the bible (Palmer, 1969; Benton and Craib, 2001). 
Hans-George GadamarÕs work is particularly important in the application of 
hermeneutics to sociology. Gadamar asserted that a segment (an individual) can only 
be understood in relation to its environs/context, the entirety of its history (Palmer, 
1969; Benton and Craib, 2001). Consequently, hermeneutics can be said to focus on 
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uncovering deeper meanings Ôbeneath the manifest contentÕ (Palmer, 1969:44). 
Although bearing similarities to phenomenological and symbolic interactionist 
philosophies (Benton and Craib, 2001), hermeneutics does diverge, in its argument 
that oneÕs experiences are ever shaded by oneÕs biases (Thompson, 1998). These 
biases may in themselves alter as one becomes cognisant of them as 
time/history/tradition marches on (Benton and Craib, 2001). 
One can appreciate from this brief overview of interpretivismÕs intellectual 
origins that its premise is to try to understand those being studied instead of 
considering them to be objects that can be objectively observed. Thus, from an 
interpretivist point of view, subjectivity is part of the essence of research and is 
consequently not to be disparaged or condemned (Finlay, 2002). Indeed, the 
subjective nature of research can be observed within the act of choosing a research 
project, as a researcher tends to be influenced intrinsically by their preconceived 
biases, sympathies and/or identifications. It is arguably unusual for someone to 
research into something they do not have a special interest in, and such a curiosity is 
likely to originate from some kind of predetermined associations of thought.  
The subjective influence contained in an interpretivist approach can also be 
viewed within the researcherÕs sample choice and interpretation of data (Bryman, 
2004). The data are gathered by them in a subjective way, and analysed in relation to 
pre-existing concepts, contexts and literature (which the researcher has also 
interpreted) (ibid.). Indeed, data can be interpreted in different ways (Denzin, 
1994:481). Additionally, the social researcherÕs own human status means that they 
are just as much a part of the society they are studying as their participants, and are 
thereby influenced by the same norms and values they are aiming to critically 
investigate and examine. Indeed, qualitative research in general has been critiqued by 
Positivistic schools of thought as being solipsistic and overly subjective (Goodwin and 
Horowitz, 2002). As I mentioned earlier, subjectivity conflicts with the aim of positivistic 
epistemologies, which hold up the notion of objectivity as the gold-standard of 
research (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Crotty, 2003). Nonetheless, I share CrottyÕs 
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(2003) viewpoint that objectivity is not actually achievable within social research. This 
is reflected in my afore-mentioned constructionist ontological position.  
Additionally, as I will discuss more extensively below, it is integral, from my 
point of view, that a researcher should openly acknowledge the subjective character of 
their research and be reflexive of their own role within the research process (Ambert 
et al., 1995). This includes, for example, discussions of the researcherÕs philosophical 
standpoint(s), and consideration of their own position in relation to the research topic, 
and of any problems encountered with data collection, and/or with analysing the data. 
I appreciate that my understanding of the phenomenon being studied can never be 
complete or removed entirely from my own biased positions and beliefs (Thompson, 
1998). In essence, it is vital that a researcher aims to be critically conscious of their 
methodological approach (Seale, 1999), and thereby I have tried to use interpretivism 
as a ÔguideÕ rather than a rigid ÔframeworkÕ (Bowling, 1999:106; also Seale, 2004; 
Cooper, 2003). In addition, I have conducted this research project in the belief that 
alongside pursuing the perceptions of my interviewees, I have also desired to analyse 
such perceptions in (academic) ways, which may be unfamiliar to some of those 
participants (Hammersley, 1992). This is part of viewing the individual experience 
within a wider social context: developing a Ôsociological imaginationÕ (Esterberg, 
2002:4).  
 
Influence of Feminist Epistemologies 
Although I have not explicitly taken a feminist approach to research, my 
methodological approach has been influenced by the spirit of some feminist 
approaches, as I will now outline. Barbara McClintockÕs approach to botanical 
research on maize cobs Ð as described by Keller (1985) - struck a particular chord. 
McClintock advocated, through her tireless work (for which at the time Keller (1985) 
alleges that McClintock received little professional acknowledgement), the importance 
of taking notice of that which is different, the aberrations. In believing in this approach, 
and in taking notice of the anomalies in the maize cobs she worked on, she 
discovered important findings for genetics (ibid.). If one relates this to the social 
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sciences it highlights the need to research into the experiences of the minority, of the 
excluded, of those who perhaps deviate from the norm, even if this research may not 
be seen by others as particularly important at the time.  
For this reason, the potentially political aims of research invoked by feminist 
standpoint theories (for example, Mies, 1994) have also resonated with me. I hope 
that my research will bring attention to any discriminatory and exclusionary practices 
within Britain that I may find. As Hammersley (2000) states, research originates from 
the desire to generate knowledge and consequently it cannot be politically impartial. 
Moreover, Haraway (1988) impressed upon me that knowledge is not always rounded 
and whole: we can benefit from the fragments we are able to find, from the angles we 
are able to view them from (also Thompson, 1998). In other words, knowledge is 
ÔliquidÕ (especially that garnered from empirical research; Alexander, 2004) and it 
cannot be easily gathered or solidified into theories. I do not claim that this thesis is 
generalizable or representative. Nonetheless I do believe that the voices of my 
participants are worthy of consideration and that the findings of this study will 
contribute to the knowledge base and theorisation of concepts such as race, 
racialisation, racism and whiteness. That is, by hopefully stimulating further thoughts, 
discussions, analysis and research with regards to the racialisation of names topic.  
 
Sample, Method of Data Collection and Data Analysis 
 
Sample  
My project uses the data of 31 semi-structured interviews and one written 
response to my semi-structured interview questions (see Appendix Two). I sourced 
the participants for these interviews via a snowball sample (Biernacki and Waldorf, 
1981; Merkens, 2004; Patton, 2002; Silverman, 2010). Consequently I found 
interviewees through various situations: advertisements on social media websites, a 
press release (which led to local radio coverage and a newspaper advert), a notice on 
my universityÕs website, posters in shops, takeaways and community centres, e-
mailed adverts to students at many UK universities, and finally through family 
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members, friends, neighbours and academic colleagues (Silverman, 2010; Biernacki 
and Waldorf, 1981).  
Snowball samples have their theoretical downsides in that the makeup of such 
samples can be biased to the researcherÕs (or key informantsÕ, from whom the 
snowball is initiated) own characteristics, such as their gender, age and/or racial 
identity (Seale, 1999). Consequently, they can arguably lead to a very selective, 
restricted and unrepresentative group of participants (ibid.; Merkens, 2004). However, 
it can be difficult to reach oneÕs research sample (Ambert et al., 1995), especially 
when studying a delicate topic (Murphy and Dingwall, 2003). Additionally, in my case, 
I was trying to access a relatively inaccessible, hidden population of people (Pope, 
van Royen and Baker, 2002). It was a challenge to locate people according to the 
criteria I had laid out (that they should have experienced a name-change between one 
they themselves considered to be foreign and one they felt was stereotypically white 
British sounding).  
Consequently, despite the afore-mentioned obvious limitations of 
snowball/opportunity samples in terms of generalisability and representativeness 
(Seale, 1999; Merkens, 2004), I used this sampling method for practical reasons. I felt 
it would be very unlikely that my participants could be accessed via random sampling, 
and I managed to gain access to several persons who matched my necessary criteria 
through personal links and relationships, which then led to other interviews. These 
interviews then supplemented those I had managed to procure through the various 
means described above.  
As Rapley (2004) describes, finding interviewees is a rather laborious 
process, for which one is often reliant upon friends and acquaintances at the 
beginning and subsequently upon connections provided by people one has 
interviewed. Indeed, most social research is about finding the medium between what 
would be ideal and what is realistically achievable, and thus there are many projects 
for which the topic area, access to potential participants and/or other constrictions 
placed upon the researcher play a major role in sampling choices (Ambert et al., 1995; 
Bryman, 2004).  
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It is also pertinent to add here that my sample ended up being female-
dominated, with only three male participants. This was unfortunate as it was my 
intention to interview as many men as possible. This reason was in part why I 
interviewed one male participant (Naze Richardson) who had not changed his 
surname. He had, though, had an interesting experience in relation to a perceived 
racial disjuncture between his first and second names (I discuss this further in Chapter 
Four).   
However, it is still the case in the UK that the vast majority of people who 
change their surname are female (Wilson, 2009). Furthermore, as I mentioned above, 
the snowball sampling method can lead to discrepancies of gender (Biernacki and 
Waldorf, 1981). Consequently, despite my best efforts (including a local radio 
advertisement and advertisements in the local newspaper and via UK-wide university 
e-mail lists), it was difficult to find male participants. This would though be a significant 
line of enquiry to pursue in future research, as according to the UK Deed Poll 
company (2010), there is a trend for some migrants to Anglicise their names upon 
moving to the UK, and this presumably applies to both genders. In addition, the 
potential ways in which societal pressures upon women to change their surname upon 
marriage meet with their consideration of the surname itself, would be an intriguing 
path for further research (see Hamilton, Geist and Powell, 2011). This is especially 
interesting in light of the above suggestion that most people who change their names 
are female. For instance, as I will discuss in Chapter Five, some of my female 
participants who had a maiden name that was understood to be white British had a 
fear of being discriminated against (and/or of their children being discriminated 
against) because of taking a surname considered to be foreign. How are traditional 
female and child naming norms affected in this vein? In sum, I acknowledge that the 
sample group is skewed in terms of gender, despite my best efforts for it not to be, 
and I do believe it would be of interest to conduct further research in which male 
perspectives, on the issues this project has been concerned with, are more dominant. 
My sample included people aged between 22 and 70, which is quite a wide 
age range. They lived in various parts of England and Scotland, and they held a 
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variety of jobs, including: academic/lecturer, accountant, teacher, nurse and chemist 
assistant. Some were students, others were retired or stay at home mothers. 27 
participants described themselves as white British/European; the other five 
participants described themselves as either Black British/African, Chinese, or mixed-
race/other. The participantsÕ descriptions of the surnames that they bore/had borne 
are indicated in Appendix One. There was some variation between the participantsÕ 
descriptions of those surnames they deemed not to be white British: for example, 
Zimbabwean, Armenian, Persian, Hebrew, Nigerian, Romanian and Polish. 19 of the 
participants considered themselves to be middle-class; eight as working class; and the 
rest described themselves as a combination between the two, with one exception who 
described herself as upper-middle-class. Furthermore, 17 participants held a 
bachelors degree or higher (three of these had a PhD). I provide further information 
about the sample in Appendix One.  
It would be an important extension of my research to interview more people 
who do not consider themselves white in the future (as I will discuss in Chapter 
Seven). The same point also applies to other intersections of identity, such as social 
class and disability, which were beyond the scope of this project, but would be of 
equal interest for further research. Intersectionality mirrors the actuality of lived 
experience, in considering more than one aspect of a personÕs identity. An individual 
is affected environmentally and socially by their presumed gender, social class 
etcetera as well as their race (Shields, 2008; Davis, 2008).  
I do not use an intersectional approach in this thesis and focus only on race in 
relation to names, as it has been such an under-researched topic and there was 
consequently more than enough new data to fill my thesis. As I discussed earlier, 
previous research has only focussed on name discrimination in relation to 
employment, leaving the other aspects of a personÕs experience in relation to bearing 
a name deemed foreign in the UK context, unexplored. I consequently felt that to 
explicitly concentrate on other aspects of the participantsÕ identities (aside from race) 
would be beyond the scope of this project. However, I would like to take more of an 
intersectional approach in the future, now that I have an existing research base to 
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work with regarding the topic of names and race. Taking an intersectional approach to 
research would seemingly be a way in which further discoveries about a topic could 
be found: the ways in which unrealised links may be noticed, and their complexity may 
be appreciated, from the observation of different intersections (Davis, 2008). It would 
consequently be important to build the project from the beginning in this vein by 
looking for an appropriate sample and in designing the research questions accordingly 
(McCall, 2005). 
 
Interviews 
As a consequence of choosing a qualitative method/approach, I have 
explored the subjective points of view of my sample (one of the key features of 
qualitative research; Bryman, 1988). A main marker of quality research concerns how 
suitable the methods are for answering the research questions (Murphy and Dingwall, 
2003). The following quotation eloquently describes the purpose and value of 
interviewing, which I decided was the method best suited to the nature of my research 
questions:  
 
We cannot observe feelings, thoughts and intentions…We cannot observe 
how people have organized the world and the meanings they attach to what 
goes on in the world Ð we have to ask people questions about these things.  
(Patton, 1980:196, in Murphy and Dingwall, 2003:93). 
 
As such, I feel that interviews have allowed me to assess my own preconceptions of 
the topic in relation to the experiences of my participants (Murphy and Dingwall, 
2003). Nonetheless, I acknowledge that interviews are a socially and contextually 
based construction (as all talk is) (Denzin, 2001; Murphy and Dingwall, 2003; 
Dingwall, 1997; Jrvinen, 2000). Interviews provide a researcher with the participantÕs 
account of a particular recollection or thought (Rapley, 2004) in accordance with the 
particular temporal and spatial contexts in which they took place. Indeed, when 
describing an experience, a person is interpreting their thoughts into words: it was 
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lived before it was spoken of (Portelli, 1997), and words in themselves are living 
beings that impact upon people in many ways (Denzin, 2001). 
Moreover, it may well be that some interviewees are more concerned about 
trying to present themselves in a positive light, as rational and ethical people, to the 
interviewer, than with answering the questions according to how they actually feel 
(Murphy and Dingwall, 2003). This point also highlights the ambivalent nature of much 
of our thinking. For example, it may well have been the case that my participants had 
not considered the topics about which I questioned them prior to being interviewed 
(ibid.). In addition, self-expression is an intricate coming together of many factors. 
Jrvinen (2000) argues that interviewees may to differing extents tell their stories 
according to social and/or cultural scripts.  
Nevertheless, no method can elicit ultimate truth because there is none: Ôthere 
is no real world…There are only interpretations and their performancesÕ (Denzin, 
2001:30; also Alexander, 2004). Thus all methods are imperfect. I identify with the 
way in which the interview method is based upon the notion that words and talk are 
crucial to our understanding of our social world (Mason, 2002). Furthermore, 
interviewing has been a valuable way of gaining an insight into how my participants 
have weighed up their own thoughts and experiences in relation to my topic of 
research (Murphy and Dingwall, 2003; DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006). This may 
be why interviewing is now the dominant way that sociologists try to investigate 
research issues (Rapley, 2004; Denzin, 2001).  
In light of the under-researched status of my research topic (as I described in 
Chapter One), I felt that a semi-structured interview schedule (Appendix Two) would 
help to elicit the responses of my participants in a way that was not too close-ended. I 
wanted the interviewees to be able to lead the discussion off in ways that they felt 
were important, and touch upon issues that I may not have considered or thought of 
(Longhurst, 2010). Consequently I tried to take a flexible approach during the 
interviews so as to encourage the participants to tell me what they wanted to say, and 
qualitative interviews are known for allowing such flexibility (Miller, 1995; Murphy and 
Dingwall, 2003; Longhurst, 2010; Hopf, 2004). 
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Furthermore, I did not want to conduct completely unstructured interviews as 
my time, resources, and allowed scope for the project were limited (Miller, 1995). 
Consequently, I felt that semi-structured interviews would give participants room to 
lead the conversation in ways they felt best (Creswell, 2007; Hopf, 2004:), and that 
this would hopefully prevent the themes from being too limited (Creswell, 2007). At the 
same time, I hoped the interviews would provide me with enough structure to compare 
and contrast my intervieweesÕ data (Longhurst, 2010) within the said limited time-
frame and with restricted resources (Miller, 1995).  
In actuality I felt that the interview schedule worked well, perhaps because I 
had conducted a pilot interview, which enabled me to re-work and refine some 
questions (Sampson, 2004; Maxwell, 2005). Most participants were extensive in their 
responses to initial questions, which often meant that I did not need to ask all of the 
questions in my schedule. Moreover, many participants were prepared to elaborate on 
their points freely and to introduce new points at will. In one particular interview (with 
Dawn Legris) the participant took the lead right from the beginning of the interview and 
was happy to discuss how her name-change had impacted upon her with very little 
questioning.  
Of the 31 oral interviews
4
, eleven interviews were over an hour in length (the 
longest being 148 minutes long), with the rest lasting between half an hour and an 
hour, apart from three of the interviews, which were shorter than half an hour (see 
Appendix One). One of these interviews (with Mandy Mundra) lasted only eleven 
minutes, as the participant gave brief, almost yes/no, answers. As a result of this 
disappointing brevity (arguably semi-structured interviews tend to be at least 30 
minutes long (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006), I altered my interview schedule 
slightly after this interview (ibid.). This was in order to ensure the questions were 
sufficiently open-ended. Subsequently I only had two other interviews that were quite 
short. Like Mandy MundraÕs interview, I conducted these interviews at the beginning of 
                                                       
 
 
 
 
4
 I conducted 31 oral interviews and had one written response to my semi-structured 
interview questions. 
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my project. I think perhaps as I became more experienced and relaxed in my interview 
approach during the course of the project, this encouraged the participants to be more 
open and expansive in their disclosures (Corbin and Morse, 2003).  
Furthermore, I felt that a few participants seemed to have a pre-conceived 
suspicion that I sought to prove a pre-held hypothesis that names are discriminated 
against. They accordingly repeatedly stated that they did not think they could be of 
much help to me. I maintained that I was interested in their experiences of their name-
change in a holistic sense: that if they had not noticed any difference or if they had 
only had positive experiences then this would also be of significance. This assurance 
seemed to help the participants (aside from Mandy Mundra) to settle into the 
interviews and provide me with an overview of their experiences.  
I felt that some of the interviewees had not thought about their (sur)names 
particularly extensively prior to the interview, with some of them saying words to that 
effect. This did not seem to especially matter though, as the interview gave them the 
opportunity to do so, and a few participants e-mailed me with further thoughts after 
their interview. Nonetheless, it is an indication of the constructed nature of interviews, 
as I discussed earlier, in that they illicit data/ideas that participants perhaps would not 
otherwise have thought of. This is arguably also an ethical issue, in that my project 
has in a sense intruded upon my participantsÕ lives, and possibly left some of them 
with (perhaps long-term) thoughts and concerns, that they had not held prior to the 
interview (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004). As Corbin and Morse (2003:346) note, Ôno one 
can predict what will be said in the course of an interview, the feelings it will provoke, 
or any long-lasting effectsÕ. Nonetheless, the literature appears to suggest that long-
term harm to participants as a result of qualitative interviews is not a common 
phenomenon (ibid.). I will discuss other ethical issues later in this chapter. 
I audio recorded all of the interviews using an unobtrusive digital recording 
device. The participants were asked for their permission to record them (DiCicco-
Bloom and Crabtree, 2006) and they all agreed to this, which made the transcription of 
the interviews a much easier and more complete task than if I had had to rely on 
writing notes (Seidman, 2006; Longhurst, 2010). The recording went relatively 
87 
 
smoothly apart from on one occasion during the interview with Marion Stavridis, when 
my Dictaphone would not work as its memory was full. I did not at that stage know 
how to delete data from it, but I was able to use my mobile phone as a backup 
recording device (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006). I transferred this data onto my 
password-protected computer after the interview and deleted it from my mobile phone 
for security purposes (ibid.). I then did likewise for the data on my recorder. The data 
were subsequently backed up to CD and kept in a locked filing cabinet at my 
university. 
In addition, some interviewees lived too far away for me to realistically be able 
to travel to them, and some people did not wish to have a face-to-face meeting, for 
example because of child care issues (Sturges and Hanrahan, 2004). Accordingly, I 
conducted 13 interviews over the telephone or via Skype (without video picture feed). 
Again, all of these interviews were recorded via Dictaphone with the consent of the 
interviewee. These tended to feel different to the face-to-face interviews because I 
could not read the intervieweesÕ body language, or know if they were pausing or had 
finished speaking (Miller, 1995; Sturges and Hanrahan, 2004).  
Consequently, I found that I interrupted some participants before they had 
finished speaking or I had to ask them if they had more to say or if they had finished 
making a particular point. Nonetheless, some of these interviews seemed the most 
relaxed that I had had, perhaps because the participants (and I) felt more anonymous 
and could better concentrate on discussing the topic (Sturges and Hanrahan, 2004). I 
was also able to pick up on verbal/non-verbal cues such as sighs and hesitation 
(ibid.). Furthermore Sturges and Hanrahan (2004), assert that although there has 
been little research conducted on the differences between the use of telephone and 
face-to-face interviews in qualitative studies, their research suggests that there is little 
difference in the quality and quantity of data collected (also Miller, 1995). They also 
make the point that researchers should make use of modern technologies and 
consider using them in order to make research participation easier (Sturges and 
Hanrahan, 2004). 
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I held the face-to-face interviews (of which there were 18) in various locations 
in Nottingham. These included my university library in a private room (and other more 
public places in my university); cafes in Nottingham city centre and in a neighbouring 
town; a Nottingham sports centre; the work place of one participant in a neighbouring 
city; a business office also in a neighbouring town; and the homes of two participants. 
At all times my partner was informed of where I was and how long I expected the 
interviews to last. I had my mobile phone with me and rang him when I arrived and 
when I had finished (Paterson, Gregory and Thorne, 1999). I only went to the homes 
of people I had already met and knew to a certain extent, although they were not 
friends.  
One issue encountered with the interviews in public places (particularly those 
in cafes) was the loud background noise, which made the transcription more difficult 
(DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006; Hatch, 2002) than for those that were in private 
rooms, and in a few instances obscured a few words in a particular interview (DiCicco-
Bloom and Crabtree, 2006). Some literature suggests that interviewees can feel 
reluctant to disclose when other persons are present at the interview venue 
(Hartmann, 1995; Hatch, 2002). However, I did not perceive this to be the case with 
those participants I interviewed in public places. Perhaps there is also some 
anonymity to be found in a noisy environment where it seems unlikely that one will be 
overheard. As Hatch (2002) describes, interview venue choice is frequently a matter 
of chance and practicality. Often the researcher has to work within an environment, 
which lacks privacy or is noisy and thus may not appear perfect for an interview (ibid.). 
Ultimately, though, I felt that my interviews were successful, in that they were the 
source of some very rich data. Also, the fact that several participants (from both 
private and public situated interviews) lined up further interviews for me suggests that 
they had felt comfortable with the interview process. 
 
Data Analysis  
All of my data were derived from the audio recordings of my interviews, apart 
from one interview with Lars Hardy-Mathiesen, who preferred to type up his responses 
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to my interview questions because of a lack of confidence in speaking English (his 
second language). I analysed my data throughout the research process, in that I 
transcribed interviews whilst still conducting others (Grbich, 2007; Silverman, 2005). 
This was in line with the flexible approach I mentioned above: I could thereby have an 
idea of any emerging themes (Pope, van Royen and Baker, 2002) and alter my 
interview schedule slightly if I felt some topics should be discussed in more depth 
(DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006). For example, after the first five or so interviews, 
in conjunction with my supervisors, it was decided that I should try to ask more about 
my female participantsÕ reason(s) for changing or not changing their surname upon 
marriage. This was in terms of trying to explore if there were any underlying feminist 
convictions. As it happens, this approach did not elicit much more information in this 
regard, but it is an instance of how I tried to be responsive to emerging data 
throughout my data collection period.  
I transcribed all of the data myself, so as to facilitate my understanding of 
emerging themes (Seidman, 2006), and I thematically analysed them (Grbich, 2007). 
Thematic analysis can be described as a method for Ôidentifying, analysing and 
reporting patterns (themes) within dataÕ (Braun and Clarke, 2006:79), with a 
concentration on what the participants say rather than how they say it (Bryman, 2004).  
I therefore intensively read the transcripts individually (Schmidt, 2004) to find Ôpatterns 
of meaning and issues of potential interestÕ (Braun and Clarke, 2006:86). I 
consequently transferred the extracts of interest into Microsoft Word documents 
according to the topic of interest. I then began to find thematic linkages between them 
(Seidman, 2006; Okely, 1994), and eventually reduced these into main over-arching 
themes and sub-themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Thus I intended for the data to 
take precedence (ibid.). As explained earlier, I took an inductive approach (Pope, van 
Royen and Baker, 2002), so rather than using pre-emptive themes, I searched the 
data for the themes (Grbich, 2007; Seidman, 2006). Due to the same desire to 
inductively approach my data, I decided not to make use of software such as NVivo to 
aid the analysis, as I felt comfortable in manually sorting through the transcripts so 
that my familiarity with the data was excellent and I could feel confident in making 
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claims on the basis of my participantsÕ words (Seidman, 2006). As Okely (1994) 
expresses, a researcher is ultimately responsible, rather than a computer, for finding 
emerging themes as well as for the thought and analysis necessary for conducting 
research.  
My data analysis was founded upon the notion of a close reading of my 
transcripts and my own judgment of what the main themes are (Seidman, 2006; 
Okely, 1994). As Esterberg (2002:16) eloquently argues, good quality interpretive 
research is based upon the ÔdiagnosesÕ of the researcher, whereby the researcher 
must convincingly help to explain the ÔsymptomsÕ rather than trying to ÔpredictÕ them 
(also Okely, 1994). I discussed earlier the constructed nature of interviews, that they 
are created by the interviewee and interviewer and are affected by the particular time 
and place in which they are produced. It consequently follows that interpretive 
research in its entirety is also Ôa social productionÕ (Esterberg, 2002:16) because of 
the humanness of the researcher.  
Moreover, researchers begin with the projected understandings, explanations 
and meanings conveyed by the interviewees but they then interpret them in 
conjunction with one another (Esterberg, 2002). This in a sense is a kind of fictional 
narrative, in that the researcher can never know the ÔtruthÕ of social processes but 
rather can only ever interpret and explain their understanding of them (ibid.). Thus a 
researcher using thematic analysis from a constructionist viewpoint Ð as I do Ð 
interprets and theorises the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006) according to their own 
frameworks of understanding, rather than describing the data as though they contain 
ÔtruthsÕ. Nonetheless, the researcherÕs analyses cannot be considered total fiction in 
the sense that they are embedded within the data given by the participants, they are 
not the researcherÕs abstract invention (Esterberg, 2002).  
An important part of such an approach is to be transparent about the 
methodological approach, data sampling and collection, which I have been. This is in 
order to give my Ôreaders a vicarious experience of Òbeing thereÓ with me, so that they 
can use their human judgment to assess the likelihood of the same processes 
applying to other settings which they knowÕ (Seale, 1999:118). Moreover, although my 
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findings are not generalisable in the sense that my sample is not representative, there 
has been a growing argument that with qualitative research generalisability refers to 
how well the context of a study matches that of another study (Merkens, 2004; 
Schofield, 1994). Hence it is important for a researcher to provide detailed information 
about their study so that such judgements can be made (Schofield, 1994; Pyett, 
2003). Subsequently, I have endeavoured to provide sufficiently detailed information 
about my methodology. I will also strive to provide enough quotations from the 
interviews to substantiate my arguments throughout the rest of the thesis (Ambert et 
al., 1995; Williams, 2000; Braun and Clarke, 2006). Furthermore, I have attempted to 
rigorously question my assumptions and my analysis, which is what Cooper (2003:12) 
calls Ôreflexive enquiryÕ. I have taken the view that reflexivity is not a set of rigid 
principles that should be adhered to, but is rather a lens through which a researcher 
consistently views their decisions and interactions (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004; Pyett, 
2003). Equally, reflexivity should not be concerned with the researcherÕs Ôself-serving 
credentialismÕ, or be Ôpurely descriptiveÕ (Alexander, 2004:138). It is thus a flexible and 
adaptive approach suited to the intricacy and the importance of ethical decision-
making within social research (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004).  
 
Being Reflexive about my Research Approach  
Recently I bumped into an old acquaintance, who kindly asked me how I was 
getting on. I told him that I was doing a PhD and left it at that, but he wanted to know 
what it was in, so I replied ÔSociologyÕ, which from his body language I could tell was 
not sufficient information. I proceeded to give a brief overview of my topic: ÔItÕs about 
names and discrimination, so if you have a particular name does this affect your life 
chances and so onÕ. He smiled knowingly and said, ÔOh I see, thatÕs interesting, itÕs 
about people who have a Scottish name and how they get treated in England 
etceteraÕ. ÔUm, noÕ, I said, ÔitÕs actually about race and names, so for example if you 
have an African name…Õ. My acquaintance replied, ÔOh right…how did you become 
interested in that?Õ. I must confess I was a little taken aback: instead of him showing 
an interest, it seemed that the legitimacy of my choice of research was questionable. 
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Perhaps, though, it is not so surprising that he was startled about my interest 
in race and racism: after all, I would categorise myself as white, and my 
acquaintanceÕs assumption was seemingly that I am not raced, and that he himself (as 
a white person) is also not raced (as I discussed in Chapter Two). But really the 
history behind my deep interest in racism does not matter: I firmly (and proudly) 
believe that my topic is worthy of interest in its own right, it does not need any 
caveats, any excuses made about it. Reflexivity has become synonymous with 
qualitative research (Finlay, 2002), and it has been my intent to be holistically 
reflective about my project and my part in that. However, it is also important not to 
overly reflect upon my position: reflexivity is not about telling my own story (Yip, 2008) 
at the expense of the stories of those whom the project is about (Portelli, 1997; 
Alexander, 2004). Consequently, being reflexive about my own position as a 
researcher is concerned not so much with telling my own story but with using my 
background in order to explain how it connects with the project generally (Cooper, 
2003). Also, to discuss how it relates specifically to the methodology choices (ibid.), as 
has already been discussed above, and to the research participants (Finlay, 2002), as 
I will consider in this section. 
I will, consequently, now give a brief overview of the origins of my research 
interest. Upon leaving school I worked for a UK-based company whose function was 
to aid students from Africa with their applications to universities in the UK and 
consequently with the visa process. Whilst working there I had a lot of interaction with 
Africans from many different countries, and often had to pronounce African names 
both over the telephone and in person. This led to me taking an interest in names and 
whether or not British people (such as myself) tend to make an effort in pronouncing 
names that could be considered not typically British sounding.  
Furthermore, being in a Ômixed-raceÕ relationship has meant my partner and I 
have had to work through countless discriminatory obstacles together. In addition, we 
have both perceived that his West-African surname has been a particular target of 
such discrimination. I started to perceive that there is perhaps a symbolism behind 
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names, that a personÕs name goes far beyond them as an individual and that people 
seem to make assumptions based upon it.  
As implied earlier with the admission that I have been affected by the political 
nature of some feminist research, when I began this project I did so with the conviction 
that I was against any racism/discrimination, which I may or may not discover. I was 
therefore somewhat uncomfortable during one particular interview when my 
participant Ailsa Czerniak expressed what I felt were some rather parochial, 
discriminatory views. As Bott (2010) explained in relation to her own research project, 
it is difficult to develop a rapport in such circumstances.  Indeed, it is as one talks to a 
participant that one invariably begins to Ôidentify/disidentify [with them], like/dislike, 
familiarize/otherize [them]Õ (ibid.:160). Rapport-building tends to be considered an 
important part of gaining the intervieweeÕs trust and hence their willingness to disclose 
during the interview (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006; Dickson-Swift et al., 2007; 
Corbin and Morse, 2003). I was however fortunate that it was only really in that one 
interview that I experienced particular feelings of dis-identification with, or dislike for, 
what a participant was saying. I did not challenge AilsaÕs views. For example, when I 
asked her if she had encountered any discriminatory views in relation to her Polish 
married surname, she misinterpreted the question and felt it was related to whether 
she herself holds discriminatory views. I gently re-expressed my question.  
On the other hand, ÔunsuccessfulÕ interviews can be helpful in the sense that 
they may make the researcher look at the research topic in a different light (Jrvinen, 
2000:388). For example, in Chapter Five I will discuss the way in which data such as 
that garnered from AilsaÕs interview made me aware that some of my participants are 
complicit within racialised/racist thinking. It has, though, been quite difficult for me to 
write in a negative way about some of my participants as I feel grateful towards them 
that they agreed to take part in my project, without any obvious personal gain for 
themselves (Dickson-Swift et al., 2007). However, I felt that regardless of how 
uncomfortable this may feel, it is integral that I should analyse in a free way, without 
inhibiting myself. As Pyett (2003) rightly states, it is the academic duty of the 
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researcher to subject our participantsÕ submissions to scrutiny, in accordance with our 
own knowledge and understanding. 
In a similar vein, I perceived that some participants (such as Ailsa Czerniak) 
perhaps felt comfortable in expressing anti-migrant/racist views because they felt that 
we shared a racial and national background (as Bott, 2010, describes) and that I 
would perhaps feel the same as them or would not object to such opinions. As a side 
point, I am uncertain whether or not those participants whom I interviewed over the 
telephone or via Skype (without video feed) were aware that I am ÔwhiteÕ. 
Nonetheless, they did have my name, which (according to the findings that I will 
present in this thesis) they would probably have interpreted as being white British. 
Also, if they had performed an internet search on my name, they would have seen my 
photograph on my university profile. Moreover, I did not notice any difference in how 
open these participants interacted with me in comparison to the face-to-face 
interviewees. 
It does seem that if a researcher is deemed to have a comparable identity to 
their participant that this may aid the building up of trust and understanding between 
them, in that the participant may think that the researcher will especially understand 
their views and experiences (Yip, 2008). Presumably with those participants who 
identified as white British, and were all British born and raised, as am I, they would 
have felt a kind of affinity with me (Miller, 1995). However, to be an insider is not 
necessarily positive in that it can mean that some things are unsaid or unexplained by 
the participant because of assumed shared knowledge, or that some things are 
unnoticed/not interpreted by the researcher (ibid.; Yip, 2008; Ambert et al., 1995; 
Twine, 2000). Furthermore, I do not think I was a Ôcomplete insider or outsiderÕ (Yip, 
2008:6.4) Ð indeed, it is not possible to be so (ibid.; Twine, 2000). I shared the same 
gender as all but three participants (which in itself is important to acknowledge 
(Padfield and Procter, 1996). Also, if asked to identify myself by social class I would 
say middle-class, which (as I mentioned earlier) is the same identification as 19 of my 
participants. Furthermore, again despite the illogic nature of the race system (as I 
discussed in Chapter Two), I would say that I am white British, which is how all but five 
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of my participants identified themselves. However, arguably the key factor within the 
context of my research is that I had not experienced changing my surname as the vast 
majority of them had done. If I had conducted the interviews as a white person with a 
West-African surname perhaps my interest and, to some extent, my anti-racist views 
would have been self-evident. As it was, my connection to the research topic was not 
obvious and I think many participants were curious to know why I was conducting this 
particular project. 
Consequently, prior to my interviews I was mindful about if I should disclose 
my personal circumstances to the participants. I felt that sometimes the participant 
may not seem to trust me or want to talk openly to me, and it may be valuable to 
acknowledge my circumstances as part of the rapport-building process (DiCicco-
Bloom and Crabtree, 2006; Ambert et al., 1995; Dickson-Swift et al., 2007). On the 
other hand, I conceived that such a disclosure might take away the feeling of my being 
a stranger to them, which may thereby reduce their confidence in disclosing their 
feelings to me. That is, in the sense that some participants might feel I had an insight 
into their situation and was judging them. As Dickson-Swift et al. (2007) discuss, 
previous research has indicated that it is often the unfamiliarity of the researcher that 
encourages participants to disclose. I had also thought it might not be necessary to 
disclose my connection to the project, and may even be unhelpful to do so, as rather 
than talking about myself, my aim was primarily to hear their views (Ambert et al., 
1995). It is the case that such disclosures are difficult and challenging for both the 
researcher and the participant in terms of privacy issues, for example (Bott, 2010), 
and it is therefore the obligation of the researcher to dictate such a process (ibid.). 
In actuality, I tended to let the participant take the lead (DiCicco-Bloom and 
Crabtree, 2006). A few interviewees asked me what had led to my interest in the 
subject before the interview began and I told them about my partner etcetera. 
However, for most participants we held the interview without discussing my 
circumstances at all. It was then only at the end of the interview, if we had built up a 
good rapport, we would have an informal discussion once the recorder was turned off 
and I would often reveal more information about myself. Some participants treated the 
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interview as a more business-like process and did not ask me anything about myself 
and nor did they give any indication that they wanted to talk about my circumstances.  
For a couple of participants, however, I think knowing about my relationship 
with a person originally from West-Africa helped them feel comfortable with discussing 
their experiences of racism with me. For example, my partner had helped to set up my 
interview with Kayla Brackenbury, so she was aware of my relationship before-hand. 
Consequently, I felt that Kayla talked in a particularly free manner with me, even at 
times using my relationship as a referent to her own during the interview. 
Nevertheless, largely I noticed little impact of my own background/identity in this 
context, and this also applied in relation to the gender issue. Maybe this was because 
none of the male participants had face-to-face interviews, or perhaps gender just did 
not have a significant impact in this regard. 
With regards to my own political views on racism, this will Ð alongside my 
gender, presumed race, age, social class etcetera Ð have impacted upon the process 
of my research (Bott, 2010). This is simply because social Ð if not all Ð research is 
subjective (as I discussed earlier) and cannot be assessed in a detached manner by 
the researcher (Cooper, 2003). As Alexander (2004:147) asserts: ÔNo research on 
race and ethnicity is either accidental or apolitical in its inception, practice or 
dissemination, in its inclusions and exclusions, its invisibilities or its silencesÕ. 
Therefore, it is important to acknowledge oneÕs biases (Yip, 2008), or those of which 
one is aware, as this then increases the transparency of oneÕs research and the belief 
that the reader can have in the quality of its findings (Murphy and Dingwall, 2003). In 
addition, as I mentioned above, I have tried to provide sufficient quotations from my 
interviews so that the reader can be confident that I have based my findings upon 
what was actually said by my participants. 
Despite my attempts to demonstrate the reflexivity of my thinking, it is 
impossible to say if one has ever been reflexive enough (Murphy and Dingwall, 2003), 
and consequently it has been important for me to keep a notebook (ibid.) where I 
could write down my feelings throughout the project and be able to subsequently look 
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back upon the evolution of my thoughts and findings. My discussions with my 
supervisors have also been integral in this regard (ibid.). 
Guillemin and Gillam (2004) argue that the link between reflexivity and ethics 
is not usually recognized and that understandings of reflexive thinking should include 
ethics. In agreement with this point I will now reflexively consider the ethical aspects of 
my research project.   
 
Ethics 
My project was conducted in accordance with the ethical procedures of my 
universityÕs Sociology department (School of Sociology and Social Policy website - 
Code of Research Conduct, 2013) as is common practice (Silverman, 2010). Part of 
this process involved discussing ethical issues with my supervisors (ibid.) and 
completing an ethics checklist form. My departmentÕs ethics officer then assessed Ð 
on the basis of this form - if I had duly considered the potential ethical problems. The 
boxes I ticked in relation to the ethical risk for my project were all low-risk apart from 
one, which concerned the possibility of interviewing participants who have been the 
victims of discrimination/traumatic events.  
I was aware that some of my interviewees may have had difficult experiences, 
which they could then potentially re-live in the course of their interview. As Murphy 
and Dingwall (2001) write, research respondents may feel anxious, stressed and/or 
guilty during their participation in the project. I aimed to be sensitive to such 
occurrences and to abide by my universityÕs ethical guidelines. For example, I let my 
participants know that they could end the interview at any time. I also discussed this 
issue with my supervisors who were confident that I would handle the interviews 
sensitively. As it happens, no participant has requested for me not to use their data, 
nor did any interview finish prematurely. That is not to say that potentially distressing 
topics were not discussed, but I was careful not to push them to talk about issues that 
were particularly painful if they did not want to, and/or if they seemed distressed 
(Corbin and Morse, 2003; Silverman, 2010). 
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My project was consequently conducted in accordance with the ethical 
commitments I had made during the process of gaining ethical approval from my 
university. I also had completed several Masters-level modules about conducting 
sociological research (Cobin, 2003), and was also well aware of the ESRCÕs (2009) 
guidelines on ethical issues. I also familiarised myself with the ethical practice 
statement of the British Sociological Association (2002), which covers issues such as 
being aware of a potential difference in perceived power relations between researcher 
and participants; obtaining informed consent from my participants; ensuring participant 
confidentiality (as far as this is possible; Corbin and Morse, 2003); and making sure 
that participants are briefed and debriefed about my research and their rights to 
withdraw their data if they so wish. I also felt, however, that it was integral to imbibe an 
ethical spirit towards my research, above and beyond ethical guidelines (Guillemin 
and Gillam, 2004). I understood that a researcherÕs ethical responsibilities are intricate 
and multifaceted and cannot be achieved merely through referring to a catalogue of 
ethical regulations (Murphy and Dingwall, 2001). Thus I have tried to reflexively 
assess different issues and situations as and when they occurred within the practical 
stages of the research process (as considered at length by Guillemin and Gillam, 
2004).  
I verbally asked each participant for their consent before their interview 
(DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006) and requested they filled out a participant 
consent form, which was either completed before or after the interview. For those 
participants who were interviewed over the phone, I e-mailed or posted the form to the 
participant along with the project information sheet. A few participants whom I had 
interviewed over the phone did not return the consent form, but all verbally agreed to 
the interview (which I recorded). Also all participants saw the project information sheet 
which contained details of the project including the confidentiality part. The information 
sheet invited the participant to contact me if they wanted further information. It also 
stated that if they had any concerns with the way I had handled the interview process 
they could contact my supervisors/university (contact details were provided). Indeed, 
for those interviewees who did not return the consent form I contacted them again by 
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e-mail to say that if they have any concerns they should let me know, or if they had 
changed their minds about me using their data they could choose to withdraw, but 
they did not indicate this was the case. 
Furthermore, before each interview I discussed the project information sheet 
and asked the participant if they had any questions about the interview process. A few 
participants asked me to confirm my assurance of confidentiality and to check what 
the data would be used for, but very few participants asked any questions at all. 
Nonetheless, I was careful to verbally explain the main ethical issues I have 
mentioned above even after the participant had read the information sheet. This was 
because I felt it was important to try to prevent the participant from having a negative 
impression of research and to attempt to safeguard the participant from harm 
(DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006), even when the participant appeared 
unconcerned about such issues (Murphy and Dingwall, 2001). 
Several respondents requested that I should send them my thesis upon 
completion because they were interested to know what my other intervieweesÕ 
experiences had been, and I am happy to do so in accordance with my universityÕs 
proclamation that overall research findings should be made available to oneÕs 
research participants (School of Sociology and Social Policy website - Research 
Ethics Checklist, 2013). However, this also has potential ethical complications in that 
the participants may feel some distress when reading the findings and/or may be 
upset at the way(s) in which I have interpreted their words (Bryman, 2012).  
As mentioned earlier, interviews are a social process (Alexander, 2004) and 
encapsulated within that is the researcherÕs interpretation of what the participant has 
said and how this fits into the researcherÕs own frameworks of understanding (Ambert 
et al., 1995; Pyett, 2003). Furthermore, readers may then re-interpret the researcherÕs 
story in other ways (Gudmundsdotter, 1996). As Barthes (1977) said, the author is 
dead: once the participant proffers up their words they, to some extent, lose 
ownership of them in that they cannot control how they are understood and analysed. 
In itself, this may be difficult for my participants to accept, and they may indeed 
disagree with what I have written (Pyett, 2003; Bryman, 2012). As Cotterill (1992:604) 
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asserts, this responsibility as a researcher is a weighty one, and all the researcher can 
do is write their interpretations as ÔhonestlyÕ as they can. This is what I have striven to 
do. Additionally, it would seem that this risk of emotional harm to the participant must 
be weighed against the more positive notion of letting the interviewees be privy to the 
overall findings of a project to which they have given a significant amount of time and 
effort to. I do not think, therefore, that it would be ethical to deny my participants the 
opportunity to read my thesis, and I will take the participantsÕ lead by only sending it to 
those who have requested it. 
In a similar vein, the issue of the power relationship between researcher and 
participant (Miller, 1995) is something that I considered before, and throughout, my 
project. It has often been assumed that the participant holds less power in the 
research relationship than the researcher (Cotterill, 1992; Finlay, 2002). Whilst this 
may often be the case, it is not always so (Corbin and Morse, 2003; Hammersley, 
2000). For example, during my project I interviewed several people who either had the 
same academic qualifications as myself, or better. Whilst qualifications do not 
necessarily mitigate power discrepancies on their own, they could be said to play a 
part. 
Furthermore, as a researcher in my mid-twenties, I found that the vast 
majority of participants were much older than me, consequently there was often an 
(unsaid) implication that these interviewees had a greater level of life experience than 
myself. In addition, interviewees are able to assert power over the research process 
by withholding their thoughts in relation to questions etcetera (Cotterill, 1992; 
Hammersley, 2000). I felt this may have been the case in some interviews whereby 
the interviewee was guarded and reticent with their answers through the first half of 
the interview, but as time went on they would begin providing much more detailed, 
and personal, answers to my questions. Consequently, I did find the onus was upon 
myself to inspire the trust and confidence of the interviewee before they were 
prepared to freely disclose (Cotterill, 1992; Dickson-Swift et al., 2007). Essentially the 
researcher regains the ultimate control over the research after the interview has 
ended and it is the researcherÕs interpretations, which stand (Cotterill, 1992). 
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Nevertheless, there did seem to be changes in the power balance throughout the 
research process (see Finlay, 2002). 
Meanwhile, the confidentiality part of my agreement with my participants had 
an interesting side-effect. Usually in a project it is fairly straightforward to re-name 
oneÕs participants. However, in my research the names of my interviewees were 
important in themselves in the sense of them being a window to understanding the 
participantsÕ experiences and to being able to convey these in my thesis. In many 
respects, my participantsÕ experiences appeared to be unique to their particular 
names and how they were taken by the people they came into contact with. For 
example, as I will explore in Chapter Four, Linda Abadjian (white British, Armenian 
married surname) explained how even though her married surname originates from a 
majority-white country, her surname is often perceived in the UK to be Asian 
sounding. I felt it was necessary to try to find pseudonym names for my participants, 
which would give the readers of my thesis an insight into the real names in question. It 
would be odd to have a thesis about names without being able to know what the 
names themselves read/sound like. Edwards and Caballero conducted a (2008) study 
on how parents of mixed racial, ethnic and/or religious backgrounds chose their 
childrenÕs names in the UK context. They briefly wrote about having found it difficult to 
create pseudonym names that would be adequate representations of their 
participantsÕ actual names (ibid.). They also mentioned the importance of finding 
pseudonyms that would convey the Ôintention and effectÕ of the actual names chosen, 
in light of trying to closely portray the parentsÕ considerations around name choice to 
the reader (ibid.).  
Similarly, I set out upon the rather onerous task of creating new (first and 
second, sometimes even middle) names for my participants. I did this by considering 
how the interviewee had identified their namesÕ understood origins. For the names 
that participants had labelled as white British I was able to, out of my own familiarity 
with such a construct, find substitute names from my memory or by searching lists of 
names on the internet (e.g. British Surnames website, 2012). For the other names 
(e.g. Polish, Zimbabwean) I also searched appropriate (Polish, Zimbabwean etcetera) 
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lists of names on the internet. This task was difficult as I was naturally drawn to those 
names that sounded similar to the participantsÕ real names, and had to go through my 
list of pseudonyms periodically to check that they were not too similar to the originals 
so as to ensure the confidentiality/anonymity of my participants was being respected.  
The process of name anonymisation consequently took many hours and was 
a difficult test of my judgement. It has also, rather ironically, involved me within a 
process that I would usually avoid. That is, in writing a thesis on the racialised 
constructions of names, I have found myself adhering to such a system in choosing 
pseudonym names for my participants. Thus I openly admit to doing this, but I hope as 
you read this thesis you will appreciate that I have not done it out of a desire to 
propagate such racial thinking, but in order to illustrate my participantsÕ experiences, 
which Ð I will be argue - appear to challenge such racial constructs. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have reflexively described the ways in which I have conducted 
my project. I began this with an acknowledgment of my epistemological standpoint, 
and went on to explain my chosen method, participant sample, and data analysis. 
Furthermore, I have described my own assumed racial and social background, and 
how this may have impacted upon my interactions with the participants. I have also 
acknowledged my anti-racist stance and that this will inevitably have affected my 
research project and analyses. This discussion included my ethical reflections about 
changing the participantsÕ names to ensure confidentiality, which could be interpreted 
as practicing the racialisation of names myself. In doing all of the above, I hope that I 
have been open enough to earn my readerÕs trust that I have conducted this project 
and analysed the data in as honest a way as possible (Pyett, 2003).  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMBODIED AND DISEMBODIED RACIALISATION OF 
(SUR)NAMES  
 
Introduction  
In this chapter I discuss the (dis)embodied impacts of racialised names. Many 
of my name-changer participants indicated that their names have been used in order 
to racially categorise them. That is, that their names have been understood as racial 
and consequently racialised. Although names are a disembodied identity in that they 
are used frequently without the name-bearer being bodily present, they also have 
embodied repercussions: they are used as a signifier of the body. This has been 
indicated by Correspondence Test research (Wood et al., 2009), which provides 
evidence of racism based purely upon name in the initial stages of job applications 
(see Chapter Two). For such research, however, the connection between the 
racialised name and the racialised body was taken for granted and not investigated in 
its own right. In this chapter, however, I look more at how the name and body interact, 
the processes of name racialisation, and the everyday social, familial, educational Ð 
as well as employment Ð impacts that my participants indicated such racialisation has 
had for them.  
I will assert in this chapter that in the event of a name being racialised, the 
name-changer to whom the name belongs is simultaneously racialised in an 
embodied sense. Name is considered to be a significant indicator of race, and thus of 
expected (raced) bodily appearance: it is used as a tool of racialisation. As I discussed 
in Chapter Two, despite the fact that race does not have any scientific validity 
(Ratcliffe, 2004), literature suggests that it is still conceptually based in the body 
(Clarke, 2012; Solomos: 2001), whereby bodily difference is aligned with internal 
characteristics including intelligence (St Louis, 2005). Seemingly these differences are 
themselves seen to be perpetually held within notions of white supremacy and black 
defectiveness (Alexander and Knowles, 2005). My data support this theory. Moreover, 
despite the common usage of racial categories (e.g. white, black) in everyday 
discourse, which could imply racialisation is a harmless, common-sense/natural 
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process (Ahmad and Sheldon, 1994), many of my participantsÕ experiences testify that 
such a system can have serious impacts on the lives of those racialised as 
Other/foreign. Indeed, I will argue that the racialisation of name apparently aids the 
functioning of the system of whiteness in categorising people according to all readily 
available identities. Those of skin colour and accent have been acknowledged as 
being part of this racialisation process (for example, Herring, Keith and Horton, 2004; 
Klonoff and Landrine, 2000; Fernando, 1984; Hing, 2002; Singh and Dooley, 2006), 
but name has not Ð I will argue that it should be considered alongside them. 
My participants reveal internal structures of whiteness by illuminating this 
racial categorisation through name via their own personal experiences. I will present in 
this chapter the participantsÕ stories, which indicate that for them there has been a 
(sometimes extreme) level of disparity about how people had expected them to look 
and/or sound in relation to their name.  
 
Racialised Disparity Between (Sur)names and Body 
 When I asked Jenny Legris (white British; Mauritian married surname
5
) if her 
married surname had impacted upon her own identity, she responded as follows. 
 
Yes, yes, I think it has…most definitely…I think itÕs perception isnÕt it?...itÕs 
external perception, I think for me, obviously knowing my husband, knowing 
his life, knowing Mauritius, nothing changed for me…I just moved to a 
different name, because…IÕd married the man I loved…and I didnÕt really think 
then about how it looked to the outside world…but I think…as the years have 
gone on…it was a big deal, and other people…saw me as Mrs Legris and that 
was…an essentially white British person with an unusual sounding 
surname…and…I think, it has impacted, itÕs just always been that element of 
                                                       
 
 
 
 
5
 I have changed all names. Race (e.g. white/black), nationality (i.e. where participant 
was born and raised) and description of name origin (e.g. Mauritian) were all self-
identified by the respective participant. (I will discuss the apparent internalisation of 
such name origin constructions in Chapter Six). If no name description is given, this 
indicates that the name was identified by the participant as white British (this is for 
stylistic convenience as all of the participants had borne a name they identified as 
white British).  
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surprise…and then…sometimes when IÕve said to people, ÒWell IÕm married to 
a MauritianÓ - ÒOh okayÓ, but…thereÕs always been that, ÒCan you justify why 
your name is Legris when youÕre so British looking?Ó. 
 
Interestingly this suggests JennyÕs initial lack of awareness that her name-change 
would be perceived in a racial sense by others. She had apparently normalised the 
name within her own consciousness before getting married, she was wrapped up in 
her love for her husband and did not consider the importance of name as a tool of 
racialisation. As Jenny said, Ôthere was once or twice where I thought, ÒOh 
goshÓ…perhaps to other people it clearly is a different sounding surnameÕ. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned in JennyÕs quote above, it appears that she felt there was 
an expectation on the part of others that she should explain how her married surname 
related to her. Why, when she looks white British and sounds British does she have a 
name that is not so? Indeed, she said that people would: 
 
…almost be sort of willing me to say something about my name, without 
wanting to ask me…so I…just usually pre-empted that and said, ÒOh yes, IÕm 
married to a MauritianÓ, or, some people have actually said straight up, ÒThatÕs 
an unusual sounding surnameÓ…but sort of with the inference being, ÒWhat 
are you doing with a surname like that?Ó. 
 
 Jenny made it clear that in her mind the reason for this questioning was 
concerned with her appearance:  
 
I mean perhaps even if I had a tan…or perhaps I was olivey skinned, I 
think…they wouldnÕt bat an eyelid, they just canÕt sometimes see what IÕm 
doing almost with…a foreign sounding name…I mean…if I was a darker 
colour…and I donÕt mean necessarily Mauritian or anything, but I think itÕs just 
the name and me being so very fair, so very typically, you know, blonde 
hair…but…itÕs not the kind of name you expect me to come out with…when I 
think people expect me to say…ÒOh yes, Mrs SmithÓ or whatever. 
 
These anecdotes clearly imply that, for Jenny, her name has been racialised as 
foreign/non-white, and that this has become apparent to her because of othersÕ 
106 
 
reactions to her own embodied white identity. Those she meets seemingly show 
surprise that she should bear the name of Legris. Jenny provided an example of 
where she asserted that she did not Ôquite fit the nameÕ, which was when she went to 
a hospital for ante-natal check-ups and the staff members Ôwould just look up at you 
when you say your name…just, ÒOh Legris…And youÕre a White British 
personÓ…there was definitely surprise on peopleÕs faces when I said my nameÕ.  
 Jenny indicated that she did not perceive this surprise, however, whenever 
her husband was present with her, and she asserted that her husband and children 
have not experienced any reaction to their surname, because their looks have 
apparently ÔmatchedÕ it more than hers: ÔweÕd say, ÒOh itÕs Mr and Mrs LegrisÓ and he 
often being with me didnÕt have…any impact…and when heÕs on his own as Mr Legris, 
itÕs absolutely fine. And the same for Edward and George [her sons] because theyÕre 
slightly darker, but for me itÕs like the name didnÕt quite matchÕ. She explained that her 
husband had ÔAsian colouring so…the name is like, ÒOh well there you go, yesÓÕ, 
whereas because she is Ôtypically British looking…itÕs like almost…ÒWhat are you 
doing with a name like Legris?ÓÕ. Indeed, she went on to say, ÔIf I was…a few shades 
darker, I donÕt think thereÕd be a problem, because…people always 
automatically…associate…an unusual sounding name with…a foreigner…perhaps 
not…British…so I think…itÕs just been my colouring has added to the intrigue of my 
nameÕ. Even more explicitly: ÔPeople see a white British person and they expect a 
white British name…and I do think thatÕs…largely across the boardÕ.  
Linda Abadjian (white British; Armenian married surname) also asserted that 
she had had issues with her name being racialised as Other. Even though her married 
surname is Armenian, Linda said that people often think it is from India or Pakistan, 
because of the way it is spelt. This in itself ÔannoyedÕ her, although she did not explain 
why. Potentially this could be because - in terms of the hierarchy of names that will be 
discussed further in Chapter Six - she perceives an Armenian name to be higher 
ranked than an Asian one. Although she did not deem the name to be white British, 
she indicated that it is a name associated with whiteness.  
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Linda did say, though, that Ôthe next thing which has always annoyed me 
[is]...when they see me face to face they donÕt associate me with that name...I can tell 
by the expression on their face…and I have stood there if they say the name, I could 
be stood in front of them, and they will look over my shoulder and repeat the name 
again…Õ. Linda spoke of how this used to irritate her, but now she Ôexpect[s] itÕ and 
thinks Ôit makes them look silly, when they realise that IÕm the person theyÕre shouting 
for…say in a waiting room, stood right in front of them…Õ. Linda stated that she had 
never had any such issues with her maiden name: when she was in a waiting room 
with that name, Ôthey would look at me when I got up off my chair and say, ÒWell this is 
the person that IÕve shouted forÓ…I think they expect a white skinned personÕ. 
Moreover, Linda talked of still having recently experienced Ôthat slight look of 
surprise that you can catch in someoneÕs eyesÕ, when people have expected Ôa certain 
person and what they get is a surprise to them, because IÕm blonde and blue eyedÕ. 
Indeed, Linda spoke of being an ÔoptimistÕ and that she has always thought: ÔthereÕs so 
many foreign sounding names now that…all [people will] be interested in is, ÒHow do 
you spell that?Ó...but, no, you, still see it, on their faces…actually youÕre stood right 
next to them and they still donÕt think youÕre the person that theyÕve shouted for, 
so…maybe IÕm too much of an optimist, I donÕt know!Õ. This example in itself suggests 
the continuing prevalence of racialisation. 
Suzanne Balester (white British; formerly had a Moroccan married surname) 
also noted similar reactions from people regarding when she answered to her former 
married name, which was Moroccan: 
 
I think people were…quite surprised when they realised I was English……IÕm 
thinking about when I was pregnant more than anything, and you got a lot of 
appointments…and theyÕd be like, ÒHmm…Ó, and I knew…ÒOh itÕs my 
turnÓ…and then when they call…your name in a group of women and IÕd stand 
up theyÕd be like [pulls face]…they used to look at me quizzically, I think…. 
 
Furthermore, Sally Hasani (white British; Albanian married surname) reported 
comparable responses in relation to her Albanian surname and appearance: ÔI think 
some people do react because I donÕt look like they would expect me to be…if IÕm 
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going for an appointment somewhere and they just see my name, they come and call 
for me in the waiting room…ÒMrs HasaniÓ and IÕm like, ÒMe!Ó [chuckles], and I do…feel 
thereÕs a look of surprise as if to say, ÒOoh thatÕs not who I expected!Ó.  
Indeed, Amy Jammeh (white British; Gambian married surname) asserted 
that: Ôthere is a level of interest I think in names that arenÕt usual, and I suspect 
thatÕs…about me being standing in front of them and looking white British in terms of 
ethnic origin and having a name that doesnÕt match that appearanceÕ. Rebecca 
Travers (white British; had a Polish surname during first marriage), suggested that her 
Polish surname also impacted upon peopleÕs expectations of her physical 
appearance: 
 
Rebecca: I went to a building society, because I needed to get a loan to buy a 
house, so IÕd got an appointment, and they said…the person I needed to 
see…was upstairs, and she came down and then the woman IÕd originally 
seen was like, ÒOh thatÕs her over thereÓ and, ÒOh that wasnÕt what I was 
expectingÓ kind of thing. I was like, ÒWell what…were you expecting?Ó 
Emily: Yeah…was that before sheÕd spoken to you? Just on what you looked 
like? 
Rebecca: Yeah, yeah…[chuckles] So sheÕd obviously got some pre-conceived 
idea of what a Polish woman would look like…I donÕt know, a bag of 
cabbages, or…I donÕt know what…I canÕt imagine…. 
 
Furthermore, Anna Aladeoja (white British; Nigerian married surname) described how 
she started a new job and one of her colleagues said to her some time later that, ÔÒOh 
we thought you were…weÕd imagined a black lady coming…When we heard your 
nameÓ. Kayla Brackenbury (black British; born and raised in Zimbabwe) who had 
originally had a Zimbabwean surname (Manyika), spoke about being called up for 
more job interviews with her married surname, because: Ôyour name is not ringing 
bells to say, Òthis person…sheÕs [not white]ÓÕ. Kayla said that when she subsequently 
arrived for the interviews, Ôpeople are shocked to see…that youÕre black and youÕve 
got this English nameÕ. 
 Charlotte Leary (black British; born and raised in Zimbabwe) who had given 
up her Zimbabwean surname (Manyika, like her sister, Kayla Brackenbury) upon 
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marriage, explained how since the name change she has been asked more frequently 
about where she is from, as with her maiden name she felt it was Ôprobably obvious 
that IÕm from ZimbabweÕ, but with her ÔIrishÕ married name, Ôthey will start asking me 
like, ÒOh where are you from?ÓÕ or Ôthey just say, ÒOh itÕs an Irish surnameÓ…thatÕs 
their way of asking me [chuckles]…they saw an African with an Irish surname, they 
just want to know how [she got the name]Õ. Her surname has apparently been related, 
in these incidents, to an expected racialised body image, which Charlotte was not 
understood to meet. Kayla Brackenbury described how, upon seeing her, people were 
ÔconfusedÕ about her married surname: ÔÒWhereÕs this from? Are you from Jamaica?Ó 
or something like that because…most Jamaicans are black but theyÕve got English 
names and English second names...Õ. Thus, upon seeing her appearance in relation to 
her name, some people have seemingly tried to rationalise how someone deemed 
black could have a white British name. Apparently KaylaÕs name goes against the 
racialised system of naming and consequently must be explained.  
 Additionally, Charlotte Leary provided a couple of examples of times where 
her name had apparently led to false impressions of her appearance: 
 
…sometimes…when I used to register with some of these agencies, I would 
probably e-mail my CV and maybe IÕll just speak to them briefly on the phone 
and then IÕll go to the place for the interview or something, and 
theyÕll…probably be expecting someone white to come in, theyÕll see me and 
theyÕll be like, ÒOh, oh!Ó…theyÕll be shocked, but…you sort of know, ÒOh they 
were actually expecting someone white, because of my name…they wonÕt say 
it to your face but you can still tell that theyÕve got a bit of a shock…. 
 
A further illustration Charlotte gave related to when she was at work and her car had 
broken down. She explained that she had called a car breakdown company to come 
and fix it and had given them her name. She went on to say that when the mechanic 
arrived she walked down to the reception to meet him and had to: 
 
…repeat…twice…ÓAre you waiting for Charlotte Leary?Ó and he just said 
ÒYesÓ, I said, ÒThis is meÓ and he probably just thought, ÒOh itÕs maybe 
somebody elseÓ, but like ÒOh itÕs me, IÕm hereÓ and it took him a while to…say 
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ÒOkay!Ó…But he was probably expecting somebody else, thatÕs what I 
thought…maybe he was expecting somebody else …he was quite shocked!. 
 
These anecdotes seemingly indicate a belief in the fixity of race and what names 
signify. The mechanic, for instance, was apparently unaware of the possibility that the 
person to whom that name belonged could be black in appearance. Charlotte has 
here described how she had to be persistent in telling the mechanic that she was the 
person he was looking for, and that consequently he was forced to break out of his 
racialised expectations. 
Sophie Clarke (white British), whose maiden name (Madaffari) came from her 
Italian-born father, outlined that this surname was often taken to be Polish. 
Subsequently she explained how she felt people had expectations of someone petite 
with dark hair and olive skin, whereas Sophie described herself as blond and blue 
eyed. She asserted that her married name Ôis probably what I look like…very British 
looking, blond…I do fit into the stereotypeÕ. For Sophie, to stereotype what someone 
would look like based on their name was something quite normal that most people do, 
herself included (see Chapter Five for further discussion about this topic). When I 
asked if she believes that there is discrimination based on name, she described how 
Ôwhen you see a name on a list you make a judgement…it might not even be good or 
bad, it might just be what theyÕre going to look like…but you automatically think 
something when you see a name…so yeah, I think people do make judgements and I 
donÕt think itÕs necessarily a good thingÕ. She explained that she had had a negative 
experience of walking into a room and not meeting peopleÕs expectations of what she 
would look like: Ôsomeone at university actually said they were disappointed because 
they thought IÕd walk in and be like a dark beautyÕ. For her, this was Ônot very 
nice…[when] people voice it or show you their disappointment for whatever reasonÕ. 
In addition, when I asked Jenny Legris whether or not she thought there was 
name discrimination in the UK, she said that she felt there is Ôquite a lotÕ of meaning in 
a name, that at some schools where she had taught, Ôif itÕs been a little black person, 
ÒOh yeah, thatÕs right, thatÕs your surname, because youÕre that colourÓ, do you know 
what I mean? As I say, not in any particularly horrible wayÕ Ð in other words, the black 
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pupilÕs name is black so this matches the racialised system of naming. A person is 
apparently signified by what they are called, and thereby the cog of whiteness powers 
on, by fitting people into the boxes to which they are assigned and according them 
privilege or not (Dyer, 1999; see Chapter Two).  
Jenny said that she did not perceive the surprise she has encountered in 
relation to the disjuncture between her own bodily appearance and her name to be 
racist. She expressed her belief that Ôcolour discriminationÕ was not prevalent 
anymore, Ôwell certainly in the world IÕve mixed inÕ, and that, as such, if she had been 
ÔAsian coloured, nobody would bat an eyelidÕ about her name. However, I do not think 
JennyÕs argument that her experiences do not equate to racist thinking holds up to 
scrutiny. For people to think that someone should embody a particular racial identity in 
order to carry a certain racialised name means that this distinction is seen to be 
significant and to have purpose. As I discussed in Chapter Two, people are seemingly 
placed into categories in accordance with the structures of whiteness so as to 
differentiate and subsequently to discriminate against, or assign privilege to, them 
(Ginsberg, 1996).  
Moreover, Nicola Zheung (white British; Chinese married surname) said that 
she has often been to the doctors and given her surname, spelt it out and then been 
told that her surname could not be found on the system. Nicola said that when she 
asked the administrators how they had spelt it, they repeated her name back either as 
ÔZ-H-U-N-GÕ or as ÔY-O-U-N-GÕ: Ôquite often people substitute Zheung for an English 
sounding name…just because I think thatÕs what theyÕre expecting to hear. But I think 
we do stereotype a lot on what people look like, we assume what weÕre going to hear 
back…So basically itÕs around thatÕ. NicolaÕs description is intriguing in that she has 
apparently said her correct surname and even spelt it, but another name has been 
invented in order to match her perceived embodied race. Marion Stamatis (white 
British; Greek married surname) also described how the children she has taught have 
often called her: 
 
Stav-a-vridis or Steve-ridis, lots of them made that mistake year after year so I 
think it is a pattern…the way that the English language works, that theyÕre 
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trying in the same way over and over to twist it into something English…But I 
never took that as racist, I always took it as fun really…with the children 
anyway, because to me it was a bit like Lego…youÕd be moving the parts 
about, ÒHow can we make this sound English?Ó…ÒWeÕll add an [E]Ó, and that 
seemed quite honest…I think most people generally speaking are quite 
honest…theyÕre surprised and they express that, but in an honest way.... 
 
Marion explained that such Anglicisation has been committed by adults as well, and 
that she would normally correct people who say ÔSteve-ridisÕ. The apparent 
Anglicisation of these participantsÕ names is reminiscent of the enforced name-
changing, which I discussed in Chapter One: that historically officials often Anglicised 
migrantsÕ names and thereby tried to neutralise their foreignness (Weekley, 1928). 
The participantsÕ anecdotes that I have presented in this chapter indicate that 
when they are perceived to be of a different embodied race to that which their name is 
seen to represent, this has caused surprise and misunderstanding in their everyday 
social encounters. It has even seemingly prompted attempts to correct their surname 
in order to match their embodied race (i.e. NicolaÕs and MarionÕs experiences of 
Anglicisation). All of these examples thus far indicate a disruption to the expected 
norm that (sur)names should equate to embodied race. That is, to the anticipated 
understanding that oneÕs bodily appearance should match oneÕs name (as has been 
previously argued by research such as Wood et al.Õs (2009) study, which equated 
name to race in order to investigate racial discrimination in the UK job market; see 
Chapter Two). My participantsÕ (sur)names have apparently been understood in a 
racialised way. 
 Some of the interviewees also related their childrenÕs experiences, which 
seemed to be connected to the relationship of the racially embodied appearance of 
the child and the childÕs name. Victoria Ravanbaksh (white British; Persian married 
surname), for example, who had given her children a Persian first name, an ÔEnglishÕ 
middle name and a Persian surname, spoke of how her daughter had Ô…had to cope 
with people thinking Òwhat nationality is she…with that name?Ó. And having to 
listen…when itÕs been read out in front of a group of people and everybodyÕs like, 
ÒWhoÕs that then, whoÕs that?ÓÕ. For Victoria, this confusion appears to have derived 
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from her childrenÕs appearance not necessarily matching peopleÕs expectations of 
what someone with Persian names should look like: Ôif they [her children] go out in the 
[summer] sun it [their skin tone] gets darker, and then people would sort of see where 
their name came from…but in the winter, they would look at them and wonder whether 
they were English or, thereÕd be a lot of confusion…[about] where they came from.Õ 
Victoria compares this to her own experience that Ôpeople will look at me and they 
wouldnÕt associate that name with me at allÕ because she is white. Again, one can 
conceive that name is heavily associated here with embodied appearance. Within the 
racially categorising structures of whiteness, a personÕs name appears to be equated 
to who they are, to their race. As Victoria illustrated, if a person has a dark skin tone, 
this explains why they have a foreign name. This is the common-sense reasoning of 
racial categorisation that whiteness has seemingly promoted. 
 The same notion of puzzlement about the childÕs racial origins in relation to 
their name and appearance, seems to be borne out also in Suzanne BalesterÕs (white 
British; formerly bore a Moroccan surname) interview. She asserted that her son (who 
has a Moroccan surname and first name, the latter of which Suzanne had shortened 
in order to appear ÔEnglishÕ) has been questioned Ôabout where his name comes from 
and whatÕs his ethnicity and things like that…Õ. In other words, it seems that to have a 
name, which apparently is not viewed as normal or usual (i.e. white British) in the UK 
context, is not something that goes without comment. As I discussed in Chapter Two, 
it seems that foreignness tends to be constructed as obvious, and whiteness as 
invisible (Dyer, 1999). Indeed, the following description by Linda Abadjian (white 
British; Armenian married surname) of her daughterÕs experience at primary school is 
a powerful example of how much some people apparently rely on (sur)names as a 
means of drawing up embodied, racialised, images. It is seemingly when the person in 
question does not fit the expected stereotype that such processes become most 
apparent.  
LindaÕs children were given her husbandÕs Armenian surname, along with 
ÔChristianÕ first names, which Linda stated were common in both the UK and Armenia: 
Ô…the only thing that was foreign sounding was their surnameÕ. What makes the 
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situation particularly interesting is that Linda said she felt that the Armenian surname 
had Asian-sounding associations, or that it was often taken by others to be an Asian 
name. Linda stated: 
 
Linda: [My daughter] would come home as a young child and tell me things…I 
can remember one [day], that…they were eating at lunch time and a child 
said, ÒWell your…daddyÕs got brown skinÓ Ð which he hasnÕt actually Ð but 
thatÕs what they said to her, ÒHeÕs got brown skinÓ and I thought, ÒWell 
obviously theyÕve associated brown skin with the nameÓ…and that wasnÕt a 
comment coming I donÕt think from some four, five year old, I think that was 
discussed in the household…The parents hadnÕt met us as parents, and just 
automatically assumed that he…had black or brown skin… 
Emily: But…your children…are they quite white in appearance? 
Linda: Yes, they are, yes 
Emily: So itÕs a bit strange…ItÕs just literally from the name… 
Linda: She has blonde hair, theyÕve all got blue eyes, yeah… 
Emily: That is very odd then that the parents would say that to their children… 
Linda: Well I think…whatÕs happened is, maybe their child went home and 
mentioned my daughterÕs…full name, and they automatically made an 
association due to that… 
Emily: Mm…yeah that makes sense…was that something that concerned you 
then, or? 
Linda: It did concern me at the time…she wasnÕt upset about it, but I thought, 
ÒAre we going to have this throughout her school life and is it going to get 
worse?Ó…But that was a long time ago…I mean sheÕs 27 now, but I do 
remember…that incident … 
Emily: …were there any other as they got older then… 
Linda: No, as they got older, no…maybe because theyÕd seen…myself and 
my husband, picking them up from school, maybe that made a difference…. 
 
This passage quite clearly implies an association between name and expected racial 
appearance. What is also interesting is LindaÕs reported concern that this kind of act of 
mistaken racial identity would continue throughout her childrenÕs schooling. As her 
daughter had not apparently been upset by the incident, it would seem that LindaÕs 
apprehension was that somehow this disparity between name and racial appearance - 
that is, to be thought of as Asian rather than white British - may have been detrimental 
for her children. Indeed, existing research suggests a big disparity between the life 
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chances of white Britons and their racial minority counterparts (e.g. The Runnymede 
Trust Report, 2012:9; EHRC, 2010; Ramesh, 2010; see Chapter Two). 
 The stories I have provided in this section have buttressed existing theory, 
which suggests that race is still conceptually based in the body (Clarke, 2012; 
Solomos, 2001), rather than in the cultural notions that have been asserted in 
common UK rhetoric (Solomos and Back, 2000; Brah, Hickman and Mac an Ghaill, 
1999; see Chapters One and Two). Thus it would seem that despite the scientific 
refutation of the idea of biological race (Ratcliffe, 2004), this has not dismissed the 
everyday importance of the body in founding notions of difference and Otherness.  I 
have asserted that name is used as a tool through which this embodied racialisation is 
practiced (as revealed by the disruption of this process in terms of the participant not 
bearing the expected name according to their embodied racial identification). In the 
following section, I suggest that accent is also used alongside name and body in the 
processes of racialisation. 
 
Racialised Disparity Between (Sur)names and Accent 
Some name-changers mentioned that it was not just their bodily appearance 
but also their accent, which was understood not to match their anticipated racial 
category by others. Marion Stamatis (white British; Greek married surname) noted the 
ÔsurpriseÕ that had often accompanied her appearance in relation to her Greek married 
name. When I asked why she felt people were surprised, she replied: ÔI suppose 
because they…think IÕm obviously English…I think IÕve got a fairly working class 
accent…I think people read me as that and then to come out with a foreign sounding 
name…it contradicts the obvious…and I probably donÕt look foreign…so people are 
not expecting that reallyÕ.  
Additionally, Stephanie AlAsadi (white British; Kuwaiti married surname) 
indicated that her maiden name had made it Ôclear to people that IÕm BritishÕ. However, 
after taking her Kuwaiti/Arabic surname she stated that when attending appointments 
at places like the bank, Ôthey have different expectations of…who IÕm going to 
be…they think IÕm foreign for example but IÕm not, IÕm still British, but they donÕt know 
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that…They kind of donÕt know until I speak to them…and they hear my accentÕ. 
Furthermore, Victoria Ravanbaksh (white British; Persian/Iranian married surname) 
spoke of her perception that some people who have telephoned her have been 
expecting someone with a foreign accent, and that when they have spoken to her, 
they have thought: ÔÒOh itÕs an English person, oh well thatÕs fine then Ð how did you 
get a name like that?Ó…thatÕs what they come out with, and you think, Òyeah, Ôcause 
you thought I couldnÕt speak EnglishÓ, and you can, itÕs not said, but thereÕs a 
prejudice against it, IÕm sure there isÕ.  
It is interesting to note that the racialisation of the person and the name has 
seemed to happen in two directions. That is, when the participant gave their surname 
in the course of an encounter after they were already bodily present (as with Marion), 
and when they have given their name in a disembodied sense and arrived into the 
social interaction afterwards (as with Stephanie and Victoria). In both situations, the 
participant has still been understood as being - in body and in accent Ð racially 
oppositional to the racialised understanding of their surname.  
Likewise, Marianne Watson (Asian; born and raised in the Philippines), who 
had had a Chinese surname (Wong) before marriage, but a white British first name, 
spoke of experiences she had encountered at work over the telephone. Ô...[P]eople at 
work start saying, ÒCan I speak to Mrs Watson?Ó and when they speak to you, theyÕre 
like ÒOhÓ and they realise that youÕre not [chuckles] actually Watson…I got people say 
that before, ÒYou sound…ExoticÓ or something, ÒAsianÓ, or something like that…Õ. 
Thus, the implication is that Marianne may have a white British surname but that it is 
not her real name, it is not reflective of who she really is in a racialised sense.  
Marianne also mentioned how for her job she has had to ring up colleagues 
within the same building. She described situations where the colleague asked her at 
the end of the conversation about whom they should contact in the future. Marianne 
explained that she gave own name as the contact person, and the colleague then 
asked who that person was, with Marianne replying, ÔÒItÕs me! YouÕre speaking to this 
personÓÕ, and the colleague responded, ÔÒOh, oh I didnÕt expect this!ÓÕ. Marianne then 
said, ÔÒOh okay…I marry and I change my name, thatÕs allÓÕ. She explained that this 
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has not happened so much since people in the building have got to know of her. 
Nonetheless she described how she experiences times where because of her married 
surname: Ôpeople hear me speaking or see when they meet this person and 
somebody walk up from the door [chuckles] that is not actually what they expect…I 
think that they would just think itÕs a normal, white skinned…Westerner English 
personÕ. In MarianneÕs case, then, it appears that her accent has raised expectations 
on behalf of the converser about what her name would be. Her name is expected to 
be indicative of her race: they expected to hear an Asian name, not Watson, a white 
British one. 
Additionally, Kayla Brackenbury (black British; Zimbabwean born and raised, 
Zimbabwean maiden name) explained that people will question her about her race in 
Ôa nice way…ÒOh, your name is Brackenbury, that sounds lovely, but your accent, 
which part of London are you from, or…are you from up north of something?Õ Ð just 
trying to…find out where exactly are you fromÕ. For Kayla this was a pretence, as Ôthey 
obviously know their own dialects hereÕ, and so she felt that they knew she was not 
originally from the UK, but that this is often how people ask her, in order to Ôget to 
exactly…the bottom of the question, where they want to ask you where are you from 
originallyÕ. Kayla said that such questioning has proceeded for a while on occasion, as 
she has wanted to toy with peopleÕs prejudices: ÔSometimes I just say to [the 
questioners] Òoriginally IÕm from RetfordÓ, they say, Òoh no, originallyÓ, I say, ÒIÕm from 
LondonÓÕ etcetera, rather than tell them her country of birth. All of this questioning 
seemingly derives from a conception that Kayla should not have a white British 
surname, that it does not match her racial identity. 
As I mentioned in Chapter Two, existing theory has suggested that accent 
plays a role in racialisation processes (Hing, 2002; Singh and Dooley, 2006). The 
participantsÕ stories that I have presented in this section support this point. They also 
seemingly extend this theory by suggesting that name is used alongside accent (and 
skin colour) as a means of conceiving an individualÕs racial identity. I will discuss the 
interaction between these three apparent racial markers later on in this chapter. 
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Racialised Understanding of Inner Characteristics Based Upon (Sur)names 
Some name-changers explained that their experiences went beyond people 
just being surprised that their surname was not (apparently) representative of their 
embodied race. Their encounters suggest that (sur)names are often deemed to 
indicate an individualÕs inner characteristics, knowledge or social habits/beliefs, as has 
been argued in existing theory regarding embodied race (Alexander and Knowles, 
2005:10; St Louis, 2005:121; Bhavani, Mirza and Meetoo, 2005:9). Nicola Zheung 
(white British; Chinese married name) stated, ÔI do think thereÕs a sense of…if you 
have a particular name I expect you to be or behave a particular way…And when 
blatantly you arenÕt Chinese…and IÕm expecting you to be Chinese, I think that people 
find that a bit strange, whether they realise it or not…Õ. Rebecca Travers (white British; 
had a Polish surname during first marriage) also described an ÔembarrassingÕ episode: 
 
IÕd go into some area in an official capacity like when we [her and her 
husband] split up and I had to go and get…the mortgage put into just my 
name, and IÕd still got…that [Polish] surname, and…the people in the building 
society were kind of sniggering about it and I…found that a bit peculiar really 
and…I think they expected me to not be able to speak English, so they were 
kind of saying things as if I didnÕt understand [chuckles]…. 
 
This above description implies that the people in question had directly equated 
RebeccaÕs surname to an embodied inability to speak English. Similarly, Abigail 
Koslacz (white British; Polish married surname) indicated that when she worked at her 
previous school, where she had borne both her former surname and subsequently her 
married name, she did not have any issues with her surname. However, since moving 
school, where she had only been known by her married surname, she said that:  
 
…there was this assumption at one point, when we had a Polish girl at school 
who arrived with very little English, that I would teach her some 
[chuckles]…[Polish] and work with her, and I did actually get her a GCSE in 
Polish but I only know twelve or maybe 20 words in Polish, I donÕt speak 
Polish! And that was quite funny, suddenly I had this talent that I didnÕt know 
about, just because IÕd inherited a Polish surname…so, yeah, I do think 
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people have this expectation that IÕm maybe a little bit more exotic than I 
was…. 
 
It seems quite a leap, to go from hearing someoneÕs surname to using that surname 
as a gauge for their abilities in a different language. Indeed, Abigail described how 
colleagues had been asking her where her surname was from, and that they had been 
able to remember it was Polish. Thus it is surprising that they apparently could not 
remember that she herself was not Polish. By changing her surname Abigail had 
seemingly moved from her position of undoubted white Britishness, when using her 
maiden name, into one of a certain Otherness, whereby she would magically have 
imbibed the ability to speak anOther language as a consequence of taking a foreign 
surname.  
Jenny Legris (white British; Mauritian married surname) also said that her 
married surname meant that Ôpeople have maybe…seen me as…sort of part of this 
Mauritian life really…it has had an impact sociallyÕ. This intriguingly implies that the 
racialisation of her name as Asian/Other has led to a change in expectations 
regarding her social identity. She has somehow aligned herself with Mauritianness by 
having a Mauritian surname and the (disembodied) identity of name has been equated 
to an internal (embodied) identity. This supports and extends the notion I described in 
Chapter Two that skin colour is equated to internal characteristics of the self (St Louis, 
2005; Bhavani, Mirza and Meetoo, 2005). The name Ð as a presumed marker of skin 
colour Ð is assumed to further represent the name bearerÕs inner qualities. 
Jamal Hassan Hamdaoui (mixed-race British) had used an Anglicised alias 
throughout his childhood, but had subsequently decided to revert back to using his 
Arabic official name as an adult. He spoke of how he had booked a bed and breakfast 
in a remote part of Scotland and when he turned up the lady exclaimed, ÔÒOhhh!ÓÕ and 
indicated that, ÔShe [had] expected one of those Iraqi terrorists!Õ because of his name. 
He also said that, as a musician, sometimes when he performed a gig people had 
expected it to be, Ôsome sort of ethnic music...because of my name!Õ, rather than the 
jazz set that he did perform. In addition, Jamal described how he had seen Ôpeople 
puzzling over [his name]...especially the elderlyÕ, and he asserted his belief that Ôat the 
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end of the day people are still conditioned enough to believe in their identity as being 
a, b or c...they still hold on to thatÕ. 
Jamal highlighted that such afore-mentioned incidents are perhaps 
representative of how when a personÕs name is written down, they have not defined 
themselves, but others are seemingly Ôascribing a certain definition to that name, 
before theyÕve put it into contextÕ. He pondered that this is something Ôperhaps 
inevitable......thereÕs always going to be an ascription thatÕs going to help reinforce 
peopleÕs individual sense of reality...And thereÕs always going to be a projection of 
what people expect of a certain phenotypeÕ. Indeed, he relayed how because of his 
name: Ôa funny question I find myself being asked, is: ÒDo you like pork?Ó, and it 
almost seems like, theyÕre fishing…and itÕs like, you can just ask, ÒAre you a Muslim?Ó 
[chuckles] You donÕt have to do this walking on eggshells thing!Õ.  
It seems that JamalÕs physical appearance is not responsible for such 
comments/questions, as he described himself as Spanish looking, rather than having 
an appearance stereotypically related to predominantly Islamic countries, such as 
those in North Africa or Arabia. He also mentioned how when he has travelled abroad, 
South Americans and Israelis have often approached and spoken to him in 
Spanish/Hebrew, because of his appearance. Thus, to Jamal, his experiences have 
been Ôpurely because [people] know the name is Arabic, theyÕre making that 
connection, Arab and IslamÕ. Jamal said that such incidents as presented above, have 
caused him to feel ÔparanoidÕ about things such as handing in his work at university:  
 
…in first year for example my...Philosophy class was hundreds of people 
strong, so youÕre very much anonymous apart from this name so you hand in 
your work and you do sometimes think that…they are going to look at this and 
think of it as perhaps a different…point put from a different culture.  
 
In other words, Jamal indicated that his name is being interpreted in terms of 
stereotypical notions of his inner beliefs and qualities. Moreover, he expressed that he 
himself did not think of names as being consequential, but others, more than he would 
perhaps like to admit, do.  
121 
 
 
I think that itÕs going to be harder to break down the borders of expectations 
for people with a Muslim name in this country, I think thereÕs enough 
misinformation kicking [around] about what it is to be Arab, what it is to be a 
Muslim, what it is to be...this, that and the next...that people do sort of 
automatically maybe think that heÕs a Muslim and he beats up his wife 
or...something ridiculous…and…yeah, I definitely would say that thereÕs an 
issue in the UK with pre-conceptions attached to names, that is without a 
doubt. 
 
For Jamal, such pre-conceptions about his name have been almost inevitably 
ÔmisleadingÕ, as he described himself as not being a Muslim (furthermore, the religious 
background of his father - from whom his surname came - is Catholic). Yet according 
to Jamal, ÔthereÕs definitely an ascription of Islam to [his] name...and I guess when 
people see me, you know, IÕve got tattoos and IÕm [chuckles] whatever I am!Õ Thus, he 
felt their alleged pre-conception of him as a Muslim had been Ôquickly quenchedÕ. 
Consequently, the preconceptions associated with JamalÕs name, in terms of his inner 
(religious) beliefs and race, are seemingly in some way rebuffed by his embodied 
appearance and accent. 
Meanwhile Naze Edgerley (mixed-race British) had not changed his surname, 
but I included him in the sample because he provided an interesting example of the 
relationship between having a first name, which is commonly perceived as not being 
white British (even though it is an English place-name), and a surname, which is. 
Naze said that people have argued with him about where his first name originates 
from and have asserted that his first name is not ÔEnglishÕ but ÔArabicÕ. He talked about 
how this upsets him: Ôit annoys me…itÕs like theyÕre saying IÕm not English…because 
of my name…it just winds me up. I can understand people saying, ÒAh it doesnÕt 
sound EnglishÓ, but when theyÕre saying, ÒOh no itÕs not English, youÕre wrongÓ, itÕs like 
ÒOkay…ÓÕ.  
 There is also the suggestion that NazeÕs appearance had influenced such 
claims. Naze had a Nigerian grandfather and described himself as lightly tanned (he 
defined all of his other family members as white). Thus Naze said that his appearance 
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in combination with his first name meant Ôa lot of peopleÕ have thought he is ÔAsian or 
North African, Egyptian, AlgerianÕ. What is more, he spoke of how people have often 
asked him, ÔÒAre you Asian?ÓÕ, to which he replied: 
 
ÒNo, my granddad was from AfricaÓ…[and] that…changes their 
perspective…because now theyÕre talking to an African, not an 
Asian…and…an African is not a Muslim, most people find, even though my 
granddad himself was actually Muslim…so…in some peopleÕs minds, itÕs like, 
ÒOh right, okay, thatÕs alright thenÓ.  
 
This is interesting in that it suggests those people, because of NazeÕs name and 
appearance, had wanted to establish his race and especially his religious 
beliefs/background. It also implies that people have often openly attempted to racially 
categorise Naze, to tick the box of what he is or is not. To discover that his name was 
not Islamic apparently indicated to his conversers that Naze himself was not of the 
Islamic faith. Thereby his name was directly equated to his inner belief system.  
Moreover, Suzanne Balester (white British; formally held a Moroccan married 
surname) conveyed how she Ôhad one very big negative experienceÕ in relation to her 
name, which happened when she was pregnant, and went for her first scan at the 
hospital.  
 
IÕd decided that I wanted to know the sex of the baby…I was there and my 
husband was there, and the midwife…was doing the scan, ÒHereÕs the baby, 
hereÕs the photographÓ and so on, and I said, ÒActually, IÕd like to know what 
sex the baby isÓ and she sort of hesitated and said, ÒWell…we donÕt do thatÓ, 
so I said, ÒWell other people get the sex of their babiesÓ and…I said, ÒWell 
what, whatÕs the problem?Ó. I said, ÒA friend of mine has just found out the sex 
of her babyÓ. She said, ÒOh no, we donÕt, we donÕt give out the sex, she must 
be at a different hospitalÓ…IÕm not nave, I knew the reason for that…was 
obviously the ethnicity and the degree of boys are more important than 
females…But I definitely felt that that was a real discriminatory issue…and 
they never told me…and I asked a few times…the only inkling that I got that I 
was actually having a boy, was probably about a month before he was born, 
and I got this new midwife who was a coloured lady…and she was listening to 
the heartbeat and I said to her, ÒOh IÕve heard that you can tell what sex 
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the…baby is by the heartbeatÓ, so she said, ÒOh yeah theyÕre different, a boyÕs 
heartbeat is different to a girlÕsÓ, so I said, ÒWell can you tell what IÕm having 
then?Ó, so she said, ÔWell, what, what do you actually want?Õ…I said, ÒWell IÕd 
like a boyÓ, and she said, ÒWell I donÕt think youÕll be disappointedÓ, you know 
and, she was telling me but…there was still a bit of hesitancy. I didnÕt believe 
it Ôtil he was born obviously, but I think it was the biggest thing thatÕs ever got 
to me…this negativity around what they would consider possibly Asian 
people, the Muslim background and so on of…getting rid of girls, basically, so 
not telling what the sex is…Really bizarre. 
 
Suzanne stated that the fact her husband (of North African appearance) was present 
with her the first time had contributed to the nurses acting in this manner, but that it 
was also about her surname. She said that she was really upset about this treatment 
and saw it as discriminatory. In essence, SuzanneÕs reported experience suggests 
that her surname had been racially categorised as Islamic, and that stereotyped views 
had accordingly surfaced regarding the beliefs that Suzanne would consequently hold 
regarding the supremacy of male children and potentially a desire to abort female 
children. 
The quotations I have presented in this section have supported the theory that 
there is an equivalence made between embodied skin colour and internal abilities, and 
its tendency to be conceptualised in terms of white superiority and black lowliness 
(Alexander and Knowles, 2005), or - more specifically - there is the implication of 
Christianity (perceived as the religion of white British people) being conceived as 
superior to Islam (viewed as the religion of the Other, of non-white Britishness). For 
example, with regard to the equation of an Arabic name to terrorism, or to a desire to 
abort female children. These can be seen as examples of the effects of politically 
motivated Othering of Muslims that is prevalent in the UK currently (Alexander, 2002b, 
2004; Alexander, Edwards and Temple, 2007; Per, 2013:6), as I discussed in 
Chapter One. Consequently, bearing a name that is racialised as Other apparently led 
to fixed notions not only of what my participants looked or sounded like but also of 
what their knowledge, abilities, beliefs and/or identifications might be. 
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Foreign Surnames Equated to ParticipantÕs Embodied Racial Identity Rather 
than to Marital Name-Change 
Similarly to the previous section, several of the white name-changers stated 
that their foreign surname had often been taken to be indicative of their embodied 
race, notwithstanding the fact that they used the title of Mrs. This is despite the 
prevalent practice (over 90%) of women taking their husbandÕs name upon marriage 
in the UK (Wilson, 2009). The question was raised by a few participants that if 
someone is married, should it be automatically assumed that their surname is their 
maiden name and thus apparently indicative of their embodied race? Anna Aladeoja 
(white British; Nigerian married surname) asserted that her surname Ôeasily identifies 
me as married to a Nigerian…when I meet especially NigeriansÕ. However, the 
example she used to support this claim was related to being at the train station ticket 
booth, where the person serving was Nigerian: Ôhe…looks at my season ticket name 
and like looked up at me, really confused, and then looked back and then looked up 
and then I said, ÒOh, IÕm married to a YorubaÓÕ. Thus, Anna apparently had to explicitly 
state here that she had taken the surname through marriage.  
Furthermore, Natalie Mustapić (white British; Croatian married surname), 
spoke of how she initially started work as a lecturer before she had the title of Doctor, 
and she was thus known as Mrs Mustapić. Nonetheless, she said that she was still 
often assumed to be Eastern European herself, despite her assertions that she does 
not look as though she were from this region. Consequently Natalie asserted that 
these assumptions were made ÔsimplyÕ because of her name: Ôin terms of…looking at 
me, people would automatically assume that…I was…white Anglo-SaxonÕ. Also, 
Natalie relayed how she has been complimented several times on her Ôgood EnglishÕ 
by her students, which is an indication of the ascription of Otherness to foreign 
surnames. It also, though, indicates that her title of Mrs was not enough for the 
surname to be considered an adornment. It was instead seemingly essentialised as 
being symbolic of her own racial identity Ð so much so, that her asserted white British 
appearance and British accent were ignored because of her surname. This, to some 
extent, goes against AhmedÕs (1998) point, as I presented in Chapter Two, that white 
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people can use foreignness merely as an adornment through tanning, without it 
affecting their understood racial identity. It appears that because NatalieÕs married 
name is associated with whiteness (even though it is not British whiteness), it is not 
deemed to be specifically in opposition to her embodied racial identity. 
Nonetheless, Nicola Zheung (white British; Chinese married surname) argued 
that her name had affected how people conceived her racial identity: Ôfor a lot 
of…people it causes them some confusion…I find that people expect me to look 
ChineseÕ. She explained that she does not look Ôtraditionally ChineseÕ, but suggested 
that her Ôslight astigmatismÕ may have prompted people to think she is Ôhalf ChineseÕ. 
However, Nicola said that before she got married, she had Ôa standard English nameÕ, 
and that nobody had: Ôever really noticed my surname before, or has questioned my 
ethnicity before…Õ, which would imply that her appearance had little to do with 
conceptions of her as Chinese. Nicola asserted that ÔItÕs like theyÕre trying to find a 
reason why IÕve got the surname, other than just being married…Õ, and stated that: 
 
I would have thought it [name through marriage] would be the first thing youÕd 
think if youÕve got the name Mrs Zheung and…you donÕt look Chinese, in the 
stereotypical way, because it is quite a dominant set of characteristics, you 
normally have some very black hair and brown eyes and…and obviously…a 
slightly darker skin tone as well…so that always surprises me. 
 
In addition, Rose Urzica (white British) said that one of the most common 
questions she had been asked in relation to her Romanian married surname was, 
ÔÒHow did you end up with that name?ÓÕ. She stated that she found this to be: 
 
…the most irritating one, because I would have thought that one was clear 
and obvious, that the simplest way I could acquire that name was marry 
someone with that name, who happens to come from a country where that 
name comes from, but they donÕt seem to rumble that, and I have to…say to 
them, ÒWell, my husbandÕs nameÓ, ÒAhhh!Ó And I think, ÒWell itÕs not rocket 
science really is itÓ, but obviously and clearly for some people it is. 
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Rose said this questioning had occurred even when the people have known that she 
had Mrs in front of her name, and consequently is also a sign of the seemingly 
common, racialised assumptions made on the basis of oneÕs (sur)name. The 
disembodied label becomes the embodied categorisation. 
 In this section I have further empirically buttressed the existing theoretical 
notion that conceptions of difference still appear to be located in racialised notions of 
the body, as I stated earlier. Names seem to be essentialised as having racialised 
meaning in the body - therefore the biological, rather than cultural, sense of race is still 
propagated, as I suggested in Chapters One and Two (e.g. Bhavani, Mirza and 
Meetoo, 2005; Herrnstein and Murray, 1996). 
 
Extreme Reactions Towards a Disjuncture of Racialised (Sur)names and Body 
 I discussed in Chapter Two the panic that the conception of racial (embodied) 
passing provoked amongst white North Americans despite there being no real 
evidence of how extensive (or not) such a practice was (Ginsberg, 1996). Similarly, 
my participantsÕ experiences suggest that to interfere with the usual name racialisation 
process can cause quite extreme reactions, which in turn highlight the importance of 
the process of name racialisation within national understandings of race and 
whiteness. I suggested above that the concepts of whiteness and racism are all about 
categorising people in order to determine who will access privilege within a nation and 
who will not. Thus it seems inevitable that confusing this system will draw strong 
reactions. It appears that race is conceptualised and discussed as though it were 
irrefutable and natural, despite its inconsistent and unscientific basis (Ratcliffe, 2004), 
as will be demonstrated in the following examples.  
Nicola Zheung (white British; Chinese married surname), described how 
although she Ôquite like[s] having [her married surname]Õ, She spoke of having Ôhad a 
few weird experiencesÕ: 
 
…people say, ÒIÕm really sorry to have to ask, but are you actually 
Chinese?Ó…or, ÒAre you actually English?Ó because theyÕre not quite 
sure…One occurrence a few months after I started [a job]…my boss, I 
127 
 
remember her saying to me, I donÕt know how we got on the topic, but she 
said after my interview they had a discussion about whether or not I was 
actually Chinese, because they couldnÕt tell, which I find a very strange thing 
to say, because IÕve got green eyes…and brown hair. 
 
This experience suggests that NicolaÕs name was initially considered to be a 
description of her embodied racial identity. She expressed her amazement that the 
panel should have been deliberating about her name/race following her interview Ð 
Ônot my interview performance but ÒIs she Chinese?Ó. So it makes me think thereÕs 
something in people that they have to know, before they can get past that really…I got 
the job anyway so obviously…it wasnÕt a problem for them, but…I do find it curious…Õ. 
Nicola said that she found out about this conversation a few months after she had 
started working at the company through one of her work colleagues. She admitted to 
being Ôsurprised that they mentioned itÕ, and she ponders why they did so:  
 
[I wonder] whether it was a bit of a confessional thing, you know, ÒOh we 
werenÕt really sureÓ, or...they felt like they ought to mention it, or whether, I 
donÕt know, perhaps it was a lesson to me maybe…that other people might 
question it…ÒitÕs not unreasonable that we did itÓ, for example…But IÕm not 
sure what the ÒreasonableÓ is [chuckles] there…But I mean I think itÕs very 
human the curiosity thing most of the time…. 
 
In addition, Nicola described another incident in relation to her name and perceived 
racial identity: 
 
Nicola: …I think the worst occasion…I was in a business meeting at work, it 
was myself and another agency…we were talking about partnership 
arrangements, and about 20…minutes into the conversation she started 
moving her head and sort of squinting at my face and…looking at me moving 
her head around…Eventually she said, ÒIÕm really sorry to stop you, but I have 
to ask, ÒAre you Chinese?ÕÓ And…I said…ÒWhat has that got to do with our 
discussion?Ó and she said, ÒOh well nothing, but I was just thinking about your 
name…Ó she said, Òand I was looking at your eyes and I just canÕt tellÓ. I said, 
ÒReally? What are you talking about? What has that got to do with absolutely 
anything at all?Ó. I think itÕs probably the most rude thing IÕve encountered… 
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Emily: …So…how did that make you feel when she…said that? 
Nicola: I was quite angry with her actually, because…I couldnÕt work out why it 
was so important to her…and…if you have to ask a question, why not wait 
until the end of the conversation, and why blatantly stare at somebody in an 
effort to determine…especially when youÕre on business as well, I mean 
itÕs…In a social situation someone would probably just come out and ask, but 
in a work situation you donÕt expect people to ask at all…. 
 
The questioner apparently ÔhadÕ to know NicolaÕs race, it was a matter of such 
importance that she was willing to step over the arguably usual social boundaries of a 
professional business relationship in order to question Nicola about her racial identity. 
This begs the question of what the questioner would do with such information. If 
Nicola was obviously racially foreign or Other in an embodied sense, her interlocutor 
perhaps would not have had such an overt reaction to her foreignness. They could 
instead have had a more subtle, discriminatory one, as for NicolaÕs converser race is 
apparently especially significant. This indicates the importance of my name-changersÕ 
experiences in revealing the processes of name racialisation. Alternatively, the desire 
to establish if Nicola has Chinese heritage could be due to the notion that to attempt to 
racially pass as white is in some way deceitful (Piper, 1996). That is, in North America, 
it has been suggested that when a person categorised as black attempts to racially 
pass as white, this is a dishonest means of them trying to gain access to white 
privileges (ibid.). This concept implies that the deceit should be uncovered so as to 
prevent a person deemed racially Other from claiming the privileges of whiteness that 
they are not conceived to be entitled to. 
 I asked Nicola how she thought her work colleagues perceived her married 
surname. She stated that she had thought that Ômost people didnÕt notice it [her 
surname] anymoreÕ until the following incident at her workplace. 
 
Nicola: I was in the office with my colleague and I was waiting for a trainer to 
arrive to do some work with us, and he came in and he saw my colleague first, 
so they…said hello and my colleague introduced me, gave my correct 
surname, and…the trainer said, ÒAh this is youÓ…ÒItÕs okayÓ…ÒDonÕt 
worryÓ…ÒIÕve just met with your colleague in the lift and he told me youÕre not 
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ChineseÓ, at which point I exploded! [chuckles]…I was so incredibly livid that 
somebody that I work with had thought that that was an important thing to tell 
a complete stranger, who was coming to meet with me for the first time… 
Emily: Yeah… 
Nicola: …I couldnÕt understand why that was of any relevance whatsoever, to 
any conversation I might be having with this man… 
Emily: No… 
Nicola: …and I told him that I was very unhappy that he had even considered 
saying such a thing to me…I made myself really clear on the subject, and then 
I went and spoke to the HR department, because I donÕt know who it was… 
Emily: Right 
Nicola: …I explained that I was incredibly unhappy that this had happened…I 
just wanted them to be aware of the fact that thereÕs obviously people within 
our organisation who somehow think that your ethnicity is important enough to 
be divulging to strangers… 
Emily: Yeah 
Nicola: …on the basis of their own preconceptions even, never mind what the 
other person might be thinking, or not thinking…they obviously made the 
assumption that he was going to think I was Chinese and pre-empted his 
finding out that I wasnÕt, by telling him that I was English…So whether they 
thought that this would be a language problem that he was expecting, I donÕt 
know…but weÕd been communicating in English for some time via e-mail, so I 
canÕt imagine why he would have thought language would be a problem… 
 
As can be perceived from the dialogue above, Nicola still appeared upset about this 
incident in relation to her name, also saying that she ÔcanÕt just imagine why they 
ranked it as important enough in their internal consideration to say it…ThatÕs the…bit 
that I donÕt understandÕ.  
That the visitor apparently felt free to say to Nicola that it was okay because 
he knew she was not Chinese, underlines the power of the idea of a racial hierarchy 
(Dyer, 1999; Ratcliffe, 2004). That is, seemingly the visitor did not need to hide the 
importance of NicolaÕs racial categorisation: for him it was of obvious significance. So 
much so, that he assumed Nicola would think likewise, as to be categorised as white 
is supposed to be the coveted identity (Dyer, 1999). Nicola stated that the 
aforementioned behaviour implied that Ôbecause IÕm English it wonÕt bother me that 
someone says, ÒYouÕre not ChineseÓ…Õ. As I highlighted previously in Chapter Two, 
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white supremacy is not separate from mainstream thinking, but grows from it and is 
maintained by it (Ferber, 1999). The pre-eminence of whiteness is presented as 
natural, unquestionable, common-sense (Macedo and Gounari, 2006).  
As Nicola further described: 
 
…itÕs that total lack of understanding there about what ethnicity actually 
means…[To] some people, itÕs just a check box because they never thought 
about it, because they always check the number one box for white, the 
number one box for UK national, you know, the first option on all of them in 
the UKÕs…they meet that stereotype, so theyÕve never thought…that there 
might be something good about being different maybe…IÕm not sure that they 
think about it negatively that you can have a different surname to your 
ethnicity, but thereÕs obviously something in them…that has warranted a 
comment, which suggests to me that theyÕre not entirely comfortable with the 
idea of ethnicity generally…. 
 
The above quotation ties in with the notion of whiteness being invisible or unnoticed, 
as if somehow white people are not raced, are not part of the racial system (Dyer, 
1999; see Chapter Two. To be raced is deemed within the system of whiteness, and 
arguably within the UK as a white majority nation, to be naturally inferior (ibid.). 
Additionally, it appeared that Nicola felt it was a personal betrayal that one of her 
colleagues should have such strong feelings about her racial identity that they would 
discuss it with somebody else behind her back. As Nicola said, ÔthereÕs obviously 
something in their mind that distinguishes my name from my ethnicity, and they felt 
the need to speak about it with a stranger…and that bothered me quite a lot…Õ.  
Furthermore, Nicola asserted that the incident: 
 
…shows a certain ignorance…firstly of people…as beings with emotions and 
feelings and…the ability to think for themselves, and I think secondly because 
it shows a lack of understanding of what a personÕs name might mean to 
them, and how they identify with that and…how they might view 
themselves…ItÕs almost as though you have to have them in a box, and if you 
think someoneÕs got them in the wrong box, then you have to tell them, rather 
than allowing someone to make their own impression…you jumped in there 
and said that…And…you almost get a feeling of Òdo they think IÕm 
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masquerading as something IÕm not, because my name and my face donÕt 
match?Ó I think those were my initial thoughts when IÕd calmed down enough 
to not be quite so angry anymore…. 
 
This latter point is notable in that NicolaÕs experience suggests that her name had 
been essentialised as being Chinese, and the question was whether or not her 
embodied racial identity matched this, and if not, why not? Nicola described how there 
was often ÔreliefÕ for others if she confirmed that she fitted within the box people 
believed she did, Ôbecause IÕm not then…defying what theyÕre expectingÕ, ÔthereÕs 
definitely an element of reassurance that I fit in a particular box, or I donÕtÕ, and the 
Ôthing that makes me cross is the fact that thatÕs something I donÕt have any control 
overÕ. Nicola appeared particularly upset that her racial categorisation was seemingly 
out of her hands, and this was also reflected in her remark that, ÔOne day maybe IÕm 
going to reply to them in Cantonese and that really will show everybody!Õ. This 
quotation suggests that she hoped to be able to defy peopleÕs racial definition of her, 
and to express her pride in identifying with her husbandÕs Chinese roots. For Nicola, 
then, to be categorised as white was not necessarily a positive, in contrast to the 
afore-mentioned notion that whiteness is the most coveted and desirable of racial 
identities (Dyer, 1999). For Nicola, Otherness and difference seemingly could be 
positive, and not inferior to whiteness, and she asserted that she should be the one to 
decide her identity, not others.  
Also, Nicola said that in her experience many people had a Ôneed for 
confirmation…about where you fit…which box do I belong inÕ, and that often ÔtheyÕve 
formed an opinion and all they really want you to do is let them know if theyÕre right or 
not really, theyÕre not interested in any of the history that comes around thatÕ. Indeed, 
Nicola referred to people looking either Ôreally smug and self-satisfied Ð ÒI didnÕt think 
you were [Chinese]Ó, or ÒIÕm really surprised because I thought you looked itÓ…pretty 
much thatÕs where the conversation endsÕ. Thus the interest for these people 
apparently did not lie in the culture or the history behind the name, but purely in how 
the name related to NicolaÕs own appearance: was she white or was she Chinese? 
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Nothing else mattered. NicolaÕs reported experiences therefore suggest that racial 
categorisation is seen as important and meaningful Ð that race matters. 
 Rebecca Travers (white British; bore a Polish surname during first marriage) 
also suggested that she has been racially categorised. However, unlike Nicola 
Zheung, who was asked about her race, Rebecca described that she was sometimes 
automatically taken to be Polish, after she took a Polish surname upon marriage. 
When asked if she felt differently about herself when she changed her surname, she 
replied directly that, ÔI didnÕt feel different, but the way people reacted to me was 
differentÕ. She explained that she was concerned by: 
 
…the fact that people seemed to be judging me as a Polish person even 
though I wasnÕt, and even people that had known me before I had been 
married, so they knew I wasnÕt Polish, would make silly remarks about, ÒOh, 
itÕs not as cold as when you were in SiberiaÓ…or…Òyou must eat a lot of 
cabbageÓ…I donÕt know, just really peculiar, semi-racist remarks. 
 
One example Rebecca gave of this kind of response to her name concerned a guess 
the baby competition at her workplace. Rebecca explained that she had worked there 
for seven years before she had married and so Ôpeople knew [she] wasnÕt PolishÕ. 
However, Rebecca said that one of her colleagues, who was looking at the 
photographs, told her: ÔÒOh I was trying to find you by the one that looked like she was 
PolishÓÕ and that she replied, ÔÒYou know IÕm not Polish!Ó [chuckles]…I just thought that 
was a bit odd really…And what does a Polish baby look like anyway?Õ. Indeed, 
Rebecca stated that ÔitÕs like people think youÕve changed your…ethnicity…rather than 
just…your nameÕ.  
 Rebecca said she interpreted such behaviour as being a response to her 
having Ôstepped away from the normÕ by taking a Polish name, which had made her 
ÔvulnerableÕ in some way: ÔitÕs like a way that they could make fun of me almost, some 
people, and…itÕs kind of where you change something about you and people can pick 
up on that…Õ. When I pressed her on whether or not she thought her work colleagues 
genuinely had forgotten that she was not Polish, she replied, ÔPossibly…YouÕve got to 
remember it was a big office…people didnÕt really know each other that well, maybe 
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they just…I donÕt know! [chuckles] Maybe they thought IÕd always been Polish all 
along! [both laugh] And now itÕs coming to light…Õ. There is a suggestion here that 
perhaps RebeccaÕs work colleagues believed they had uncovered her act of racial 
passing as white British (Piper, 1996; see Chapter Two). Either way, her experiences 
suggest that RebeccaÕs married surname certainly made a difference to how people 
perceived her racial identity. It is also an overt example of how name-changing 
apparently can be partnered with a change in how a personÕs body is viewed in a 
racial sense. Because Rebecca had changed her surname, her colleague had 
racialised expectations that Rebecca as a child would somehow look Polish. 
 Additionally, some participants talked about people having disbelieved them 
when they gave their surname. Linda Abadjian (white British; Armenian married 
surname), for example, spoke about when she had first changed her name she 
expected Ôa look, that particular look, and itÕs hard to explain that particular look...you 
can see it in the personÕs eyes Ð ÒIs this her [bank] card?Ó, for instance. They look at 
the name, ÒIs this her card...has she stolen this card?ÓÕ. Likewise, Kayla Brackenbury 
(black British; Zimbabwean born and raised; Zimbabwean maiden name) relayed her 
experiences of giving her married surname and seeing that people ÔwouldnÕt believe 
me, they were looking at me funnyÕ. She gave a prominent example of this was when 
she had ordered some clothing through a major clothing company and had requested 
her order to be delivered to her local store. Kayla described how when she went to 
collect it she gave her married surname, upon which the shop staff would not believe 
that she was the person to whom the name belonged. Kayla said that the shop staff 
asked her, ÔÒOh, have you got any form of ID?ÓÕ and that she replied, ÔÒOh I didnÕt 
bother to bring any, but…I can show you my [work] card, itÕs got Kayla Brackenbury 
on itÓÕ, but Ôthey were looking at me funny thinking, ÒYou canÕt…where…is that 
Brackenbury from?ÓÕ.  
Furthermore, Kayla asserted that it is Ôtough to convince people that youÕre a 
genuine person and whatever documents youÕve got are genuineÕ. She explained that 
she was used to such occurrences now, and another instance was when she went to 
her doctors surgery and Ôyou could tell that my GP was expecting somebody else, and 
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said, ÒAre you Mrs Brackenbury?Ó and I said, ÒYes, itÕs me!Ó [laughs]Õ. Additionally, 
Kayla relayed how when she has been called in for interviews the interviewers 
seemed surprised she was not white. She said she felt that the interviewers were 
thinking, ÔÒHow can she be Brackenbury?ÓÕ and that she needed to ÔproveÕ herself and, 
Ôwork a little bit harder to convince them…that…[she was] a genuine person, [she 
knew] what [she was] doingÕ, that she was up to the job. 
 In this section I have presented some quite extraordinary stories about the 
perceived disjuncture of racialised name and body. As I mentioned above, such 
occurrences would appear to have been elicited by the participants because of the 
continuing vital importance of race to the way in which difference is structured within 
British society. My name-changers have in their everyday lives seemingly disrupted 
the ways in which race is usually categorised, and have thus helped to shed light 
upon, and embarrass, such discriminatory processes. Indeed, in the following section I 
will now discuss the ways in which my participantsÕ individual collections of 
supposedly contrasting racial signifiers have apparently determined the extent of their 
access to the privileges associated with white British categorisation. 
  
The Interaction of Accent, Body and (Sur)name in Determining ParticipantsÕ 
Access (or Not) to White British Privilege: their Inbetween Status. 
 Abigail Koslacz (white British; Polish married surname) said that children she 
taught at her school would often ask her if she was Polish because of her surname, 
even though she was born and raised in the UK. This suggests that her surname 
perhaps carried more weight than her accent in the way some people perceived her 
national and racial identity. It seems curious that a disembodied identity (name) 
should take precedence over an embodied one (such as accent), although this implies 
that even if a person sounds British, it does not mean they are authentically so (as I 
discussed in relation to the concept of racial passing in Chapter Two; Belluscio, 2006; 
Kennedy, 2004; Sollos, 1997). Whiteness, as a system of according privilege, appears 
to be very discriminating in its criteria for acceptance. Having any hint of Otherness, 
such as a foreign name, could be enough to deny a person access to the privileges of 
135 
 
British whiteness in the UK context. This ties in with the Ôinbetween peopleÕ thesis I 
discussed in Chapter Two, whereby access to the categorisation of whiteness was 
apparently ever at the whim of those in power (Dyer, 1999; Clarke and Garner, 2009).  
Abigail said she would reply to questions about her nationality by saying, ÔÒNo, 
IÕm not Polish, IÕm British, IÕm married to somebody with a Polish surnameÓÕ. She 
suggested that many of the children believed the notion that ÔEastern Europeans 
came over to steal all the jobs from the white British peopleÕ, and generally this has 
not bothered her, that people assume she is Ôa Polish immigrantÕ. However, she 
asserted that she was concerned by some Ôquite unfortunate eventsÕ she had 
encountered with her next-door neighbour. Abigail described that when she and her 
husband first rented their current house, some of their mail was accidentally delivered 
to their neighbour, whom Abigail said ÔobviouslyÕ saw their surname. Abigail explained 
that the neighbour gave the mail to them, but that Abigail subsequently realised the 
neighbour now held Ôa prejudice against [them]Õ: Ôbecause she believes that we are in 
some way Polish immigrants and we are getting this house probably paid for by the 
councilÕ.  
Abigail stated that she and her husband discovered this from their gardener, 
whom the neighbour had questioned about whether he was Polish and upon replying 
that he was not, the neighbour said, ÔÒThey are, arenÕt theyÓÕ, meaning Abigail and her 
husband. Abigail said the gardener explained that they were not in fact Polish, were 
born in the UK and just had a Polish surname. However, Abigail explained that the 
neighbour Ôcomplained about several things [they] had done to the council, like [they] 
havenÕt cut [their] garden back adequately….and things like thatÕ, which have Ôcaused 
a lot of problems for [them]Õ with the council. This is similar to the point I made above 
about the seemingly fickle nature of the ways in which a white British identity is 
ascribed. Apparently, the neighbour felt that Abigail and her husbandÕs Polish 
surname excluded them from the privileged identity of white Britishness. 
 Furthermore, Rose Urzica (white; Romanian married surname) said in relation 
to the Romanian surname she took upon marriage that, Ôthe assumption is that I am 
not English, for sureÕ. She said, Ôyou can hear the surprise, or when people meet me, 
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having assumed that I was foreign, because theyÕve had letters from me or weÕve 
arranged a meeting and I go to a meeting and they say, ÒOh! I didnÕt realise you 
were…EnglishÓÕ. Rose stated that she does not believe she looks Eastern European, 
unlike her husband and son. Yet she asserted that people have still assumed that she 
was, until she spoke and her British accent collided with Ð and in this case, replaced Ð 
the assumptions that had been made on the basis of her surname.  
The stories I have presented in this chapter thus far are interesting in that they 
suggest a personÕs name interacts with their accent and appearance (skin colour 
etcetera) in the system of racialisation, as I argued earlier. There may, though, be 
times when one aspect takes precedence over another, such as a disembodied name 
on a CV. The overarching point, however, is that each part of an individualÕs racialised 
identity seems to relate to the other. Nonetheless the interpretation of this interaction 
is perhaps difficult to predict. Sometimes a personÕs name appears to be enough to 
categorise them as foreign, as has been suggested via the copious examples I gave 
earlier. Yet at other times the racial category accorded to an individual on the basis of 
their name may be dispelled by their appearance or accent, as shown in RoseÕs 
example. 
Furthermore, Rose said she has experienced Ôan occasional spark of hostilityÕ 
towards her because of her surname, including when she was asked where the name 
was from and she told them that it was Romanian. She explained that she believed 
this to have been Ôtied up with the whole Eastern European migration thingÕ, whereby 
Eastern Europeans have had negative press in the UK, as alluded to earlier in Abigail 
KoslaczÕs quotation. Rose said this ÔhostilityÕ had then tended to be followed by the 
surprise and comments such as, ÔÒOh I expected you to be foreignÓÕ or ÔÒOh thatÕs a 
strange name, where does that come from?ÓÕ. Thus, RoseÕs white Britishness (through 
her accent and skin colour) essentially seemed to carry her through the hostility. She 
bore the foreignness as a temporary ornamentation, which could be Ð and was Ð 
removed in the light of her true British whiteness underneath. This links with the notion 
of tanning, which I discussed in Chapter Two, whereby white people are apparently 
allowed to take on blackness through tanning in a superficial sense. They still remain 
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white underneath and their white privileges thereby remain intact, whereas black 
people are conceptualised as never being able to take on whiteness, as always being 
categorised as black and therefore as never escaping the negative 
connotations/consequences of such an ascription (Ahmed, 1998).  
In a similar vein, Alice Melissinos (white British; Greek married surname) 
depicted an incident whereby she Ôhad some young workmen at one time who had a 
thing about Greek people, didnÕt like them and they sort of made comments about the 
surname Ð ÒYouÕre not one of them though are you? YouÕre…just married to oneÓ and 
things like thatÕ. This also indicates that the name does not always racially make a 
person into what it symbolises. A person might have a Greek surname, but they may 
still be perceived as white British and not foreign. This seems to depend on the 
specific circumstances, and the relationship between the name and the personÕs 
embodied identities (skin colour, accent etcetera). 
Natalie Mustapić (white British; Croatian married surname) spoke of how she 
has noticed a difference in her treatment at airports since changing her surname.  
 
…suddenly…from having a name that is essentially seen as a white 
[chuckles] if not Anglo-Saxon, a white indigenous surname, to having one that 
is suddenly a foreign surname…say IÕm going to an international conference, 
it is quite striking how me among others with foreign-sounding surnames, 
coincidentally seem more likely to be stopped and searched.  
 
She described how Ôfrom being somebody…who could have that sort of assumption 
that they might not have any problems at any border, to being somebody that 
sometimes might be chosen…for extra checks, is actually quite strikingÕ. Moreover, 
her Ôexperiences of that shift were before 9/11Õ, thus they cannot be explained away 
by increased security checks related to terrorist atrocities. Natalie said that this has 
made her Ôconscious of how luckyÕ she is, that she does not have other Ôdefining 
features that made me more foreign to an official…weÕre all equal, but some people 
are more equal than othersÕ. She stated that she has had this experience at UK 
borders as well as international ones, and it has made her more cognisant of times 
when she is: 
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…negotiating with authority…itÕs just that extra question mark…more arising 
because of the experience crossing borders, that youÕre not quite as British as 
you were…slight doubts over your Britishness…But again as I say…it more 
arises from the experience of being more likely to be searched at borders.  
 
Consequently for Natalie, her married surname was apparently essentialised in an 
embodied way. NatalieÕs white British appearance, British accent and passport 
seemingly were not sufficient in this context to preserve her white British privilege at 
the airport gates. Unusually perhaps, her name appeared to take absolute precedence 
over her embodied identities and made her visible, foreign, Other. 
In addition, Linda Abadjian (white British; Armenian married surname) talked 
of attending a hospital appointment in 1983 when the receptionist shouted out her 
name. Linda said that as she approached the desk, Ôshe looked at me and…said, 
ÒHave you been resident in the UK for the last 2 years?ÓÕ, which Linda asserted was 
purely based upon her name. Linda said she had been under the impression that such 
incidents belonged to a former era, until this experience. Here, LindaÕs surname has 
apparently been explicitly equated to foreignness/Otherness. Her name is foreign, 
therefore so must she be, she is framed as a migrant. 
Furthermore, Kayla Brackenbury (black British; Zimbabwean born and raised; 
Zimbabwean maiden name) argued that taking her husbandÕs white British surname 
had not led to any ÔacceptanceÕ of her within society generally. 
 
…theyÕll never accept you...as an individual...theyÕll just know that, ÒOh, 
maybe sheÕs got a fella…whoÕs EnglishÕ…Some people donÕt even tolerate it, 
they think itÕs disgusting…itÕs like, ÒHow dare you?Ó…I donÕt feel accepted, I 
donÕt feel like, ÒOh, IÕve made new English friendsÓ or maybe at work people 
talk to me better because they know IÕve got a husband whoÕs an individual 
carrying an English name. No thereÕs no acceptance, thereÕs no tolerance at 
all. ItÕs zero tolerance, nothing has changed...weÕre still dancing to the same 
tune, but it just came in a different name, so thereÕs no tolerance, nothing at 
all…My circle of friends are still the same...and you get used to it...and 
it...becomes a way of life. 
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For Kayla, then, changing her name did not mean she was no longer perceived as 
foreign, because her physical appearance had not altered. She was still apparently 
seen as black with a Zimbabwean accent. The black body is conceptualised within 
whiteness discourses as being incontrovertible: it can never not be black (Ahmed, 
1998; see Chapter Two). Indeed, Ahmed (1998:45) writes that bodies are ÔÒlived outÓ 
and marked by differences by focusing on ÒskinÓ as the unstable border between the 
body and its others, which comes to be fetishisedÕ, in that the body is believed to 
indicate/mirror the reality of the personÕs identity and health. I am arguing here that a 
personÕs name represents and/or mirrors their body in the psyche of whiteness, in that 
they are expected to appear and sound in a particular way because of their name. 
Thus one can assert that name is ÔfetishisedÕ because of its expected relationship to 
the body.  
However, the concept of racial passing does provide a challenge to this notion 
in certain circumstances, in enabling a person to escape their racial categorisation by 
passing under a different racial identity (Ginsberg, 1996; see Chapter Two). Indeed, 
Kayla said that when she has not been physically present with her name, she has 
found her married surname has made quite a significant difference to her everyday 
life. She asserted that if people do not hear her Zimbabwean accent on the phone, 
Ôyou find that the tone of the voice, and the way people are speaking to you…is a bit 
better than [with] my maiden nameÕ. 
Moreover, Kayla explained that her Ôcredit file has improved, because IÕve got 
a new name…IÕm getting…offered, more credit…just compared to offering me as 
Kayla ManyikaÕ. In addition, Kayla said that her name-change meant that if she were 
to ever get: 
 
…stuck in another foreign country, and they say ÒthereÕs an English lady stuck 
somewhere, and [her] name is Kayla ManyikaÓ theyÕll be like, ÒWhat?Ó, but if 
they say, ÒThereÕs an English lady stuck in wherever country, Afghanistan, 
and her name is Kayla BrackenburyÓ, the government is more likely to take it 
more seriously, on my behalf…I feel that way.  
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Thus for Kayla, to have a white British surname makes her appear more bona fide 
British in some contexts. It gives her that (imperfect/partial) link to white British 
privileges that she felt her old surname did not have. 
Rose Urzica (white British; Romanian married surname) meanwhile, said that 
her sonÕs Romanian first name and surname had caused him problems. She 
described that although her son was born and raised in the UK, his name, and to 
some extent his appearance (which she described as Eastern European), meant that 
he has often been perceived as Eastern European rather than British. Rose cited an 
example of how her son had come back to the UK from America and wanted to 
exchange some dollars at their local bank, Ô…and they wouldnÕt change it…and kind of 
muttered stuff…Õ. She also described how there are many things that she does for her 
husband [who is originally from Romania] and her son, Ô…because it is less hassle, 
like that [exchanging money at the bank]Õ. Rose then explained about how her son 
had had problems with the police: 
  
[He has] been stopped a few times for, for speeding or parking or something 
and he goes through the most horrendous rigmarole each time about his 
licence and who he is and, because theyÕve had such trouble with Eastern 
Europeans coming here and even though heÕs British and itÕs just his name 
and his appearance…he still gets the flack, so yeah thatÕs an interesting 
one…the name is the trigger for the questions to be asked, I think thatÕs the 
point. 
 
Thus seemingly RoseÕs son had, because of his name and perhaps his appearance, 
been perceived by some people as being Eastern European, despite his British 
accent. I say only perhaps because of his appearance has he had these experiences 
because Rose went on to say that if he had had a white British name, she did not 
think he would have encountered trouble with the bank or the police. In other words, 
she asserted that the name had been backed up by his ÔEastern European 
appearanceÕ. It was seemingly the combination of both of these aspects of his identity 
that contributed to his racialised identity as Eastern European. Without the Romanian 
name, perhaps his appearance would go unnoticed. As Rose said:  
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I think the name is probably the most important bit in that combination [of 
name and appearance], because…when heÕs out with his step-brothers, who 
are [called] Bond heÕs totally accepted, as being one of the boys…by their 
friends and by his friends, and I mean in a small town like this, theyÕre all a[n] 
homogenous group, type of thing, and nobody differentiates. But certainly 
outside, I think the only problem with having a name thatÕs different is that…it 
does flag you up as…being different. 
 
In other words, to have a name that is not considered white British could be 
equated to that person being racially ÔdifferentÕ or foreign in their entirety, whereas at 
other times this may not be the case. Such a racial position is reminiscent of the 
literature I discussed in Chapter Two about the nineteenth century Southern European 
migrants to the USA who seemingly lived with an inbetween racial status. They were 
not quite white, not quite Other, which meant they lived with an uncertain racial 
category (Roediger, 2005). Thus, despite their white physical appearance, they were, 
to some extent, denied access to the privileges of American whiteness (Garner, 2007; 
Barrett and Roediger, 1997).  
Just as the inbetween people were white American in some instances and 
non-white in others, apparently my participants are likewise considered white British 
only in certain situations, as I have described above. In other words, because race is 
not a biological fact it is, to some extent, open to interpretation, although judging from 
my participantsÕ reported experiences, perhaps this interpretation errs on the side of 
caution. One hint of foreignness could be enough to remove or deny the privileges of 
white Britishness and cement a personÕs Otherness Ð just as the one drop of black 
blood was enough to make someone black in the USA (Ginsberg, 1996; 
Chryssochoou, 2004; see Chapter Two). Although, as the literature suggests in 
relation to the inbetween people, it seems from my participantsÕ stories that those who 
appear physically white will always be closer to gaining the privileges of whiteness 
than those who embody Otherness, foreignness and/or non-whiteness. If my white 
British participants were to change their (sur)names to ones considered white British, 
they could potentially (re-)claim the privileges associated with being white British 
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(Wilson, 1998; Rohrer, 2007) (see the discussion on name changing in Chapter One). 
Those Ð such as Kayla Brackenbury Ð who are embodied black, on the other hand, 
will seemingly always be held back from white privileges, even though bearing a white 
British name may give them access in a disembodied context.  
This discussion also ties in with the notion of racial hierarchies, which I will 
explore in Chapter Six. I have asserted in this section that my participantsÕ 
experiences relate to the privileges of British whiteness rather than just to the 
privileges of Britishness. As I mentioned in Chapter Two, the high levels of racial 
inequality in the UK (Stevenson, 2011; The Runnymede Trust Report, 2012; EHRC, 
2010; Ramesh, 2010; Macedo and Gounari, 2006; Chryssochoou, 2004) suggest that 
to be black British or Asian does not carry the same advantages as to be white British. 
Consequently, privilege in the UK is about whiteness first and foremost, rather than 
just Britishness. Furthermore, although some participants carry surnames from 
countries associated with white populations (e.g. Polish names), my assertion is that 
these names are seen as white Other within the UK context. This is similar to the 
inbetween people thesis mentioned above: in the racial hierarchy of the UK (and 
consequently the racial hierarchy of names), white Britishness stands at the top, and 
Other whiteness is below this.  
Accordingly, whilst those with Eastern European surnames may be closer to 
white British privileges than those with African or Asian surnames, nonetheless, there 
is a racialised distinction of whiteness. Some surnames (and bodies) are whiter than 
Others, and such hierarchization is subject to the particular time and national context. 
As I discussed in Chapter Two, those groups with power in a nation are apparently 
able to frame who belongs and who does not (Solomos, 2001). Because this is a 
politically sensitive process, the Other is variable. For example, in the recent past, 
Eastern-Europeans have been portrayed negatively in the UK, whereas at present, 
Muslims are especially vilified (Alexander, 2002b, 2004; Alexander, Edwards and 
Temple, 2007; Per, 2013:6). This enables such groups to be blamed for the nationÕs 
problems and minority and/or migrant bashing is seemingly used by national elites to 
encourage cohesion amongst the white British majority (Per, 2013).  
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Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have presented my participantsÕ experiences pertaining to the 
seeming racial disparity between name, body and accent. I have argued that Ð at least 
in the reported experiences of my participants Ð a personÕs (sur)name is used as a 
tool of racialisation. An individualÕs surname is accorded a racial categorisation, which 
is then reflected within expectations of their embodied race. This process enables the 
functioning of whiteness: the prescription of privilege to those deemed white British 
and the denial of it to those categorised as Other/foreign, to differing extents. I will 
discuss this further in Chapter Six in relation to the idea of a hierarchy of racialised 
names. Thus a personÕs name appears to be an important aspect of their racial 
identity and thereby of the signifiers used in order to categorise their race, alongside 
more established indicators such as skin colour and accent. 
 My participants have revealed the alleged racialised naming process purely 
because they took a surname perceived to symbolise a different race to their own 
embodied one. Thus one can ascertain from the name-changersÕ stories the 
problematic and unfounded notion of race, whilst simultaneously gaining an insight 
into the eternal importance of this system in creating difference between people and 
according privilege or not on this basis. Consequently, the extraordinary responses 
that my participants have elicited because they have gone against expected racialised 
naming norms indicate what an integral part of the process of racialisation naming is. 
This point was further demonstrated in the section that established the way in which 
name, through the name-changersÕ experience, was assumed to be wholly connected 
to racial inheritance. The common practice of a woman changing her name upon 
marriage seemingly was not often considered as a reason for bearing a name that 
was not deemed to racially match the participants, even when they used the title of 
Mrs in the social interaction.   
 Indeed, in this chapter I have explored the ways in which some participants 
found their surname had led others to conceive and stereotype their inner qualities, 
knowledge, and beliefs. This equation of name with race suggests that names are 
used as part of the racialising system Ð the purpose of which is to apparently 
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determine the levels of access people should have to resources and privileges 
etcetera (Garner, 2010; Goldberg, 2005). I outlined this function of race in Chapter 
Two. Furthermore, I have suggested in this chapter that many of the name-changers 
occupy an inbetween people status in a similar way to the nineteenth century 
Southern European migrants in North America, in that they are vulnerable, on a more 
individualistic basis, to a partial fluctuation in the way that their race is categorised by 
others. I have suggested that such alterations in the standing of minority and migrant 
identities in terms of access to privilege, is decided by national elites who tend to 
scapegoat vulnerable groups in order to promote cohesiveness amongst the white 
majority populace.  
In this chapter I have provided examples at the level of individual, everyday, 
experience of attitudes towards foreignness, and the ways in which access to white 
British privileges is often seemingly determined in an incoherent manner. I presented 
such incidences in the section on the ways in which accent, body and name interact in 
determining a personÕs access (or not) to white racial privileges. These data have 
demonstrated how these indicators of racial status collide in ways that may be difficult 
to predict. This surely further underlines how the disruption of the racialisation system 
causes confusion and extraordinary responses. In the following chapter, I will discuss 
some further quotations from my interviews, which suggest that there is no end to 
discrimination (racism) based upon the concept of race. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: NO END TO RACISM Ð (SUR)NAMES AND DISCRIMINATION 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I demonstrated how my name-changers have 
indicated that a personÕs (sur)name is used as a tool of racialisation alongside skin 
colour and accent. In this chapter I will extend the argument that the racialisation of 
name has had serious repercussions upon many of my participantsÕ everyday lives. 
This is with reference to their familial, social, educational and employment 
experiences. As I argued in Chapters Two and Four, racial categorisation is 
apparently used as a way of creating difference and consequently as a means of 
according privilege or not to people deemed to be of different races (Alexander and 
Knowles, 2005). Moreover, as I discussed in Chapter Two, the dominant conception is 
of whiteness as superior, unraced, flexible and speaking for all of humanity, and of 
blackness as lowly, inferior, and raced, fixed within the body (Dyer, 1999). Therefore 
the racialisation of name is not a harmless or meaningless process, but one that, 
according to my participantsÕ reported experiences, has real consequences. I also 
discuss in this chapter how the racially inbetween status (via name) of my name-
changers has led some to feel uncertain about their identities, especially because of 
persistent questioning with regard to the perceived disjuncture between their 
embodied racial identity and their name. Furthermore, the importance of the name 
racialising system will be underlined by examples I provide about the coping strategies 
many participants have invented in order to evade or fight name discrimination. Finally 
I will touch upon the complicity of everyone within the racialising system - even the 
name-changers themselves. 
 
No End to Racism: Racist Incidents in Relation to (Sur)names 
As I described in Chapters One and Two, there has been a common claim 
that racism has ended (Solomos, 2003; Gilroy, 1987; Berger, 1999). In this section I 
present many of my name-changersÕ experiences, which suggest racism is by no 
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means over. They instead indicate the dominant nature of racism in relation to the 
racial categorisation of name and the seeking out of difference. 
 
Family and FriendsÕ Reactions 
Carol Sidibeh (white British; Gambian married surname) described that her 
daughters were very opposed to her second marriage after their father (her first 
husband) had died. She explained that one of her daughters had told her that, Ôit [her 
getting re-married] wouldnÕt matter if [her husband] was from here [the UK]Õ rather 
than from the Gambia. Carol indicated that such attitudes were reflected in the 
development that only one out of her three daughters would put the name Sidibeh on 
mail that they send her. When I asked why she thought this was the case, Carol said 
that Ôthey donÕt want to writeÕ the name, it is not because they do not know it. Indeed, 
Carol said that one of her daughters even went so far as to write CarolÕs maiden name 
on a card instead. 
In a similar vein, Abigail Koslacz (white British; Polish married surname) 
spoke of how her sister calls her husband by a parody name: Ôshe wonÕt call him ÒMr 
KoslaczÓ, heÕs ÒMr [Coal-shed
6
], but…nothing negative. HeÕs a lovely man, heÕs got a 
silly name, thatÕs how it is! [chuckles]Õ. It seems doubtful that Koslacz would be 
regarded as ÔsillyÕ in Poland, thus the reason it is ÔsillyÕ in the UK is seemingly because 
it is Other/foreign. Although Abigail apparently did not see anything untoward in her 
sisterÕs nickname, the implication that the surname is somehow comic, does seem 
disparaging of it. Similarly, Suzanne Balester (white British; formerly held a Moroccan 
married surname) told of how her family Ôwere totally agog…that IÕd married outside 
my own cultureÕ in that she had married someone from Morocco. Additionally, she said 
her biological father Ôwas very disgusted about the fact that I was married to the man, 
but also walking around with that name [Moussamih]Õ. Suzanne also mentioned that 
her father asked her if she would soon start wearing an Islamic veil.  
                                                       
 
 
 
 
6
 I have changed this parody name in order to protect the anonymity of the 
participantÕs surname. 
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Suzanne said that her father told her when her son was born that he did not 
want him to have an Islamic name, and referred to her son as a Piccaninny
7
. 
Meanwhile, Suzanne spoke of how her friends Ôjust laughed about [her surname] 
really…the fact that it was a difficult nameÕ, which appears to be a similar reaction to 
that of AbigailÕs sister. Also, Suzanne indicated that they questioned her a lot about 
whether they should call her by her husbandÕs prefix of ÔAliÕ along with her surname: 
Ôthat caused more humour than anything, because it was like, ÔAli [speaks with funny 
voice]…I suppose from that perspective like an Asian or a Pakistani, Indian type of a 
name…it sort of had that connotation didnÕt it? And I know they did mock a bit about 
ÒAliÓ, more than about ÒMoussamihÓÕ. Regarding the latter name, Suzanne asserted it 
is Ôa little bit different and I donÕt think the association [with Islam] for a lot of people is 
directÕ, in contrast to ÔAliÕ. 
Stephanie AlAsadiÕs (white British; Kuwaiti married surname), friends were 
seemingly less jovial than SuzanneÕs and more overtly discriminatory: Ôthey knew I 
was taking on his [her husbandÕs] surname and I would be joining that kind of [Islamic] 
culture and stuff, and they…werenÕt too keen…they didnÕt really approveÕ. Stephanie 
said this was all on the strength of her husbandÕs name, as they had not Ôgot to know 
him or anythingÕ. Stephanie explained that once she had got married, Ôthat just made 
my life go in a new direction, so…people that didnÕt agree [laughs] I know it sounds 
harsh, but I didnÕt really have time for them, I mean…if they donÕt approve then…itÕs a 
choice I made and IÕm happy with my choiceÕ. She said that her family members were 
Ôaccepting and open-minded and stuffÕ, even though her ÔnanÕs…first question is: ÒIs 
he brown?Ó, which is a bit of a funny question. I mean just by hearing his name…Õ. 
Also, Stephanie said that some of her family members ÔdidnÕt agree with it, they didnÕt 
want me to change my name, or change my cultural perspective kind of thingÕ. It can 
be perceived here that her friends and family had made a direct correlation between 
surname and race, even religion, and that in taking her husbandÕs surname 
                                                       
 
 
 
 
7
 A derogatory term referring to ÔblackÕ children.  
148 
 
StephanieÕs family/friends feared that she would be racialised in the same way. She 
would become Othered, a Muslim, would forgo her white Britishness. 
 Indeed, Stephanie said that: ÔItÕs only with people closer to me…they know 
me, they know what my surname is, they know who my husband is and everything, 
thatÕs when problems start to ariseÕ. Issues she described included: 
 
…the usual comments like,  ÒOh so heÕs foreignÓ, that ÒHeÕs going to be using 
youÓ…or, ÒHeÕs just trying to get into the countryÓ, lots of rubbish like 
that…again, that was just by me mentioning his name to them, so they didnÕt 
meet him or know anything about him…they just presumed heÕs some 
[chuckles] foreigner…that he must be up to something or whatever…I mean 
no one like…none of my old friends congratulated me, when I got 
married…there was no kind of positive comments there. 
 
It seems quite extraordinary that Stephanie should have apparently encountered such 
racist reactions from all of her childhood friends, merely in response to the name of 
the person she had chosen to marry. Stephanie indicated that none of her friends 
would even try to get to know her husband, the name was deemed sufficient to tell 
them all they needed to know about him. He was apparently understood by her friends 
to be raced, a Muslim, foreign, and they did not want any association with these 
identities, even at the expense of disowning their long-established friendship. 
Meanwhile, Beth Villiers (white British; did not take her husbandÕs Dutch 
surname upon marriage), said that several of her family members and friends, upon 
learning that she had not changed her surname upon marriage, had assumed Ôthat it 
is just to do with his name…because it is so difficult and long…not necessarily it being 
foreign I donÕt think, but I think people are like…ÒI donÕt blame youÓ, and thatÕs quite a 
common responseÕ…So yeah there is an assumption that that would be the reason 
why you wouldnÕtÕ. Regarding her parents, Beth said: ÔI do think that definitely with my 
parents thereÕs probably again a bit of that…ÒWhy would you want to take such a 
difficult name?Ó kind of attitudeÕ. It is intriguing that people should apparently have so 
readily assumed the reason for Beth deciding not to change her name was because of 
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the name itself rather than for other reasons. Moreover, the ÔdifficultyÕ of the name is 
perhaps mostly concerned with the fact it is deemed foreign, unfamiliar, Other. 
Jamal Hassan Hamdaoui (mixed-race British; Arabic name) described how his 
sister said to him one day Ôthat there were too many foreigners in [their home town in 
Scotland], and I sort of looked at her and I thought like…me and my sister have dealt 
with identity in two completely different ways, I guess when I was growing upÕ, during 
which time they had both experienced Ôquite a bit of racismÕ. For example, Jamal 
spoke of how when he was a young boy (known as Mal McKenzie) his teachers 
discovered his official name, assumed it was Islamic, and made him pray for 
forgiveness for the sins of his ancestors (because they were presumed to be 
Muslims).  
Whereas Jamal explained that his reaction to such incidents was to identify 
with the cosmopolitan values he had internalised in London, he asserted that his sister 
Ômade much more of an attempt to assimilate herself, I guess you could say that 
whole thing of the oppressor becoming the oppressed…and the rest of itÕ. Her 
comment about ÔforeignersÕ was for Jamal indicative of her Ôtrying to fit in as best as 
she couldÕ: ÔI do believe that it was through the scapegoating of her race, shall we 
say…itÕs what made her try to change her characterÕ. Jamal said that his sister had 
subsequently changed her name officially to the white British alias her mum had given 
her as a child when she separated from their father, whereas Jamal chose to revert 
back to his official, Islamic, name. This is reminiscent of the literature I discussed in 
Chapter Two about racial passing and of the history of name-changing I considered in 
Chapter One. Racial passing and name-changing have been used historically by 
some individuals who were conceived as Other in order to try to access privileges 
associated with a white racial identity (Ginsberg, 1996; Wilson, 1998). Similarly, 
JamalÕs sister had apparently perceived the privileges associated with bearing a white 
British name and decided to embrace that identity, in keeping the name her mother 
had given her, in order to racially pass as white British. She had seemingly 
internalised the fear of being known to be foreign/Other and consequently turned her 
back on the name she was given at birth. 
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General Societal Responses 
Abigail Koslacz (white British; Polish married surname) said that she had been 
particularly troubled by an experience she had had with her bank. She explained that 
she had paid for a haircut by cheque, because she was waiting for her husbandÕs pay 
cheque to go into their bank account. However, Abigail said the hairdressers did not 
cash the cheque for a while and when they did, it caused her to go overdrawn by £30. 
Abigail said that she then phoned her bank about it and was told: ÔÒWell you knowingly 
wrote a cheque for £30 when you know you had no money in the accountÓÕ, and made 
insinuations about how Abigail should not have spent money when she did not have it. 
Abigail said that she: 
 
…was really upset, I had to write a letter to the bank manager. And IÕm not 
sure, IÕd never dealt with this woman before, I donÕt know how long sheÕd been 
there, whether she had known me as my previous name, I donÕt really know, 
but I felt afterwards, ÒMaybe she was being like that with me because my 
name is Mrs Koslacz and [she thinks] IÕm Polish and I donÕt have a jobÓ. 
 
Rebecca Travers (white British; bore a Polish surname during first marriage), 
meanwhile, indicated that she had not, prior to my interview, considered the 
implications of the following remark made to her concerning her first married name 
(Czajkowska). ÔI think IÕd said it was cold and somebody said, ÒWell you must have 
been used to that when you were in SiberiaÓ. I just thought, ÒHow ridiculousÓÕ. When I 
questioned Rebecca about why the person mentioned Siberia when they understood 
her name to be Polish, not Siberian, she said that a lot of Polish people were sent to 
concentration camps in Siberia during World War Two, and thus it was an insensitive 
remark for the person to have made. Rebecca then said if she had been Polish, the 
comment would have probably been upsetting, even though she still described it as Ôa 
fairly innocent thingÕ. This comment arguably could be understood as extremely 
derogatory: along similar lines to telling someone with a Jewish name that they should 
be used to the cold in Auschwitz.   
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In addition, Beth Villiers (white British; did not take her husbandÕs Dutch 
surname) said her husband has been asked several times why he does not just 
change his surname to ÔSmithÕ. Beth said her husband had found such questioning Ôa 
bit disrespectfulÕ. She also mentioned that at his workplace he is generally called 
ÔÒDutch DaveÓ and quite often introduced in that way rather than people trying to get 
their tongues around the surnameÕ. She said she did not believe that this bothers her 
husband, but it does seem to suggest a lack of understanding around the meaning of 
a name to somebody. He was born and raised with the surname and it therefore most 
likely has meaning to him. I will also highlight this attitude that foreign names should 
be Anglicised in Chapter Six. I also discussed this in Chapter One regarding the 
history of name-changing, in that historically, thousands of migrants to the UK had 
their names Anglicised for them by immigration officials (McKinley, 1990). Similarly, to 
suggest that BethÕs husband should just wipe away his name because someone does 
not wish to remember it or try to pronounce it, appears to be a racist concept in every 
respect. The idea seems to be that the surname is not worthy of paying heed to, that 
BethÕs husband should acknowledge the Otherness of his name and hence the 
inconvenience that it apparently causes to white British others, and therefore just 
change it to one deemed white British.  
 
Employment/Work-Related Incidents 
Kayla Brackenbury (black British; Zimbabwean born and raised; Zimbabwean 
maiden name) said that she perceives that racism has changed, so that Ôyou wonÕt be 
told that, Òyou monkey blah blah blahÓ like before…they donÕt do it that way, they do it 
in a very smart way, where you apply for something and you donÕt get it, you try to get 
something and you donÕt get itÕ. As I discussed in Chapter Four, Kayla indicated that 
her chances of being invited for job interviews greatly increased after changing her 
surname to her husbandÕs white British one. This suggests that her Zimbabwean 
surname had been the tool used by people to deny her chances in the job market and 
in other everyday situations. However, KaylaÕs sister, Charlotte Leary (black British; 
Zimbabwean born and raised; Zimbabwean maiden name), asserted that her job 
chances had not really altered since changing her name. She said that her married 
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surname Ôin a way might give me a bit of an advantage sometimes…but…sometimes 
when they see you…if they were bad people they would just go back to their own 
original [chuckles] mentalityÕ. Consequently, it appears that having a surname deemed 
white British may give an individual not considered white British (in an embodied 
sense) the advantages of whiteness in a disembodied sense. However, once that 
individual becomes embodied (i.e. their physical appearance/accent are known) they 
then seemingly become raced and foreign. The advantages of carrying a white British 
surname are wiped away (see Chapter Four for more on this topic). 
Anna Aladeoja (white British; Nigerian married surname) said she had 
changed her name at the age of 18 upon marriage, looked for work after leaving 
school, and that she had been unsuccessful in a few job interviews. Anna said one of 
her former teachers told her that she should not have changed her surname from 
Rogers to Aladeoja, Ôlike implying that thatÕs why I wasnÕt getting the jobs…he said 
because people will look at it and think that they have to go through, obviously 
immigration and things and they wonÕt want that hassleÕ. As Anna expressed to me, 
this argument is somewhat flawed. She stated that she had already been invited for 
job interviews using Aladeoja as her name, which one would not expect if they were 
prejudiced against the name, unless she was invited to comply with equality criteria. 
Nonetheless, it seems that some people clearly believe that having a surname not 
deemed white British detrimentally affects the name bearerÕs chances of employment 
in the UK, and that to have a foreign surname indicates that that person is a migrant. 
This notion is supported by pre-existing research on racial discrimination in the UK job 
market, as I discussed in Chapter Two. For example, Wood et al.Õs (2009) research 
suggested that a job seekerÕs racial identity impacts greatly upon their chances of 
being called for interview, to the detriment of candidates with African and Asian names 
(Wood et al., 2009). 
Naze Edgerley (mixed-race British) had not changed his surname, as I 
explained in Chapter Four. I included him in my sample because he provided an 
interesting example of the relationship between having a first name that apparently is 
generally perceived as not being white British (even though it is an English place-
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name), and a surname, which is. Naze explained that his parents, as was his familyÕs 
custom, had chosen an unusual first name for him (i.e. Naze), and that it has often 
been assumed by those he encounters to be Asian or Islamic sounding. Naze 
described that when he was working at a call centre, he received a phone call from a 
lady who Ôhad been passed around [several colleagues]Õ and was therefore Ôa bit 
annoyedÕ. He said he began the call by greeting her and giving his first name, as was 
customary for his company. Naze stated the lady was Ôvery shortÕ with him when he 
was trying to help her. He said that at the end of the call, after he had advised her 
what she needed to do in order to solve her problem: Ôshe goes, ÒRight okay well 
thank you…Can I take your name again please?Ó, I go, ÔYes, itÕs NazeÕ. She goes, 
ÒSpell it, NazeÓ, I go, ÒN-A-Z-EÓ, she goes, ÒAnd your surname Naze?Ó, and I went, ÒItÕs 
EdgerleyÓ, she goes…thereÕs a little pause, she goes, ÒOhhh! I wasnÕt expecting 
that!ÓÕ. Naze spoke of how he did not know what: Ôshe expected...what was she 
expecting me to say, ÒNaze Abdullah Mohammed?ÓÕ. Furthermore, he said that after 
he had given his surname: 
 
...it was very, very strange because her demeanour completely 
changed…after that…She was like, ÒOhh Naze is a very unusual name, where 
does that come from?Ó and I was like, ÒWell actually IÕm led to believe itÕs 
actually Anglo-SaxonÓ, she was like, ÒAh okay well thatÕs...excellent, well 
thank you very much for your help!Ó She became suddenly very, very polite…. 
 
For Naze, this behaviour was suggestive of name discrimination, as he said: Ôshe 
thought I was…some kind of foreigner and when I gave my Western sounding 
surname, her demeanour changed…her attitude towards me changed, which I think is 
a classic example…of discrimination based on nameÕ.  
Furthermore, Abigail Koslacz (white British; Polish married surname) 
conveyed how her husband (who is British-born) had come across quite a lot of 
prejudice against Polish people in his council job: Ôif anyone comes in with a Polish 
surname, itÕs just assumed that theyÕre after a free houseÕ and so on. Consequently, 
Abigail said her husband was unenthusiastic about the idea of her taking his surname 
upon their marriage, asking her if she was sure she wanted Ôto have a Polish 
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surname…Especially working in teachingÕ. She said that she decided to take the 
surname anyway with the assumption Ôthat people would treat me differently and that 
there may be some negative associations, but I wasnÕt that botheredÕ.  
Also, Ailsa Czerniak (white British; Polish married surname) spoke of how her 
husband felt he had been discriminated against at work: Ôwhen he was younger he felt 
he was prejudiced when he was in his jobs…Not [with regards to] getting work, [but] 
the way he was treated in workÕ. However, according to Ailsa her husband is now 
prejudiced against Polish migrants who come to the UK to work: Ôhe feels guilty that 
theyÕre taking the jobsÕ because he feels that it reflects badly on him, with his Polish 
heritage. This draws parallels with the example given earlier, whereby Jamal Hassan 
Hamdaoui said that his sister had experienced racism and had subsequently 
expressed racist views towards migrants. It is seemingly as though JamalÕs sister and 
AilsaÕs husband have felt guilty for having a migrant parent when the prevalent UK 
mentality is anti-migrant, and consequently they have aligned themselves with this 
same mentality, in an attempt to disassociate themselves from any form of 
foreignness. These examples are apparently telling of the immense power of anti-
migrant, in-group/out-group rhetoric within a national context (Macedo and Gounari, 
2006; Stolcke, 1995; Van Dijk, 1993), as I discussed in Chapter Two. That is, that 
such discourse is so prevalent that even those against whom the anti-migrant/minority 
rhetoric is aimed can internalise it themselves. 
Rose Urzica (white British; Romanian married surname), meanwhile, 
described how her husband, who is originally from Romania, has experienced some 
discriminatory attitudes in his job as a teacher:  
 
…heÕs certainly had a certain amount of stick from parents…I think the name 
has caused some problems for him, with parents…thereÕs been comments 
about, ÒHe should go back to his own countryÓ, that kind of thing, from the 
kids, from the parents via the kids: ÒMy dad says you should go back to where 
you come fromÓ, that kind of thing.  
 
Furthermore, she said that he has had Ôparents…backing their kids up, saying: ÔÒmy 
child doesnÕt understand this foreign teacher…He shouldnÕt be teaching my daughter, 
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because my daughter canÕt understand his lessons because heÕs foreignÓÕ, and that 
this is when those same parents Ômay well have never spoken to him…itÕs all based 
on his nameÕ. 
When I questioned Rose about how the school tended to respond to such 
treatment, she explained that her husband does not always report it: ÔthereÕs a certain 
amount of prejudice even within the school, the staff as well…I mean the whole 
ÒEastern European coming over here to take our jobsÓ…happens in schools as well, 
so…there are staff members who are not very happy to have him there eitherÕ. Rose 
stated that there have however been Ôa couple of occasions…where itÕs gone too far 
and itÕs actually been dealt with, by the parents being called into the school and the 
headmaster talking to them, but I mean, I think generally speaking itÕs best left. It 
shouldnÕt be left. I wouldnÕt leave it, but IÕm not himÕ. When I asked why she felt it was 
sometimes best left, she responded that: ÔI think the way things are at the 
moment…what can you do?...you canÕt bully people, push them or force them into 
changing their attitudes and their ideas…you can educate their children so itÕs not 
perpetuated…into the next generationÕ.  
Sally Hasani (white British; Albanian married surname) described an incident 
at her former workplace, which was Ôironically…a race relations charityÕ: 
  
…the director there was quite trying to pressure me to keep my unmarried 
name [Hayden]…and I never understood her reasons…why she felt that 
way…But she was quite adamant that I shouldnÕt take my married name and 
that I should keep my unmarried name as my professional name, even though 
I was only an administrator…which was very odd, and…I never found out 
why. 
 
Sally said she had started doing some training for the company: Ôgiving talks to 
schools and my husband was doing that in a voluntary capacity, he was also going out 
to schools and talking so it seemed to be something to do with her…I donÕt think she 
wanted people to know that we were marriedÕ. In fact, Sally asserted that the director 
said to her that: 
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ÒI think it would be better if you kept your unmarried nameÓ and I said to her, 
ÒNo, this is my name, IÕve changed it now, IÕm keeping itÓ, and she repeated it 
two or three times again, saying, ÒI really think you should keep your maiden 
nameÓ…She did seem to feel quite strongly about that…she didnÕt seem to 
want that association…I really donÕt know why! [chuckles].  
 
Sally said to this day she remains ÔbaffledÕ, Ôespecially because it was a race 
discrimination charity…it was hard to believe that it could be racial discrimination…But 
then again, I couldnÕt see why else she would feel so strongly about itÕ. What is more, 
Sally claimed that this occurrence in question led to Ôa whole kind of breakdown of the 
situationÕ and her leaving the company. Consequently it would seem that SallyÕs boss 
had a strong (racist?) aversion to the idea of Sally, as a white British person, taking a 
surname deemed non-British. It seems quite extraordinary that what was a personal 
decision of SallyÕs, should apparently have had such ramifications at her work place 
that she ended up leaving her job. 
 
Education-Related Incidents 
Jamal Hassan Hamdaoui (mixed-race British; Arabic name) related a couple 
of intriguing experiences he had had at university with regards to his name. Firstly, 
Jamal described how he had written an essay for one of his classes and had: 
 
…scribbled one [version] out…and then there was one that was typed…and I 
had asked my sister if she could just pop it into the university because I was 
off to the airport, so she had picked up the one that was handwritten and she 
took it into the university and handed it in, and I got it back…and it came back 
with an eight…saying that I should maybe like to take advantage of the in-
sessional English classes…I was absolutely seething...I took great pleasure in 
going to his [the markerÕs] office and…by and large I have quite a good 
command of the English language…[chuckles] I went in with my most 
articulated hat on and I just sort of laid waste to him, and I really felt justified 
doing it, because that was an assumption that he shouldnÕt have made. 
 
For Jamal, the lecturerÕs assumption was Ôobviously [based on] the name, if IÕd put 
down Jock McCleod and handed in that same piece of work, heÕd of went, ÒThis kidÕs 
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got problems…he needs to…get an examination doneÓ, but because my name was 
Jamal Hassan Hamdaoui it wasnÕt a disability it was a lack of acculturationÕ. Jamal 
said he managed to get it Ôall fixed in the end, I got 60Õ but he still felt angry and that it 
was Ôsuch the wrong assumption for someone in an academic situation to make…it 
made me lose a little bit of faith in the whole system from the very start, it was just like, 
ÒWell, you know, I mean these people are marking me based on their assumptions 
hereÓÕ. JamalÕs anecdote raises the question of what other stereotypes were 
potentially being made about his work purely on the basis of his name? As I discussed 
in Chapter Two, the power of whiteness has apparently created a world in which white 
people flourish at the expense of those constructed as raced/Other, whereby those 
who are white are deserving of success and privilege and those who are not can 
perhaps see their talent go to waste (Garner, 2007). In the British context, there is an 
additional layer of the importance of Britishness in conjunction with whiteness. To be 
deemed white British is apparently the categorisation of ultimate privilege. 
The second incident that Jamal related concerned how he had been travelling 
abroad and came back to the UK and applied to university in his hometown. He 
explained that the administration department had decided he would have to pay 
international fees as he has been outside of the UK for a certain amount of time. 
Jamal said he conveyed to them that he had only ever had temporary travel visas and 
had thus not been resident in any other country. Jamal described how the university 
nonetheless decided that there was some ambiguity about where he was from, 
despite him having given them all the appropriate information. He then had to attend 
an appeal panel, with:  
 
…a photocopy of my motherÕs passport, a photocopy of my sisterÕs passport, 
my passport and my birth certificate and everything…So I went to this review 
meeting with my teeth clenched, I was like, ÒThey are getting the most 
incomprehensible [local dialect from his hometown] they have ever heard! 
And…there were a couple who couldnÕt even understand me and I thought 
this was brilliant, here I am speaking the language of where I am from in a 
university, being judged by people who arenÕt from this place, judging whether 
I am from here or not! 
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Jamal relayed how the interviewer at the meeting told him that the meeting 
had been: ÔÒthe biggest waste of time ever! IÕm going to follow all this up and see why 
this had to come to such a thingÓÕ. For Jamal, this incident was also about his name, 
as: Ôput it this way, if my name was James Bucken I donÕt think there would be so 
much ambiguity in the admissions office, theyÕd have been more like, ÒOh check out 
this boy, heÕs been all over the placeÓ…Because I put my name as Jamal Hassan 
Hamdaoui, yeah, sure they questioned itÕ. It is difficult to comprehend how a university 
could apparently make such crude assumptions about a person purely on the basis of 
their name. JamalÕs name was seemingly used Ð alongside his travel history Ð as a 
way of constructing a foreign identity for him.  
Similarly, Rose Urzica (white British; Romanian married name) expressed 
some concerns for her sonÕs future because of his Romanian names, in terms of, for 
example, applying for jobs. She related how when her son applied to university he 
was initially questioned about his nationality:   
 
…there were questions about, ÔAre you a foreign student?Õ…And I think…from 
that point of view that if his name was David Urzica, it would be slightly easier. 
I think people can kind of take a surname but I think the combination of 
Augustin and Urzica [her sonÕs name] is slightly more problematic, than Rose 
Urzica is, for instance. 
 
This incident also arguably raises the notion that just to have a surname (and/or 
perhaps a first name) that is perceived as foreign, can draw questions about a 
personÕs race/nationality, without any other information being needed. When reading 
RoseÕs sonÕs name, for example, some people are seemingly visualising that he is of a 
specific nationality and/or race. That they apparently would feel comfortable in directly 
questioning his nationality on the basis of just his name suggests that to them it is not 
something potentially discriminatory, but is an obvious state of affairs, as apparently 
oneÕs name symbolises oneÕs nationality and race. This raises comparisons with the 
historical practice in the USA of one drop of black blood being sufficient to categorise 
a person as black (Ginsberg, 1996; Chryssochoou, 2004; see Chapter Two).  
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In addition, Katia Evans (white British; Polish maiden name) spoke of her 
experiences at school with her Polish maiden name (Wielky):  
 
…at school it was quite negative…but then my parents had foreign accents, 
so I think at primary school I used to get…a bit of teasing…and there were a 
few comments about that, so to go with my name as well, I suppose as a 
primary school child I just wanted to fit in and…I wasnÕt bothered about my 
Polish roots or…I didnÕt want to be different, I just wanted to be the same as 
everyone else.  
 
From the above experiences, then, it can be perceived that to have a name, which is 
deemed foreign can be enough to make a person stand out in a disadvantageous 
way, even in the field of education. Indeed, in this section my participantsÕ descriptions 
have suggested some quite blatantly racist thinking on the basis of their (sur)names. 
In their position as name-changers, I asked my participants to try to compare their 
treatment between their two respective surnames, and they have consequently 
suggested that there are some underlying racist attitudes towards (sur)names seen as 
foreign/Other. In the following section I further suggest that my participantsÕ stories 
have intimated that there is a dominant attitude of disdain towards names conceived 
as foreign. 
 
Disrespect for Foreign (Sur)names 
Linda Abadjian (white British; Armenian married surname) conveyed that 
some people have not even attempted to say her surname: ÔI donÕt mind it being 
pronounced incorrectly, but…I think I deserve an attempt at itÕ. She provided an 
example of being in the pharmacy awaiting her prescription and observing that two 
assistants were giggling and looking at a prescription form, and she: Ôinstantly thought, 
ÒIt must be mine, and theyÕre thinking, ÔHow do we pronounce this? You do it, IÕll, no 
you do it, you do itÕÓ, and in the end they called me by the name of my house, so I 
didnÕt even have an attempt at itÕ. Indeed, Linda asserted that people not even trying 
to say her name Ôhappens a lotÕ in all kinds of places. It seems extraordinarily 
disrespectful towards Linda that the pharmacy assistants should apparently think it 
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acceptable to call her by the name of her house rather than to even try to read her 
surname. 
Relatedly, Linda described the following incident: 
 
…a couple of weeks ago my son was in hospital outpatients, heÕd broken his 
thumb……weÕre waiting for his name to be called, they said his first name, 
and again two people nudging each other, and I just knew it was for us, and I 
waited on purpose to see whether they would just try to pronounce his name, 
shouting in front of the waiting room, so they said his first name and then they 
sort of said, ÒA-a-a-AdrianÓ and I thought, ÒWell IÕm busy, I need to get homeÓ, 
so I stood up, and I came up to them, we stood in front of them, and they 
looked over our shoulders and tried to say, ÒEr William [her sonÕs first name] 
er AdrianÓ again, and I said, ÒDo you mean William Abadjian?Ó and they said, 
ÒOh rightÓ, because they werenÕt expecting...a white skin, put it that way…. 
 
Linda said that she believed the people were nudging each other out of 
embarrassment at having to Ôtry to pronounce the nameÕ and that subsequently Ôthey 
didnÕt expect me and my son to come upÕ. It is interesting that the name, which Linda 
reported was called in relation to her son, was what is commonly conceived to be a 
white British first name, rather than the Armenian surname. As the only similarity was 
that they began with the same letter, this appears to be a poor attempt at saying the 
surname, and perhaps matched the act of Ônudging each otherÕ Ð this could be 
construed as quite disrespectful towards LindaÕs and her sonÕs surname rather than 
being prompted by ÔembarrassmentÕ, as Linda suggested.   
Anna Aladeoja (white British; Nigerian married surname) also indicated some 
irritation with people making a lack of effort with her surname: Ôoften I think maybe 
white people…will think itÕs so hard to say that they donÕt want to try in a 
way…whereas actually when you look at it, you do kind of say it how you spell itÕ. 
Additionally, Sally Hasani (white; Albanian married surname) described how Ômost 
people donÕt tryÕ to pronounce her name, which she has found Ôquite strange because 
itÕs quite a short name, and itÕs not that difficult, but people do seem to have…just a 
complete mental block, ÒAre you Mrs erm IÕm not even going to try to pronounce 
thatÓ…- ÒDo try, itÕs not so hard!ÓÕ. 
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Natalie Mustapić (white British; Croatian married surname), meanwhile, said 
that her surname is frequently mispronounced, and that, in her position as a lecturer, 
often her students will not know how to say her surname and Ôthey sort of mumble my 
surname and very quickly just want to call me Natalie on the first dayÕ. This seems 
quite surprising that students should apparently so quickly begin calling their lecturer 
by their first name without invitation: is her surname so difficult that this should be her 
studentsÕ response? Moreover, Marion Stamatis (white British; Greek married 
surname) spoke of how, regarding her surname, Ômost people just pull a face or make 
a comment…IÕd say most of it is just, ÒBy gum, thatÕs a mouthful! Where, where does it 
come from? WhereÕs that from?ÓÕ.  
Jenny Legris (white British; Mauritian married surname) argued, though, that 
people within her field of education have generally been able to say her surname 
correctly: Ônone of my teacher friends get the name wrongÕ, and this has made her a 
bit impatient when it is pronounced incorrectly Ôin…other walks of lifeÕ, especially on 
the phone. She depicted herself as thinking, ÔÒWhy are you saying it wrong?...other 
people can get it rightÓÕ. This implies that those who are not especially close to Jenny 
do not make the effort to say her surname, that perhaps a lack of respect is shown 
towards it. Jenny said that she corrects people instantly who say her surname 
wrongly: Ôyou might think, oh youÕd let it slip, but no, because youÕve said my name 
wrongÕ. She also expressed her surprise at the sheer number of mispronunciations 
she has experienced for such a short name, and how she had never had any 
problems with her maiden name (Taylor), which is the same length. Although she said 
she ÔwouldnÕt change Legris for the worldÕ, she did indicate that it would have been 
easier to have held a complicated white British surname than it has been to bear 
Legris: Ôa few times I wish I had been Mrs Bennett, itÕs easier, I mean, IÕd even cope 
with a double N, double T or one N, two Ts, or one N and one T…but sometimes 
Legris has been…a bit difficultÕ. 
Similarly, Claire Negev (white British; Israeli/Hebrew married surname) 
described how one of her friends called her by a completely unrelated, Spanish 
surname for a couple of years after she had married, which ÔirritatedÕ her, Ôbecause I 
162 
 
had told her several times it was different, but she just didnÕt kind of seem to think it 
mattered to get it rightÕ. Additionally, Bryony Chiamaka (white British; Nigerian married 
surname) explained that her surname had been spelt wrongly by the DVLA on her 
driving licence, in that the ÔIÕ had been missed out. She said that she did not bother to 
report this: ÔYou might say, ÒOh! What if the police get you and they say, ÔOh youÕre 
nameÕs…ÕÓ, ÒNo! They wonÕt notice!ÓÕ. It seems quite surprising that BryonyÕs surname 
apparently has been spelt incorrectly so frequently that she is confident that the UK 
authorities would not notice her name was incorrect on an official, and major, 
document. It also suggests that, in her reported experience, her surname tends not to 
be properly noticed in the UK context: all that is perceived is a foreign name, rather 
than the name in itself.  
Likewise, Katia Evans (white British; Polish maiden name (Wielky)) described 
how her maiden name, was Ôalways spelt wrong…it would be the most ridiculous 
[spellings]Õ, and that even her bank cards had her name spelt incorrectly on them, as 
did some of her mail. Katia stated that Ôit was unbelievable that there were so many 
different ways of misspelling itÕ, considering it was such a short name, and how she 
has not experienced any such problems with her married surname, [a difference] 
which she felt was Ôquite niceÕ. Nicola Zheung (white British; Chinese married 
surname) also indicated that she could not understand why her surname should so 
often be misspelt (especially with the ÔEÕ missed out):  
 
IÕve never understood why, itÕs like in their head they know how itÕs spelt, so 
theyÕre going to spell it that way regardless of whatever I say…because if I 
spell my name for you, I expect you to be able to write that down, itÕs only six 
letters, whereas to miss one of those letters out when someone has spelt it for 
you is a bit strange. 
  
Furthermore, Jamal Hassan Hamdaoui (mixed-race British; Arabic name; 
grew up unofficially as Mal McKenzie) described times when people have tried to 
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pronounce his name and how he feels that ÔtheyÕre trying to project that theyÕre making 
an effort to say your name, you know…itÕs like, ÒOh, weÕve got one here, oh!Ó, itÕs like, 
ÒJust get over it, those syllables are really, really simpleÕ
8
. Indeed, Jamal explained 
that ÔtheyÕll always say it wrong, like always…and I get people putting Bs in thereÕ. 
Jamal said that such issues originate from Ôthe fact that thereÕs a construct of how you 
say these names and people are trying to find it…theyÕre looking for the…Ahmed or 
whatever, and they look at it and because itÕs such an unfamiliar Arabic name, people 
always stutter with itÕ. 
These stories suggest that problems of pronunciation/spelling derive not from 
the complexity or length of a surname, but from the foreignness/Otherness of it: the 
structures of whiteness seemingly indoctrinate people with the invisibility of white 
(British) names (within the UK) and the raced inferiority of Other names. This thereby 
supports existing theory relating to embodied notions of whiteness. As I discussed in 
Chapter Two, the system of whiteness purports that white people are not raced, they 
are individuals. This contrasts with the notion that black people are raced and thereby 
inferior (Dyer, 1999). The conception of certain names being inferior is suggested by 
my participantsÕ experiences, in that foreign names were presented as not being 
worthy of being properly listened to or spelt/pronounced, which is borne out in the 
many people who apparently refused to even try to say my participantsÕ surnames. I 
will address in the following section the apparent impact such incidents have had upon 
some of the name-changersÕ feelings of identity.  
 
Experiences of Invasive Questioning: Hostility Towards Foreign (Sur)names 
Leading to Uncertainty of Name-BearerÕs Identity and/or Impacting Upon the 
Name-ChangerÕs Decision-Making. 
As I discussed at length in Chapter Two, and touched upon in Chapter Four, 
academics such as Roediger (2005), Garner (2007), and Barrett and Roediger (1997) 
                                                       
 
 
 
 
8 The pronunciation of the participantÕs actual surname was (in my opinion) simpler for 
an English speaker than of this pseudonym. 
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have written about the migration of Southern Europeans to the USA in the 1800s. 
These migrants, despite their white physical appearance, were considered by the US 
system to be inbetween white and black racial statuses. Their racial categorisation 
was, though, continually reassessed and was consequently indefinite. My participantsÕ 
experiences invoke a similar concept, in that they spoke about what it is to live in such 
an inbetween racial position by having a name, which is commonly racialised as not 
matching their understood embodied race. In this section I will analyse how some 
name-changers have described some uncertainty of identity as a consequence of 
feeling not quite white, not quite Other/foreign, and having encountered often quite 
hostile questioning/reactions as a result of bearing a surname perceived as Other. 
Such incidents have also apparently impacted upon many participantsÕ decision-
making. 
Abigail Koslacz (white British; Polish married surname) described how the 
mispronunciations of her surname that she has encountered, have led to a feeling that 
her ÔidentityÕs not clearly defined, because you can be Mrs Koslacz, Mrs Colacz, Mrs 
Kuslack…Õ. This is a fascinating statement, as it implies that the fact that a personÕs 
surname is hardly ever pronounced correctly or recognised, potentially leads to a level 
of uncertainty as to the veracity and existence of that name. A personÕs name is 
arguably integral to their identity, and if their name is in a constant state of flux, what 
does this do to their sense of identity? As I discussed in Chapter Two, writers such as 
Hall (2000), have asserted that a personÕs identity is founded upon the notion that 
there is a concrete ÔselfÕ inside of them. Because names are an important identity 
marker (Titford, 2009), it would appear that if a personÕs name is not ÔdefinedÕ Ð as 
Abigail described Ð then this seemingly can lead to that person feeling uncertain about 
their sense of identity.  
Moreover, Elinor Murley de Mendoza (white British; only uses the 
Spanish/Peruvian Ôde MendozaÕ at the doctors surgery), spoke of how such 
mispronunciation issues are a significant factor in why she decided mostly not to use 
her married surname. Elinor talked quite movingly of her love for, and interest in, 
ÔSouth American culture and Spanish and Portuguese and that sort of thingÕ Ð so 
165 
 
much so, that when she first got married, despite being a feminist, she said that she 
thought the idea of adding the Ôde MendozaÕ name to her existing maiden name (as is 
usual in the Spanish naming-system) Ôwas rather lovely!Õ According to Elinor, the 
name was Ôdefinitely…foreign, but itÕs quite sort of artistic and continentalÕ and would 
associate her with one of the cultures she so admires, thus in that sense it had Ôquite a 
nice set of connotations or…associations…for meÕ. However, she said that she 
ÔdiscoveredÕ Ôwhen you actually transport it into England and everyone goes, ÒMen-e-
doza?Ó then itÕs not pretty and exotic and lovely anymore, itÕs just a bit annoying that 
no one can say it right...Õ.  
Elinor therefore asserted that whilst for her the surname is Ôquite a nice nameÕ, 
it does not ÔnecessarilyÕ translate well Ôinto the British contextÕ, which Ôis 
probably…why I donÕt necessarily use it, why I donÕt embrace it as I mightÕ. Indeed, 
she went further to suggest that if, when she had used the surname: 
 
…everyone IÕd met had been like ÒOh Mendoza [with correct pronunciation], 
what a beautiful name! How exotic…how nice! Ah that must be related to 
South AmericaÓ or that sort of thing, then I might have just used it, I might 
have just said IÕll get rid of Murley [her maiden name] and use Mendoza but, 
that didnÕt happen and it was a lot simpler to stick with Murley because it was 
a name people recognised and could pronounce and that sort of thing.... 
 
Thus, in summary, Elinor conveyed that de Mendoza Ôsymbolises…exoticism and 
difference, or at least continental sophistication…to me personally…but actually, in 
everyday usage it doesnÕt carry those connotations Ôcause people get it wrong and 
they donÕt recognise it and so itÕs not a pretty, lovely name, itÕs just a…bit of a hassleÕ. 
Elinor went further to discuss her first name and how this has quite an unusual 
spelling, and is consequently Ôa slightly different nameÕ, which she has always liked to 
have. However, she said that she also recognises the benefits: 
 
…that Elinor is a recognisable name and that, I think if IÕm like booking a table 
or booking a taxi or something, then I have a choice of giving Elinor, giving 
Murley, or giving de Mendoza, and I know that if I try to book a table under 
Mendoza, IÕll be there all day, going, ÔM-E-N...Õ [chuckles], whereas if I book a 
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table under Elinor theyÕll spell it wrong, theyÕll spell it E-L-E-A-N-O-R, but I 
wonÕt have to spell it out to them, and I hate them spelling it wrong, but I do 
appreciate that having something thatÕs kind of recognisable is also quite 
useful in some ways. 
 
Furthermore, Elinor admitted that her experience of using de Mendoza has 
been limited, as she has only used it at the doctors surgery, but this experience has 
nonetheless made a big impression upon her: 
 
…when someone picks up my prescription…you can just like see their faces 
falling [laughs]…like, Òerm...what possible part of this name can I pronounce? 
Where does the first name end and the surname begin?Ó ItÕs…unfortunate that 
not only is the very last bit of it foreign, but also the whole thing is quite 
incomprehensible in terms of you donÕt know whatÕs the first name, whatÕs the 
middle name, whatÕs the surname etcetera, but…I think, every single time IÕm 
like waiting to have my prescription...filled...I especially pay attention when 
they come out of the back room...and if thereÕs a massive pause, then I know 
itÕs mine...and then when IÕm there and I go, ÒYes, thatÕs meÓ, then you can 
just see the relief and I think...yeah, there is something strange about that for 
me, that IÕve not experienced before, I put this bit on the end of my name, itÕs 
very...new and itÕs partly a result of having such a...long and peculiarly built 
name for my married name, but itÕs also the fact that when you put one 
unpronounceable bit on, the whole thing becomes unpronounceable...they 
canÕt pronounce Murley anymore…. 
 
Elinor very clearly expressed here that she has experienced what it can be like to bear 
a surname conceived as foreign in the UK, and she has not enjoyed it. By having a 
foreign surname attached to her pre-existing white British one, she had apparently 
made her whole name, and therefore at the very least her disembodied identity, 
entirely Other. Elinor said that she began to feel an ÔanxietyÕ about ringing up her 
doctorsÕ surgery to make an appointment, knowing that they would have difficulty 
finding her name on the system. She stated that: 
 
…itÕs actually put a lot of, just that small thing, and…itÕs only at the doctors, 
because thatÕs the only place I use it, but even there it does add kind of 
anxiety to the whole experience…And most of my name is still British, so if I 
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had an entirely foreign name, I can imagine it would be...very laborious and 
awkward to have to make an appointment at the doctors or that sort of thingÕ.  
 
Elinor, in effect, asserted that her surname at the doctors Ôbecomes an issue, 
where it wasnÕt an issue beforeÕ. ElinorÕs quotations provide a rich insight into the level 
of inconvenience that bearing a foreign surname seemingly can bring: to her, the 
pronunciation issues are important. Elinor implied that she does not perceive the 
pronunciation difficulties of de Mendoza to be a slight inconvenience similar to the 
misspelling of her first name, as de Mendoza is not recognisable in the UK context, 
thus it has an extra layer of difference to it, which is something she felt unable, and/or 
unwilling, to deal with. Elinor expressed that the efforts involved in bearing the name 
outweighed her own personal liking of it. de Mendoza apparently became a token of 
discomfort, something to be avoided if possible, so much so that Elinor said that even 
when she was picking up a prescription she would tell them to just use her maiden 
name. I will discuss later on in this chapter how Elinor appeared to have internalised 
the apparent negative attitudes towards her husbandÕs surname.   
Rebecca Travers (white British), spoke of how at times when she bore her first 
husbandÕs Polish surname (Czajkowska), it seemed ÔunprofessionalÕ at work:   
 
I used to have to give my name quite a lot as part of my job…it was a 
requirement for me to give the name, so I always had to have that kind of 
embarrassment of knowing that I was giving a name that people couldnÕt say, 
and I would have to spell it out, and then when people asked for me theyÕve 
got that embarrassment of saying [her surname wrongly], and I donÕt know I 
suppose I felt a little bit unprofessional, with having a…stumbling block 
to…normal communication...and thatÕs something I was quite glad to get rid of 
[chuckles]...I mean…I quite liked it to be honest when I first got it, I thought it 
was nice to have an unusual name…I found it quite exotic and nice in a way, it 
was quite a pretty name...it was just a drawback when it came to…trying to be 
taken seriously...I felt that English people were a bit unwilling to look beyond 
it.... 
 
Indeed, Rebecca said that it was a relief to revert to her maiden name when she 
separated from her husband: ÔI was fed up of it, and I thought, ÒWhy am I having the 
168 
 
hassle of this awkward name when weÕre not even married anymore?Ó, so that was 
quite nice [chuckles]……I think when I took the name on, I didnÕt realise…I thought it 
was going to be all romantic and exotic and everything, I didnÕt realise it was going to 
be a bit of a drag day to day…Õ. 
Marion Stamatis, meanwhile, indicated that although she is Ôfairly outgoingÕ 
about being questioned in regards to her surname, she is also wary about why 
someone is questioning her about her name, and tries to ÔjudgeÕ, ÔÒhow are they asking 
it, why are they asking it, what am I going to tell them?ÓÕ. Thus she said she takes her 
Ôcues from the person whoÕs asking really…youÕre always alert to it, you think, ÒOh 
no…IÕve got to spell my name now, or IÕve got to say IÕve got this foreign sounding 
nameÓÕ. Consequently Marion said she often will Ôlax into most working class white 
English as IÕm going to say, ÒWell IÕve got this foreign sounding name, but actually I 
was born in [Nottingham], what are you going to say about that? Bring it on!ÓÕ. In other 
words, Marion asserted that if she feels as though the questionerÕs motives are not 
friendly, she will be Ôon the defensiveÕ, whereas if she: 
 
…felt like they were genuinely interested then you can relax a bit…and enjoy 
it…but youÕve got to be on guard, I think IÕm on guard, so I must have had 
enough knocks with it, and perhaps I just donÕt remember them…Maybe you 
just feel it, you know, because youÕre not, IÕm not Hawkins or Jones, you 
know, you just live with it that itÕs something different…I donÕt know what I am 
really, I donÕt think I would describe myself as [Nottingham] now, because for 
30 odd years IÕve lived with somebody from a different culture, so IÕm like a 
hybrid…so then youÕre speaking from that position, arenÕt you?. 
 
This quotation suggests that having a foreign name seemingly can make a white 
British person feel vulnerable, perhaps open to attack, in that they have so obviously 
associated themself with Otherness, and can no longer assert that they are truly white 
British anymore.  
Relatedly, Rebecca Travers (white British) indicated a dislike for being 
questioned about her Polish surname (Czajkowska), held during her first marriage, as 
she said the surname Ômade me stand out, like they would [say], ÒOh sheÕs someone 
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with a Polish nameÓÕ. Rebecca explained that she is Ônot somebody that likes to be in 
the limelight or anything…I didnÕt like the fact that it drew attention to me or…I didnÕt 
want to have that conversation with people I suppose…ÓHow do you say your name?Ó, 
ÒWhy is it like that?ÓÕ. For Rebecca, then, her surname made her too visible, too 
different and open to being questioned. These participants apparently had been 
(perhaps unconsciously) used to the privileged invisibility and individuality of their 
white British maiden names: to be racially Othered (at least in a disembodied sense) 
on the basis of their married surnames shattered this experience. Marion Stamatis 
(white British; Greek married surname) stressed that to have a foreign surname 
makes one feel like Ôan odd person, and…you do feel a certain degree of trauma 
associated with itÕ.  
Furthermore, Lynsey Bridger (white British; did not take her husbandÕs 
Kashmiri surname) spoke about her difficulties with having chosen to give her 
daughter a Kashmiri/Islamic surname, whilst she had kept her white British maiden 
name for herself. She referred to the questioning which she had consequently 
encountered: ÔI hadnÕt quite realised quite how complicated it would be sometimes, so 
thatÕs quite interesting that even in 2011…your child having a different name, and 
within that a culturally different name, just makes things more complicated, and you 
are asked to explain yourself at various pointsÕ. Lynsey said this questioning would not 
Ôstop me…naming my children the way I wanted to, but…that I guess does signify that 
if theyÕre doing that on a[n] overt, conscious level, and they feel free, the amount of 
times people ask questions, it does make you wonder whatÕs going on that theyÕre not 
saying…Õ. Thus, Lynsey seemingly suggests here the hidden, controlling power of 
whiteness in determining a personÕs life chances according to their allocated race 
(Dyer, 1999). That is, that white people have created the world according to their own 
benefit and to the detriment of those they classify as Other (Bush, 2011). Yet this 
privilege is not acknowledged by white people, who assert that their success is 
because of their own individual merits (Dyer, 1999; see Chapter Two). 
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Indeed, Lynsey spoke of how the questioning has led her to be concerned that 
her daughterÕs surname will potentially leave her in a vulnerable position, for example 
when she applies to go to school:  
 
…it does make me realise that actually at that point, admissions have got the 
power to make a decision around who they take and they donÕt take, and the 
name that you put on that application form is what they see…so…itÕs a 
potential opportunity for people to make a decision about who they accept at a 
school based on a name.  
 
Lynsey asserted that she has been asked about why she and her daughter do not 
have the same surname by Ôpassport control, doctors, anywhere where you go 
anywhere new for the first timeÕ, and that it is her impression that one of the reasons 
she is questioned so much is because her daughterÕs surname is Islamic, Ôit is a 
different nameÕ: Ôif a child had a different second name that sounded English, they 
may just assume that itÕs an ex-partner or whateverÕ. This is something Lynsey said 
has surprised her, that Ôsomething within…means people…feel they have the right to 
probe…further than they wouldÕ if her daughterÕs surname had been white British. As 
Lynsey argues, Ôthere is a climate of high levels of divorce in general, itÕs not unusual 
for children to have a different second name [from their parent]Õ. Thus her reported 
experience of being questioned so much about having a different surname to her 
daughter, implies that it is to do with the two surnames being commonly 
conceptualised as racially (with religion included within this term) different, and that 
somehow this difference is of importance.  
Additionally, some participants described the invasive nature of questioning 
they encountered in relation to their surname, specifically in regard to why they have 
the surname when their embodied racialised identity is deemed not to match it. 
Victoria Ravanbaksh (white British; Persian/Iranian married surname), for example, 
spoke about how she knows that her surname: Ôis differentÕ, it Ôstick[s] outÕ and so 
there is: 
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…more conversation about it just because your nameÕs different, and thereÕs 
no need for it…ÒItÕs none of your business, donÕt be so nosey!Ó [laughs]…you 
know why should everybody know your life history?...And thatÕs what theyÕll 
want…to know all the ifs, buts and whys, whereas if I just said, ÒOh IÕm 
Victoria Hay [her maiden name] well thatÕs it, end of story.  
 
Victoria asserted that such questioning is something that Ôcomes up all the timeÕ, and 
she argued that:  
 
…you donÕt usually tell everybody everything do you…because then they want 
to know, ÒWhere did you meet? How did you meet him? How did this happen? 
How did that…?Ó And you think, ÒWell who are you anyway?!Ó You know! No, 
itÕs not necessary. I mean sometimes itÕs appropriate, but sometimes it just 
isnÕt…but itÕs always there, and youÕve got to decide what level you want to 
discuss it with anybody and everybody. 
 
Furthermore, Chloe Hardy-Mathiesen (white British; Norwegian name added 
to her maiden name (Hardy) upon marriage) described herself as having Ôan American 
accent even though IÕm EnglishÕ, and joked that she Ôshould just write out a card that 
explainsÕ why she has the accent and why she has Ôa funny name even though IÕm 
English….because…I have to spend around 15 minutes at the beginning of talking to 
people, just answering questions about sort of quite normal things, like your nameÕ. 
Natalie Mustapić (white British; Croatian married surname) said that the questions she 
fielded were often motivated by a desire to know if she came from Former Yugoslavia, 
thus they were leading questions, trying to find out more information. Moreover, Anna 
Aladeoja (white British; Nigerian married surname) suggested that she does not get 
questioned so much about her name when talking to someone over the phone as she 
does face to face, and she thinks that is because the phone converser Ômight think IÕm 
a black personÕ and that it might be construed as racist to question her so much if she 
was black.  
It appears then from the experiences outlined above that, as I discussed at 
length in Chapter Four, when there is an understood racial disconnect between the 
participantÕs embodied identity and the surname they carry, this causes problems with 
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the hardwiring of the way whiteness works. Racial passing demonstrates that there 
can be no such thing as race if someone can pass as white when they are supposed 
to be racially black (for example) (Ginsberg, 1996; see Chapter Two). My name-
changers have also shown up the problematic and inconsistent nature of racial 
categorisation, when they have to be questioned to know if their surname 
accurately/racially represents their embodied racial identity, or why it does not.  
As Victoria said above, apparently if she uses her white British maiden name 
there are no questions, because the name matches who she is usually (racially) 
considered to be. It appears that as soon as there is a suggestion of foreignness, 
through the name-changersÕ foreign surnames, many of my white participants have 
been questioned. Seemingly it must be established whether or not they are truly white 
British or not, and if they are, then there is consequential confusion and intrigue: why 
have they got this foreign disembodied label/identity? Furthermore, as I described 
above, it seems that such questioning has the added impact of affecting how some 
name-changers feel within themselves, in terms of not feeling confident about using 
their married surname or not wanting to face such invasive challenges concerning why 
they bear their surname. Indeed, in the following section I further assert this point and 
describe how some participants have attempted to reduce the amount of 
questioning/racism they receive in relation to their surname.  
 
Avoiding (Sur)name Discrimination/Interrogation 
It was notable that many of the participants spoke about trying to avoid what 
can be described as discriminatory or interrogatory incidents, such as those I have 
presented in the sections above. Victoria Ravanbaksh (white British; Persian/Iranian 
married surname), for example, stated that there: 
 
…are certain times…itÕs not because IÕm embarrassed, itÕs not because 
of…trying to hide anything, but sometimes itÕs just easier when people say 
whatÕs your name, I just say ÒVictoriaÓÕ, and they subsequently ask, ÔÒVictoria 
what?Ó And I can say well IÕm the only Victoria here….so…itÕs often easier just 
to go no further and say Victoria will do.  
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In addition, Victoria explained that she often books unofficial things, such as cinema 
tickets under her maiden name (Hay), Ôbecause itÕs [three] digits to say down the 
phone rather than having to go through the whole conversation of: ÒYes, itÕs from Iran 
and itÕs from here and this is thisÓ, itÕs easier to say ÒItÕs under HayÓ, but then youÕve 
got to remember when you go to pick them up!Õ .  
Indeed, Victoria also said that for the first ten years of marriage, although she 
had taken her husbandÕs surname straight away, she kept one of her bank cards 
under Hay and one under Ravanbaksh, as Ôit was easier to sign Hay, because itÕs so 
much shorterÕ. Victoria explained that sometimes she does not mind talking to people 
about her married surname, but at other times she thinks, ÔÒAh not going to play today, 
weÕll be Hay!ÓÕ. However, Ôthere were a couple of occasions that I forgot which one IÕd 
given them and I signed the wrong one Ð I thought ÒNo, IÕve got to become one person 
and not two!Ó. But…sometimes it makes it easier not to have to go through the 
rigmarole of telling everybody who you are…why youÕve got a name like thatÕ.  
Victoria also said that her daughter uses the shortening of ÔRavÕ at school, and 
that Victoria herself uses an e-mail address with this same shortening Ð Ôjust because 
itÕs easier and you donÕt have to go into everything…yeah nobody knows where Rav 
comes from, but…because itÕs so short they donÕt associate it with anything…so they 
donÕt sort of pry and nose…they just accept itÕ. Rav is apparently not so easily 
racialised as Ravanbaksh, it reads more as a nickname, and hence Victoria said that 
she is more invisible when using it. Indeed, it seems to be the invisibility of her white 
British maiden name that Victoria misses: people seemingly tend to racialise 
Ravanbaksh and consequently demand to know how she racially matches (or does 
not match) the name. 
Bryony Chiamaka (white British; Nigerian married surname) also mentioned 
that her husband calls himself ÔMr David [his first name]Õ if itÕs Ôfor something that 
doesnÕt…legally require him to give his name…So like heÕs putting the car in to be 
serviced, he will just call himself ÔMr DavidÕ because itÕs so much easier…it doesnÕt 
worry him, it makes his life easierÕ. Bryony said they also do this at places like their 
Chinese takeaway (as does Alice Melissinos with her husbandÕs first name). Even 
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Ailsa Czerniak (white British; Polish married surname), who said that her surname has 
Ônever bothered me one iotaÕ, stated that when she and her husband have ordered 
things over the phone they used the name ÔBrownÕ, Ôbecause it was easier for spelling 
and saying itÕ. Rebecca Travers (white British; bore a Polish surname throughout her 
previous marriage) also recalled how she and her husband had used the name 
ÔWilliamsÕ on their holidays, Ôjust because it was…easier than people stumbling over 
your name…[chuckles] and he [her husband] told me that he used to call himself 
Stuart sometimes [instead of his Polish first name]Õ. As I touched upon earlier, 
Rebecca herself said it was an Ôadded bonusÕ when she divorced her husband to Ôdrop 
this troublesome name!Õ. 
A couple of participants said that they avoided using parts, or the entirety, of 
their husbandÕs surname, in an attempt to avoid hassle. Suzanne Balester (white 
British; Moroccan married name), who took her former husbandÕs surname of 
Moussamih, said that she decided not to use the ÔAliÕ prefix, Ôprobably because of what 
it represented, if IÕm honestÕ, which referred to her reported perception that ÔAliÕ was 
too obviously Asian, and thus open to racist attacks. Marion Stamatis (white British; 
Greek married surname) apparently struggled even more than Suzanne with the idea 
of taking her husbandÕs (Greek) surname and said that she initially kept her first 
husbandÕs white British surname (Goodall), which was Ôa lot easier to deal withÕ.  
Marion explained that it was only after about eight or so years of marriage 
when she started a new job and the lady who did the wages insisted that she should 
be recorded by her married surname, that Marion used Stamatis at all. She said that 
she did not use it anywhere else, but living with two names became Ôan awkwardnessÕ 
and Ôin the end…youÕve just got to get your head together and make a decision on 
what youÕre going to do, and I settled for StamatisÕ. Nonetheless she still spoke of 
having Ôan ambivalence towardsÕ the name: ÔI donÕt think IÕve ever comfortably used 
the full name, Haji Stamatis, I think I get enough reaction from Stamatis really 
[chuckles]Õ.  
Marion described how even once she had changed her surname, she still 
tended to Ôuse whichever name suited me…if I felt like I was in a context that might be 
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tricky I would use an English name…I wouldnÕt say that IÕve felt that frequently but itÕs 
always an option…Obviously there are people out there that are racist and you just 
have to use your kind of antennae about it reallyÕ. Indeed, Marion said that she does 
have a lot of admiration for her husbandÕs full surname, and how when she is in Ôa 
safe communityÕ (such as when she had been teaching a class of Muslim children) the 
Haj part is Ôsomething that you can celebrate…but you canÕt do that everywhere…in 
other contexts itÕs something that I might have to conceal or play down or feel a bit 
uncomfortable aboutÕ. In addition, Marion said that she does not use Haj: Ôpersonally I 
donÕt think I could live like that [using the Islamic pre-fix] very easily…itÕs too much of 
an encumbrance…too difficult to spell, people can get perplexed and a bit grumpy…if 
theyÕre trying to spell it and thereÕs not enough boxes for the letters [on forms] 
[chuckles]Õ.  
Furthermore, she stated: 
 
Stamatis is bad enough…trying to spell Stamatis is difficult enough, especially 
on the phone because…[M] sounds like [N], and you start going through the 
police Ò[M] for [Mike]Ó…and that kind of thing…So just to minimise that 
inconvenience to people really, I donÕt use the Haj very often…Yeah, so 
thereÕs a lot in there isnÕt there, IÕve definitely made the decision not to use the 
full name even though I think itÕs glorious…and…my husband, he does as 
well, he calls himself Dr Stamatis, but heÕll put PH, so the Haj is…subsumed 
into H. 
 
This is quite interesting in implying that both Marion and her husband (to some extent) 
have been prepared to alter their names according to anticipated discrimination or 
hostility in relation to them. Nevertheless, Marion said that now she would always 
confront racism with regards to Stamatis, and would always use the name, but not 
with Haj. For her, it is as if she has had to grow emotionally strong enough to use a 
surname that is not deemed white British, as apparently it was not something she was 
able to countenance for a good part of her marriage. 
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Stephanie AlAsadi (white British; Kuwaiti/Arab married surname), meanwhile, 
said that she had converted to Islam upon marriage - and that to do so one must 
choose an Islamic first name, which she chose not to use, because:  
 
IÕm happy with my first name for starters, my parents gave it to me…in a way 
changing that would feel like IÕm kind of saying something to my parents and 
that wouldnÕt be true…[C]hanging your first name, that is a bigger 
step…people would know straight away then [that she had an Islamic name], 
because first names are much more recognisable. 
 
These stories have indicated the emotional difficulty of bearing a name that is 
commonly seen to be foreign/Other, and/or the vulnerability felt, the fear of meeting 
with racist attitudes because of it. They have also suggested that some of my white 
British participants were willing either to move back towards their previous white 
British identity by using their former surname, or tried to avoid taking and/or using their 
married surname in full. This bears similarities with existing literature on racial passing 
that suggests some people who are able to claim a more privileged identity may well 
do so (Ginsberg, 1996; Belluscio, 2006; see Chapter Two). It also supports the name-
changing history that I discussed in Chapter One, in that many migrants/racial 
minorities have altered their names in an attempt to claim the privileges associated 
with the majority white identity in the UK and the USA (Wilson, 1998). In the following 
section I will suggest the universal nature of whiteness and racial thinking, and how 
carrying a (sur)name that is seen to represent a different race to oneÕs embodied 
racial identity seemingly does not make such a person exempt from the influence of 
such discourse. 
 
The All-Pervasiveness of Racist/Problematic Attitudes Towards Foreign 
(Sur)names. 
As I mentioned in Chapter Two, Said (2003) asserted that the West has 
created prevailing interpretations of Orientals (the Other), which have then been 
adopted by the Other themselves. He further argued that there is no two-way 
interchange of ideas regarding this but that there is only a Western monologue (ibid.). 
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Similarly, a theme which has been running as an undercurrent throughout many of the 
experiences I have presented in this chapter has been how the foreignness of the 
participantsÕ adopted surname has been something that apparently has played upon 
the white name-changersÕ minds. They have seemingly in some way become Other, 
because of their adopted surname, in accordance with the apparent name racialising 
system. Furthermore, there has been a tendency on the part of some white name-
changers to arguably overstate in the interviews how awkward their surname must be 
for others. This suggests they have internalised the notion of foreignness/Otherness 
as being negative, inconvenient and difficult, and of white Britishness as being the 
marker of civilisation, easiness and normalness (Dyer, 1999; see Chapter Two). 
Indeed, it was quite noticeable how a number of participants were quick to try to 
explain away any incidents/attitudes that could potentially be perceived as racist. 
Elinor Murley (white British; only used her husbandÕs Peruvian/Spanish surname at 
the doctors) spoke of how she felt Ôbad in some ways for the pharmacists, that they 
canÕt pronounce my nameÕ, that they are ÔstrugglingÕ [my emphasis] to say her name, 
and that she often tells them to call her by her maiden name: ÔitÕs fine you donÕt need 
to say the rest of itÕ [my emphasis]. To refer to her husbandÕs part of her surname as 
Ôthe rest of itÕ could be interpreted as being disrespectful to the surname, to its origin 
and meaning, that somehow it is not worth someone making the effort to say it.  
 Rebecca Travers (white British) meanwhile spoke of her Polish surname from 
her first marriage as being ÔembarrassingÕ and ÔunprofessionalÕ at her workplace (as 
mentioned earlier), that having the name Ôundermine[d] her professionalismÕ [my 
emphasis], so much so that she would get people to pronounce the name Ôin an easier 
wayÕ [my emphasis] Ð in other words, it was the nameÕs fault for being difficult, not the 
people who would not make the effort to say it. Indeed, Rebecca asserted that those 
who tell people how to pronounce their name correctly Ôcan come across as a bit…itÕs 
making people uncomfortable by presenting them with a really difficult name to 
pronounceÕ [my emphasis]. Rebecca suggested that the reason for any negative 
responses to her name was that there was Ôa bit of embarrassment there for people, a 
fear that they canÕt say your name, or you might not be able to communicate with each 
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other, because of your nameÕ [my emphasis]. This arguably implies that she was 
somehow at fault for bearing a Polish surname, for requiring others to try to pronounce 
it. Similarly, Sally Hasani (white British; Albanian married surname) said that she does 
not usually get too annoyed with people who mispronounce her surname because: 
Ôalthough to me it looks like an easy…I mean I know myself, I think everybody knows, 
when you see a foreign name and you donÕt know how to pronounce it, you do kind of 
panic and think ÒOh…Ó, wonder if the person is going to be offended…I donÕt really 
mind too muchÕ. 
Linda Abadjian (white British; Armenian married surname) spoke of how her 
childrenÕs friends have always made jokes about their surname, and for Linda this was 
Ôbecause, a lot of people I think are embarrassed at trying to attempt to say a foreign 
sounding surnameÕ [my emphasis]. In addition, she described how at her workplace 
the only problem with her name was regarding the pronunciation of it: ÔI think itÕs a bit 
like the attitude we have in this country about learning foreign languages…we tend to 
think, ÒOh I mustnÕt try to say that because IÕm going to sound stupid if I get it wrongÓÕ. 
As I mentioned in Chapter Four, Linda said that she has experienced a lot of surprise 
at her physical appearance in relation to her name, but her caveat was that: ÔI think itÕs 
just normal isnÕt it…wouldnÕt you normally associate the person with that name? For 
instance, if I had a Chinese surname, then I could expect people to think that maybe 
someone whoÕs Chinese is going to appear before themÕ. This explanation contrasted 
somewhat with the annoyance she described when people kept looking over her 
shoulder, not believing she was the person to whom her surname belonged. It is as 
though she felt the need to make excuses for the behaviour she had encountered, 
despite feeling irritated by such incidents. Indeed, she was keen to state that she 
believes that the questioning she gets about her name is because ÔI think they 
genuinely are interestedÕ in the name. 
Chloe Hardy-Mathiesen (white British; Norwegian ÔMathiesenÕ added upon 
marriage to her maiden name (Hardy)) also suggested that Ôhuman beings [have]…an 
inherent fear of strangers that we as civilised people should recognise…and 
overcome…and certainly not let it affect our judgementÕ [my emphasis]. Furthermore, 
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Jamal Hassan Hamdaoui (mixed-race British; Arabic name) said that although there is 
Ôa lot of prejudice around a nameÕ, for him the Ôbigger question is…is that a racist or an 
intolerant act…Or is it exactly the same as anyone looking at an ambiguous word that 
maybe pushes their nose out of joint, because they donÕt know exactly what it means 
first off?Õ. The example he gave was that Ôif you were a proud sort of self-assertive 
person, your nose might be a little out of joint because you canÕt tell me what that 
name means, that word is other…and I think itÕs exactly the same for a label for a 
person or nameÕ. 
In addition, Victoria Ravanbaksh (white British; Persian/Iranian married 
surname) spoke of a theory she has developed regarding why people could not say 
her surname:  
 
I think when you come across a strange word, you pick out certain letters and 
your mind blanks some of the others, and they just pick out the ones and form 
it into something that they can say, or that they think it might be, and they 
donÕt do it consciously, sometimes it is totally subconsciously…because your 
brain just works that way, and it picks out certain letters that are the main 
ones, or they might pick out the first few and then somethingÕs left at the end 
that just Ð ÒWell, weÕll forget about that bitÓ……if they try, if they make a 
conscious effort and sound it out, then theyÕd get it right, but…I suppose 
theyÕre unbelieving that itÕs as easy as it is, they expect itÕs going to be harder, 
so, they donÕt want to make a fool of themselves, which you can kind of 
understand…but a lot of it is just the way their brains work...I mean mineÕs the 
same, everybody when you see a strange word, you pick out certain letters 
and form it into something that you know…and thatÕs what comes out of your 
mouth…so…you know, itÕs a long word, and itÕs got Ds and Bs and Rs and 
Ks…all over the place, so you just kind of make something up that sounds like 
itÕs got those in…I think thatÕs it!  
 
Ailsa Czerniak (white British; Polish married surname) also asserted that she 
does not mind that people ask her about where her surname comes from as she often 
asks Ôpeople where they originate fromÕ. She further explained that it Ôgets my back upÕ 
if people get angry with her for not being able to pronounce their name so she does 
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not get angry with those who cannot say her name. Indeed, AilsaÕs view of migrants or 
foreignness appeared to be quite colourful:  
 
Emily: you donÕt feel like youÕre treated any differently because of your name? 
Ailsa: No, no. I get more annoyed with other people when I ring…IÕm on NTL 
and I ring up for help, and itÕs gone to India, and itÕs gone to someone who 
canÕt speak English. I get annoyed about that… 
Emily: Right… 
Ailsa: …and itÕs not really with the person, itÕs with Virgin, for employing 
people that canÕt speak English and you canÕt understand them…I get 
annoyed with that, and I get annoyed with doctors at the hospital when they 
canÕt speak English…Õcause I donÕt think thatÕs fair. I get annoyed with other 
things as well! I am prejudiced with some things, I guess, not towards me, but 
towards other people, because it annoys me that the National Health has to 
pay for interpreters because they canÕt speak English, that annoys 
me…because if we went to another country, we wouldnÕt get that free, we 
would have to pay for it. Those things really rile me, especially when the 
National Health Service is on our knees. So I guess IÕm more prejudiced than 
IÕve felt it to me. 
 
Additionally, Marion Stamatis (white British; Greek married surname) said that 
when the children she taught used to Anglicise her name as ÔSteve-ridisÕ, she Ônever 
took it as racist, I always took it as fun really…because to me it was a bit like 
Lego…moving the part about…ÒHow can we make this English?ÓÕ. This example 
buttresses LipskiÕs (1976) point that names deemed foreign often tend to be re-made 
by others in terms of the dominant phonetic system in the particular country. Lipski 
(1976) also asserts that the name bearer may do the same thing due to an 
expectation that their name will be badly mispronounced. Nonetheless, MarionÕs point 
also seems to be another example of a participant trying to think the best of people 
who mispronounce/modify their name, of a belief that the mispronunciation is almost 
natural. Similarly, Natalie Mustapić (white British; Croatian married surname) said that 
she tells people not to ÔworryÕ [my emphasis] about mispronouncing her name and that 
Ôhalf of my colleagues and family canÕt pronounce my name anyway, so…I donÕt make 
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a big issue of it…I tend to make people feel more comfortable about the fact that they 
mispronounce my nameÕ [my emphasis]. 
Furthermore, Anna Aladeoja (white British; Nigerian married surname) said 
that ÔitÕs funny, because I can kind of judge people [for not pronouncing AnnaÕs name 
correctly]…but then I realise that I do exactly the same…when it comes to African 
names or something, just kind of skim over it when you donÕt recognise itÕ. Also, she 
stated that when she started her new job, one of her colleagues said to her that when 
she had attended the job interview they had Ôimagined a black lady comingÕ because 
of her name. Anna said that this comment was Ôquite interesting…it wasnÕt said in a 
negative way at allÕ. Anna thereby implies that this comment did not have any adverse 
side to it, but would she have been given the job if she had been conceived as 
actually black? Why had the panel been considering whether she was black at all?  
Also, Charlotte Leary (black British; Zimbabwean born and raised; 
Zimbabwean maiden name) seemed very aware of her status as a migrant, even 
though she is now a British citizen, and seemed to try to justify the racism that she 
indicated she has experienced in the UK:  
 
…this is not my country so obviously sometimes people can pick their own. If I 
was in Zimbabwe IÕd probably do the same thing, so sometimes thereÕs 
natural discrimination that someone can just favour someone from their own 
origin or from skin colour you just…do them a bit of a favour in comparison to 
the other person. So there can be something like that, yeah…. 
[My emphasis]. 
 
Meanwhile Linda Abadjian (white British; Armenian married surname) articulated that 
her surname tends to be remembered when she complains about something: Ôthey 
certainly remember the surname as being that weird sounding nameÕ. When I asked if 
someone had actually referred to her name as ÔweirdÕ, she said, ÔYeah they have 
yeah, ÒThat weird sounding nameÓ, ÒThat funny sounding nameÓÕ. Linda said that she 
did not react to these comments, Ôbecause IÕve come across so many things over the 
years, I just donÕt bother reacting anymore nowÕ, and that she was just relieved that 
they remembered her, so that her phone call could be dealt with quickly. It seems 
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surprising that Linda should not be offended by such comments, especially when she 
was already making a complaint about something else. Linda stated that this Ôprobably 
sounds strangeÕ, and explained that, Ôbecause itÕs my married name, thatÕs probably 
why I wasnÕt offended…I think if I was born with that name, I probably would have 
been offended, thinking about itÕ. This implies that she has been so used to negative 
responses to her married surname that she does not even notice, or bother about, 
them. Or perhaps if it was not her surname, but was someone elseÕs, she would have 
thought it was a ÔweirdÕ name too. 
I have presented these excerpts not in order to castigate my participants but 
rather to underline how the concept of white supremacy, and the Othering of anything 
not deemed white British, are apparently so overwhelmingly pervasive and natural. 
Moreover, it is seemingly taken for granted by my participants that there are such 
things as white British names and foreign names: just as the literature suggests is the 
case with race itself (Ratcliffe, 2004; Ahmad and Sheldon, 1994).  My participants 
cannot be exempt from dominant societal discourse just because they have changed 
their surname to one deemed to be of a different racial category to their conceived 
embodied one. In the next section, however, I will provide examples of participants 
who have seemingly tried to make a stand against anti-foreign discourse. 
 
Fighting Discrimination/Racism through Name 
In the previous section, I mentioned SaidÕs (2003) view on the internalisation 
of Othering discourse by those constructed as Other. However, as I stated in Chapter 
Two, SaidÕs argument can be criticised for seemingly disallowing the possibility of 
Orientals/the Other to resist dominant Western representations of them. As Foucault 
(1983) argued, relations of power are found within everyday, individual relationships, 
as well as within structural/institutional situations (also Wemyss, 2009). I will use the 
following interview excerpts in order to demonstrate how some of my participants have 
spoken of strategies for avoiding name discrimination/racially-motivated questioning, 
of a desire to fight racism by promoting their foreign (in the UK context) name in their 
everyday decision-making and encounters.  
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Sally Hasani (white British; Albanian married surname) explained that her 
husband Ôconsidered changing his name [to SallyÕs maiden name when they got 
married] to avoid…discriminationÕ, because he had experienced episodes of 
discrimination, but she did not Ôfeel comfortable with thatÕ so she took her husbandÕs 
surname. She gave one of her main reasons for doing so as: ÔI did feel like if 
thereÕs…discrimination, I donÕt think itÕs the right response for you to have to 
change…do you know what I mean? I didnÕt feel like it was right to do thatÕ. 
Additionally, Anna Aladeoja (white British; Nigerian married surname) described how 
she likes the fact that her surname is ÔdifferentÕ, because: 
 
…it reminds me that IÕm married, and…I think itÕs really important to value my 
husbandÕs culture as well…because obviously IÕm aware of…racial issues in 
the past and even now, like the way that Africa is often kind of looked down 
upon, I think itÕs good to be like proud of who he is and stuff…and then I like 
the fact that it identifies me as married to a Yoruba. 
 
Furthermore, although Marion Stamatis indicated that she was in two minds about 
taking her husbandÕs name, as I discussed above, she asserted that she has used her 
experience in order to correct children she has taught:  
 
…they might be taking the mick out of another kid for some reason or other 
and then I could draw them up and say, ÒAh right, you think thatÕs bad, what 
about this?Ó, because somebody would make some cocky comment, and I 
could tackle it, I could try in a little way to try to tackle a bit of racism, a bit of 
bullying…so it was definitely an advantage in that position of power or 
authority, but in a nice way, because you canÕt like terrify kids…I used to see 
that as a definite positive at school. 
 
Also, as I will discuss further in Chapter Six, Jamal Hassan Hamdaoui (mixed-
race British; Arab name) spoke of how he decided to drop his informal name (given to 
him by his mother to help him racially pass as white British) of Mal McKenzie so as not 
to give in to prevalent Islamophobic and anti-migrant views. He asserted that it was 
his name, so why should he not use it? He said that he ÔstronglyÕ feels that those 
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Ôpeople who are actively trying to Anglicise themselves by deliberately trying to hide 
an aspect of their identity which they feel will maybe hinder themÕ, Ôare doing other 
people of mixed-races a slight injusticeÕ. Jamal argued that Ôit needs more people just 
to have the guts to say, ÒYeah [chuckles]…my genes come from all over the place, 
what can I do about it?Ó…whatÕs a name…?Õ.  
Jamal stated that his inner ÔrebelÕ was ÔexcitedÕ by the idea that in having a 
name, which does not reflect the stereotypical idea of his race (in that he is mixed-
race and his white, European heritage is obscured by his name), he was somehow 
fighting against ascriptions of race in relation to name. He depicted how this notion 
was also reinforced by his habit of telling people who questioned him about his race 
that his grandmother is Swedish:  
 
I guess itÕs because you donÕt look at me and see a Swede…I specifically start 
with Sweden, not because I feel that itÕs easier to integrate myself being part-
Swedish, because it totally just bloody throws them!...theyÕre ready to make 
ascriptions and IÕm like, ÒYeah, SwedenÓ and theyÕre like, ÒHow can you be 
Swedish?Ó.  
 
Indeed, Jamal said that: Ôthe fact that my grandmother comes from Sweden seems to 
be insignificant, but the fact that my grandfather comes from Lebanon is significantÕ. 
Thus, Jamal appeared to revel in the way in which his name, his appearance, and his 
mixed-race identity, seemingly challenge peopleÕs conceptions of what he (racially) is. 
This is similar to DreisingerÕs (2008) point, which I mentioned in Chapter Two, 
concerning how racial passing can be an anti-racist, revolutionary act, in that it 
problematises and thereby challenges the presumed absoluteness of whiteness (also 
Pfeiffer, 2003). Jamal has asserted that he has deliberately chosen to use a name, 
which he knows will lead to a lot of questioning about his race etcetera in order to try 
to show up the constructed and problematic nature of racial categorisation. 
Rose Urzica (white British; Romanian married surname) spoke of having 
played with peopleÕs perceived prejudices against her surname. She emphasised her 
belief that the UK is no Ôless racist than it ever wasÕ but that people have Ôjust got 
cleverer at covering it upÕ, and the Ôname is the tag that…racists use…Sometimes 
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wrongly, which is quite amusingÕ. She described her occasional response to apparent 
discrimination as follows:  
 
…when people have made that assumption that IÕm Eastern European…IÕve 
played along with it, just to see…how far down the road they 
would…go……IÕve also done it with the whole Roma thing…and because 
people have no clue about Roma names…IÕve let people assume that IÕm 
Roma, until theyÕve met me, and thatÕs been quite amusing as well.  
 
This is an apparent example of someone pretending to meet othersÕ expectations of 
their race (based upon their name) and then confronting those people with the 
problematic and inconsistent nature of racial thinking. Indeed, these examples above 
have indicated an awareness on the part of my participants of the racism associated 
with foreign names and that they have felt some duty to make a stand against such 
attitudes.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have highlighted the significance of the racialisation of names 
upon my participantÕs everyday lives in terms of their familial, social, educational and 
employment experiences. Despite claims that difference is now conceived in terms of 
culture rather than race (Solomos and Back, 2000; Brah, Hickman and Mac an Ghaill, 
1999; see Chapters One and Two), my participantsÕ reported experiences strongly 
suggest that the essentialisation of skin colour (embodied race) lives on, and thereby 
so does racism. Indeed, many of my name-changersÕ stories have also indicated the 
high level of disrespect and/or invasive questioning they have experienced in relation 
to their names. I have suggested that the seemingly persistent questioning of my 
participants implies the remaining importance of racialisation within UK society. I 
subsequently discussed in this chapter how hostility towards foreign (sur)names has 
led some participants to make decisions about their name choice, which they may not 
otherwise have taken.  
Moreover, for some name-changers, bearing a (sur)name associated with a 
different race to their own ascribed embodied race has apparently led to feelings of 
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uncertainty, even vulnerability, in relation to their own sense of identity. I compared 
their position with that of the inbetween people, as theorised particularly by Roediger 
(2005). Such feelings apparently led some participants to develop strategies in order 
to try to feel safer/more at ease in terms of trying to avoid name discrimination and/or 
questioning. On the other hand, some other participants described how they tried to 
make a stand against racialised thinking.  
What came through very strongly from the participantsÕ reported experiences 
is that the racialisation of name appears to matter very much, as it has impacted on 
their everyday lives. Names in relation to race thereby are worthy of further research, 
alongside other signifiers of race such as skin colour and accent. I have also asserted 
in this chapter that racialised thinking is seemingly all-pervasive, even amongst those 
who have taken a (sur)name associated with a different race to their own perceived 
embodied race. As I discussed in Chapter Two, we are the product of the society in 
which we are raised and we seemingly cannot be exempted from its systems of power 
or discourse, including those which assert the supremacy of whiteness (Ferber, 1999).  
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CHAPTER SIX: ÔWHAT WOULD IT BE REASONABLE FOR THE KID TO BE 
CALLED?Õ Ð NEGOTIATING THE RACIALISED ESSENTIALISM OF NAMES. 
 
Introduction 
Lieberson and Bell (1992) assert in their US-based study that parentsÕ naming 
choices are influenced by what they believe their childrenÕs eventual personalities or 
characteristics will be. However, they also cite outside pressures on name choice. For 
example, the parentsÕ perceptions of how other people will react to the chosen name, 
a mindfulness of how names are viewed in the mass media, and an awareness of 
institutional Ônorms and pressuresÕ (ibid.:514). This refers to religious, class and 
ethnic/racial norms (ibid.). Research into naming practices where the parents consider 
themselves to be of different racial and/or faith backgrounds has been surprisingly 
limited in the UK setting (Edwards and Caballero, 2008). Edwards and CaballeroÕs 
(2008) work is an exception, and it indicated that whilst such couples tended to 
choose names that they liked from popular culture, they also desired that the names 
should represent the dual heritage of their children. Edwards and Caballero (2008) 
suggested that parentsÕ attitudes towards the chosen name may change as their child 
grows older, and that they may begin to fear that a name conceived as foreign could 
make their child vulnerable to racial abuse. 
I will analyse in this chapter the data from my interviews, specifically in 
relation to the topic of naming children. As I mentioned in Chapter One, this issue 
emerged in the interviews as a theme of particular importance to many of my 
participants. My data in this regard further suggest that names are racially 
essentialised as being foreign/Other or white British. Accordingly, in line with Edwards 
and CaballeroÕs (2008) claim, name-discrimination was something many of my 
participants feared would be encountered by their children.  
Consequently, in a similar vein to the analyses of Lieberson and Bell (2008) 
indicated above, something that became very apparent during my interviews was the 
deep level of thought that most of the interviewees had given to naming their children. 
Specifically, though, some of my participants suggested that such thinking was in 
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terms of how the name would be racially perceived: would it be too foreign/Other? At 
the same time, there was often an articulated desire to represent the non-British side 
of the childÕs heritage, and the name was frequently considered to be one of the main 
ways of symbolising this. Name was thereby often reified as standing for what the 
person is, in terms of race. The incongruence of these two considerations was also 
combined with some of the participantsÕ own rather problematic position towards race 
and name, in that some participants seemed to consider their child to be in some way 
foreign/Other. This is perhaps unsurprising in light of the literature I discussed in 
Chapter Two on the way in which white supremacy grows out of the mainstream 
(Ferber, 1999), and Ð in relation to my white participants - how every white person is 
complicit within the system of whiteness, in promoting and benefitting from its power 
and notion of superiority (Macedo and Gounari, 2006).  
Such (perhaps unconscious) difficulties/struggles about their childrenÕs 
race/foreignness subsequently resulted in some participants asserting that they had 
developed the coping strategy of giving their child a name that they felt would help 
them to racially pass (Ginsberg, 1996; see Chapter Two) as white British, at least in a 
disembodied sense Ð that is, on paper. Some other participants, however, indicated 
that they had chosen to give their children foreign names in the belief that this would 
oppose racist structures. It is interesting to note that the interviewees therefore 
(un)consciously associated/equated name to race/nationality, almost as though it is 
some kind of regime of truth (Reed, 2005; see Chapter Two). They indicated that their 
married/maiden name (respectively) would be perceived as foreign, whilst their other 
surname was constructed as white British, unmarked, invisible.  
Furthermore, I discussed the notion of a racial hierarchy (Bulmer and 
Solomos, 1999; Bhavani, Mirza and Meetoo, 2005) in Chapter Two, which suggests 
that people conceived as black are placed at the bottom and those considered white, 
at the top. In this chapter I will also consider if, according to my participantsÕ reported 
experiences, there is likewise a common conception of a racial hierarchy of names.  
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What is it ÔReasonableÕ for a Child to be Called? Balancing Fears of 
Discrimination with Desires to Reflect ChildrenÕs Heritage.  
Victoria Ravanbaksh (white British; Iranian/Persian married surname) said 
that she and her husband wanted their childrenÕs names to be pronounceable by both 
her English family and her husbandÕs Iranian family, and that it was thus a ÔdeliberateÕ 
decision to give them one ÔEnglishÕ first name and one ÔPersianÕ first name to go with 
the Persian surname. At the same time, however, Victoria expressed that her husband 
in particular was: 
 
…aware of prejudice against name, on your application form for a job and that 
sort of thing…so we wanted them to have a very English name if they want to 
use it…So he was really aware that there may be a prejudice against the 
Iranian name, so we decided to go for one of each…and we put the Iranian 
name first because it flowed better, with the names weÕd chosen. 
  
However, Victoria said that she and her husband impressed upon their children that 
they could use their English name in the future should they encounter discrimination. 
This implies an understanding that names are reified in terms of whiteness and 
Otherness, in that Victoria discussed English and Iranian names without conscious 
awareness of the constructed nature of these terms, as well as in suggesting that her 
children may suffer from having a name that is understood to be foreign. 
Consequently, Victoria and her husbandÕs apparent strategy for coping with their 
expressed dilemma, was to give their children a choice. They could try to racially pass 
as white British in the future, by using their English name, should they feel that they 
have experienced discrimination in relation to their Iranian name (although they would 
still presumably carry the Iranian surname). Alternatively, they could express their 
dual-heritage within their names. This latter option supports Edwards and CaballeroÕs 
(2008) afore-mentioned research finding that parents with different racial backgrounds 
tend to want to reflect both heritages within their childrenÕs names. 
Chloe Hardy-Mathiesen (white British; raised in America; added Norwegian 
name to white British maiden name upon marriage) and her husband Lars Hardy-
Mathiesen (white British; born and raised in Norway; British name added to existing 
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Norwegian surname upon marriage), both expressed a desire to choose names for 
any children they have in the future that are pronounceable and recognised in both the 
UK and in Norway. Chloe said that this is a constraint in terms of the pool of names 
that could be chosen: Ô…itÕs annoying because it does kind of limit you, you think, 
ÒOoh thatÕs a really nice name, but oh no well it doesnÕt work…itÕs not a name that 
anyone in Norway has ever heard, or itÕs not a name here anyone has ever heardÓÕ. 
When I asked her for more detail about why she would decide their childrenÕs names 
according to this criteria, Chloe cited her concerns that their children would find it 
difficult enough having to spell their Norwegian surname in the UK, without also 
having an unfamiliar first name: 
 
Emily:  …how does that make you feel when your name isnÕt pronounced 
correctly? Is that something that really…upsets you, to that extent…where you 
would let it affect your choice of names? 
Chloe: …IÕd let it affect my choice of names simply because it just makes your 
life so much more difficult…I mean youÕre already going to have to spell 
Mathiesen, having to spell your first name as well and having people get it 
wrong…I donÕt like people getting my name wrong…I think fitting in more 
rather than less would be better for my child, and being able to fit in both 
cultures means choosing a name thatÕs conducive to both 
cultures……But…with first names I donÕt want it to become that huge issue 
that people canÕt pronounce things and itÕs a nightmare for them and it…just 
makes you stick out more…so…I think…trying to fit in with a name would be a 
good idea. 
 
It is interesting how Chloe uses the term ÔcultureÕ in order to express the way 
in which her childrenÕs names would or would not Ôfit inÕ within British and Norwegian 
societies. As I discussed in Chapter Two, culture has largely replaced the term race in 
common discourse within the UK (Gilroy, 1993). There has been a move away from 
the biological understanding of difference, which has been acknowledged to be racist, 
towards culture, which is deemed to be accessible to all and thereby not 
discriminatory (Lentin and Titley, 2011a). However, in actuality, culture can be as 
essentialised as race (Lentin, 2005). To argue that there is one culture of white 
Britons, and likewise other cultures belonging to specific ÔcommunitiesÕ of racial 
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minorities within the UK, and still other cultures belonging to other nations, is 
problematic, and racialising in itself. It would appear that names are similarly 
essentialised in terms of a racialised notion of culture. It seems that names considered 
British Ð with the strong undertones of whiteness that this classification seemingly 
suggests - are perceived positively within the powerful majority discourse of the British 
nation, whereas names, which are deemed foreign are conceived negatively (- 
perhaps to differing extents, as I will discuss later). 
Elinor Murley (white British; husband has a Peruvian surname, which she 
decided not to use generally) also spoke of her wish to have names for her children 
that would be representative of both her, and her husbandÕs, backgrounds. Yet she 
expressed concern about the potential for discrimination in relation to those names 
that would symbolise her husbandÕs Peruvian heritage: 
 
But in terms of names...I suppose, yeah…I would worry about it, and IÕm 
looking at de Mendoza [her husbandÕs surname] now, and IÕm thinking, ÔitÕs 
not that badÕ, but in the fact that IÕm thinking, ÔitÕs not that badÕ, then I sort 
of...itÕs on some kind of progression of being more difficult to live with 
perhaps......I mean particularly because as mixed-race children they would be 
dark-skinned...not recognisably of a particular culture…then…itÕs a concern, 
how would they go through life with that and perhaps…it would depend on the 
choice of Christian names as well, but if you called…them Spanish names 
that, again English people didnÕt recognise and a Spanish surname, or well we 
just think of it as a foreign name that people didnÕt recognise and a foreign 
surname, then it might be...an added problem…. 
 
Elinor thus suggests here that names are essentialised: those names that are not 
considered by the majority discourse to be white British are lumped together and 
given a foreign label. She is implying that there is little desire within mainstream white 
British discourse to understand the origins of Other names Ð some are just foreign and 
that is that. Relatedly, Winder (2004:348) provides an interesting example of British 
television commentators who Ôfind it hilarious when their colleagues stumble over a 
foreign nameÕ, whereas a migrant who Ôslightly mispronounces an English word is 
thought an utter dunceÕ  (see Chapter One for more discussion on this topic). All in all, 
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as I suggested in Chapter Five, names that are perceived to be different/foreign are 
not necessarily accorded much respect, for they are conceived as noticeable and 
different, in contrast to the invisibility of white British names. This supports the notion 
that embodied whiteness is deemed invisible and pure, and oppositional to the 
negative and ultra-visible embodied blackness (Dyer, 1999). 
Furthermore, Elinor eloquently represented her dilemma as regards naming 
any children she may have:  
 
…there is kind of that question that…would you burden your child with 
a…foreign name, when you donÕt have to, or when itÕs not, for me, it doesnÕt 
necessarily represent part of my culture, it would almost be giving them that 
name because I thought it sounded pretty......but at the same time then...if you 
avoid giving your child a slightly different name, then itÕs almost kind of making 
the whole situation worse, and dividing society more between people who can 
claim white heritage and people who canÕt and that sort of thing…. 
 
Here Elinor has asserted that some names are representative of ÔdifferenceÕ, of 
foreignness, in contrast to other names, which are symbolic of Ôwhite heritageÕ. 
Thereby Elinor has suggested that some names actually represent a personÕs racial 
background. The implication of this is that if Elinor were to give her children names 
that she felt were white British, and which thereby did not reflect her husbandÕs 
Peruvian heritage, she would consequently be helping them to racially pass as white 
(Ginsberg, 1996; see Chapter Two for my discussion of embodied racial passing). 
Elinor did though express that her ideal preference would to be represent the 
childrenÕs dual-heritage within their names: 
 
…it would be very nice if we could work it out so that our childrenÕs names 
perfectly symbolised...their full ethnic background from both me and 
EduardoÕs [her husbandÕs] side, um if we could come up with the perfect 
name…[on] the level of ideas Ð that is what we both want, and itÕs certainly 
what I would want would be to come up with a perfect kind of combination of, 
either a collection of things that were very Scottish and very Peruvian, or very 
Spanish…. 
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Nonetheless, Elinor also outlined another consideration that Spain had conquered 
Peru and that her husbandÕs surname was more Spanish than Inca. Consequently, 
she questioned if they would Ôbe really signifying what [they] want it to signify?Õ if they 
chose Spanish Peruvian names for their children. Thus, Elinor said, Ôin an ideal world, 
at the level of kind of ideas and things, what we would both want…would be to have 
the perfect name for our children, which synthesised all these different things, had bits 
of Scottish and bits of Peruvian, and sounded very nice, and very artistic and that sort 
of thingÕ. However, Elinor asserted that the difficulty with this idea is that: 
 
…no one would be able to pronounce it and no one would be able to spell it, 
and every time the poor little child said what its name was, people would go, 
ÔOh, where are you from?Õ, so for those reasons we might have to tone down 
[chuckles] what weÕd like to do in the way of names, or what IÕd like to do in 
the way of names, and think, actually...what would it be…reasonable for the 
kid to be called.... 
 
To talk of Ôwhat it would be reasonableÕ to call a child is an intriguing 
statement, as it implies that there is a juggling act going on within ElinorÕs mental 
process of choosing her (hypothetical) childÕs name, which could also be said of many 
of my other participants. The dual-heritage of the child is apparently being considered 
and how this should duly be reflected in the childÕs names. However, there is also the 
underlying concern of practicality: what is going to be recognised, what is it acceptable 
for a child to be called in the UK in terms of their not being subjected to questioning 
about their origins, or even to discrimination. One can perceive in both ChloeÕs and 
ElinorÕs accounts the power of whiteness at work, in that making name-
discrimination/practicality a factor in name-choice is presented as being a natural 
consideration. It seems that these participants feel it is common-sense to consider the 
Otherness of their partnerÕs heritage in comparison to the apparent notion that white 
British names belong and are unmarked. 
Indeed, several parents expressed concerns about their childrenÕs 
employment chances in relation to them not having a typically British sounding name. 
Victoria Ravanbaksh said that she feels things are much better now than in the past, 
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but nonetheless: Ôyou can never tell, I mean when thereÕs 50 applicants for a job, you 
donÕt get an interview, how do you know itÕs not your name?Õ. Furthermore, Natalie 
Mustapić (white British; Croatian married surname) revealed that: ÔItÕs…a question I 
raise for my children…in terms of what would happen if they were applying to…the 
sort of traditional law firm that I applied to…how would they react to my children with a 
foreign surname…applying for a job there?Õ.  
Natalie indicated that her concern was therefore about: Ôthe impact of the 
childrenÕs names in terms of in the future applying for the jobs and the key 
thing…that…initial judgements are being made, purely on their application and 
their…namesÕ. She also spoke of an awareness of Ôthose employment surveys that do 
suggest that names, unfortunately they do sometimes matter…on that initial thing…Õ. 
This seems to be a reference to Correspondence Test research (e.g. Wood et al., 
2009) (as I outlined in Chapters One and Two). NatalieÕs anxiety about how such 
economic penalties may apply to her children is especially poignant when considered 
in relation to her own reported experience of being a young person who grew up with 
the apparent privileges of an unmarked, invisible white British surname. 
Linda Abadjian (white British; Armenian married surname) also spoke of being 
apprehensive about potential economic penalties, as she said her childrenÕs Armenian 
surname was often perceived by others to be Asian-sounding: 
 
Emily: Is that a concern for you…when perhaps your children are applying for 
jobs…that…their name is taken to be Asian, do you think there is a 
disadvantage?  
Linda: ……when they employ…it should just be based on ability…But youÕve 
got to get past that barrier havenÕt you, to get to the interview stage? 
Emily: Yep… 
Linda: ThatÕs the problem, so if youÕre just applying, then itÕs your name 
thatÕs…coming up isnÕt it, itÕs not what you look like… 
Emily: Mm… 
Linda: You see, I find these particular questions difficult to answer because 
IÕm not in that situation…IÕve often thought that they would have more of a 
problem with the surname, to be honest, as they were growing up…IÕm hoping 
things will have changed a lot…but then again…as I said, you know, itÕs 
underlying isnÕt it [discrimination], itÕs still there…. 
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Something that seems to come through from many of my participantsÕ 
interviews is a fear of the unknown, of things which could happen but over which they 
have no control. Often they spoke of a hope that things were getting better, that 
discrimination could not be so bad anymore because there are more and more people 
with names that are not typically white British sounding in the UK. Victoria 
Ravanbaksh asserted that: Ô…I think things have changed, and I think people are 
more accepting now than they were twenty years ago of funny names…Õ. Amy 
Jammeh (white British; Gambian married surname) also expressed the rationale that 
her sonÕs Gambian first name ÔdoesnÕt particularly stand out even amongst the kind of 
white British children - many of them have…quite unusual names nowÕ. 
 Both Amy and Victoria have here suggested that some names are ÔfunnyÕ or 
ÔunusualÕ: in other words, strange or Other. As I mentioned above (and in Chapter 
Five), this intimates that many of my participants have (perhaps unconsciously) 
internalised the notion that some names are white British, unmarked, familiar. Also, 
that Other, foreign names, are unnatural, overly-visible and potentially 
disadvantageous in a context where some races are deemed to be higher up in the 
national hierarchy than others. As I discussed in Chapter Two, such ideas are 
seemingly perpetuated and promoted via a nationÕs elite members, who draw the 
boundaries of normalness and who thereby depict (in the UK) minorities as Other and 
to be excluded (Solomos, 2001). I am arguing that my participantsÕ data suggest this 
Othering also occurs with names: names construed as white British are privileged, 
and those that are not conceived as such, do not carry this privilege. 
Indeed, Amy said that she fears for her son in the future because of his 
mixed-heritage: ÔI think as he gets older thatÕs when children start looking for 
differencesÕ, and this concern is so deep-set that she has been making preparations 
(such as taking a Masters Degree to improve her employability abroad) to move with 
her husband and son to Gambia once he finishes primary school in the UK: ÔIÕd like to 
put him in an environment where itÕs more focused on his education than his name 
and his heritage reallyÕ. This appears to be an attempt by Amy to take control of the 
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situation, to shield her son as much as she can from the discrimination she perceives 
to be awaiting him in the UK. She stated: 
  
I donÕt want him to be bullied or persecuted or discriminated against in any 
way...and if I can protect him from that by making that move, I think thatÕs a 
perfectly reasonable thing to do…I canÕt see any reason that I would not do 
that…and if I have the choice to make his life simpler then I think thatÕs what I 
need to do really.... 
 
On the other hand, not all of the interviewees said they had worried about 
their children having a foreign name. For example, Bryony Chiamaka (white British; 
Nigerian married surname) responded to my asking Ôdid you ever have any concerns 
about…your children…having a Nigerian surname…?Õ, as follows: 
 
Bryony: No…And…maybe I should have done, but I didnÕt because I just 
thought that they were very lucky to have such a lovely dad who is very 
clever…all my three kids are clever, all the grandchildren are clever, so how 
lucky are they? 
Emily: Yeah 
Bryony: And…theyÕre good looking, theyÕve got this lovely physique…tall and 
slim and…[they] donÕt put on weight, and so I just used to talk about all the 
advantages they have, and…IÕm not saying that they never have problems, 
donÕt think IÕm saying that, IÕm just saying that everybody has problems, 
everybody has issues and you have to face them and you have to deal with 
them…. 
 
This is interesting in that even though Bryony said she did not have concerns for her 
children in connection with their Nigerian surname, it seems to be reflective of her own 
positive outlook on life. Throughout the interview she promoted the idea of having an 
empowering attitude towards living, of how a person should not let the negativity of 
others, and/or problems they encounter, affect them, that they should instead grasp 
the positivity of their situation. Nonetheless, her assertion that everyone has issues 
does imply an acknowledgement that she did have underlying concerns for her 
children in bearing Nigerian names. Moreover, as I expressed in Chapter Two, that 
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ObamaÕs race is much referred to when assertions are made that the USA is a post-
racial society, suggests that race does still matter (Lentin and Titley, 2011a) Ð 
likewise, Bryony arguably would not be so vehement in stressing the positives of her 
childrenÕs dual-heritage, if she did not think there were also potential negatives to 
bearing names perceived as foreign. 
Additionally, Mandy Mundra (white British; Indian married surname) described 
how her sons have told her of their own feelings that their Indian surname may hold 
them back in life, but Mandy does not seem to accept that this could be the case: 
 
Emily: Do you think that some surnames have more advantages than others? 
Mandy: Um…I donÕt think so, I mean, I think listening to…my boys, they would 
say that they can see it being sort of a hindrance for them, because people 
donÕt know them, they donÕt see them, but people, there is a problem with 
surnames, sort of, people judge you without seeing you…but I donÕt feel like it 
has done so far with them, and I donÕt think it matters at all with me, so… 
Emily: Yeah sure. So, when theyÕve been saying that to you, is that in terms of 
their education, or is it socially? Or…I mean, what kind of examples did they 
give you? 
Mandy: I think they feel in university, or when theyÕre applying for jobs that 
theyÕre wondering whether theyÕll be judged because…it is an Indian name 
and whether…there will be a time that maybe…they donÕt know how thatÕll 
impact on them. So far itÕs not mattered at all, I mean thereÕs such a mixture at 
university anyway…. 
 
It may be the case that MandyÕs children have indeed not had any problems with their 
surname. Nonetheless, it seems from the way that Mandy was so dismissive (in tone 
as well as vocally) of the possibility of them encountering problems (despite what she 
said her sons had told her), that she was denying the possibility of her children 
experiencing racism from a perspective of love, from the perfectly understandable 
position of not wanting this to happen and so not acknowledging that it has or could.  
 
Racial Hierarchy of Names 
In a similar vein to MandyÕs quotation above, Chloe Hardy-Mathiesen (white 
British; raised in America; white British maiden name (Hardy), Norwegian name 
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(Mathiesen) added upon marriage) also seemed to deflect any worries about name 
discrimination away from her (future) children. For Chloe, though, the reason she gave 
was: ÔI have read in the papers…of people who have had problems with foreign 
sounding names, but…as far as I can tell they tend to be Asian and African names, 
which sort of…I would say is less anti-foreigner and more racist, so I donÕt think that 
having a Scandinavian last name would prejudice my children…in that way, so it 
wouldnÕt worry me at all…Õ. She said she perceives in the UK that: 
 
…there is this feeling with Scandinavians that…there are, I hate to say it, but 
itÕs like, ÒTheyÕre foreign, but theyÕre our kind of peopleÓ…ÒTheyÕre foreign, but 
theyÕre alrightÓ…and…when people think of Scandinavia they think of fish and 
IKEA and Abba…I canÕt think of that many negative connotations that people 
have in this country about Scandinavians except maybe people who 
disapprove of their liberal views towards things like sex and nudity and stuff 
like that, but itÕs not something IÕve ever come across really…. 
 
Consequently, Chloe is suggesting here that there is a racial hierarchy of names, 
whereby Asian and African names are at the bottom, and Scandinavian names are 
higher up, signifying a more acceptable form of Otherness: in parallel with the notion 
of a hierarchy of races (Dyer, 1999; Ratcliffe, 2004; see Chapter Two).  
Moreover, we can see from the history of British naming that there have been 
trends of giving children exotic names originating from France and Scandinavia. In the 
twentieth century, for example, there was Ôa vogue for French versions of names that 
already exist in English: Abigail, Diane, Nicole; and for Scandinavian names: Greta, 
Karen, Kirsten and IngridÕ (Wilson, 1998:330). Wilson (1998) asserts that the 
exoticness and ÔstrangenessÕ of these names disappeared once they had become 
popular and accepted. Thus it would seem that Chloe may have a point, in that some 
names may be conceived as acceptably or even positively foreign in the UK context, if 
they are associated with a country that is not disdained within the UK. 
In addition, Chloe also shared an interesting anecdote in relation to this topic, 
whereby at a previous workplace of hers, she said one of her Ôwhite colleaguesÕ 
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decided to give his son a first name that she took to be Asian-sounding. She 
explained how: 
 
…there were a lot of raised eyebrows…someone actually said to him, ÒWell 
donÕt you think that that might prejudice people?Ó, because…I could have 
understood it, and I think most people could have understood it more if it had 
been a mixed marriage, you know, if his wife had been black or Asian, and it 
had been a name from her culture, but they were both like middle class white 
people.  
 
She went further to express that to have Ôthis little blond hair, blue eyed boyÕ with an 
Asian sounding name: 
  
…is quite unusual, and I would say that it wasnÕt that people disliked the 
name, but there was this sort of worry that…youÕre already making his life that 
much more difficult because people are going to make assumptions about him 
based on that name…unfortunate assumptions…people are going to assume 
that heÕs black….  
 
Consequently, it seems that ChloeÕs concern about her own future childrenÕs 
Norwegian names was somewhat dissipated by her expressed belief in a racial 
hierarchy of names: some names will be more discriminated against than others, 
some names may be foreign but some are more foreign than others. This asserted 
belief meant that her own potential concerns for her children were seemingly deflected 
onto others. To have a name that people perceive to be ÔblackÕ is ÔunfortunateÕ as it is 
the Ôblack namesÕ, which attract the discrimination, not the Norwegian names her 
children would have. Furthermore, her anecdote indicates a real equation of name 
with race. The implication is that a personÕs name matches their heritage, who they 
are: therefore, why would someone give a black name to a white child, and thereby 
risk tempting racism when the child does not have the embodied racial heritage to 
prompt it?  
Jenny Legris (white British; Mauritian married surname), meanwhile, 
explained that her son had altered his surname. Jenny said he researched about his 
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Mauritian surname (Legris) and discovered that it originally had a prefix of ÔDeÕ 
attached to it, and so he added this prefix to his existing surname. When I asked 
Jenny if she had any idea why her son had done this, she responded as follows. 
 
Jenny: [Laughs] Yeah, I think so. Edward [her son] is a typical prep school boy 
[both chuckle] and I think he thinks it sounds like itÕs got more kudos, I think it 
was only for that reason…yeah… 
Emily: Yeah, I just wondered if it was to make it sound more French or… 
Jenny: Yeah…I think it might have been, yes…theyÕre sort of fairly strong 
names arenÕt they, that have ÔDeÕ in them, and theyÕre quite…aristocratic 
arenÕt they? I mean I think EdwardÕs always got pretentions to sort of aspire to 
greater things in life, you know! [both chuckle] ItÕs interesting that George [her 
other son] hasnÕt bothered, nor his dad for that matter…It could have been, 
yes, but I donÕt think, I know what youÕre saying but I think itÕs more…Edward 
likes things to be very sort of…public schoolboy…and I think that sounds a bit 
more up the social ladder, do you know what I mean? 
Emily: Yeah 
Jenny: Awful, awful really in a way…that shouldnÕt…be an issue, but…I must 
admit I like the ring of it: ÒDe LegrisÓ it does sound rather sort of…Louis the 
14
th
 doesnÕt it really?. 
 
Thus, for JennyÕs son, it appears as though his original surname, which Jenny said 
had sometimes been mistaken for being Egyptian, but never for being French (even 
though it seems that its etymological origins may be French), was not so 
advantageous as a surname that was more obviously French. Jenny framed her sonÕs 
decision to change his name as being about attracting privilege rather than avoiding 
discrimination, but perhaps all in all this is a similar thing. Moreover, this anecdote 
also seems indicative of the concept of a racial hierarchy of names: whilst some 
names are white, some are whiter than others. For EdwardÕs surname to be 
associated with France was to move up the rungs of the racialised name hierarchy, 
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perhaps. That is, away from a name that sounded merely foreign, to one that sounded 
Ð not white British, but one not too far down the hierarchy of whiteness Ð French. I will 
further touch upon this notion of there being a racial hierarchy of names within the 
following section. 
 
Using Name Choice to Help Children Racially Pass / Avoid Discrimination 
Some participants openly expressed that one of the main factors involved in 
choosing their childrenÕs names was that of avoiding racial discrimination, and that as 
a strategy to protect their child from this, they chose names that they perceived to be 
white British. The assertion was that they wanted to give their children every chance 
of attracting the privileges associated with a white British identity, and thereby save 
them from the discrimination they associated with names conceived as Other.  
Lynsey Bridger (white British; did not take her husbandÕs Kashmiri/Islamic 
surname) explained how she had had her first child when she was only 19 years old, 
and that her partner was a practising Muslim. She said that her partner wanted their 
child to be given an Islamic first name, but Lynsey studied this requirement and 
argued that Ôthere are various interpretations of what would be accepted as Islamic, 
because different cultures have different names, as obviously thereÕs the original 
Arabic names, but thereÕs all sorts of variations of themÕ. She said that she 
consequently chose a white British first name, of which she had found there to be an 
Islamic version. Lynsey stated that she did not like the Islamic version, so she chose 
the white British version, and one reason she cited for this was that she 
Ô…was…concerned about…racism that he would experience if he was using in Britain, 
at the time Ð I must have been fairly aware of that Ð a non-Western-sounding name - it 
did concern meÕ.  
Lynsey explained that this choice of name has been a ÔniggleÕ between her 
and her now-husband since then, especially as she had also given their son her own 
maiden name (Bridger), rather than her husbandÕs surname. Nonetheless, Lynsey 
conveyed that her worry when naming her son was not so much about discrimination 
based upon what her son looks like, but: 
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…that kind of more hidden level [of discrimination], particularly around job 
applications actually and that level of…power that people have over you when 
they see a name and what they decide to do with that name…and you donÕt 
know, you never know, how can you ever prove it unless somebody 
reported…a colleague that had made a decision on that basis…. 
 
Indeed, she explained that a person can never be aware of how many times someone 
has made a decision about them, such as whether or not to give them a job, based 
purely upon their name. Lynsey thus suggests she has a high level of awareness 
about the apparent power-structures involved within the racialisation of names: that a 
personÕs name often goes beyond their embodied existence and is interpreted without 
them being present, in a manner over which they have no control.  
Similarly, Kayla Brackenbury (black British; born and raised in Zimbabwe; 
Zimbabwean married surname) spoke of having concerns about racism in regards to 
any children she might have. She was adamant that her children would be given Ôan 
English name that theyÕll use at school, and my husbandÕs second nameÕ. Although 
she said she planned to also give them a Zimbabwean middle-name in order to 
represent her own heritage, she stated that the Zimbabwean name would: 
 
…never be found out at the school…IÕll probably use it around the house just 
so that they can have a little bit of me…because theyÕre growing up here, 
theyÕre going to be whatever, I just want them to know, even when they get 
old, and say, ÒIÕve got a middle name and my middle name is whatever and I 
got it from my mumÓ......thatÕs all...just so that they can remember....  
 
Kayla explained that her reason for deciding this was purely to try to help them avoid 
the name discrimination that she described she had experienced before she got 
married and changed her Zimbabwean surname (Manyika) for her husbandsÕ white 
British surname (Brackenbury). She asserted that her children will Ôgrow up affected 
with the discriminationÕ because they are mixed-race: consequently she said she is 
going to give them typically white British names so that Ôthey donÕt face much 
discrimination, as much as I haveÕ. 
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Kayla went on to say that her husbandÕs white British surname is Ôa blessingÕ 
for her children, and she explained why. 
 
…because at least with their name and their second name and their accent, it 
will only be the colour that will be in the way...their accent will be…okay, their 
names will be fine, so it will be when they are in the school, or when they go to 
work, it will be their colour, of which usually they wonÕt be as dark as me, 
theyÕll be a little bit on the light side, they will look a little bit tanned, so it 
shouldnÕt affect them that much. But…they will face it, but it wonÕt be as bad 
as what IÕve been through…because at least they can stand and say, ÒIÕm 
born here, I grew up here, and IÕm EnglishÓ.... 
 
KaylaÕs statement is interesting as it suggests that she wants her children to be able to 
racially pass as being white British, in a non-embodied sense: 
 
...at least when they make phone calls theyÕll be taken serious, because their 
accent is not selling them......their name is not selling them, everything is 
not...showing that this person is…[an] ethnic minority......because obviously 
they will be treated like ethnic minority, so...itÕs an advantage to be, opposed 
to...if you [Emily] have kids and they take your boyfriendÕs name, it will be 
slightly different for them. They will think that they came from Nigeria or 
Zimbabwe to here...and they…are foreigners, theyÕve come on holiday and 
theyÕve overstayed their stay...Unless their accent carries them through, if 
theyÕre a little bit lighter, those are the things that will carry them through, but 
without that…IÕm hoping by the time my children will be old enough, at least 
things will be levelled a bit, but itÕs difficult......I think maybe itÕll be okay, but...I 
hope so, itÕs just a hope, that they wonÕt go through what IÕve been through.... 
 
It seems that KaylaÕs own experiences of racism have left a painful psychological 
mark, and this means that she would be prepared to try to hide her childrenÕs 
Zimbabwean heritage, and promote their fatherÕs white Britishness, through their 
names and their English accents. Kayla said that the Zimbabwean names would not 
be put on the childrenÕs birth certificates, they would only be used at home in secret, 
their skin colour would hopefully pass as tanned white skin that would not betray their 
real blackness. This all aligns with AhmedÕs (1998) point about the overlapping nature 
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of skin colours (see Chapter Two), which contrasts with the purported essentialisation 
of skin colour and race. The doctrine of whiteness infers that a white person can be 
tanned as an adornment that does not permanently remove their true state of 
whiteness, but to be black is incontrovertible and immovable. Yet one can be in-
between this tanned whiteness and real blackness, the boundaries can be blurred 
simply because of the constructed nature of the concept of races (Ahmed, 1998) Ð as 
KaylaÕs testimony implies. KaylaÕs interview data also ties in with FanonÕs (2008) 
notion that a black individual must wear a white mask in order to be perceived as 
human. That is, they must adopt the values and culture associated with whiteness in 
order to dissociate themselves from the stigma of blackness. Fanon (2008) asserted, 
though, that in doing so, the person can be estranged from their own feelings of self. 
Kayla would appear to be in such a position.  
Suzanne Balester (white British; had a Moroccan married surname -
Moussamih - prior to divorcing), also said she chose her sonÕs first name on the basis 
that she did not want him to experience discrimination because of his name: 
 
I wanted him to have, because I knew how racism exists in this country…more 
of an English name…because I thought he would be better served if he 
had…an English name than if he had a name like Mohammed or Husain or 
whatever…because of the way things are, and I didnÕt want him to be 
victimised and…racially abused and stuff like that…so…unbeknown to my 
husband, I trawled through this book of suitable Arabic names, and found one 
that I could shorten to an English name…. 
 
Thus Suzanne said that because her husband expected his son to have an Islamic 
first name, she did give him such a name (Hamal), which is on all of his official 
documents, but unbeknown to her then husband, her reason for choosing this name 
was so that it could be shortened informally (to Mal) and pass as being ÔEnglishÕ. So 
much so, that Suzanne stated that only her sonÕs father and his side of the family 
actually call her son by his full Islamic name, and that when applying to schools she 
used his shortened name. Suzanne said that many people Ômake an assumptionÕ that 
her sonÕs full first name is actually a Christian name (Malachi), as Mal is also a 
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common shortening for this name. Suzanne explained that her son does tend to 
correct people and tell them his full name and is not ashamed of it, but she named him 
as such because ÔI wanted him to fit in more…IÕm not daft and I know that there is still 
a lot of racism in this country, and even more so now with war on terror and things like 
thatÕ. 
Suzanne said much of her concern for her son came from her own 
experiences with regards to how her father, for one, behaved about her Ômixed-raceÕ 
marriage: Ômy dad…was very racist, came from that era where racism were okay, you 
know? It were alright to go around calling people disgusting names…A lot of my 
friends were shocked that I was going to be marrying somebody who was Muslim…it 
was quite a big thing really…Õ. Suzanne also related an incident she had had when 
she and her ex-husband went on holiday to Scarborough about 20 years ago: 
 
…IÕve never felt so…it was awful…we walked down…the coast, 
and…everybody was staring at us…it was really bad…And I remember saying 
to [her husband], ÒWhyÕs everybody staring at us?Ó…and he said, ÒOh no, just 
ignore them, they obviously havenÕt seen very many mixed-race 
couplesÓ…[chuckles] ÒItÕs not normal!Ó But I think because theyÕre 
probably…[in] a smaller environment where there werenÕt so many different 
cultures…my goodness, it were awful, it really was…they didnÕt say anything, 
but you could quite openly see the disgust…the aggression over it…it wasnÕt 
nice…And I didnÕt want Mal, because I knew we were living in a predominantly 
white area anyway, to go through that, and I thought it would be easier if he 
had a name…he got a Muslim name, with an English version, but I did do it 
specifically…. 
 
It appears, then, as though just as with Kayla Brackenbury, SuzanneÕs own 
experiences of racism had left a deep impression upon her that impacted greatly on 
how she named her child. Suzanne was apparently anxious to protect him from the 
racism that she understood, and still understands, to be prevalent within the UK. 
However, she did make it clear that the fact her sonÕs name was often taken to be 
Christian was not an intentional outcome on her part. Suzanne explained that when 
she separated from her husband, she told him that their son would not be raised as 
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either a Muslim or a Christian and that when he was old enough he could choose if he 
wanted to practice a religion. To her, the shortening of her sonÕs first name was 
intended to make it, ÔNot Christian, [but] more EnglishÕ. This implies Ð as I suggested 
in Chapter Five - that many of my participants tended to conceive Islamic names as 
Other/foreign in a racialised, rather than in a particularly religious, sense. Their 
concern appeared to be not so much that the name would be considered Islamic but 
that it would be perceived as foreign, and therefore not as white British. This 
buttresses and extends my earlier point that cultural identities can be as essentialised 
as racial ones and therefore be just as racialising (Lentin, 2005:388; see Chapter 
Two). I should acknowledge here that most of my participants chose Islamic names 
prior to the Islamophobic backlash of recent years, which could be a reason for this 
conflation of religion into a general category of Otherness. Nonetheless, most of these 
participants did indicate a current awareness of Islamophobia in their interviews and 
still made such points as I have just discussed. 
 Suzanne went further to say that her motivation in choosing her sonÕs name 
was related to her belief that: Ôin society youÕve got to acknowledge, whether we like it 
or not, that people are racist here…and we were living in a…predominantly white 
area, I knew he were going to go to that school and I wanted him to fit in with an 
English name, because I knew there was not going to be another boy or girl in his 
class who was not English…Õ. It is notable that Suzanne implied her son is not 
ÔEnglishÕ, in saying that there would not be another child who was not English in her 
sonÕs class. To her, then, it seems her sonÕs dual white English-Moroccan heritage 
was something that prevented him from being ÔEnglishÕ, that made him somehow 
foreign in an embodied sense, and she did not want his first name to further suggest 
this. SuzanneÕs apparent conclusion that her son is Other seems surprising. Yet, as 
mentioned previously, the power of whiteness is penetrative and consuming: although 
there is the possibility to fight against its doctrine (as I suggested in Chapter Five), 
nonetheless a person is heavily influenced by the societal discourse with which they 
grow up (Ferber, 1999).  
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Indeed, Suzanne talks of her sonÕs Ôvery large brown eyes…Afro hairÕ and 
ÔbrownÕ skin, whereas she said all his classmates were Ôwhite EnglishÕ. She further 
explained that, ÔI think a name like that with a white parent and another parent whoÕs 
not from here, in a predominantly white area in a predominantly white school, would 
have caused him more problems than I really was willing to let him have…ItÕs 
protection isnÕt it, you know what lifeÕs like out thereÕ. Suzanne further described how 
her then-husband had presented her with Ôvery Muslim names, like Mohammed and 
SafirÕ to consider calling her son, regarding which she said: Ôhopefully IÕd like to think 
for the right reasons, I didnÕt want him to have a name like that…Õ. She said that she 
did not discuss her reasons for selecting the first name they did call their son with her 
then-husband, even though he had often experienced discrimination/racism himself: 
 
Emily: So he didnÕt ever…suggest about…your sonÕs name…that by calling 
him a Muslim name that might actually…not be so advantageous? 
Suzanne: No, no…Because he wouldnÕt look at it like that…Even though he 
knows about things like that, for him itÕs…first born, boy…mega important if 
youÕre Muslim…My son now is the oldest boy in that family…and they treat 
him like a king…but…they [Moroccans] have a very negative approach 
themselves to women and their importance within the family, so…he [her son] 
was always going to be very important, and he was always going to be having 
a Moroccan name…because that would have been an insult to the family…it 
wouldnÕt ever have crossed his mind. If…heÕd have said to me, ÒNo itÕs 
Mohammed and thatÕs itÓ…and IÕd said, ÒWell, no, we canÕt call him thatÓ… 
ÒheÕs got to go to school here and…Ó Ð that wouldnÕt have come into it, heÕs 
Moroccan, heÕs meant to be a Muslim, heÕs got to have this name… 
Emily: Yeah 
Suzanne: …that was more important than, would he be racially abused or 
whatever, for them…. 
 
Therefore, in sum, Suzanne asserted that she felt so strongly about the 
potential for her son to experience discrimination in relation to his first name that she 
deceived her then-husband into choosing the name, which she informally altered so 
that it would not sound Islamic. This action could be perceived as being quite extreme, 
and as symbolic of her fears that even now if he Ôhad gone to the school that he went 
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to with a name like Mohammed, he would have had problems…as it is, he didnÕt…Õ. In 
effect, she is asserting that she does not regret her decision, but sees it as being 
decisive in preventing her son from being racialised as Other, and incurring resultant 
negative experiences, on the basis of his first name. She goes on to suggest that by 
shortening his first name she in effect helped him to pass as being ÔEnglishÕ/white: 
 
Emily: …why do you think he didnÕt have problems? I mean IÕm just wondering 
how the…name discrimination relates to like colour, more physical 
established… 
Suzanne: Because…heÕs quite fair skinned, and you could actually think to 
yourself well actually heÕs…just a dark haired, brown eyed English boy, and 
heÕs called Mal, so thereÕs nothing, you know, and children…theyÕre not going 
to look at the surname and all this sort of thing, theyÕre going to look at what 
they see: ÒSo hereÕs a boy, heÕs called Mal. Oh, heÕs got brown hair, but heÕs 
not black, heÕs not dark brown, he doesnÕt look PakistaniÓ…but all that has 
come from their…first five years at home, and I think…that still goes on now, I 
know it does, I know it does…We like to say it doesnÕt, but it does…. 
 
SuzanneÕs declaration that her son could visually pass as being white differs 
somewhat from her description earlier of his ÔAfro hairÕ, Ôvery large brown eyesÕ and 
ÔbrownÕ skin. Her suggestion seems to be, then, that her son could racially pass as 
white if he had a first name that symbolised this identity. Thus the notion of 
disembodied racial passing through name is intertwined here with the idea that the 
name could aid and/or enable embodied passing. For Suzanne, her son was not white 
or even truly English, but was Other and vulnerable to discrimination. She decided to 
do everything within her power to try to limit his susceptibility to this: just as Kayla 
Brackenbury intended to do with her future children. As I discussed in Chapter Two, 
this is indicative of passing in order to access white privileges (Ginsberg, 1996; 
Belluscio, 2006), which Suzanne implied would be closed to her son should his 
Islamic, racialised identity be known. Suzanne wanted him to pass Ð as much as it is 
possible with his mixed-race appearance and Moroccan surname - as white and 
thereby be racially invisible. 
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Marion Stamatis (white British; Greek married surname) said she too 
struggled with the idea of giving her child a name that would mark her out as being 
ÔforeignÕ. Even though she explained that she had divorced and re-married, and had 
her daughter with her second husband, she had kept her first husbandÕs surname, 
Goodall. She perceived this name to be white British and subsequently she gave this 
surname to her daughter too because of her concerns about giving her the surname of 
her second husband. When I asked her for the reasoning behind this decision, Marion 
said she perceived her second husbandÕs Greek surname with an Islamic prefix (Haji-
Stamatis) to be: 
  
…a huge, cumbersome problem really…how could you call this little child 
Haji-Stamatis…it was so foreign, even to me…it was definitely a foreign thing 
to me, even though…IÕd lived for five years in London and did hear every 
name under the sun…as patients and as colleagues, and then I moved to 
Manchester and that was quite multi-cultural, so when I met Parthenios [her 
husband] and started to go out with him, it didnÕt strike me as odd at all. 
 
It is intriguing that Marion said she did not find her husbandÕs name Ôodd at allÕ 
when she was dating him, however when it came to the idea of giving their daughter 
the surname, it apparently then became ÔforeignÕ. Seemingly her asserted initial 
attraction to the exoticness of her husband was replaced by her fears regarding the 
Otherness of the identity that would now be passed onto her daughter. Consequently, 
Marion said she desired for her daughter to pass as white British, and that that is why 
she gave her daughter her first husbandÕs surname.  Indeed, Marion said it was only 
when her daughter started nursery and the headmistress interviewed Marion and 
found out about her daughterÕs Greek heritage that she was then known by the Greek 
surname with the Islamic prefix (Haji-Stamatis). Marion spoke of how the 
headmistress: 
 
…wanted to know all the background…and she was very poetic and romantic, 
and I suppose it [the history of the name]…is very lovely…Oh and she 
absolutely insisted…she threw up her arms and said, ÒWe should celebrate 
this glorious name, this glorious tradition!Ó…and the poor little thing…about 
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two foot high and she had to go to school and be registered as Haji-Stamatis 
[chuckles].  
 
Marion said her daughter was consequently known by her fatherÕs surname 
(Haji-Stamatis), whilst Marion herself still kept her first husbandÕs surname (Goodall) 
for a number of years afterwards. However Marion asserted that she made the 
Ôdecision…for [her daughterÕs first name] to be a brief, English nameÕ: Ann. Even 
though she said she would have liked to have used the French spelling (Annette) she 
did not because she presumably knew her daughter could potentially have the Greek 
name (which she of course eventually did). The surname, including the Islamic prefix, 
was 13 letters long, so Marion said she gave her daughter the Ôshortest [first] name 
that I could kind of get away with at that timeÕ.  
Marion also spoke of her belief that when her daughter was born (nearly 30 
years ago) Ôthere wasnÕt this Muslim threat…thatÕs come in more recent yearsÕ, and of 
how with hindsight she wished that her daughter had been registered just with the 
Greek name (Stamatis) rather than with the Islamic pre-fix (Haji) attached. Moreover, 
(as I will discuss later) Marion indicated that she fears the Islamic connotation for her 
daughter because she has a disability, and that she tends not to discuss the Islamic 
pre-fix in connection with her daughter, as she has to be Ôvery careful how [her 
daughter is] perceivedÕ.  
It therefore seems that Marion does not want her daughter to be racialised as 
being Muslim, whereas she had come to consider the Greek part of the surname as 
being okay, perhaps not too far down the hierarchy of names. As I mentioned earlier, I 
have used the term ÔracialisationÕ in regard to the Islamic religion because my 
participants have implied that this is how they have viewed it. In addition, it would 
appear that, despite the fact anyone can practice a religion, there is a common 
conception within the UK that Islam is associated with Otherness and not with white 
Britishness. A prime example of this was very recently when the BBCÕs Political Editor, 
Nick Robinson, apologised for asserting that the two men who apparently murdered a 
British soldier in the Woolwich area of London were of ÔMuslim appearanceÕ 
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(Robinson, 2013) Ð a statement that was apparently proven wrong when the men 
were found not to be Asian but black. I will discuss this further in Chapter Seven. 
Marion said her fears about her daughter having the Islamic prefix have grown 
over time, seemingly in parallel with increases in Islamophobia (Alexander, 2002b, 
2004; Alexander, Edwards and Temple, 2007; Per, 2013:6; see Chapter Two), and 
she appeared to regret having being persuaded by the headmistress to change her 
daughterÕs surname. Having said that, she did stress the beauty and the historical and 
cultural significance of the Islamic name, and of the Greek surname too, but she 
expressed her fear that discrimination may come her daughterÕs way because of 
bearing it.  
Furthermore, Linda Abadjian (white British; Armenian married surname) spoke 
of how although she was not against giving her children an Armenian first name as a 
way of reflecting her husbandÕs Armenian culture, she and her husband 
Ôprobably…did think that it would be easier to give them a commonly used name here 
[in the UK] than a[n]…Armenian first name with an Armenian surname…I suppose we 
thought that for a child at school it would be easier for them…Õ. This is also similar to 
Sally Hasani (white British; Albanian married surname), who indicated that she had 
given her children white British first names to go with their Albanian surname, and that 
it: 
 
…was quite a conscious decision to give them that mixed name…and…I 
suppose part of that was to avoid discrimination, because we did feel like we 
would be living here [in the UK] for some time, and it would make it easier for 
them to have, [than] if weÕd picked very Albanian sounding names…So I 
suppose there was part of that in the decision to name them that……I guess it 
was a choice not to have the Albanian first name….  
 
Sally explained that this naming-decision was based upon her ÔhusbandÕs 
experiences…He has experienced some discrimination, because he is foreign…Õ. The 
way that she so simply justified the discrimination her husband had experienced with 
the statement, Ôbecause he is foreignÕ, is interesting. Seemingly for her it is not a 
matter of surprise that he should be discriminated against, but just the way of the 
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world. Indeed, Sally said that her husband initially tried to persuade her that he should 
take her maiden name (Hayden) upon marriage and forgo his Albanian surname. 
However, Sally stated that she did not feel comfortable with breaking the tradition of 
taking her husbandÕs name, and that she did not believe it was right to let 
discrimination affect her decision-making in that regard. Nonetheless, that she 
apparently allowed her husband to persuade her when it came to choosing their 
childrenÕs first names, suggests that she was not comfortable with the idea of her 
children having an entirely foreign set of names. 
Jamal Hassan Hamdaoui (mixed-race British), who was born to a white 
Scottish mother and a father of mixed French-Lebanese and Spanish heritage, was 
registered upon birth with a fully Arabic name. However, Jamal said when he was a 
few years old his parents divorced and his mother decided to take him and his sister 
away from London to live in her relatively remote hometown in Scotland. Jamal 
explained that upon doing so, his mother informally changed her childrenÕs surname to 
her own maiden name of McKenzie, a name perceived to be white British, and she 
also shortened JamalÕs first name to Mal so that it appeared to be a white British 
name (Malachi). Jamal stated that this was Ôin a bid, I suppose in my motherÕs head to 
kind of shelter us from any kind of racial abuse or anythingÕ, and that he and his sister 
were consequently known by these new, but unofficial names, from there on. Indeed, 
Jamal said his sister eventually changed her surname legally by Deed Poll to 
McKenzie, whilst Jamal in his early twenties decided to revert back to being known by 
his Islamic surname, Hamdaoui (as will be discussed further later on). The point here, 
is that Jamal said his mother made him feel as though his real name was something 
that needed to be hidden in order to avoid racism. He said that in actuality perhaps the 
name change did help him fit in (or even racially pass as white British) at school, 
although he said he does not with hindsight agree with his motherÕs decision.   
Some parents, however, framed their decision to give their children white 
British names in terms of practicality, in order to make their childrenÕs lives easier, 
rather than acknowledging a fear of racism. Bryony Chiamaka (white British; Nigerian 
married surname), for instance, described how she and her husband gave their 
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children both ÔEnglishÕ and Nigerian names to go along with her husbandÕs Nigerian 
surname (Chiamaka). Bryony said they decided to Ôput the English name first, the 
Nigerian name second…Because…the children were obviously going to live in 
England…none of them were ever going to live in Nigeria, and so itÕs much easier [to 
have English names]Õ.  
Bryony went on to enunciate how several of her Nigerian nieces and nephews 
have Anglicised their first names, Ôbecause…when youÕre at school, youÕve got these 
names that nobody can get their tongue around, it just makes life…Ð their lifeÕs difficult 
enough in school without really difficult names…Õ. Bryony compared this phenomenon 
with ÔEnglish children [who] change their names, especially boys [who] give 
themselves nicknames…Óthe name I call myselfÓÕ. Thus, it appears that Bryony 
perceived her decision about the order of her childrenÕs first names to be a practical 
one: not so much that the children would be discriminated against because of having 
a Nigerian name but that it would be difficult to pronounce. Bryony emphasised her 
pride in her husbandÕs Nigerian heritage and surname, admitted to having quite a 
forceful personality, and declared that she would not let other peopleÕs negative 
attitudes affect her. Consequently, it seems that she did indeed perceive that the 
hassle for her children to have a Nigerian first name would be quite significant, 
considering she had let it affect her decision-making in giving them ÔEnglishÕ first 
names. This notion of making the childÕs life easier was also expressed by other 
participants, such as Chloe Hardy-Mathiesen (white British; raised in America; 
Norwegian name added to her white British maiden name of Hardy) who talked about 
not wanting her childrenÕs Ôname to be such an issue that they are going to suffer from 
having…ÒHow do you pronounce this?ÓÕ, which she said her husband (Lars Hardy-
Mathiesen) had experienced a lot because of his Norwegian names.  
Such attitudes seemingly further highlight the depth of whitenessÕ influence on 
how names are generally perceived. There are many long and phonetically difficult 
surnames that would seemingly be considered white British, yet it is unlikely that 
parents bearing such a surname would spend so much energy contemplating which 
first names would not add to the difficulty of the name as a whole. There appears to 
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be a rather pervasive attitude in the UK that foreign names are kindly tolerated by the 
white British, who have to expend much effort in order to do so. As I mentioned in 
Chapter One, there is a proud rhetoric in the UK about an age-old (some would argue, 
mythic) notion of British tolerance (Clarke and Garner, 2009; Putnam, 2009; 
McKinnon, 2006; Wemyss, 2006). This notion can be perceived in the following 
quotation from the website of a company that helps people to change their name in 
the UK for a variety of reasons, one of which is described below. 
 
Many people who come to live in the United Kingdom can experience 
difficulties with their original names especially if they are particularly difficult 
for British people to pronounce and spell. Some find that the easiest thing to 
do is to abandon their original name altogether and change to something that 
is more common and easier for British people to use. In such a situation it is 
also possible to rearrange or add names to the current one. For example, if 
somebody's surname was the ÒdifficultÓ one, they could take a new surname 
and use their previous surname as a middle name. This option allows people 
to maintain a link with their family name, and at the same time simplify 
everyday matters. Other people choose to simply alter the spelling of their 
current name, making it easier to pronounce and therefore more convenient. 
This option favours those who do not want an entirely new name but are 
having difficulties with their current one. 
(UK Deed Poll company website, 2010). 
 
 Seemingly at the root of such pronouncements about the ÔdifficultyÕ of names 
is the notion of racial otherness/foreignness. That is, a name that is not deemed white 
British represents foreignness/racial difference, which varies in terms of its desirability 
according to how highly or lowly it ranks within the changeable racial hierarchy of 
names. I suggested in Chapter One that the UK media tends to portray problematic or 
negative attitudes towards names deemed foreign (e.g. Allen, 2013), and I also 
discussed the history of migrantsÕ names being changed wholesale by UK officials 
(McKinley, 1990). I thereby intimated that there appears to be a dominant attitude in 
the UK that foreign names are a hassle, whilst white British names are easy and 
somehow universal Ð no one could struggle to say them, as suggested by the 
anecdote about television commentators, which I presented earlier. The UKÕs move 
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away from being Ôpassively tolerantÕ (Cameron, 2011; see Chapter One) would seem 
to be reflected within the above UK Deed Poll quotation, which indicates that the 
responsibility for dealing with such foreign names rests with those who bear them: 
why should they not just dispose of them when they are so inconvenient to the white 
British majority? This is framed as straight-forward, common-sense, and as non-
discriminatory, when in actuality it seems to be grounded within the hegemonic power 
discourses of whiteness. That is, that whiteness is the coveted identity, that all people 
should strive to be white (Dyer, 1999; see Chapter Two). 
Similarly, although Nicola Zheung (white British; Chinese married surname) 
said she had not fully discussed the issue of naming (any future) children with her 
husband, she indicated that they would be given ÔEnglishÕ first names and Chinese 
middle names, with the order being justified on practical grounds:  
 
I think partly itÕs for ease really, because obviously if youÕre living in the UK 
and you were born in the UK, then I think itÕs, weÕre not quite culturally ready 
to deal with names…because obviously where I work we have a wide range of 
customers with names from all over…the world and very often…itÕs the names 
that arenÕt the most traditionally English that you end up with the most spelling 
problems and data problems, and the result of that…so people just…I donÕt 
think itÕs intentional, I think people just donÕt understand them yet…. 
 
It is intriguing, in the same vein as the above-discussion, that Nicola explains her idea 
of naming from a very practical, perhaps functional perspective: she mentions Ôspelling 
problems and data problemsÕ rather than discrimination or racism, such as with 
access to the job market. Her idea appears to be that the UK populace is not familiar 
with names that are not typically white British. However, this notion is challenged by 
her subsequent remarks that, ÔI donÕt think itÕs intentionalÕ and ÔI think people just donÕt 
understand them yetÕ. To not ÔunderstandÕ something is surely an active verb, 
something that is consciously considered. Spelling and data errors are arguably not a 
lack of understanding a name, but more a lack of concentration or perhaps respect for 
the name. To suggest that she does not ÔthinkÕ it is intentional, is not a definitive or 
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strong claim, and perhaps even raises the possibility that some name difficulties are 
deliberately perpetrated.  
Victoria Ravanbaksh (white British; Persian/Iranian married surname) said she 
gave her children Persian first names and her husbandÕs Persian surname 
(Ravanbaksh), as well as what she considered to be white British middle names. 
Victoria had also indicated that her children were happy to use their Persian first 
names rather than wanting to use their white British middle names. However, Victoria 
explained (as I mentioned in Chapter Five) that her daughter had informally shortened 
her surname, so that Ôwhen she was at Sixth Form nobody ever called her [by] her full 
name, she was Rav and that was her name, everybody knew her.Õ Victoria also spoke 
of her belief that there is discrimination against name: ÔIÕm quite sure, I know one of 
my employers in the past has looked at peopleÕs names and immediately binned a 
fewÕ, and she applied this concern to her children: 
 
…what concerned me a lot was what will happen with my children, when 
theyÕre applying for jobs. I mean, IÕd already got my qualifications and what 
have you, but theyÕre starting out. And whether thereÕs prejudice against 
them…theyÕve got an Iranian or a Persian first name and an English first 
name, and IÕve always said to them, if you want to put your English name on, 
do it…and you might find you get further. 
 
Consequently, this implies that Victoria does have concerns about her children 
bearing Persian names, in spite of her prior claims to the contrary, and that she would 
be happy for them to try to racially pass as white British should they wish to do so. 
The way she suggests they could achieve this is similar to that promoted by the Deed 
Poll quotation: they should just use their white British names and hide their foreign 
ones. 
 
Using Name-Choice to Fight Discrimination and/or Promote Otherness. 
I began the previous section with Lynsey BridgerÕs (white British; did not take 
her husbandÕs Kuwaiti/Islamic name) explanation that she gave her son white British 
names in an attempt to circumvent racial discrimination. However, Lynsey said that 
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she and her partner went on to have a second child over a decade later, and she 
outlined how her Ôawareness, and…understanding of racism, and how it operatesÕ, as 
well as her own role within that, had altered during this time. As such, she stated that 
although she had named their first child with the idea of Ôwanting to protectÕ him, she 
now felt that ÔitÕs also colluding with, and supporting Ð I think Ð broadly…principles of 
racism at the end of the dayÕ. Consequently, Lynsey explained that she and her 
husband gave their daughter Ôthree Islamic names and one English nameÕ (the 
opposite way around to her sonÕs names), even though, as Lynsey professed, Ôthe 
climate in terms of the racism she could experience by having this Islamic name 
is…more profound and significant now [than when her first child was born], so…itÕs 
not a decision I took lightlyÕ. 
Lynsey declared that she would be happy to support her son, Ôin terms of 
whatever legal processes were involvedÕ, should he wish to change his white British 
names to Islamic ones. However, when I asked if she would do the same for her 
daughter should she wish to change her names to ones considered white British, 
Lynsey admitted that she would Ôhave a lot more concerns about her wanting to 
change her name, and I would tell her that, although IÕd let - obviously when sheÕs an 
adult she can do whatever she wants -…Because of my own awareness of the role 
that that would playÕ. She compared the idea of her daughter changing her name to 
the idea of racially passing, of concealing her identity in order to pass as white. She 
stated that this was especially so because her daughter could perhaps physically pass 
for being white, and that it is only her name, how she dresses, or her being seen with 
her father that would indicate that she was not white. 
Lynsey said she was well aware from anecdotal experience and reports she 
had read that since 9/11 there have been attacks, particularly against female Asians in 
the UK, and that Ôthe general climate now is, if youÕre racist and…within that…have 
Islamophobic beliefs…you perceive any name that sounds vaguely Middle Eastern to 
be Islamic nowÕ. As such, and as mentioned above, she seemingly did not take the 
decision to give her daughter Islamic names without a great deal of thought. That she 
218 
 
did so is seemingly in part testament to her reported desire not to be complicit with 
Islamophobia and the system of racism.  
Nonetheless, Lynsey said that she chose not to use her own Islamic first 
name, which she had selected for herself upon getting married. When I questioned 
her about this, she did not provide a reason. There could be many explanations for 
this, one of which could be that (as I discussed in Chapter Two) it is perhaps difficult 
for a white person to withdraw entirely from the system of whiteness: all white people 
are complicit within it and benefit from its privileges (Garner, 2007). Nonetheless, to 
give her daughter Islamic names after how much she had tried to help her son to 
racially pass as white does seem quite a brave decision in the context of her 
awareness of Islamophobia Ð even if she did not want to claim an Islamic identity 
herself.  
Sally Hasani (white British; Albanian married surname) also avowed her belief 
that even if her children do experience discrimination in relation to their Albanian 
surname, that Ôthat is who they are, that is part of their background…part of their 
family is Albanian, and we shouldnÕt have to deny that just to avoid discriminationÕ. 
However, she freely admitted that: ÔHow I feel about that [the idea that they should not 
deny their Albanian heritage in order to avoid discrimination] when they grow up, I 
donÕt know! [chuckles]Õ. This latter caveat acknowledges that her seemingly 
courageous stance against racism, both through taking her husbandÕs surname 
herself and in giving the surname to their children, may falter should her children 
experience racism. Therefore there is something in the foreignness of a surname that, 
not just Sally but most of, my participants implied: they acknowledged the visibility of 
foreign names, and the (potential) consequences of this visibility in terms of 
racism/discrimination. No one appeared to just see a name, all of the participants 
talked in terms of the racially representative and symbolic nature of names. 
Jamal Hassan Hamdaoui (mixed-race British; Arabic name) explained how he 
reverted back to his Arabic name from a white British alias his mother had given him 
(as I mentioned earlier). Jamal said that when he was in his early twenties he 
Ôdecided, well…my nameÕs never been changed properly from my birth certificate so, 
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yeah, you know what, IÕm just going to change my name back to what it should be…I 
mean…not that it had been changed at all but…[to] make sure people are calling me 
by my name…! [chuckles]Õ. When I asked what led him to make this decision, he 
explained that he had just started at university and had been thinking intensively about 
his name: 
 
…I realised the only reason I was McKenzie [his motherÕs maiden name] was 
for some reason that would keep me safer than if I was Jamal Hassan 
Hamdaoui and it seemed to me that it was a ridiculous thing…this notion 
that…what the thingÕs called, represents what the thing is…itÕs absolutely 
ridiculous. 
 
Indeed, he said he felt Ômore than anything…there was no problem with my nameÕ, 
even though he did divulge that Ôit definitely did helpÕ when he was younger to be 
called McKenzie, Ôin the context of growing up in Scotland with…a Scottish name as a 
part-Arab…I definitely would say that to an extent it made it easier for meÕ. Jamal said 
this was in the sense that, Ô…even though I looked foreign it was easier for them to 
bridge the gap, you know, to locate McKenzie to understand this, the boy speaks in a 
Scottish accent, everythingÕs fine, you know?…but as Hamdaoui there is definitely…a 
construct of Hamdaoui [that they have]Õ. 
However, Jamal indicated that there was more to his name situation than the 
practical side of it being easier for him to have a name considered white British: Ôthere 
was that sort of identity part of it, where I felt like I was kind of hiding from who I was, 
through this adopting a Scottish name…especially when your mother…sheÕs instilled it 
upon you, you think, ÒWell it must be very seriousÓÕ.  Since changing his name back to 
Hamdaoui, Jamal stated that he felt Ômore empoweredÕ: 
 
…IÕm not scared of being who I am…and being a McKenzie, youÕre always 
kind of on your back foot…ÓWhy am I a McKenzie? Why has everyone else 
got their dadÕs name? Why have I got to change? I donÕt understand…Ó, and 
then you start to understand and you think, ÒWell I donÕt like this!Ó [chuckles]Õ.  
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Jamal further explained that his desire to revert back to his Arabic name had nothing 
to do with Ôkeeping the paternal line goingÕ, but that Ôit solely came fromÕ wanting to be, 
feeling Ôthat I could be meÕ. This is reminiscent of my discussion in Chapter Two 
regarding the way identities are seemingly so multi-layered and complex (Alexander 
and Knowles, 2005). It appears that JamalÕs apparent experience of racially passing 
as white British via his name encapsulates GinsbergÕs (1996:2) point that Ôpassing is 
about identities: their creation or imposition, their adoption or rejectionÕ. Jamal has 
seemingly lived a life of Ôdouble-consciousnessÕ (Du Bois, 1999:126) and he has 
chosen the more difficult path of being Othered, by reverting back to his Islamic name.  
Jamal further described that in using his motherÕs maiden name he had been 
passing, Ôcontinuing this tradition of trying to shroud yourself…trying to sort of 
masquerade as one of them when youÕre notÕ. This links to GoffmanÕs (1990:20) 
assertion, which I presented in Chapter One, that trying to avoid a stigma by passing 
(by a person changing their name in this case) does not necessarily help that person 
to be ÔnormalÕ, they still hold the history of that which is not ÔnormalÕ inside their minds. 
Jamal suggested here that he felt uncomfortable with hiding his Otherness and that he 
disagreed with the notion that Otherness is a negative, and thereby wished to present 
his un-normalness to the world. Indeed, as Jamal went on to say: 
 
Jamal: …if I could put it into a sentence that would kind of…[W]hy should I call 
myself a name that has been chosen for me to make more discreet something 
about who I am?...And I guess you get to an age where…you get over the 
fear of racism, you get over it all, and you just think, you know what, I donÕt 
even believe in race…in this whole shroud of McKenzie...itÕs very restricting I 
think… 
Emily: …so in essence…you kind of feel that…your surname now 
is…representative of your mixed-race identity…as you say race doesnÕt really 
exist, but is that kind of what you mean? It…represents that part of you that 
you donÕt want to hide, youÕre not ashamed of? 
Jamal: Yeah, yeah…McKenzie to me was…it did kind of represent an attempt 
at hiding from oppression…and turning back to Hamdaoui it was kind of like a 
rite of passage, like I was over it…. 
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Hence it seems that JamalÕs desire was to re-claim his real name and thereby stop 
racially passing as white. In doing so he implied that he had somehow attacked the 
whole premise of racism in not being afraid of it and not being held by its power Ð just 
as Lynsey Bridger said she had tried to do in the naming of her daughter. She too had 
apparently moved from wanting to hide her sonÕs dual-heritage due to apprehension 
about potential discrimination, to being proud to give her daughter names that signify 
her Islamic identity from her fatherÕs side of the family.  
Anna Aladeoja (white British; Nigerian married surname) also indicated a 
desire to call her (future) children by full Nigerian names (that is, first names and 
surname), in order to reflect her husbandÕs heritage, although she said she would also 
consider Biblical first names to reflect their Christian faith. Should she give them 
Nigerian first names, she declared that she does not think she would have any 
concerns in doing so, as she: 
 
…would want them to be proud of both sides of their heritage…If theyÕre 
growing up particularly in England they will already be exposed to 
their…English way of life and stuff…and obviously I wouldnÕt be ashamed of 
being English myself and obviously things I naturally do are English…but I 
would want them to be very proud of their Nigerian heritage and…spend time 
with their Nigerian family, so I think having the name is part of that…. 
 
Anna also emphasised her pride about being in a Ômixed-raceÕ marriage, and her 
belief that they are setting an example to others of what, according to the Christian 
Bible, heaven will be like, with people mixing freely together. She also clearly 
professed a deep respect and admiration for her husbandÕs Nigerian background 
throughout the interview, and raised her concern that images of Africa in the West 
tend to be negative. This all seemed to be reflected in her asserted desire to consider 
giving her children fully Nigerian names, as though she felt that this, alongside her 
mixed-race marriage, would in some way blaze a trail against racism. The attitudes 
contained within the stories I have discussed in this section so far, indicate that these 
participants are not passively accepting the notion of racial discrimination. They are 
seemingly prepared to make sacrifices Ð perhaps to their own and/or their childrenÕs 
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detriment Ð in order to make a stand against racism. This buttresses the point made 
by Per and Solomos (2010) that racial minorities (I include racial minorities via name 
in this category here) are not always passive as some literature seems to suggest 
(e.g. Said, 2003). Indeed, there is seemingly a link between these participantsÕ acts 
and the notion that passing for black can be a revolutionary act, which challenges 
racial categorisation processes (Dreisinger, 2008; Pfeiffer, 2003; see Chapter Two).  
Furthermore, Rebecca Travers (white British; whose Polish married name 
before divorce was Czajkowska) conveyed how, had she had children with her first 
husband who was of Polish descent, they would have given them Polish first names, 
middle names and the Polish surname, because she Ôthought it was a nice thing to do 
really, to keep that part of their identity, especially because they would then be the 
second generation being born in this countryÕ. She explained how her husbandÕs 
identity was very much based on being Polish (even though he had been born and 
raised in the UK), and that consequently she felt that this was something important to 
ÔcontinueÕ for her children Ð saying, ÔEven our cat had a Polish name!Õ She said that 
she did not have any concerns about the idea of her children having fully Polish 
names, and that she just saw it as important to promote their Polish heritage and not 
let this die out. 
Thus in all of these cases Otherness seemingly has been (or would have 
been) chosen in order to refute the power/status of whiteness. Nonetheless, these 
children/people are/would be racially passing entirely as the Other, rather than as 
people of dual-heritage. In so doing it is perhaps debatable how much they undermine 
the racial categorising system of whiteness. If someone is considered to look mixed-
race and has an entirely foreign name, they would perhaps be considered purely 
foreign/Other, if the Ôone dropÕ rule applies, as I discussed in Chapter Two. 
Consequently, perhaps such names confirm the racial system - rather than confuse it 
as those participants who had names perceived to be oppositional to their embodied 
racial identity apparently do. Furthermore, in some of these intervieweesÕ descriptions 
of fighting against racism, there is also the latent notion of essentialism, in that they 
talk of their partnersÕ racial identities as though they were fixed entities rather than 
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social constructions. Does this not also contribute to the eternal power of 
race/racialisation and, consequently, of whiteness? As Dreisinger (2008:149) argues, 
a person who chooses to pass as black must be continually Ôself-reflexiveÕ and employ 
a double-consciousness of how they conceive the world to be, and how they are 
regarded in the world (see Chapter Two), in order to truly challenge white supremacy.  
 
Reactions to the Foreignness of Names 
Another topic that emerged in my interviews with regards to childrenÕs names 
was the perceived lack of patience, tolerance or even respect allegedly shown 
towards those participantsÕ childrenÕs names, which were deemed not to be white 
British. Linda Abadjian (white British; Armenian married surname), for instance, 
related her disappointment at how some teachers at her childrenÕs primary school had 
not learned how to spell her childrenÕs surname: 
 
…I would have thought after my child being in their class for a certain amount 
of time, they would have made a point of learning how to spell their surname 
correctly, because often we found that they didnÕt…And that was a total 
surprise to me, because if it was me, I would make doubly sure that I had 
spelled it correctly, and I used to get comments like, ÒOh IÕm sorry, I 
havenÕt…spelled it correctly…Ó, you know, as if itÕs acceptable to spell a 
foreign sounding name incorrectly…. 
 
This last bit about it appearing that the teachers somehow thought it acceptable not to 
spell a Ôforeign sounding nameÕ correctly, indicates a certain lack of respect for the 
name, on the part of the teachers: if they perceived a name to be important, would 
they not then see it as integral to try to spell it correctly? 
In addition, Marion Stamatis (white British; Greek married surname) talked 
about her daughter being bullied at school in relation to her name. As mentioned 
previously, Marion explained that her daughter has a long surname, which is Greek 
with an Islamic pre-fix, along with a very short, stereotypically British sounding first 
name (Ann Haji-Stamatis). Marion conveyed that her daughter was given an obscene 
nickname at school by the other children, who used her first name as it is, but added a 
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parody of the sound of her surname, which questioned her gender and contained an 
explicit word. Marion said that she felt her daughter Ôsuffered from it 
really……unfortunately that was a very unhappy period of her life…Õ. It is impossible to 
know the motivation(s) for the childrenÕs apparent parodying of MarionÕs daughterÕs 
name in such a way, but perhaps it is likewise reflective of a certain disdain or lack of 
respect towards foreign names. As I have discussed earlier, a person is largely a 
product of the (racist) society in which they are raised (Ferber, 1999). Therefore, if a 
person grows up in a society, which devalues foreignness on a hierarchized scale (as 
I have asserted is the case in the UK), why would they not then consider it natural to 
belittle names deemed foreign and/or find them comical/bizarre? 
Similarly, Linda Abadjian (white British; Armenian married surname) spoke of 
how her childrenÕs friends have made jokes about her childrenÕs surname: 
 
Linda: IÕve noticed as well throughout school theyÕve had their 
friends…making jokes because a lot of people I think are embarrassed at 
trying to attempt to say a foreign sounding surname, and to try [to] hide the 
embarrassment theyÕll sort of make a joke out of it, like say, Abadijagidan or 
something like that…theyÕve [her children] been accepting of that, they just 
think itÕs a joke…their friends think itÕs a joke and…theyÕve accepted 
that…they will call them…silly names… 
Emily: Mm, thatÕs interesting. How do you feel about that then? Do…you see it 
as a joke? 
Linda: Um I think if theyÕre okay with it, then IÕm okay with it…. 
 
LindaÕs response when I asked her if she finds it funny that her childrenÕs friends make 
jokes about their surname seems quite non-committal. In effect, she is not making a 
judgement on it. If her children were upset about it, then seemingly she would be too, 
as she makes no case about it being funny or unfunny, just that she is happy for her 
children to take the lead on it. She did, however, see it as significant enough to raise 
in the interview. LindaÕs description of her childrenÕs reactions to jokes being made 
about their names suggests an internalisation of racist attitudes towards names 
generally, as if they conceive that they have a peculiar, foreign name, and that it is 
consequently natural for their friends to joke about it. This is a similar point to the one I 
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made in Chapter Five about how some of my participants had arguably internalised 
problematic attitudes towards their names. Similarly, it appears that Linda tries to 
make an excuse for the jokes, in saying that she thinks the childrenÕs friends are 
ÔembarrassedÕ about saying a foreign surname. In my experience, it was not the case 
that children had to call their friends by their surname at school, and even if they did 
have to say the surname, it does not seem that they were suffering from 
embarrassment, judging by the jokes they apparently made about it. 
It is also interesting that when some participants raised positive experiences 
in relation to their childrenÕs foreign names, there was still an element of the names 
being conspicuous: they were never invisible. For example, Claire Negev (white 
British; Israeli/Hebrew married surname) spoke of how her childrenÕs teacher has 
been Ôreally good at listening to how they pronounce it and…checking up on 
pronouncing it how it should be and things like that, which is good.Õ Alice Melissinos 
(white British; Cypriot married surname) also illustrated how her daughter Ô…used to 
perform and she just used to use her name…and…they would say, ÒWell you donÕt 
need to have a stage name with a name like that, itÕs lovelyÓÕ.  
Furthermore, in some interviews I perceived on the part of some participants, 
who had given their children foreign names, a feeling verging on guilt. Jenny Legris 
(white British; Mauritian married surname) mentioned more than once about how she 
has often contemplated how her children feel about their surname and their dual-
heritage: 
 
I must admit…IÕve…had moments where IÕve wondered how it is for my 
children, and I do wonder…because, I donÕt know, maybe you could say 
selfishly so, Ros [her husband] and I decided to bring…a sort of mnage of 
culture and skin colour into the world and that will stay for a very, very long 
time. 
 
JennyÕs words are reminiscent of the afore-mentioned point made by Edwards and 
Caballero (2008), whose research suggested that as time goes on, parents of mixed-
race children may increasingly come to fear that their children will experience 
discrimination. JennyÕs statement also implies the essentialisation of race: that Jenny, 
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in having parented children with her husband feels that they have created mixed-race 
beings, the consequences of which will last down the ages.  
Indeed, Amy Jammeh (white British; Gambian married surname), who had not 
changed her maiden name [McConaughey] upon marriage, said that she decided to 
take her husbandÕs Gambian surname when their son was born, as she felt that if her 
son was going to experience any discrimination in relation to his name, she would feel 
guilty if she did not also have the surname: 
 
Emily: I was just wondering…if you had thought that your future lay here [the 
UK]……would you still have changed your [sur]name?… 
Amy: No I think I would…I think if Alieu [her son] had difficulties and any of 
that was down to his name and I had a different one…I would be really 
uncomfortable in that situation in terms of support, if I hadnÕt shared it. And itÕs 
clearly different for me to have that name as…a white British person…that…I 
cannot in that sense…be prejudiced against in terms of my race, where I think 
that…Alieu certainly can, as can his dad, but I canÕt…I might experience it in 
other ways but it can never be about my race, whereas for them they have 
that factor. So to just change my name seems a very simple thing to do…and 
to show that…itÕs a unit of people, itÕs a family…so it was…symbolic I think in 
some ways really…. 
 
Consequently, there is the implication that a white British parent who gives birth to a 
child considered (partly-)foreign, carries the guilt of taking away the childÕs white 
British privilege that they would have enjoyed if not for miscegenation. Alternatively, if 
their child had been fully Other, the parents would not necessarily have experienced 
this guilt, because their foreign name would have represented who the child really is in 
an embodied sense. When the child is of dual-heritage, it seemingly casts a burden 
onto the parents to decide if they should try to help the children racially pass as white 
British in an attempt to access white British privileges. This interrelates with Lieberson 
and BellÕs (1992) afore-mentioned assertion that parents are influenced by societal 
norms regarding race when choosing names. Thus there is seemingly an expectation 
that a personÕs name should match their embodied racial identity (as I have argued in 
Chapter Four). When parents have children considered mixed-race, they then have to 
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decide whether to name them according to such societal norms, or to name them 
according to their own wishes (should these differ).  
Furthermore, Jenny Legris provided an example of how some participants 
appeared to worry about other peopleÕs perceptions of their childrenÕs foreign names: 
 
…itÕs times for me where itÕs clearly been an unusual name…when the 
children were in the [cathedral] choir…and we got a bit of headline news in the 
[local newspaper]…all three of them [her children] were from the same family 
and…they were in the choir, and you could just imagine somebody Ð I mean, 
this is only my opinion Ð…I could imagine some people in [Canterbury], bless 
them, maybe thinking, ÒOh gosh, Legris!Ó, you know, you wouldnÕt mind if it 
was, oh I donÕt know, Tinsleys or…Rowbottom or…Smith or whatever…but 
you know nothing untoward, just…and perhaps itÕs just me, I mean perhaps 
nobody bats an eyelid…but I think maybe itÕs something because I do know 
itÕs clearly not a British name…maybe IÕm putting too much weight on it 
really…. 
 
This same kind of concern can also be gleaned from Marion StamatisÕ own expressed 
idea of what she imagines could be the far-reaching negative consequences for her 
daughter in having an Islamic pre-fix to her surname (this is despite her having said 
that she thinks most people in the UK would probably be unaware that it is an Islamic 
pre-fix because it has many different spelling variations). Marion said: 
 
I would always face it out with Stamatis…and deal with any racism but 
because of the Haji bit, having to explain that, I would be very careful who I 
explained all that to, because now thereÕs obviously a Muslim 
connotation…and my daughterÕs disabled, I have to be very careful how sheÕs 
perceived as well…[I]n my most sort of imaginative moments…I can kind of 
see that weÕd be targeted…[Y]ou know in the last war…Japanese and 
Germans were interned, well weÕd probably be interned if there was a war Ð 
because of that…itÕs not such a far stretch of the imagination really, so you 
have some degree of that feeling just from day to day really…. 
 
Moreover, Marion stated that she regrets that her daughter has got the Islamic 
pre-fix at all and that Marion herself only uses Stamatis without Haji. 
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Emily: …I was also going to ask about your daughterÕs name at the moment, 
does she still use the [Islamic pre-fix] bit or does she just use the Stamatis? 
Marion: She uses the full works, yeah 
Emily: Okay, so um, so that doesnÕt make you think that you should use the 
same as her? To be like a family… 
Marion: No, no I wish it was the other way around actually, I wish I had 
registered her as Stamatis……but I suppose it would be more convenient if 
we were all Stamatis - that would be my preferred option. 
 
For Marion, it appears that her husbandÕs familyÕs Islamic heritage is something to be 
hidden because of the dominant Islamophobic discourse that has been, and still is, 
prevalent in the West since the September 11
th
 terrorist attacks (Alexander, 2004; 
Alexander, Edwards and Temple, 2007; Chryssochoou, 2004; Clarke and Garner, 
2009; Yuval-Davis, 2006). Despite the fact that people categorised as Christians have 
also committed atrocious murders in the name of religion (for example, the IRA in 
Northern Ireland) (Younge, 2011), terrorism has been particularly framed in the West 
as an Islamic problem, and consequently, it seems so have names conceived as 
Islamic. For Marion, it appears that the Islamic name has the potential to give her 
daughter an Islamic identity, which intersects with her identity as a vulnerable, 
disabled young person.  
 
Conclusion 
I have provided an overview in this chapter of some naming practices my 
participants spoke of. For example, many participants expressed a desire for their 
childrenÕs dual-heritage to be reflected in their names, which supported Edwards and 
CaballeroÕs (2008) findings. Many of the data I have presented also suggest that the 
participants have been negotiating issues of race and the way in which names are 
commonly understood to be racialised identity markers, when contemplating what to 
call their children. This appears to be a role that holds significant responsibility for the 
parents, and many of the quotations I have presented indicate that parents felt the 
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weight of this pressure and even guilt about their children having to negotiate their 
dual-heritage.   
Indeed, many participants expressed their concern that the idea of their 
childrenÕs names being racially symbolic of their childrenÕs dual-heritage should be 
balanced with the notion that if their children could pass as white British then they 
would potentially have access to the privileges of whiteness Britishness, rather than to 
the discrimination which is apparently connected to foreign names. Some parents 
made steps towards trying to deflect the gaze of others from their children, by making 
their names invisible, passable - in other words white British. This extends the 
literature on racial passing (e.g. Ginsberg, 1996) to include names as a disembodied 
indicator of race. 
Indeed, it seems clear from the data I have presented in this chapter that 
names are not just personal identity markers, but are in fact perceived, both by the 
participants and seemingly by the people they have interacted with, as important 
markers of race on the level of individual experience. Indeed, as I have shown, the 
participants referred to names as being ÔEnglishÕ or ÔNorwegianÕ or ÔforeignÕ etcetera, 
as if there is absolutely no doubt that that is what they are: racialised categories of 
names do not seem to be perceived as social constructions, but rather as real.  
I have also asserted that some of my participants have implied that there is a 
hierarchy of names: that names, which are deemed particularly Other/foreign will 
attract more discrimination, whilst some names are more foreign than others. This 
extends the existing theory on the hierarchy of embodied race (Dyer, 1999; see 
Chapter Two). Those names, which are perceived to be white British appear to be 
conceived as unmarked, familiar and of greater privilege (in symmetry with embodied 
notions of white privilege (Dyer, 1999). It is not surprising then that many participants 
implied they desired names for their children, which would embody the latter 
characteristics. In trying to make their children racially pass as white British via their 
names, however, there is the implication of further-strengthening, rather than 
challenging, the hierarchical system of whiteness.  
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Nevertheless, I have suggested that even those participants who aimed to 
fight/oppose this racial hierarchy of names may also not make an impression on it, in 
that they may be reinforcing the idea of foreignness and its embodied attachments. 
Arguably, by giving what the parentsÕ presume to be their (partially-)foreign child an 
entirely foreign name, they are telling the world Ð within what appears to be the 
currently dominant racialised naming system Ð that the child is also entirely foreign. 
Indeed, perhaps my name-changer participantsÕ reported experiences, which I 
displayed in Chapter Four have questioned more firmly the power of race and 
whiteness, in that their (sur)names represent Ð in the current Ôregime of truthÕsÕ (Reed, 
2005:80-81) dogma Ð something different to their embodied race, which thereby 
somewhat confuses and undermines the racialised naming process. Nonetheless, 
there does seem to be some admirable bravery on the part of those participants who 
could seemingly claim a white British embodied identity for their children and/or 
themselves but who have instead embraced a foreign identity, via choice of name, in 
order to try and make a stand against racist discourse. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 
 
Introduction 
I began this thesis by outlining the dominant notion that multiculturalism has 
failed (McGhee, 2008) and the prevalent idea that a neo-assimilationist approach 
(Per, 2008; Grillo, 2005; Vasta, 2007; Alexander, Edwards and Temple, 2007) to 
conceived cultural difference should be pursued. I suggested that the idea that racial 
minority and migrant cultures are somehow a threat and an imposition on the majority 
white British culture is essentially a smoke screen for racialised notions of difference. 
In addition, I wondered if the prevalent focus on the incompatibility of cultures appears 
to reduce the conceived importance of racism and racial inequality. I also discussed 
how there is an accompanying rhetoric, which suggests that the white British majority 
has been overly tolerant (for example, as cited by David Cameron, 2011, the British 
Prime Minister) and that this has led to a disjointed society Ð framed as the fault of 
racial minorities and migrants. The common discourse asserts that racial minorities 
and migrants refuse to integrate into the Ð undefined - British way of life (Sveinsson, 
2010), in terms of refusing to wear British clothes, or learning the English language 
(Alexander, Edwards and Temple, 2007), yet they are able to readily claim benefits 
paid for by the white British majority. They are seen to be underserving of such 
benefits and the white majority is framed as being too generous in allowing racial 
minorities and migrants to claim them (Bonnet, 2000). I also explained that it was my 
impression that such rhetoric was ill-founded, that race is still a much-used tool of 
categorisation, and that consequently racism may still be a dominant force. Whereas 
prevailing rhetoric suggests that anti-racism is merely a preventer of free speech 
(Gilroy, 1987), in actuality racial minorities and migrants do not have such societal 
power that they can dominate the white British majority (Lentin, 2012). Rather, the 
extent of racial inequality is well documented (The Runnymede Trust Report, 2012; 
EHRC, 2010; Ramesh, 2010; Macedo and Gounari, 2006; Chryssochoou, 2004). Yet 
this racial inequality is hidden behind the neo-assimilationist discourse I have 
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described, and thereby race and racism are seemingly not given credence in popular 
rhetoric.   
In order to explore from a sociological perspective this issue of the denial of 
the importance of race and racism, I decided to focus on the function(s) (if any) of 
names within potential racialising processes. This was within the context of existing 
quantitative research (Wood et al., 2009), which had indirectly argued that names are 
used as a means of propagating racial discrimination in the job market. My interest in 
name racialisation was also reinforced by an existing history of name-changing in 
response to perceived discrimination on the part of the name-changer (as I presented 
in Chapter One). It was further supported by what I perceived to be generally 
problematic attitudes towards names within the UK media (as I also discussed in 
Chapter One). In Chapter Two I discussed embodied notions of race, racism and 
whiteness, and nationalism. I also explored how my project might draw upon issues 
within these bodies of literature. As described in Chapter Three, I have taken a social 
constructionist and interpretivist perspective towards conducting my research project. 
In Chapters Four, Five and Six I have investigated and analysed the data that I 
collected from my 31 semi-structured interviews and one questionnaire based 
interview. 
 In this chapter I outline the key conclusions I have reached, on the basis of 
my analyses and interpretations as presented in the data chapters. Specifically, in the 
first section I discuss my conclusions in relation to my research concerns and 
questions. I consider these findings with regard to the literature I presented in 
Chapters One and Two. In addition, I also reflect on the research limitations of my 
project and potential for further research. In the second section I further expand upon 
the main theoretical contributions of my study.  
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The Case Study Findings  
Conclusion One: Racist Attitudes Towards (Sur)names Impact Significantly Upon the 
Name-BearerÕs Everyday Life, and/or Choice Making and/or Feelings of Identity 
In relation to my research question, ÔDoes bearing a surname, which is 
stereotypically taken to be from a different racial/national origin to a person's former 
surname have an impact on their everyday experiences/quality of life: for example, in 
the social and employment contexts?Õ, I have asserted in this thesis that some name-
changer participants have experienced racist incidents in relation to their surnames. 
The racialised coding of surnames had impacted upon many participantsÕ everyday 
familial, social, educational and work lives in various ways, which I explored in 
Chapter Five. Consequently, the racialisation of name has had especial significance to 
many name-changersÕ lives. For example, many name-changers described the 
invasive Ð and what could be deemed hostile Ð questioning that they experienced 
regularly in relation to the alleged disparity between their embodied race and the race 
that their surname was seen to signify.  
Indeed, my project has highlighted that to have a (sur)name suggestive of 
white Britishness but to be conceived in the embodied sense as not white is 
problematic purely because a personÕs name is supposed, within the racial system, to 
racially match their embodied race. The importance of this is that whiteness (in this 
context, white Britishness) accords someone privilege, and Otherness, the reverse 
(Dyer, 1999). This is likewise the reason that racial passing has caused such 
controversy in the USA, because it has been conceived as a fraudulent attempt by 
black people to gain the privileges of whiteness (Ginsberg, 1996; Belluscio, 2006; 
Piper, 1996). This project has provided the testimony of those who have been in a 
sense (largely unconsciously) racially passing through name. It is when the disparity 
between name and embodied racial appearance has become apparent that problems 
ensued for the participants. In other words Ð in a similar sense to what the racial 
passing literature suggests - it was when the apparent deception in terms of the lack 
of symmetry between the supposed racial connotations of their name and their 
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embodied racial identity had been revealed, that the participants experienced negative 
responses.  
Another of my research questions was: ÔWhat experiences are related to 
bearing a (sur)name that is not (potentially) considered to represent a personÕs 
embodied racial identity? And what impact do such experiences have upon those 
peopleÕs personal and/or outward identities?Õ. Some participants, as I discussed in 
Chapter Five, expressed how constant questioning about their surnames in relation to 
perceptions of their own embodied racial identities had emotionally affected them. 
Furthermore, this also led, for one participant in particular (Abigail Koslacz; white 
British; Polish married surname), to some uncertainty of identity in that her surname 
was so often disrespected and/or consistently misspelled or mispronounced. This 
contrasted with the assuredness she indicated that she had felt when bearing her 
maiden surname, which she conceived to have matched her embodied race.  
This notion of a personÕs identity being affected by the perceptions of others 
holds similarities with the literature on identity, which I discussed in Chapter Two. For 
example, Stuart (2005) writes of the importance of the otherÕs gaze in establishing 
oneÕs existence. There is a ÔdoublenessÕ (Du Bois, 1999:126) in simultaneously seeing 
oneself and the ways in which one is viewed by others that is central to the creation of 
oneÕs identity (Ratcliffe, 2004).  
Name is an important identity marker (Titford, 2009), and when that name is 
not properly respected, known, or acknowledged, this arguably questions the 
significance and meaning of that name and consequently of that personÕs identity. 
This bears similarities with BondÕs (2006) point that majority views significantly affect 
an individualÕs sense of national identity. Indeed, some white participants let the 
ambiguity regarding their relationship with a surname constructed as being opposite to 
their own embodied race affect their decision-making in terms of, for example, 
deciding whether or not to use their spouseÕs foreign surname (as discussed in 
Chapter Six). Whilst it may appear that my participantsÕ experiences are 
representative of ÔbanalÕ episodes of everyday racism, such incidents must not be 
discounted, just because of a widespread preoccupation with more obvious/overt 
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racist incidents (Lentin, 2005). Indeed, as I discussed in Chapter Two, Kohli and 
Solrzano (2012:443) assert that understated everyday slights, such as 
misreadings/mispronunciations of names, are Ôracial microagressionsÕ, which uphold a 
Ôracial and cultural hierarchy of minority inferiorityÕ (ibid.). They may not seem blatantly 
racist, but they cumulatively cause a similar effect upon those who suffer them (ibid.). 
In addition, it would be interesting for further research to consider gender with 
regard to the topic of name-changing and racial discrimination. Solomos and Back 
(2000) rightly emphasise the importance of exploring the interaction of race with 
gender within social research. I did not take an intersectional approach to research, as 
I explained in Chapter Three, because the area of names and racialisation/racism had 
been so under-explored, and consequently I felt that to explicitly concentrate on other 
aspects of the participantsÕ identities (aside from race) would be beyond the scope of 
this project. Nonetheless, there were indications from three of my (white) female 
participants that they considered feminist issues when trying to decide if they should 
take their husbandÕs surname upon marriage. Two of these participants suggested 
that this decision was tied up in the fact that their husbandÕs surname was foreign. It 
would be interesting to explore this interaction more extensively, as well as how, and 
to what extent, the apparent pressure for a woman to take her husbandÕs surname 
affects those (white) women who decide to take a foreign surname upon marriage: are 
they put under societal pressure to take their husbandÕs surname? (Hamilton, Geist 
and Powell, 2011). Do they have doubts over taking the surname for feminist reasons 
and/or because of fears of experiencing discrimination?  
It would also be intriguing to explore the ways in which experiences may differ 
in terms of name-changing for male participants. Do they experience societal pressure 
with regards to keeping their surname upon marriage, for example? And/or do their 
experiences differ from the female participants in terms of applying for jobs in relation 
to their name?. A further concern would be to interview more racial minority 
individuals, as the sample for my project was regrettably skewed towards individuals 
who considered themselves white (as I discussed in Chapter Three). Additionally, I 
discussed in Chapter Two how it has been asserted that the privilege of whiteness 
236 
 
can cause class differences to be temporarily forgotten amongst white people 
(Garner, 2007): that racism is a cohesive device in this regard. Consequently, it would 
be interesting to have explored the intersection of social class and names. 
Unfortunately, this was also beyond the scope of this thesis.   
 
Conclusion Two: (Sur)names are Racialised (Racially Coded) in the UK 
My project grew out of an initial interest (as I outlined in Chapters One and 
Three) in whether or not (sur)names are racialised. This subsequently informed a 
concern with how this racialisation of names may occur. For example, were some 
names conceived as being normalised and invisible within the UK context? I situated 
this latter question within whiteness literature in relation to embodied race. This 
suggests that to be conceived as white in terms of embodied race (skin colour, 
phenotypical features etcetera) means that that person is seen as unraced, just 
human, and that this is consequently a privileged position (Dyer, 1999). I wanted to 
understand if such conceptualisations also apply to names.  
I have suggested on the basis of the data presented in Chapter Four that 
(sur)names are understood in a racialised way in the UK, and that they have been 
commonly perceived to be either white British or Other/foreign. I have further asserted 
that the disembodied racialising process of categorising surnames applies the 
respective racial category to the bearer of the name in an embodied sense. That is, 
that the bearer is expected to racially embody what the surname signifies.  In addition, 
most participants uttered terms such as ÔforeignÕ, Õnon-BritishÕ, ÔBritishÕ, ÔEnglishÕ 
etcetera to label (sur)names, without appearing to consider the socially constructed 
nature of such concepts.  
Furthermore, many name-changers (as I discussed in Chapter Four) indicated 
that since their name-change, others consequently expected them to be of a different 
race and/or nationality to the one they allegedly embodied. These experiences 
particularly emphasised the racially coded nature of surnames. Additionally, some of 
my white British female participants expressed how people often assumed that their 
foreign surname was reflective of a foreign heritage or that people felt there was a 
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disjuncture between their white embodied racial identity and their foreign surname. 
Consequently, these participants asserted that the possibility of them having taken the 
surname upon marriage (despite this still being common practice in the UK; Wilson, 
2009) was not considered. This highlights the apparent strength of associations made 
between (sur)name and embodied ideas of race.  
 
Conclusion Three: The Name BearerÕs Inner Characteristics/Knowledge are 
Stereotyped According to their Surname  
A further research aim was to establish if a personÕs surname is commonly 
constructed as being symbolic of their entire racial identity within the UK context. That 
is, are surnames taken to be representative of an individualÕs racialised identity? As I 
explained in the section above, the data presented throughout the thesis have 
indicated that (sur)names are socially constructed in racialised ways. In addition 
though, as I explored in Chapter Four, some interviewees found that their foreign 
surname was equated to more than just their understood external racial appearance. 
It was also deemed to represent their internal abilities, and/or beliefs, and/or lifestyle, 
and/or knowledge etcetera. This is consistent with, and extends, existing race theory, 
which asserts that perceived differences in embodied race can be aligned with 
understandings of internal characteristics (Alexander and Knowles, 2005; St Louis, 
2005; Bhavani, Mirza and Meetoo, 2005). Consequently, a personÕs surname is Ð 
within most of my participantsÕ experiences - taken to be holistically representative of 
that personÕs identity, of who they are racially understood to be. That some 
participantsÕ inner characteristics were assumed on the basis of their surname 
indicates that the stereotyped racialised coding of surnames has potentially 
discriminatory consequences beyond just disbelief or surprise at the name-changerÕs 
appearance in relation to their surname. Indeed, whilst name racialisation may be a 
common process of perception for all surnames, the exclusions which often follow are 
not shared, but are particular to those with Other/foreign names Ð particularly when 
they are deemed to match such a name in an embodied sense. I will discuss this 
further in the subsequent conclusions below. 
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Conclusion Four: There is a Racial Hierarchy of Names in Terms of the Level of 
Access to White British Privilege 
It emerged from the interview data that some participants felt that not only 
were (sur)names racially coded, but also that such racialisation is hierarchised. I 
discussed this in Chapter Six. For instance, Chloe Hardy-Mathiesen (white British; 
raised in North America; Norwegian name (Mathiesen) added to her maiden name 
upon marriage) spoke of how she was not concerned that her children would bear a 
Norwegian (sur)name because she felt that Norway generally holds positive 
connotations in the UK. She contrasted this with the negative connotations she felt 
Asian- and African-origin (sur)names carry. Indeed, whilst some (sur)names may be 
deemed acceptably foreign/exotic (for example, the historical trend for taking 
European names in Britain; Wilson, 1998 - see Chapter Six), Other (sur)names are 
constructed as unacceptably so. As I mentioned in Chapter Five, most of the foreign 
(sur)names held by my name-changers were not particularly long or difficult to say in 
comparison with their white British (sur)names. Yet the amount of issues reported by 
them in relation to their foreign (sur)names was quite extraordinary. This endorses the 
argument that it is not the (sur)name in itself that is difficult but perhaps the meanings 
accorded to the (sur)namesÕ respective racial associations, and consequently the level 
of respect, trust and acceptance afforded them by those with whom the participants 
came into contact.  
Indeed, as I explored in Chapter One, historically some of those migrants to 
the UK who Anglicised their surnames apparently spread the stigma of their 
designated Otherness to their new surnames (Wilson, 1998). Their Anglicised names 
were then seen to represent their own embodied race and foreignness. In essence, 
my argument is that it is not the (sur)names in themselves that have caused the 
problems faced by many of my participants, but rather it is what the names are 
deemed to stand for or signify. As I mentioned above, the data I have presented in this 
thesis have suggested that (sur)names are racially coded, hence some names are 
more advantageous than others. Not only is there a conception of white, Asian, 
239 
 
African names, but there are internal hierarchies within these categories. This extends 
the hierarchy of embodied race idea (Ratcliffe, 2004; Bulmer and Solomos, 1999), 
which I discussed in Chapter Two, whereby white people are considered at the top 
and black people at the bottom (Dyer, 1999). Within the UK context I have argued, in 
an extension of current whiteness theory, that it is not just bodies that are understood 
as white but also (sur)names, as they are deemed to be reflective of embodied race. 
The importance of this is carried in the notion that to be conceived as embodied white 
is to be in a position of privilege, to be understood as an individual (Clarke and 
Garner, 2009; Dyer, 1999; Garner, 2007) who is unraced (Aanerud, 1997; Babb, 
1998; Dyer, 1999). This contrasts sharply with understandings of blackness as being 
entirely raced, as the negative opposite from which whiteness finds its identity 
(Garner, 2007; Babb, 1998).  
This oppositional nature of whiteness means that it has a normative, invisible 
quality (Garner, 2007): to be white is simply to be human (Dyer, 1999). This in itself is 
a position of immense power: all others are judged from this position of white 
normativity (ibid.). I have asserted that the same notion likewise applies to (sur)names 
as a disembodied aspect of racial categorisation. Consequently, those (sur)names 
deemed to be white British are invisible, unraced, accepted, whilst those constructed 
as being at the bottom of the hierarchy (those seen as foreign, non-white etcetera) are 
highly visible, raced, and disadvantageous.  
I have also argued that this notion of whiteness is interwoven with the concept 
of nationalism. The most privileged identity within the UK has been deemed to be that 
of the majority: white Britishness. The nation, through its elite members, consequently 
frames minorities as Other, as they are able to demarcate who and what is normal 
and thereby exclude those who are not deemed to be so (Solomos, 2001). These 
minorities can be conceived both in terms of skin colour (e.g. Black and Asian Ð 
regardless of whether the individual carries British citizenship or not) and in other 
terms that are in vogue within the nation at the time. For example, the politically 
motivated Othering of groups such as Polish migrants and Muslims (Alexander, 
2002b, 2004; Alexander, Edwards and Temple, 2007; Per, 2013:6) etcetera. 
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Alexander (2002b:564) asserts that Muslims have become Ôthe ultimate ÒOtherÓ, 
transfixed through the racialization of religious identity to stand at the margins: 
undesired, irredeemable, alienÕ. As Goldberg (2002:196) argues, white nation states 
are ones that plan and enforce the Ôsocial, political, economic, legal and culturalÕ 
situations that favour white privilege and power. The Ôcodes, norms and rulesÕ that 
support these privileges are made to appear universal, whereas in actuality they only 
serve to benefit the prevailing group (Solomos, 2001:199). The UKÕs minority groups 
are subsequently blamed Ð overtly and/or covertly Ð for the nationÕs problems, and this 
is reflected in attitudes towards (sur)names. Race and nation differ as concepts but 
they are used to mutually reinforce one another. As Per (2013:8) asserts, Ôthe stateÕs 
management of diversity and cohesion in contemporary Britain has been actively 
centred around and defined against migration and ethnicityÕ. I discussed this in 
Chapter One with regards to the replacement of multiculturalism in the UK with neo-
assimilationism. This change has led to a dominant rhetoric that excludes minorities 
and migrants from being part of the nation whilst, at the same time, attributing the 
nationÕs problems to them (Per, 2013). This also serves to demonise the super-
diversity of the British nation (ibid.)  
I discussed in Chapter Two about existing theory on hierarchies of embodied 
race, whereby since the Enlightenment, humans have been ranked in terms of 
worth/intelligence by some Western thinkers in accordance with their respective skin 
colours (white at the top, black at the bottom) (Dyer, 1999; Ratcliffe, 2004; Bulmer and 
Solomos, 1999). I have suggested in this thesis that there is a racial hierarchy of 
(sur)names, which works via the attribution of levels of access to privilege within a 
particular society (in the case of my project, in the UK) on the basis of (sur)name - in 
its function as a signifier of embodied race. Chapter Four revealed some of the 
extreme reactions to the apparent racial disjuncture between some participantsÕ 
(sur)names and their embodied appearances/accents. These episodes further 
suggested that for a white British person to have a surname that is deemed 
Other/foreign/not white British, is something of importance. Otherwise, why would it be 
so remarkable, so commented upon, so questioned Ð often in a most insistent way? 
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This in turn proffers up the question of what are the usual consequences for people 
whose surname is deemed to match their embodied racial identity: what kind of 
discrimination is practiced, or privilege accorded, on this basis?  
I have thereby asserted that at the top of the racialised hierarchy of 
(sur)names in the UK are those (sur)names conceived as white British, but within that 
category there may be further classifications (as illustrated in Figure One below). 
Those (sur)names understood as white British names are the ones that within the UK 
are deemed normative, invisible and therefore powerful. I have included (sur)names 
from all parts of the UK within this category, although I am aware that there may be 
anxieties around Englishness in Scotland (McIntosh, Sim and Robinson, 2004). 
However, I feel Ð subject to further research Ð that these (sur)names would most 
probably carry the privileges of being categorised as white British. Also in this group 
are those (sur)names, which are considered white British and are borne by citizens of 
ex-British colonies such as the USA and the Caribbean. 
The historical, and perhaps current, discrimination against Irish-ness 
(particularly Catholic-based concerns) in England (Ghaill, 2000) has led me to place 
Irish (sur)names in the second tier. In the category below this are (sur)names that are 
considered white, but not white British. This category includes (sur)names from the 
more politically and economically powerful countries within Western Europe in 
accordance with the current time and context. Beyond these, Eastern European 
names, whilst belonging to those considered physically white, do not at this moment in 
time necessarily enable full access to the white privileges belonging to those with the 
normative, white British (sur)names. As I mentioned above in relation to embodied 
notions of whiteness, to have a (sur)name that is normative and invisible is to be 
viewed as unquestionably white British on paper. At the bottom of the hierarchy would 
apparently be those (sur)names that are deemed unquestionably Other, such as those 
(sur)names perceived as African, Asian and Islamic. The table below presents an idea 
of how the UK (sur)name hierarchy could be structured. More research needs to be 
conducted in order to substantiate and theorise this claim, however. It would also be 
interesting for further research to consider the notion of a racial hierarchy of 
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(sur)names in other countries. As I mentioned earlier, identities are not static, but 
changeable according to time and context. Thus a longitudinal study that looks at 
(sur)names in relation to racism would also be helpful in order to gauge the ways in 
which the meanings and social standing of (sur)names change over time.  
 
Figure One. Potential Racial Hierarchy of Names in the UK   
 
 
Conclusion Five: Name, Skin Colour and Accent Interact in Determining Access to 
White Privilege 
In Chapter Four I discussed the ways in which accent, bodily appearance and 
(sur)name apparently interacted in determining the name-changersÕ level of access to 
white British privilege. It seemed that in some situations to be white, to have a British 
accent, but to bear a foreign surname was sufficient to deny some participants the 
entitlements they had been used to with their maiden name. For example, Natalie 
Pavlović (white British; Croatian married surname) reported that she has been singled 
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out for extra security checks at airports since taking her married name (see Chapter 
Four). For others, such as Kayla Brackenbury (Zimbabwean born and raised, 
Zimbabwean maiden surname) who considered herself to be black British, to have a 
surname considered white British appears to have positively impacted upon her rate 
of being called for job interviews. Such an experience supports the Correspondence 
Test research findings (e.g. Wood et al., 2009; see Chapter Two), which implied that 
CVs with white British names on them have a much better success rate than those 
with names deemed to be foreign. Nonetheless, in other respects, such as when her 
skin colour and/or Zimbabwean accent were noticed, Kayla reported that her access 
to privileges was lessened accordingly.  
Thus it is a context-specific, quite flexible (within limits) relationship between 
name, skin colour and accent in the process of determining the levels of access an 
individual may have to white British privilege. As I discussed in Chapter Two, during 
certain periods Gypsy, Jewish and Irish peoples have variably been considered to be 
white or not white (Reed, 2005; Belluscio, 2006; Babb, 1998). Such individuals have 
thereby rested upon the margins of whiteness, but have been excluded on other 
grounds. Their racial categorisation has been subject to the whims of those in the 
position to judge (that is, those who are unquestionably conceived as white) (Dyer, 
1999; Clarke and Garner, 2009). The inbetween people thesis further illustrates this 
conception of the uncertainty of racial categorisation: to be conceived as physically 
white but not white in other senses (Roediger, 2005): to be close to the privileges of 
whiteness, but not to have access to them (ibid.). I have asserted that this status of 
inbetween-ness is also experienced by those who change their (sur)name to one that 
is not deemed to reflect their embodied racial identity. My project has thereby 
extended the notion of inbetween people to include (sur)names as a factor in racial 
categorisation.  
However, the experience of inbetween-ness was not uniform for my 
participants. Arguably those white British participants who took their partnerÕs foreign 
name were using foreignness as an accessory. If they removed the surname 
considered Other and reverted back to the surname considered white British, they 
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would seemingly encounter no difficulties in terms of their access to white privilege. 
They would embody normalness in both its racially embodied and disembodied 
senses. Thus tanned blackness, or Otherness through name, is not a permanent 
stigma for a white person, but rather something removable, something added and 
disconnected at will, not being fundamental to their identity and thus being admissible 
because the person still remains authentically white beneath Ôthe luxury of a brown 
veilÕ (Ahmed, 1998:59-60). The same would apply in reverse to the Asian and black 
participants: their white British surname gave them a disembodied privilege but when 
their embodied racial identity was apparent, this privilege disappeared. If they 
changed back to their Asian/African maiden names, they would not be questioned, but 
merely returned back to their wholly disadvantaged position, both in the disembodied 
and embodied aspects. This is in line with literature on tanned white bodies, in the 
sense that white bodies merely take darkness as a removable adornment (ibid.): the 
darkness is temporary and does not change that personÕs racial status (ibid.).  
I have provided on the following pages some example combinations of racial 
markers and suggested how the interaction of these markers may affect an 
individualÕs access to white British privileges. This is in order to demonstrate the 
importance of (sur)names in this process of racialisation and in the name bearerÕs 
subsequent access to privilege. I also intend this to underline the socially constructed 
notion of race (as demonstrated by my participantsÕ inbetween racial position on the 
basis of a perceived disjuncture between their (sur)name and embodied race) as well 
as its parallel societal importance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
245 
 
Figure Two. Examples of Racial Marker Combinations & Presumed Access to 
White British Privilege 
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Conclusion Six: Strategies Are Often Developed for Avoiding or Coping with the 
Racialisation of Name e.g. Racial Passing through (Sur)name 
Another of my research questions contemplated if coping strategies are 
developed by those who bear (sur)names (potentially) considered Other. This 
question was most certainly relevant in the light of my intervieweesÕ data. I discussed 
coping strategies at length in both Chapters Five and Six, such as those proposed by 
parents who made attempts to racially pass their children as white British by giving 
them a name/names they felt would signify such an identity. In Chapter Six I explored 
the ways in which parents approached issues of naming their children in the light of 
their experiences of bearing a surname deemed not to match their embodied 
racialised identity. The prevalent concern amongst the participants was, as one 
participant aptly stated: ÔWhat would it be reasonable for the kid to be called?Õ. There 
was a common assertion made by the participants that name choice could not be as 
simple as choosing names that may be familiar/meaningful to, or liked by, each 
respective parent, but that the difficulties of giving a child a foreign name must be 
considered. Whilst many participants asserted their desire to reflect the racial heritage 
of both parents within the childÕs name, this was not always felt to be fair to the child 
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or sensible. This perception was often expressed in relation to practical issues of 
pronunciation and spelling but also in terms of fears that their child would be 
perceived as foreign and/or discriminated against.  
Some interviewees consequently opted to try to help their child(ren) racially 
pass by giving them names they felt would be deemed white British and which would 
therefore not mark them out as foreign/Other. Suzanne Balester (white British; 
Moroccan married name during former marriage), for example, provided an interesting 
description of how and why she deceived her husband into choosing a first name for 
their son that, whilst it was a Muslim name, could be shortened in order to appear 
white British (see Chapter Six). This research finding adds to the existing theory of 
racial passing that I discussed in Chapter Two. Whereas that theory related to African 
American racial passing (Belluscio, 2006; Kennedy, 2004; Sollos, 1997) in an 
embodied sense (Ginsberg, 1996), my project has highlighted disembodied racial 
passing (through (sur)name) in a UK context. My thesis has also looked at racial 
passing in terms of (sur)names and their interaction with embodied indicators of race 
such as skin colour and accent, rather than just in terms of skin colour alone, as the 
existing literature had done. This is therefore a significant contribution to race 
literature.  
Furthermore, many participants reported that they had encountered such 
difficulties with their surnames that they were prepared to avoid using them in certain 
situations. This is suggestive that the disjuncture between a personÕs (sur)name and 
the perception of their embodied race does have everyday consequences to the 
extent that decision making is affected. In a similar vein, some participants indicated 
that they had developed coping strategies in an attempt to avoid the intense interest 
and uneasiness felt around issues encountered due to the asserted disjuncture 
between their married surname and their embodied racial appearance. This mostly 
involved using a pseudonym surname in certain situations: Victoria Ravanbaksh 
(white British, Iranian/Persian married surname) reported that she held bank cards for 
many years in both her married surname and her maiden surname. Victoria said that 
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she would often use the card in her maiden name when she wished to avoid being 
questioned about her (racial) relationship to her married surname (see Chapter Six).  
This is reminiscent of the history of name-changing, which I discussed in 
Chapter One, whereby names have been altered or Anglicised by migrants to the UK, 
or British citizens with names conceived as foreign (such as the British Royal Family; 
Rohrer, 2007) in order to try to avoid discrimination and/or the stigma associated with 
bearing (sur)names considered foreign. Thereby, in some cases it was easier for my 
participants to use a (sur)name that was perceived to match their embodied racial 
identity than it was to answer questions about the disjuncture between that identity 
and their married name. This is also an example of the way in which my project has 
gone beyond existing research into names and racial discrimination (Wood et al., 
2009; The Runnymede Trust, 2012). My thesis has not just looked at the notion of 
foreign names in relation to employment concerns. It has provided an original 
contribution to existing literature by presenting a fuller understanding of the everyday 
experiences, in a more holistic sense, of individuals who have borne a (sur)name 
perceived as foreign.  
 
Conclusion Seven: Name-Choice can Alternatively be Used in Order to Resist Racism  
Some participants indicated a desire not to let discrimination against, or the 
difficulties of having, a foreign (sur)name prevent them from using it or giving it to their 
children. A particularly interesting example of this was articulated by Lynsey Bridger 
(white British, did not take her husbandÕs Kashmiri surname upon marriage). She 
described how she had feared her first child would face discrimination and had 
accordingly chosen to give him a white British first name and her white British maiden 
surname. Upon having her second child many years later, she reported that she still 
felt that the child would face racism, but chose to give her a fully Arabic name. She 
said she made this decision because she felt that trying to help her child racially pass 
as white British would not make any difference in the fight against racism (see 
Chapter Six). Furthermore, Jamal Hassan Hamdaoui (mixed-race British) explained 
how he chose to revert as an adult to his Arabic name given to him at birth, after his 
249 
 
mother had Anglicised his name throughout his childhood in an attempt to help him 
racially pass as white British. He reported that he had made this decision on the basis 
that he did not want to hide his given name because of the fear of racism. Jamal 
spoke of feeling that he had the right to bear such a name and that he should not live 
according to the comfort of those around him. Nonetheless, in a similar way to those 
participants who tried to avoid name discrimination, in trying to fight it these 
participants also affirmed the significance of the racialised classification of names.  
However, in both this and the previous conclusion I have highlighted that 
those categorised as foreign or Other (via name) are not necessarily passive in 
respect of racism or discrimination. This is in contrast to some literature, which tends 
to highlight the passivity of minorities and migrants (as mentioned by Per and 
Solomos, 2010). For example, I made the point in Chapter Two that Said (2003) 
appears to underestimate the OtherÕs ability to resist the Western discourse, which 
asserts their inferiority. My participants, in apparently developing strategies to fight 
against perceived name discrimination and problems, did not act the role of 
marginalised subjects, but instead showed agency. 
 
Conclusion Eight: (Sur)names Should Be Recognised as a Tool of Racial 
Categorisation Alongside Embodied Factors (Skin Colour and Accent)  
In the light of the above conclusions, it would appear that in relation to my 
remaining research question, (sur)names should indeed be considered alongside well-
known indicators of racial classification such as skin colour and accent. My 
participantsÕ experiences suggest that there is a strong relationship between 
(sur)names and embodied indicators of race (skin colour, accent etcetera), and that 
this relationship varies, and is changeable, according to particular situations and 
contexts. Existing literature argues that the importance of embodied markers of race 
should not be forgotten (Alexander and Knowles, 2005) in the light of new racismÕs 
move away from biological differences based in the body and towards alleged cultural 
differences (Lentin and Titley, 2011a). My project supports this call in the fact that it 
has underlined the ever-present racialisation of the body. My thesis also, however, 
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argues that skin colour and accent are not the only markers of race, and that 
(sur)names are integral in the process of racialising an individual. In this sense, 
(sur)names can be used both as a designator of embodied race and as a disembodied 
signifier of race. An example of the disembodied function of names is a job application 
form, as this uses a personÕs name without the applicantÕs skin colour or accent 
necessarily being known. In this regard, names are used on their own as a marker of 
race and may be used as a factor in determining whether that person is invited for an 
interview or not. It would only be at the interview that the personÕs skin colour and 
accent could be assessed. Consequently, names interact with skin colour and accent 
in different ways and in different contexts and should thereby be acknowledged within 
the literature as doing so. As I expressed in Chapter Two, existing research (Wood et 
al., 2009; The Runnymede Trust, 2012) asserts that names play a role in racial 
discrimination. However, it does not specifically look at the impact of names in a 
personÕs everyday life. My project has filled this gap in existing theory and therefore 
represents a significant contribution to the literature. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
As I outlined in Chapters One and Two, it appears that there is a general 
weariness within the UK regarding the concept of racism and a readiness to 
pronounce that it has been overcome (Solomos, 2003). Anti-racism initiatives have 
been attacked by politicians, press and public as curbing white BritonsÕ freedom of 
speech (Gilroy, 1987). Moreover, the subtlety of modern day racism in practice has 
not been matched in terms of common understandings of it. Whereas racist abuse 
shouted on tubes by white individuals towards black or Asian people may be publically 
condemned and punished (The Guardian, 2012), there is little apparent awareness of 
less obvious forms of exclusion. The example I provided in Chapter Two regarding the 
lack of racial minority characters on a popular UK drama supports this point. It was not 
until the director admitted that this was a deliberate casting policy on his part that 
there was any outcry (Jones, 2011). Seemingly nobody had noticed or cared about 
the exclusion of black/Asian actors previously. Consequently, the white backlash, the 
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attacks on anti-racism measures and the lack of appetite for understanding what 
racism actually is, is equivalent to ideological manipulation and racist behaviour 
(Macedo and Gounari, 2006; Lentin and Titley, 2011a). My thesis has added weight to 
the point that racism is far from being over. My project has also added names to the 
list of racial markers, alongside skin colour and accent.  The process of racialising 
names in order to assess a personÕs supposed embodied racial identity is one which 
usually works silently and subtlety. It covertly works away within the background 
societal processes of racialisation. My thesis has, however, revealed the role names 
play by disrupting the usual Ð socially constructed - associations between names and 
embodied race.  
The data I have presented constitute a strong argument that race is very 
much an active and integral part of the way British society is constructed. This is in 
contrast to the assertion made by Samir Shah (2009), the former Runnymede Trust 
chair Ð as I cited in Chapter One Ð that race is no longer relevant in the UK. His 
argument was that it is a personÕs ÔStyle, background, accent, dress sense and 
cultural (as opposed to ethnic) background and Ð most of all Ð [their] mannerÕ that 
count in terms of getting a job. This assertion has been challenged by my findings, 
which suggest that the notion of biological race, as something grounded very much in 
the body, is still essential to the way in which difference is understood, and racism is 
perpetrated, in the UK. My findings also question the governmentÕs move towards a 
colour-blind, race-less approach Ð as I mentioned in Chapter Two, the Runnymede 
Trust Report (2012:9) has called for an end to the UK governmentÕs ÔÒcolour-blindÓ 
approach with regards to racism in the employment sector. Also, as I discussed in 
Chapter One, the Children and Families Bill, 2013 denies the relevance of race (and 
racism) in terms of placing children with adoptive parents. That is, the Bill asks for 
social workers to ignore childrenÕs deemed racial difference. However, I have asserted 
that racialisation is still very much prevalent, that people seem to think in terms of the 
concept of embodied racial difference. If this is ignored, then racism may well become 
even more rampant.  
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In addition, my thesis has asserted the socially constructed nature of race 
(Garner, 2010) throughout. The fact that it is even possible to racially pass is 
demonstrative of the fact that race is not a biological phenomenon. The 
inbetween/racial passing status of my participants and in some cases the removal 
from some white participants, and the attainment for some black participants, of 
certain privileges of whiteness purely on the basis of their name-change, has clearly 
shown that race is ascribed rather than fixed.  
Furthermore, I have suggested that in parallel with embodied racial passing, 
racially-based name-changing can reveal and embarrass racial thinking. Nonetheless, 
this does not in any way challenge the power of such racialising processes or take 
away the desire to exclude or discriminate. Racism is based upon power and access 
to that power and privilege. Historical name-changing, as I discussed in Chapter One, 
has perhaps enabled people to racially pass as white British, but it does not 
necessarily take away the stigma that those people carry. This was demonstrated with 
the example I gave in Chapter One of those Jewish people who Anglicised their 
surnames, and how these surnames then subsequently bore the perceived stigma of 
Jewishness (Wilson, 1998). It is not the names in themselves that are an issue. 
Indeed, as I argued in Chapter One and throughout this thesis, one cannot 
unproblematically identify what a white British name could be, just as one cannot 
determine what a race is (Salkeld, 2011). This is because they are both socially 
created and are consequently changeable and flexible according to the needs of those 
in economic, political and media-based positions of power (Per, 2013): the excluders. 
Racism thereby changes according to time and context. It is not particularly 
sophisticated in terms of how it excludes, but the historical power racism carries (such 
as the legacy of slavery: Gilroy, 1987; Casciani, 2007; Roediger, 2003) ensures that it 
is not often acknowledged in any meaningful way by those in power (white elites). An 
example of this can be seen in the white backlash of recent years against the notion of 
racism (Garner, 2007, Clarke and Garner, 2009). The argument being that the fight 
against racism has led to racial minority groups being advantaged at the expense of 
white people, and that white people are now the disadvantaged group (Garner, 2007; 
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Clarke and Garner, 2009). This is despite the fact that minority groups in the UK are 
by far more disadvantaged than the white majority (e.g. Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, 2010; Ramesh, 2010). 
In Chapter One I discussed the UKÕs recent move away from multiculturalism 
and its introduction of a more assimilationist attitude towards difference (Per, 2008a; 
Grillo, 2005; Vasta, 2007). In addition, this neo-assimilationist movement includes an 
asserted rebuttal by the UK government (Cameron, 2011) and media of the celebrated 
national trait of tolerance. Tolerance is a paradoxical term. Whilst it is admirable to 
practice restraint towards something one does not approve of, at the same time when 
the concept is used in relation to human beings this takes on the connotation that 
there is something about those people that is negative and inferior. It further implies 
that the ingroup has the power to alter or subdue the OtherÕs ways of living 
(McKinnon, 2006), but so as to be virtuous it does not do so.  
This is the tolerance that British Prime Minister David Cameron referred to as 
ÔpassiveÕ (Cameron, 2011), which he has urged should be replaced by a more 
Ômuscular liberalismÕ (ibid.). It is worth repeating CameronÕs words that what is Òat 
stake is not just lives, itÕs our way of lifeÓÕ (ibid.). British minorities (in his view), such as 
Muslims (all tarred with the brush of terrorism) have taken advantage of British 
passiveness and are a real threat to ÔourÕ lives. In addition, Cameron appears to be 
using ÔourÕ to indicate that there is a specific British way of life that the outgroup of 
British minorities is not adhering to and should be made to do so. It would seem that a 
major driver of this attitude is that politicians want the population they govern to 
conceive that they are a community (Smith, 1998), and one of the ways of doing this is 
to construct an ingroup to contrast with those constructed as being Other.  
This outgroup is changeable according to time and context. As I suggested 
above, in the UK at the present time Muslims are most definitely placed within this 
group, as are Eastern Europeans. Research findings further indicate that those 
individuals conceived as black British and Asian British tend to also be Othered, in the 
sense that they do not have the same life chances (for example, in terms of 
employment opportunities) as their white counterparts (Macedo and Gounari, 2006; 
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Chryssochoou, 2004). Racism, as I discussed in Chapter Two, has moved somewhat 
away from its biological base and towards a cultural conception of difference 
(Solomos and Back, 2000; Miles, 1999). My thesis has asserted that racism can refer 
to religious and national (e.g. Eastern European) based exclusionary rhetoric 
(Ratcliffe, 2004) as well as that directly based upon traditional indicators of race, such 
as skin colour and phenotypical features.  
As I argued in Chapter Two, I have referred to race rather than to ethnicity 
throughout this thesis, in the belief that ethnicity essentialises cultural and national 
characteristics as though they were racial, and that ethnicity thereby merely serves to 
mask racialised thinking (Lentin, 2008, 2012; Lentin and Titley, 2011a; Gunaratnam, 
2003). An interesting example of this Othering of racial minorities on the basis of 
name, skin colour and religion, can be found in the initial media reports of the murder 
of the white British soldier, Lee Rigby in London on the 22
nd
 May 2013. Before 
photographic images and mobile phone footage of the two perpetrators had been 
seen by the media, Nick Robinson, the Political Editor for the BBC, said live on air that 
they were ÔÒof Muslim appearanceÓÕ (Robinson 2013). A small outcry ensued and Nick 
Robinson made an apology for his use of the phrase (ibid.). As anyone of any 
appearance can believe in a religion, it is incoherent to say that someone has a 
ÔMuslim appearanceÕ. Nonetheless, the phrase suggests that there is a particularly 
dominant image in the British national domain of what a Muslim looks like: ÔAn Asian 
man with a backpack and a beard, or perhaps a woman wearing a hijabÕ (Lodge, 
2013). This is also an instance of the way in which race is discussed in other terms, as 
mentioned above, such as culture and in this case religion. Thereby religion is 
racialised. When it became apparent that the two men were not Asian, the focus 
quickly turned to their blackness. It would seem that their Nigerian-origin surnames 
made the prominent labelling of the men as being of ÔNigerian originÕ not so 
conspicuous, in spite of the fact that both men were heard to speak with distinctive 
London accents in camera footage released on the same day as the murder had 
taken place (Hartley-Parkinson and Dolan, 2013). As the days went by and the media 
continued to report details about the two men, their British citizenship was 
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acknowledged, but the ÔNigerian originÕ tag remained alongside this description (e.g. 
BBC News, 2013). In killing a white British soldier in the name of (a warped version of) 
Islam, the men had placed themselves outside of national understandings of 
Britishness Ð a construction that their skin colour and names also greatly contributed 
to.    
I have placed my participantsÕ experiences within this UK context of exclusion 
and racism in this thesis. I have asserted that their reported experiences are indicative 
of the enduring relevance of race and racism to the ways in which individuals are 
categorised. Also, that the current attitudes towards difference inform the 
consequences of this categorisation, in the sense that those names deemed Islamic, 
African, Asian or Eastern European etcetera will have negative connotations, in 
contrast to those names conceived as white British. In addition, my contribution to 
racial theory is the suggestion that names are an important part of the racialisation 
process of individuals. I have asserted that the racial assessment of names goes hand 
in hand with perceptions of embodied indicators of race such as skin colour and 
phenotypical features.  
Moreover, it is self-evident that it is skin colour that still stands as the most 
important determiner of an individualÕs life chances: ÔOnly those who possess, or 
appear to possess, certain phenotypical characteristics experience the full force of 
racismÕ (Ratcliffe, 2004:29; also see Lentin, 2008). My thesis affirms such an assertion 
by outlining the surprising power of (sur)names, whilst also acknowledging that it is 
the combination of (sur)names with other factors that influences oneÕs everyday 
experiences. For example, as I discussed above, if a person is white with a foreign 
(sur)name, their experiences may nonetheless not be so negative as a black person 
who bears a white (sur)name. Consequently, racism is an integral topic for research: 
we must continue as social scientists to seek to understand its dominance (Bulmer 
and Solomos, 1999). Goldberg (2000) asserts that race and racism are primarily 
concerned with the creation of difference. If a system is so focused on difference, then 
it will come to see race as natural and easy (ibid.), no matter what terms are used to 
refer to it. 
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As I mentioned earlier, and as I have expressed throughout the thesis, I have 
made sense of my findings in relation to racial power through the theory of whiteness. 
As Garner (2007:64) argues, whiteness contains Ôpatterns of power relations…the 
power to name, the power to control and distribute resourcesÕ. As I outlined 
previously, (sur)names cannot be unproblematically categorised as white/British 
etcetera, yet this is the system that one lives by in the UK (and indeed perhaps in 
other respective countries with their own notions of majority versus Other names). 
Seemingly in the UK one is socialised from birth by the idea that some (sur)names 
belong and some are foreign, and it has yet to be uncovered exactly how much 
damage such a system has caused to those deemed non-white or foreign. This is a 
matter of great importance for those who research into the social effects of race and 
racism. Put simply, whiteness has always thrived on maintaining the authority and 
advantage for those deemed white (Ferber, 1999). As Wemyss (2009:11) asserts, 
there is a need for more Ôgrounded researchÕ in relation to whiteness in order to 
Ôexpose the different and shifting ways that whiteness functions and what it means to 
be the subjects of its discursive dominanceÕ. Whilst this project did not begin with the 
desire to investigate whiteness, I felt that my participantsÕ experiences of name-
changing uncovered hidden power structures of the normative qualities of whiteness, 
its universality and remit to talk for, and judge, all of humanity (Garner, 2007; Ware 
and Back, 2002).  
Although I have acknowledged the socially constructed nature of race, 
nonetheless I have asserted that racialisation processes still tend to be biologically 
based. It is important to consider that race still has its basis in notions of skin colour 
and is not just culturally based (Lentin, 2008). The tendency to not talk in terms of 
race, but to use ethnicity, religion, culture etcetera (ibid.), is not to have defeated the 
exclusionary and discriminatory nature of race, but is rather just not to have 
addressed it: to have ÔÒburied it aliveÓÕ (Goldberg, 2006:338, quoted in Lentin, 
2008:497). As Alexander and Alleyne (2002a:548) argue, if researchers ignore the 
concept of race, then racism also becomes ÔinvisibleÕ. 
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 This project increases awareness of the continuing prevalence of racist 
thinking and practices in a society that is often acclaimed as being post-racial (Lentin, 
2011b, 2012). Although this project has a small sample group and therefore is not 
representative of the UK population, I feel that it raises interesting questions for future 
research both in the UK and elsewhere. Other researchers can make use of the thick 
descriptions of my methodology and research findings, which I have provided within 
this thesis, in order to carry out similar work in other contexts and/or along the lines of 
the suggested new sample groups I have outlined briefly in this chapter and in 
Chapter Three. The influence of social research upon public policy is not usually 
particularly potent (Hammersley, 2000). Nonetheless, my thesis contributes towards 
making a case that the reigns of whiteness, and consequently of racism, continue to 
thrive. (Sur)names are just one part of the racialising process but nevertheless they 
are an important one, which seems to have been ill-acknowledged. The racialisation 
of (sur)names is an important finding in raising awareness of the role that race still 
plays within British society: in relation to the life chances of not just migrants, but 
British born people who happen to bear a (sur)name that those they come into contact 
with, often conceive as foreign. 
Denzin (2001:24) articulately envisions a place where Ôhumans can become 
who they wish to be, free of prejudice, repression and discriminationÕ. Sadly my 
studyÕs findings Ð and the evidence of inequality I mentioned in Chapter Two - suggest 
that the UK is nowhere near being such a place. For racism to be challenged, there 
must be a common appetite within society to openly admit that there is a problem.  It 
is integral for it to be acknowledged that racism actually exists, that it is not imagined, 
and that it really does impact in a significant way upon peopleÕs life chances, in spite 
of the socially constructed nature of race. The words from my participantsÕ mouths, 
which are presented in this study, colourfully demonstrate their lived experiences of 
race and racism. Britain can be described as super-diverse (Vertovec, 2006, Per, 
2013) Ð that is, as Ôinextricably and irrevocably multiracial, multicultural, multifaithÕ 
(Alexander and Alleyne, 2002a:543). The data I have presented provide a new and 
concrete reminder that Britain is not yet, however, a post-racial society. (Sur)names 
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are one of the tools that the UK as a racial Ð perhaps racist Ð society uses in order to 
categorise and allocate privilege to its members.   
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Linda 
ABADJIAN ARMENIAN F 54 CERTIFICATE
STAY-AT-HOME-
MOTHER,
WAS DENTAL 
THERAPIST MIDDLE BRITISH WHITE
BRITISH/
ARMENIAN WHITE YES 1983 3 58 mins Phone
ANNA
ALADEOJA NIGERIAN F 22 A-LEVELS STUDENT MIDDLE BRITISH WHITE
NIGERIAN/
BRITISH BLACK YES 2007 0 36 mins Phone
Stephanie 
ALASADI KUWAITI F 23 BA MA STUDENT MIDDLE BRITISH WHITE KUWAITI ARAB
YES,
ONE 
YEAR 
AFTER 2011 0 25 mins
Face to Face 
in Private 
Room 
in Library
Suzanne 
BALESTER MOROCCAN F 46 O-LEVELS BA STUDENT WORKING BRITISH WHITE MOROCCAN
BLACK 
AFRICAN YES
1990, 
DIVORCED 
AFTER 4 
YEARS 1 48 mins
Face to face 
in
Public Caf
Kayla 
BRACKENBURY ZIMBABWEAN F 28 BSc NURSE MIDDLE
BRITISH/ 
ZIMBABWEAN BLACK BRITISH WHITE YES 2010 0 72 mins
Face to Face
Participant's 
Home
Lynsey 
BRIDGER KASHMIRI F 40
PGCCE, 
MA
EDUCATION 
MANAGEMENT WORKING BRITISH WHITE
BRITISH 
BORN, 
KASHMIRI
KASHMIRI 
MUSLIM NO 1989 2 50 mins
Face to Face
Private Room
in Business
Hub building
Bryony 
CHIAMAKA NIGERIAN F 70 BA
RETIRED BANK
QUALITY
FACILITATOR 
WORKING/
MIDDLE BRITISH WHITE
NIGERIAN/
BRITISH
BLACK 
AFRICAN YES 1965 3 117 mins Skype
Sophie 
CLARKE ITALIAN F 29 BA TEACHER MIDDLE
BRITISH
(ITALIAN 
HERITAGE) WHITE BRITISH WHITE YES 2010 0 39 mins
Face to Face 
in
Public Caf
Ailsa 
CZERNIAK POLISH F 65 NVQ
CHEMIST 
COUNTER
ASSISTANT MIDDLE BRITISH WHITE
SCOTTISH/
POLISH WHITE YES 1968 1 35 mins
Face to Face
Public Sports 
Hall
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Naze 
EDGERLEY N/A M 21 A-LEVELS STUDENT WORKING BRITISH
MIXED - 
WHITE/
BLACK 
AFRICAN N/A N/A
NOT 
MARRIED & 
HASN'T 
CHANGED 
NAME N/A 0 53 mins Phone
Katia 
EVANS POLISH F 39 PGCE TEACHER MIDDLE
BRITISH
(POLISH 
PARENTS) WHITE BRITISH WHITE YES 2004 YES 53 mins
Face to face 
in
Public Caf
Jamal Hassan 
HAMDAOUI ARABIC M 31 HND, BSc
BA STUDENT, 
CHEF,
MUSIC 
TEACHER
WORKING/
MIDDLE BRITISH
OTHER 
(MIXED) N/A N/A
NOT 
MARRIED, 
BUT 
CHANGED 
NAME AT 
ABOUT
AGE 20 N/A 0 148 mins Phone
Chloe HARDY-
MATHIESEN NORWEGIAN F 37 BA
STUDENT - 
IT 
PROF. MIDDLE BRITISH WHITE NORWEGIAN WHITE YES 2009 0 96 mins Skype
Lars HARDY-
MATHIESEN NORWEGIAN M 24 A-LEVELS STUDENT MIDDLE NORWEGIAN WHITE BRITISH WHITE
YES, 
BEFORE 
MARRIAGE 2009 0 N/A
Written 
Response
to Questions
Sally 
HASANI ALBANIAN F 34 MA
POST-GRAD 
STUDENT WORKING BRITISH WHITE
BRITISH/
ALBANIAN
WHITE 
OTHER YES 2002 2 36 mins Phone
Amy 
JAMMEH GAMBIAN F 47
BA, MA 
NEARLY
COMPLETE
D
CIVIL 
SERVANT,
HEALTH 
MANAGER MIDDLE BRITISH WHITE GAMBIAN
BLACK 
AFRICAN
YES, 
WHEN
CHILD 
BORN 2005 1 59 mins
Face to Face
Private Room 
in 
Participant's
Work Place
Abigail 
KOSLACZ POLISH F 41 QTS TEACHER WORKING BRITISH WHITE
BRITISH 
(POLISH 
HERITAGE) WHITE YES 2007 0 40 mins
Face to Face
Public Sports 
Hall
Charlotte 
LEARY ZIMBABWEAN F 35
ACCA Part
Qual + BA
FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTANT MIDDLE
ZIMBABWEAN/
BRITISH BLACK IRISH WHITE YES 1999 2 32 mins Phone
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Jenny 
LEGRIS MAURITIAN F 54 PGCE TEACHER UPPER MIDDLE BRITISH WHITE MAURITIAN ASIAN YES 1984 3 104 mins Skype
Alice 
MELISSINOS GREEK F 67 ECDL
RETIRED 
FROM 
NON/SEMI-
SKILLED
JOBS MIDDLE BRITISH WHITE
BRITISH/
CYPRIOT WHITE YES 1965 YES 47 mins Phone
Mandy 
MUNDRA INDIAN F 55
City & Guilds 
Hairdressing 
& Operation 
Department 
Qualfs
SHOP 
OWNER/
SELF-
EMPLOYED MIDDLE BRITISH WHITE INDIAN INDIAN YES 1986 2 11 mins
Face to Face
Private Room 
in 
Participant's
Work Place
Elinor 
MURLEY
SPANISH/
PERUVIAN F 32 PHD ACADEMIC MIDDLE SCOTTISH WHITE
BRITISH/
PERUVIAN
SOUTH/
LATIN 
AMERICAN
ONLY 
FOR 
GP 
SURGERY 2003 0 83 mins
Face to Face
Private Room 
in 
Participant's
Work Place
Natalie 
MUSTAPIĆ CROATIAN F 47
PHD / QUAL. 
SOLICITOR ACADEMIC
MIDDLE/
UPPER-MIDDLE BRITISH WHITE
BRITISH/
CROATIAN 
WHITE
OTHER YES 1996 2 48 mins
Face to Face
Private Room 
in 
Participant's
Work Place
Claire 
NEGEV
ISRAELI/
HEBREW F 38 GCSEs
FULL-TIME 
PARENT MIDDLE BRITISH WHITE
ISRAELI/
BRITISH
WHITE 
OTHER YES 1995 3 41 mins Phone
Victoria 
RAVANBAKSH
IRANIAN/
PERSIAN F 45 PhD
ABORO-
CULTURE, 
RETAIL
WORKING-
MIDDLE
BRITISH/
IRANIAN WHITE
BRITISH/
IRANIAN
IRANIAN/
PERSIAN
YES, BUT 
NOT 
INITIALLY 1989 2 62 mins
Face to Face
in Private 
Room in 
Library
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Carol 
SIDIBEH GAMBIAN F 66 NONE
RETAIL 
MANAGER/
WORKER WORKING ENGLISH WHITE
BRITISH/
GAMBIAN
BLACK 
BRITISH YES 2004
3 -FROM 
PREV. 
MARRIAGE 54 mins
Face to face 
in
Public Caf
Marion 
STAMATIS GREEK F 61 PGCE
ARTIST, 
WRITER
MIDDLE, 
WAS
WORKING BRITISH WHITE
GREEK/
BRITISH WHITE
YES, 
AFTER
11 YEARS 1981 1 94 mins
Face to face 
in
Public Caf
Rebecca 
TRAVERS POLISH F 49 MASTERS PHD STUDENT WORKING BRITISH WHITE
BRITISH/
POLISH
WHITE 
OTHER
YES,  
BUT NOW 
DIVORCED
1987, 
DIVORCED 
AFTER
 4 YEARS 0 47 mins
Face to Face
in Semi-Public
University 
Building
Rose 
URZICA ROMANIAN F 62 BA
CULTURAL 
CONSULTANT MIDDLE BRITISH
WHITE 
EUROPEAN
BRITISH/
ROMANIAN
WHITE 
EUROPEAN YES 1994 102 mins
Face to Face
Participant's 
Home
Beth 
VILLIERS DUTCH F 33 MA PHD STUDENT MIDDLE BRITISH WHITE DUTCH WHITE NO 2007 1 25 mins
Face to Face 
in Private 
Room in 
Library
MARIANNE 
WATSON CHINESE F 27 DIPLOMA
COMPLIANCE 
OFFICER WORKING MALAISIAN CHINESE BRITISH WHITE
YES, BUT 
AFTER 2 
YEARS 2006 2 78 mins Phone
Nicola 
ZHEUNG CHINESE F 33 MA IT MANAGER MIDDLE BRITISH WHITE BRITISH CHINESE YES 2006 0 63 mins Phone
 APPENDIX TWO: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
How long ago did you get married? 
 
Have you changed your surname to your partnerÕs upon marriage? 
 
Was this a decision you thought about a lot? 
 
For those who changed their name 
 
When did you change your surname? 
 
Why did you change your surname? 
 
What is your new surname? What racial/national/ethnic associations  
do you think this name has (if any)? 
 
What was your surname before you changed it? What  
racial/national/ethnic associations do you think this name has (if any)? 
 
What were your feelings towards your new surname before you  
changed it? Have these feelings changed now?  
 
What does your new surname symbolise/represent to  
you (e.g. nationality/colour/accent…)? Has this changed?  
 
How about your previous name? What did/does that represent/ 
symbolise  
to you? 
 
What do you think your old/new surnames symbolise to others? 
 
How have your family members/friends reacted to your name change? 
 
How did your work colleagues react to your name change? 
 
Has your circle of friends changed after youÕve changed your surname  
and do you feel like members of the ÔraceÕ/ethnic minority associated 
 with your adopted (ethnic minority) surname have embraced you/been  
more friendly towards you as a consequence of changing your name? 
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If have children: How do you feel about naming your children?  
Have you/would you give them your new surname? How do you  
feel about making this decision? 
 
If have talked about discrimination:  
Have you considered changing your name back to your former  
surname? 
 
Do you think some surnames are more advantageous than others?  
E.g. in work/life opportunities? 
 
How do you think name discrimination compares to  
discrimination based on appearance (e.g. skin colour) or accent,  
nationality etc. in the UK context? 
 
For those who did not change their name 
 
Why did you decide not to change your surname? 
 
What would have been your new surname? What  
racial/national/ethnic associations do you think this name has (if any)? 
 
What is your current surname? What racial/national/ethnic  
associations do you think this name has (if any)? 
 
What does your current surname symbolise/represent to you? 
 
What does your spouseÕs surname symbolise/represent to you? 
 
How have your spouse/family members/friends/work colleagues  
etc. responded to your decision not to change your name? 
 
How do you and your spouse feel about the name choice for  
your (potential) children? Would you consider giving them your  
spouseÕs name? 
 
Do you think some surnames are discriminated against? If so,  
how does this compare to other markers of discrimination e.g.  
skin colour, accent, discriminations etc.? 
